Paul Kerr warns that the uneasy relation between Thailand and Myanmar could unsettle the overall stability of ASEAN and hamper its ability to pursue more important regional goals such as instituting ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). He suggests that ASEAN should avoid getting directly involved in resolving the bilateral disputes and that a third party, such as Australia or the United States, should act as a mediator instead.

Paul Kerr is a Research Analyst in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research interests include Southeast Asian security issues, biological warfare, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and globalization issues. Mr. Kerr holds an MA degree in International Studies from the University of South Carolina and a BA degree in History from the University of Vermont.

ASEAN's decision to expand its membership by admitting Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1998 raised concerns among many regional observers. They argued that the disparate geo-political and economic interests of the new member states would disrupt ASEAN's cohesion. The economic crisis of 1997 did not help matters, leaving most ASEAN members in recession and forcing them to concentrate most of their energy on domestic problems. Furthermore, foreign direct investment from the other ASEAN members, one of the most enticing benefits sought by the new members, dried up after the crisis. ASEAN suddenly had to implement an already difficult project of integrating new members under much less forgiving conditions.

The admission of Myanmar has been especially problematic for intra-ASEAN relations. Yangon's human rights record, its cozy relationship with China, and its occasional conflicts with some of the other ASEAN members have all made Myanmar a potential source of friction among the ASEAN nations. The most contentious of these conflicts is the border dispute between Myanmar and Thailand. The border is difficult to police, and has become an easy passage for the massive number of migrating refugees and drug trade. Thailand is deeply concerned with the involvement in the drug trade by several insurgent groups, especially after one of them was involved in two high-profile security crises in 1999 and 2000. A border that has been a source of dispute for a long time-and has yet to be demarcated-only adds to the volatility of the situation.

This article argues that the disagreements between Thailand and Myanmar could seriously deteriorate in the near to medium term, jeopardizing ASEAN's cohesion. This would have serious consequences for the security environment of the rest of the region. Not only are the two states more prone to conflict than any other nations in ASEAN, but the issues over which the two nations differ are especially likely to cause rifts within ASEAN itself.

The first section of this article contends that ASEAN's cohesion is of paramount importance for regional peace and stability in the years to come. The second section examines the sources of tension on the Thailand-Myanmar border, focusing on drug trafficking, refugee problems and territorial disputes. The third section discusses how these issues affect ASEAN's cohesion as a whole. The conclusion section evaluates the future prospect of Thai-Myanmar relation and makes some brief recommendations.

ASEAN'S TASK: STAY FOCUSED

The ASEAN nations have much to prove in the years ahead as ASEAN faces a credibility problem. Observers are closely monitoring how the organization manages its membership expansion and deals with the problems in the region. ASEAN has never demonstrated its ability to react promptly to crises. Yet many observers, as well as ASEAN members, believe that it must learn to do so if it is to remain a credible regional organization. For example, ASEAN's inability to handle the 1997 financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession raised doubts about ASEAN's effectiveness as a regional organization and its capacity to maintain its cohesion. One of the main incentives for ASEAN countries to cooperate has been the region's economic growth. Recovery and growth remain uncertain for many member countries, and it is unsure whether ASEAN can stay on its path to ensure financial stability for the region. ASEAN's effectiveness as a regional organization will play an important role as it attempts to shore up investor confidence. Maintaining stability in the South China Sea is another important task for ASEAN. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Islands which could provoke military and diplomatic conflicts. These are motivated by sovereignty claims as well as the potential energy reserves underlying them. While the risk of escalating conflict among the ASEAN nations over these islands is low, a true multilateral solution will require China's participation. China's true intentions for these islands are a subject of intense debate. Yet it is certain that a strong ASEAN is necessary for continuing its current strategy of engaging the PRC in a variety of different forums (such as the ASEAN + 3 summits and the ASEAN Regional Forum) to provide incentives to Beijing to cooperate with the other regional powers.

ASEAN has been a force for stability in Southeast Asia in recent years, demonstrating an ability to manage conflicts through a unique process often referred to as the "ASEAN Way". This process eschews formal institution building in favor of dialogue and consensus building to resolve tensions gradually. Graham Smith, a Canadian diplomat, suggested that

ASEAN had found that intensive personal interaction paid major dividends in advancing policy objectives and in working out or putting aside differences. Far better for delegation leaders to meet informally and privately beforehand, preferably during a meal and golf as the Asians prefer, in order to avoid isolating one party.

