Dai Qing argues that China still has not escaped from the mode of collective society of the previous eras. On the one hand, thousands of Falungong believers gathered together on the basis of the traditional "cultivation of life" and worshipped their master devotedly. On the other hand, the dictatorial ruling regime, the Chinese Communist Party, deployed the usual tactic of suppression against Falungong. Neither side behaved in a way that demonstrated the traits of a modern society. This event became the largest conflict against China’s transition toward modernity in the new century. This article is based on her lecture at the Fairbank Center, Harvard University on November 18, 1999.

Dai Qing is a renowned intellectual who currently resides in Beijing. She has shared her views on human rights, democracy, and environmentalism with audiences both in China and in the West.

Today, I wish to express my views on the Falungong movement, its members, its inception and development, the social and cultural background against which it was formed, and its relations to the current Chinese economy and political structure. These opinions are not delivered from the perspective of a sociologist, a cultural anthropologist, a political scientist, or a scholar of religions. They are also not based upon reliable research conducted by a journalist. Rather, they are merely the views of someone living in Beijing, among members of the Falungong organization, among many who have lost their religious beliefs, their social livelihoods, and their medical insurance. They are the perceptions of an independent observer living among those common people who are oppressed by the authority and by loyal adherents to the authority.

1. The topics of this lecture are many, and include:
2. Political authority and religion.
3. What is the Falungong movement?
4. What are the long-term and short-term reasons for its emergence?
5. The structure of Chinese politics and culture.
6. Finally, I hope that all the patriots and friends of China will support the gradual transformation of the country and resist those who attempt to exploit the well-founded discontent and demands of the public to satiate their own desires for wealth and power.

About a week ago, more than one hundred members of the Falungong were arrested. Since then, another ten or so adherents to the organization who were protesting at Tiananmen Square were seized by the police. The sympathy of nearly all in the international community rests with the Falungong. This is because judging from the behavior of both the government and the Falungong members, it is fair to say that the former has been at fault. The latter, including those who were at Tiananmen Square and Zhongnanhai, seem to have done nothing wrong.

What the government has done violated the Constitutional provisions that prescribe both religious freedom and the freedom of assembly. The government declared this civilian organization a cult through executive agencies and orders. The law enforcement violated the abolition by the National People’s Congress of the "investigation after arrest" system and arrested members of the movement at will. The prosecutor's offices and the courts have convicted these members based upon retroactive judgments and legislation.

Since August 1999, the adherents of the central authority took the initiative in targeting members of the organization. They undertook a variety of measures to dissolve the organization and to persecute its members. The general feeling in Beijing is that another Cultural Revolution has arrived. The method of the Cultural Revolution was one by which the government, through its complete control of the media and through military force, employed the vehicle of denunciation to eliminate its dissenters. For scholars and those who are genuinely concerned about China's political development and reforms, this represents a heart-wrenching regression from the gradual institution of the rule of law, spearheaded by the various speakers of the NPC, such as Wan Li, Qiao Shi, Li Peng, and even Ye Jiangying in the 1970s, back to the rampant lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution.

We all know that the Chinese Communist Party still insists on one-party rule, on full allegiance of the army to the Party, on complete control over the media, and on writing into the Constitution the "Four Cardinal Principles," which even the Party leaders and followers themselves do not fully support. But this evil and bloodstained Party has already moved beyond the autocratic and autarkic time of Mao Zedong, and is slowly moving beyond the semi-autocratic age of Deng Xiaopeng. Impelled not only by the need to adapt to the political reality of the country and the international community, but also by the demands for reform by the Chinese people and by reformers within the Party, the Communist Party has been carrying out reforms and learning to adjust to the open world. However, we all have seen clearly that the process has been furtive, vacillating, and plagued by corruption and lack of progress.

We know that the political system in China has made immense progress over the last twenty years of reform. Yet the obstacles and the setbacks have been equally discouraging. Indisputably, the greatest setback took place ten years ago on Tiananmen Square, when the government employed military force against the student protesters. The vacillating Communist Party reverted to the familiar mode of autocratic rule and took up the old practice of media censorship. Party control was again intensified, and reformers were expelled from the Party. A market and capitalist system that was dominated by corruption (open embezzlement of public funds) gradually took hold.