However, this informal process has its downside. Without any truly formal mechanisms to resolve bilateral tensions, there is the danger that tensions such as those between Thailand and Myanmar could cause serious friction among ASEAN members and disrupt the informal cooperation that has been essential to past successes. The ASEAN process was built on trust developed over a period of time. The greater the tensions between members, the less able the members will be to cooperate and take action. Protracted arguments within ASEAN deliberations could impede the Association's ability to formulate unified positions on important regional issues such as AFTA, the South China Sea, the ASEAN Investment Area, and the monitoring of members' financial situations (a scheme designed to provide early warning about potential financial meltdowns).

SOURCES OF TENSION

Many observers view the Thailand-Myanmar border as a hotspot. Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai described his country's security concerns in Asiaweek as follows

[W]hen we talk about security we have to talk about other problems, for instance, illegal immigrants and minorities fleeing from fighting in neighboring countries. Then there is the problem of drugs manufactured in neighboring countries, smuggled into Thailand.

Although he added that Thailand and Myanmar are "not enemies," these tensions can certainly escalate, at least on the diplomatic level.

1. Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking across the border has become one of the primary concerns for Bangkok. While opium and heroin from the Golden Triangle Area spanning Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar have long been a concern for ASEAN and the United States, the Thai government is especially concerned with the more recent trafficking in methamphetamines. The Thai press has made numerous references to an epidemic of methamphetamine addiction throughout the country, a phenomenon that has led the public and military to call for increased interdiction.

The principle traffickers are reported to be the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the strongest group of minority insurgents within Myanmar, which is currently in a cease-fire agreement with the government. The government in Yangon is widely viewed as having turned a blind eye to drug trafficking and has actually encouraged the drug traffickers' role as proxy fighters against other indigenous groups, especially the Shan State Army. For example, the March 2000 Jane's Intelligence Review reported that Myanmar's military encouraged the UWSA's takeover of several border strongholds from the opium warlord Khun Sa in the mid-1990s. The Wa are also seen to provide an effective counter-weight to Thailand (some within the military still view the Thais as enemies). Furthermore, the prosperity that drug money has brought to some sectors of Myanmar's economy is difficult for an impoverished state to turn down.

The increasing power of the UWSA is arousing causing concern in Bangkok. Drug money is reportedly increasing their military power. Additionally, the Wa forces have started a major development program in the Mong Yawn Valley bordering the Thai province of Chiang Mai, constructing new roads, dams, telephone lines, and other infrastructure, as well as planting crops and importing domesticated animals. Arousing even greater suspicion in Bangkok is the relocation of thousands of Wa and ethnic Chinese people to the border region (the population is predicted to grow to 120,000, according to JIR). Although the UWSA and Yangon are spinning the relocation scheme as a narcotics control effort necessitated by the failure of crop substitution efforts, regional observers remain skeptical about the sincerity of their purported motive.

Bangkok is also concerned about the growing presence of Chinese political advisors in the border region. There may be benign explanations for their presence, including a genuine concern for drug trafficking in the PRC, as well as the need for accurate intelligence on the activities of Taiwan military advisers and intelligence officers in the region. However, Bangkok worries that China's presence could produce a diplomatic crossfire between Taipei and Beijing as Thailand attempts to resolve the fate of the people in former Chinese Nationalist communities who reside within its borders but are not yet Thai citizens.

There are signs that the civilian and military leaderships are growing impatient with the situation. JIR reported that General Boonlert Kaewprasit, head of the Royal Thai Army's Narcotics Suppression Committee, described the border situation in February 2000 as "quite critical...[with] decisive action inevitable" during a troop inspection. He is also said to have called for more aggressive military actions against drug smugglers, including strikes into Myanmar. Worse still, Myanmar has made counter-accusations that Thailand has allowed the Shan State Army and the Wa National Army, both allegedly involved in the drug trade, to operate on Thai soil.

2. Refugees

The movement of refugees across the border has also contributed to bilateral tensions. Refugees come from Myanmar to Thailand to seek employment and escape fighting among the various insurgent groups. The Thai government expelled many of its migrant workers and refugees in the wake of the 1997 economic crash, but with limited success. Many workers and refugees are caught in a bind as they face government persecution as soon as they return, which drives them back into Thailand. Clashes between the Myanmar military and the Karen ethnic minority during the spring and summer of 2000 produced periodic flows of refugees into Thailand, further exacerbating the situation as victims of the fighting sought refuge across the border. This raises a whole host of humanitarian concerns as many live precarious lives on the edge of the law, turning to prostitution and other crimes to survive.