If the tension between the government and the Falungong is not alleviated, no one knows how many setbacks to reform China will suffer. But if we, including Falungong members, Chinese business entrepreneurs, government officials, politicians from America and the rest of the world, and even you and I, who are seemingly unrelated to the incident, simply sit back and take no action, or take wrong actions, the situation will surely deteriorate to the worst. One possibility is that the Chinese government will again attempt to centralize power, increase its military capacity, and set on a path towards military fascism. Equally worrisome is the likelihood of the Chinese government losing control over the country, exacerbating income disparity, creating domestic chaos, and splintering the country into warring regions. In the end, under increasing pressure from environmental destruction, depletion of natural resources, and decay of morality, the only way to stop the chaos will be to impose international rule on this ancient civilization.

How did the immense social tension and the insecure political authority come about? Did the government seek, from the very beginning, to crush the organization which "only sought to give and not to take, had a miraculous effect on health, emphasized the cultivation of character, contributed to spiritual civilization, had a decentralized structure, sought to avoid politics, and facilitated the exchange between Chinese and foreign culture"? Had the government always attempted to crush Falungong--a loosely managed organization that claims more than one hundred million members, including army veterans, old revolutionaries, old Party members, children, primary school students, secondary school students, college students, master's degree holders, doctorate degree holders, scholars, blue collar workers, farmers, and even millionaires?

From the perspective of someone who has been living outside of China and who has never attended Falungong meetings, the emergence and development of the movement can be divided into several phases.

1. Tolerance (at least superficially)
2. Conflict
3. Suppression and resistance

The resistance grows stronger as the suppression intensifies. However, the suppression and resistance have been relatively mild and restrained up to this point.

The History of the Falungong Movement

The Falungong Movement can be divided into several developmental stages.

1. Emergence: Early 1980s to 1992 (10 years). Qigong gradually became popular in China, sparking many public demonstrations and debates concerning the practice.
2. Early Development Stage: Mid-1992 to late-1994 (Two and a half years).
3. Rapid Development Stage: 1994 to 1999 (Four and a half years).
4. Conflict: April 25th, 1999 (One day).
5. The last two three-month periods:

1st (April to July, 1999): Stand-off, restraint exercised by both sides.

During the early years of 1982-1992, different branches of qigong rapidly took hold across China. Groups like Xianggong and E’meizhuang emerged, led by leaders like Yan Xin and Zhang Baosheng. Author He Yunlu befriended the leader of these branches and became their spokesperson, thereby popularizing qigong. Falungong was formed subsequently, but was later accepted into and registered at the Chinese qigong Association. The movement then experienced a period of steady development from May, 1992 to December 1994. It then entered a phase of rapid growth from December 1994 to 1999, after the publication of Zhuanfalun, the premier text of the movement.

During these two stages, Falungong has amassed more then one hundred million followers. But apart from its rapid development and emphasis on master worship, there were no noticeable differences between it and other traditional Chinese methods of health enhancement. The Communist Party paid it no special attention. A reliable source claims that until April 22, 1999, two days before its followers besieged Zhongnanhai, the official stance towards Falungong was "No propaganda. No reporting. No criticism. No organization." Everyone knows that the Communist Party insists on maintaining direct control over society. As far as imposing "regular control" over a civilian organization is concerned, the Party had dealt with Christian groups in a more brutal and protracted manner than it had with the Falungong. The treatment of Christian groups is motivated by fear of the multitude of their members. Indeed, it is said that there are more Christians than Communist Party members in the southern province of Guangdong.

Under this scheme of "regular control," the Falungong avoided harsh suppression. According to its members, the only measures taken by the Party up until April 25, 1999 were the publication of an article criticizing the movement in the Enlightenment Daily (Guangming Ribao) and the release of a document prohibiting the publication of Zhuanfalun by the News Publication Department. The criticisms by the famed three scholars, who are widely characterized as being at war with the qigong followers, were regarded as personal opinions, and did not represent the official stance of the Party.