Two high-profile incidents indicate that the refugee problem can have serious consequences for bilateral relations. In October 1999 a group of Karen students took over Myanmar's embassy in Thailand. Although the situation was resolved peacefully and the students were taken to the border and released, the Myanmar military junta was dissatisfied that the students were not dealt with more harshly (one Thai official referred to them as "student activists"). To manifest its dissatisfaction, Myanmar closed all of the main border crossing points from October to December 1999. The second incident occurred in January 2000 when Karen guerrillas took hundreds of hostages in a provincial hospital in Thailand. The siege ended when Thai forces killed all 10 intruders with no hostage casualties. It was now the Thai citizens' turn to be outraged and call for stronger border security-a call that could incite the Thai military to action.

3. Territorial Disputes

Though posing less of an imminent threat than the issues discussed above, lingering territorial disputes could resurface if relations between the two countries continues to deteriorate. Tension could easily escalate from these territorial disputes as less than 3% of the border has been demarcated. Myanmar's building of embankments on the Moei River and construction of shops along the border by the Thais have resulted in protests by the governments of both countries. Additionally, Yangon has accused the Thai military of aiding the Karen National Union in assaults on government troops. There are also disputes over territorial waters on the seas off Thailand. In one incident in January 1999, the Myanmar government accused a Thai naval vessel of firing at one of its naval ships.

ASEAN'S EFFECTIVENESS

The bilateral tensions could escalate into regional problems for two reasons. First, ASEAN has placed these issues on its agenda. For example, it has accelerated the deadline for establishing a drug-free area from 2020 to 2015. Second, Thailand is especially concerned about these issues and has demonstrated a propensity to involve ASEAN in matters that had previously been off-limits.

Disputes between older members of ASEAN such as Singapore and Malaysia would not cause so much concern. There are certainly areas of disagreement between the two countries, but the two are long time members of ASEAN with stable leaders who have a track record of working out their differences peacefully. However, the situation between Bangkok and Yangon is different in several important ways.

Thailand is a venerable founding member of ASEAN, while Myanmar is a newly admitted partner whose pariah state status has not changed significantly since 1997. Myanmar signals its desire to keep its domestic issues off the table, seeking to benefit economically from ASEAN membership while reluctant to make any significant concessions in the area of political reform. Thailand, in contrast, has been the leader in promoting the policy of "flexible engagement." This policy would allow some flexibility in the interpretation of the principle of non-interference in other members' internal affairs, which has long been a part of the ASEAN Way. Under this policy, ASEAN members are allowed to criticize or advise other member nations that have internal problems with transboundary effects. While flexible engagement was rejected at the 1998 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the concept of an ASEAN "Troika" to deal with regional conflicts was adopted in July 2000. The Troika will be made up of the foreign ministers from three ASEAN countries and will deal with events that threaten peace or security within the region. It will not have decision-making power-only the ability to deliver recommendations to the other Association members.

The division between Thailand and Myanmar was evident during deliberations on the establishment of the Troika. Thailand's position on flexible engagement suggests that it is willing to broach the principle of non-interference. This is especially true because the Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan stated in July 2000 that issues such as drug trafficking and refugees are not purely domestic. Flexible engagement would also open the door for Thai involvement in Myanmar's treatment of its Karen minority, as Karen refugees are putting considerable pressure on Thailand's society and economy. Myanmar is accused of committing numerous atrocities against the Karen in its efforts to control them. Not only have these atrocities brought condemnation from Western countries, they have also incited widespread protests against Myanmar's admission to ASEAN.

Escalating tensions between the two countries could lead to the following scenario: an issue (e.g. drug trafficking) is raised in an ASEAN forum. Bangkok calls for multilateral action, branding the issue a threat to regional security. Yangon cries foul, citing the principles of non-interference and unanimity in decision-making. This process causes rifts within ASEAN as members take sides over the issue, crowding out the other important items on ASEAN's agenda and leading to a decline in ASEAN credibility. However, the failure to address an issue such as drug trafficking could also damage ASEAN's credibility, since the organization has declared the issue to be of primary importance.