By 1997, Li Hongzhi, the leader of the organization, was earning an annual income of more than RMB 10,000,000. From this we can infer that the organization had been quite leniently regulated. I myself have been subjected to a lot of criticism in state-controlled media since 1989. My works have been banned by the News Publication Department. And I have earned less than RMB 1,000 from the publications of three of my works. The article in the official People's Daily criticizing Falungong described the income of Li and other leaders of the organization as having been obtained through illicit means. I disagree. Falungong members purchased numerous copies of Zhuanfalun, a variety of pictures of Li (framed or unframed, gold plated or not gold plated, etc), and made voluntary donations to their exercise classes. Li's income is more legitimate than those of corrupt government officials and those earned by Mao from his publications. Indeed, Mao's books were forced upon the people through the elimination of publications by other authors.

We now know that on the day of April 25, 1999, some ten thousand Falungong believers from Beijing and other provinces suddenly convened outside of the Zhongnanhai compound to collectively voice their opinions. They came and went without any warning, exhibited a high level of discipline, and disappeared without a trace under one single command. At that time, Zhu Rongji, the Premier of China, represented the government in his dealings with the protestors. He met with the leaders of the demonstration and listened as they voiced their opinions. He said the government understood their concerns and urged them to disband the demonstration. Everything seemed normal, but unfortunately, according to later internal party circulars, Mr. Zhu truly lacked a sense of struggle. Jiang Zemin, the party secretary, had himself a much higher level of class vigilance. According to internal party circulars, Jiang Zemin spent the night writing letters to fellow Politburo members in order to end the inaction of his underlings and to convey his shock at the effectiveness and organizational capacity of the Falungong.

We have also gained a certain understanding of what occurred on that day from the frank confessions of some of the arrested followers of Li Hongzhi and from the post facto evaluation of Li himself. Li Hongzhi complained that the demonstration on April 25 retreated too early. His followers did not undergo a true test. He thought it would have been great for his followers to shed some blood on that day. When he made these statements, he had just safely arrived at Hong Kong. Afterwards, he returned to his private home in Long Island. He hid all of this, including his secret trip to Beijing before the demonstration, from his followers.

Now, we only see mutual accusations by the propagandists on both sides and have not witnessed the publication of real material about Falungong. According to logical deduction, one can guess that in a three month period (between April and July), the CCP had discussed the thorny issue of whether to continue the lax "Four No" policy or to suppress the Falungong immediately. The Party ended up doing nothing because it did not know how to approach and act on this issue. One can see that the Party was on the verge of panic. Hence, similar demonstrations at newspaper and government offices occurred several times across the country.

This situation was very similar to the great demonstrations on April 27, 1989 and the situation after then Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s speech on May 4. At that time, the concessions made by the government and the patience of the government, in terms of its tradition of preserving party unity, had reached a limit. However, a considerable group of Beijing and outside students were not satisfied and did not want to quit. So, the result was June 4.

Up to this day, Li Hongzhi still insists that Falungong has neither organizational nor political goals. He claims he has never crossed paths with politics and was merely teaching his followers how to practice their art. Most Falungong followers, especially those loyal cadres in his organization, persisted in worshipping and defending their teacher, Li Hongzhi. These followers thought that the best way to avoid governmental trouble and to provide a safe practice environment for all followers was to move Li to another country.

But, I don't see it this way.

I do not believe Li Hongzhi’s claims. This is not because I have any quarrels with this former PLA soldier who modified his own "reincarnation" date. I do not believe him only because I have 50 years of experience in Communist China; because I once believed in Mao Zedong’s promises before winning the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) that he wanted democracy, freedom, and a government for the people; also because I once believed in the desires of radical student leaders in 1989 for democracy, liberty, rationality, and peace. In the end, I knew they all wanted their followers to donate their zeal, belief, property, future, and even their lives so that they themselves would receive the power and material luxury they so sought. Or they could enjoy a protected and relaxed exile if they lost the fight in China.

Let us analyze Li Hongzhi’s behavior in these three months (between April and July). I am not a practitioner of Falungong, so I have never attended any of its gatherings or internal discussions. I merely speak from the events I observe. Li had intentionally planned for the demonstration on April 25. He specially flew to Beijing to arrange this but tried to hide this fact afterward. Why? First, we should try to examine whether this was necessary. If it was necessary, for whom and for what purpose was it so?

Up to April 25, the only national decree against the Falungong had been the ban against the publication of Zhuanfalun issued by the Bureau of News Publication. This ban was also the only complaint believers had on that day. On the basis of this one ban, the Falungong could certainly voice their opinion in a public gathering. To be fair, however, the ban itself did not threaten the survival and development of Falungong in China at that time. All of us, including followers and Li Hongzhi, have lived under Communist rule for several decades. We have all experienced reform and opening for twenty years. It is hard to believe that they did not know what attitude or policy to use to further their own organization and the survival of their art. It is also hard to believe they did not know that the main characteristic of contemporary society is the need to consult and compromise in order to achieve one’s goal. Without the events of April 25 and smaller demonstrations before and afterward, and if Falungong believers exercised more patience toward others' criticism, the situation with Falungong would not have become what it is today. Facts have proven that sects that are still active in China, such as Xianggong, Emeizhuan, and the Zhinenggong that I observe daily from my window in Beijing, have exercised patience for many years.

This still leaves open the question of the necessity of the April 25 demonstration. The reality that has emerged today is that the demonstration harmed only the Falungong organization and its practicing followers. However, for Li Hongzhi, the situation is different. One can say that no matter what the outcome of the demonstration was, it only did Li good. If the government had used a moderate tactic, such as the removal of the publication ban, the organization of Falungong would have developed rapidly and Li Hongzhi’s personal reputation and fortune would have benefited from such growth. If the government had implemented harsher tactics, all gatherings would have been banned, and his organizers would have been arrested. He and his family, however, would not have met with any harm. Indeed, he himself has become an international celebrity.

The Second Three Month Period: From July 22 to October 30

On July 17, the Chinese Communist Party convened a conference for the leaders of all the provinces and special municipalities. On July 19, the Party issued the "Internal Notice" which forbade any members from practicing Falungong. After three days, the state convened a conference on outlawing Falungong. A People’s Daily editorial followed quickly on "Elevate Science, Discard Superstition." This makes the Falungong demonstration the most serious political event since the political turmoil in 1989. It constitutes an intertwining of the contradictions between the people, between the enemy and the people, and between the party and outside the party. The respect for religious freedom has become a facade for the Falungong, while Li Hongzhi’s religion has become a harmful and fraudulent heterodox in the eyes of the ruling party.

On July 29, the Public Security Bureau issued an arrest warrant for the self-proclaimed head of the illegal Study Society for Falungong, Li Hongzhi. The Chinese government also asked the Interpol to assist in the investigation. At the same time, the Attorney General's Office approved the arrest of Li, who has been charged with endangering the public order. As of July 28, those who have died due to the excesses of practicing Falungong have reached 743 across the thirty provinces.

The most authoritative opinion from the religious circle came from Yi Xiaowen, the head of the National Bureau on Religious Affairs, during his appearance on "Investigation and Discussion on Views," the most popular and widely regarded show on the Chinese Central Television. Mr. Ye concurred with the Party and stated that Falungong was a heterodox. The reaction of those of us who have been around for a few years was that the Cultural Revolution had returned.

On October 30, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress formally passed a law which categorized Falungong as an "illegal heterodox" and demanded harsh suppression from the police and the judicial branch. The Attorney General's Office and the court interpreted the law on that day and ruled that practitioners could be jailed for up to seven years. The four leaders of Falungong arrested during the June demonstration received such formal sentencing. High officials in the Party finally made public appearances in support of the crackdown. State Councilor and Politburo member Luo Gan explained to the public the importance of suppressing Falungong, even saying that Falungong posed a much greater danger to social stability than the democracy activists in 1989. This stands to reason because Falungong competed with the Party for the loyalty of the people. It could also mobilize people very effectively. Finally, the practitioners' loyalty towards Li Hongzhi far outstripped their loyalty to the Party. One has to say with some degree of admiration that the propaganda routine by the Party was watertight this time.