CONCLUSION

There has been no shortage of reports predicting ASEAN's demise during the last few years. This article does not intend to add to them. While tension between Myanmar and Thailand will not be completely eased, the key is to keep their disagreements at a manageable level. There are some positive signs of peace between the two governments. Disagreements between the two countries have not yet reached the point where they have led to permanent border closings or serious military clashes. The two governments have also taken some steps to resolve their border disputes. For example, they established a permanent technical committee in 1999 to oversee construction projects along the Moei and Salween rivers and have negotiated to demarcate the border between them.

Increasing trade between Myanmar and the rest of ASEAN is also encouraging because Myanmar's central motivation to join ASEAN was economic benefit. Foreign investment and trade should increase as the region continues to recover from the economic crisis. And expanding trade ties provide an incentive for the two governments to keep their common border open. Since sealing the border and tolerating the status quo are undesirable options, the two may be motivated by economic gain to resolve their differences peacefully.

There are also other incentives for the two governments to settle their differences. The expense of maintaining armed troops to conduct counter-narcotics operations and guard against invasion is high. Furthermore, the corruption among government officials that permits the trade in drugs and human beings to flourish is a drag on more productive economic activities and a deterrent to badly needed foreign investment. Such corruption also undermines the legitimacy of the governments in both Bangkok and Yangon.

Yangon may need to rethink its tacit support for the UWSA. The fragile nature of the cease-fire with the Wa means that an increasingly powerful UWSA could threaten the stability of the government, which is already spending a great deal of time and effort coping with other insurgent groups. Withdrawing support for the UWSA can help to strengthen the Yangon government. A stronger central government, in turn, may be better equipped to resist PRC influence that is detrimental to its stability and drives a wedge between Myanmar and its ASEAN partners.

Unfortunately, the obstacles to success are formidable. Corruption is endemic on both sides and is notoriously difficult to root out. Officials on the take allow much of the trade in drugs and other contraband to flourish. With respect to drug trafficking, more time needs to pass before one can be certain if Yangon is serious about its counter-narcotics efforts. Negotiations to demarcate the border have proceeded fitfully. However, there are limits to what Myanmar's central government can accomplish; it has obviously had difficulty dealing with insurgents groups. The increased influence of the PRC may also dissuade the Junta from cracking down on the UWSA.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although ASEAN has placed cross-border issues on its agenda, the situation between Myanmar and Thailand is too volatile for its present capabilities. The ideal outcome would be to facilitate bilateral solutions to the issues between these two countries. The risks to the rest of the Association are minimized if ASEAN has to settle as few problems as possible. If these issues do proceed to the multilateral level, there is the potential that ASEAN will be forced to proceed too fast and accommodate a number of contentious issues at a time when it can ill afford to be distracted from important regional issues. It is important to keep these bilateral issues from disrupting ASEAN's cohesion and ability to act on the rest of its agenda. Developing a comprehensive policy solution is beyond the scope of this piece, but the following suggestions may be useful.

A non-ASEAN third party may be able to assist Thailand and Myanmar in resolving their border disputes. For example, Australia or the United States could serve as the mediator, and the United States could offer to ease economic sanctions if Myanmar cooperates. It is difficult to know whether the two would agree to such a proposal. However, Bangkok has indicated a willingness to handle some of its border issues in a multilateral fashion, and Myanmar has at least nominally agreed to the same, especially in the areas of narcotics trafficking and refugees. Demarcating the border would remove one source of tension and shore up confidence in the two countries' stability. The third party mediator could also encourage Yangon to negotiate a cease-fire with its insurgent groups. While Myanmar resents interference in its internal affairs, it has already given a form of autonomy to some of its ethnic minorities. An end to the violence between these groups and the government must be part of a long-term solution to the refugee crisis.

Ultimately, the only long-term solution to the two countries' problems is for Myanmar to become more actively engaged in the regional community. The growth of a legitimate economy would decrease its dependence on narcotics money and provide more economic opportunities for people who would otherwise journey to Thailand for work. Economic recovery and growth in Thailand after the economic crisis would also help it accommodate refugees and decrease the domestic pressure on the government to eject migrants as it did in the wake of the 1997 crisis. ASEAN as a whole can aid this effort by continuing to strengthen the AIA, AFTA, and other measures to facilitate the region's economic recovery.

The two countries need to be serious about dealing with the root causes of their border problems, such as corruption. They also need to make efforts to distribute the benefits of economic growth to the countryside so as to decrease the need for narcotics production and to stop the refugee flow. Admittedly, these are tall orders, but small efforts now may reduce bilateral tensions and may better enable ASEAN to ameliorate these problems in the future.