At this point, I cannot help but to digress a bit to explain the difficulty of democratic development in China. The citizens are influenced by the government, and the government is influenced by the people. One example of this pitiful phenomenon was a broadcast by the Beijing Television Station on prime time of the meeting and arrest of a few Beijing and outside Falungong members holding a quiet gathering in a park by a river. Not only did the station secretly film the meeting, but it also showed viewers the arrested individuals, as if for a resume, before they were tried and convicted. Another example in this period was a Christian theologian’s conclusion after being suppressed by the government numerous times. According to him, the Party’s ruthless suppression of religion, especially of Christianity, is an important reason why Falungong is so wantonly practiced. One must also not forget about those old ladies who put up a big show on the streets of Beijing, demanding to know at the top of their voices in front of television cameras, "Since the government treat the people so well, what is your Falungong complaining about?"

Reasons for Toleration

So, what is so special about Falungong? We already know the self-description of Li Hongzhi. Now, let us examine one of his followers, who was situated in the core organ of the Chinese Communist Party and who wrote a letter to the Party Secretary pledging his absolute loyalty to the Party. In this letter, he writes that Buddha’s teaching, Lao Tse’s Daode Jing, Confucius’s Lunyu, Taichi, Hetunuo Shu, Zhouyibagua, the New Testament, the Old Testament, and others are all considered treasures of human civilization. However, the Zhuanfalun, the premier text of the Falungong, far surpasses these essential texts and reaches far beyond modern science. According to him, Falungong gives the nation and its people a hundred benefits and no harm, and over one hundred million people worldwide read Zhuanfalun on a daily basis. Falungong is not a principle that only applies to the earth, the solar system, the Orion galaxy, or the small universe. Rather, it is a principle that applies to the infinite system and the biggest universe. Hence, it can solve age-old puzzles with its limitless power.

We are familiar with the government’s judgment of it as a harmful heterodox. How do observers like us view the religion? This seemingly dramatic suppression that occurred in contemporary China was in fact a very serious occurrence that deserves in-depth discussion. In reality, quite a few independent observers in the country are already speaking on behalf of Falungong believers on the basis of legal principles. I agree with their perspective. My difference with them is that I stand on somewhat more advanced footing, surpassing their standpoint of complete lack of interest and understanding of Falungong. Rather, I speak from the standpoint of someone who has a certain understanding of and is interested in Falungong.

The reason I do so is due to my own special circumstances. Like many practitioners of Falungong today, I have lost wages, retirement benefits, public health insurance, and other social benefits due to the political repression that occurred ten years ago. Like many believers of Falungong, I also find myself enraged by the wanton greed and the twisted justice in China today. My knowledge of whether ancient Eastern philosophy can contribute to future society is not as authoritative as learned Daoist and Confucian researchers. However, through realization and experimentation, I now sincerely believe in the concepts and practices of traditional Chinese medicine, especially in the traditional Daoist self-cultivation of the self and body. I also believe ancient knowledge can offer many contributions to Western medicine and current understandings of scientific healing.

In my view, roughly speaking, Falungong is based on Daoist self-cultivation (yangsheng) but imports elements from other belief systems and institutions, including the People’s Liberation Army, as well as Maoist slogans. Falungong is then packaged in folk Buddhism and becomes a special Chinese product. Both internal and external reasons explain why it has become more dynamic than other sects and why it has experienced such energetic development in less than ten years. The first external reason is the social problems experienced by China in the current period, including the income gap, the lack of channels for social mobility, the lack of agencies to redress injustice, and the lack of health care and insurance. The second external reason is a cultural revolution, especially the disillusionment caused by the erosion of the people’s belief in the human spirit and in communism during the June 4th Movement. Falungong was thus founded in response to the call of fate and became the material and spiritual crutch of millions of believers. In the words of a popular Beijing saying, these reasons are having injustice without a place to report it, having an illness with no money to cure it, and having strength without a place to use it.

The internal reason, and the most significant reason, is the extraordinary healing and strengthening results of Li Hongzhi’s art. Wang Youqun provides a lively description of this:

Even more persuasive is the experience of the head of the best hospital in Beijing, Li Qihua of the 301 Hospital. This veteran officer, party member, and revolutionary could have enjoyed the best treatment available in the country. However, not only did he use Falungong to attack his wife’s serious disease, but he also appreciated the art on a philosophical level:

I truly believe their experiences, which happened when they were fully conscious. I truly feel that there is no element of deceit and fraud in their beliefs. However, I suggest that they may have treated a transient phenomenon as eternal and mistakenly recognized Li Hongzhi as the only person to possess the supernatural abilities that many ancient doctors and alchemists did as well.

I think that Li Hongzhi and the tens, maybe hundreds, of qigong and other method- practitioners truly possess supernatural abilities. I firmly believe that they can use their abilities to benefit their followers, society, or even to challenge the effects of empirical science, which has profoundly altered our lives in the past two hundred years. The regretful thing is that when we have finally recovered from the oppression of the Western powers and are now ready to improve our people’s livelihood and contribute to the world, we have to deal with Li Hongzhi. He is capable yet immoral, ambitious yet irresponsible. He understands the workings of the country yet lacks the patience, persistence, and care to take advantage of this understanding. He only has the wanton bravery of an army private.

This is a mutual process that has many historical precedents. The Communist Party benefited from the corruption and authoritarianism of Chiang Kaishek’s government. The so-called overseas democratic movement post-1989 was helped by the Chinese government’s suppression of the student democratic movement and subsequent repressive measures.

The question becomes whether the government can treat the Falungong sect the way it has. A similar question was asked ten years ago during the student democratic movement. Why must the government use heavy-handed, oppressive measures against the ordinary people? This is the Communist Party’s Achilles heel, regardless of how much effort it has made to reform. The Communist Party still has not completely forsaken its past of seizing power by force. Because the authority of the Party is still built upon "gun and pen"—complete domination over the country and an undemocratic political structure, it is always concerned about the people’s loyalty and support, and about whether it can manipulate and control the people’s sentiments. Despite the appearance of immense power, the Communist Party is in fact very vulnerable. Because it is desperate to avoid disorder, the Party views every civil organization that is not within its control as an enemy. The Party cannot seem to accept that compromise, understanding, and positive interaction can exist between the Party and these organizations.

One of my friends is a Falungong member and has been practicing in groups for three to four years. He joined the sect because he was made a scapegoat by his boss at work. His boss was defrauded when trying to raise money for the company, and subsequently forced him to bear the responsibility for this failure. As a result, he lost his lifetime compulsory retirement savings with the company. He had neither money to sue his boss, nor channels through which to voice his grievances. The only thing he could do to alleviate his agony was practice Falungong. Within the next two years, he bought copy after copy of the Zhuanfalun and supplementary materials. Seeing his husband become increasingly drawn to the sect, his wife lamented, "It was so difficult for us eventually to agree to take down Mao’s picture. Now it is replaced by that of Li Hongzhi." But he quit smoking and drinking. Even his tummy shrank in size. What made the family particularly happy was that he morphed from a reticent person into an outgoing and gregarious one. However, he did not join the other sect members in their attempt to besiege government buildings on April 25th (I do not dare to say whether he would have refused if a close friend had notified him about it). After the official suppression had begun, the leader of the homeowners’ association only asked him to refrain from practicing in public.

Another example also comes from a friend. The government unit in which she works is located in an area populated by a huge number of Falungong followers. The boss of the unit and the local sect leader had been in dispute over the permissibility of meditating at work and of hanging pictures of Buddha and Li Hongzhi in the office. No one would expect that this unit boss, who is also a loyal member of the Communist Party, would not take full advantage of the opportunity of the official suppression of Falungong to persecute sect members in the community. However, the only thing he did was to read a few documents from the central government about combating the sect to his subordinates. This leniency won him applause from the local citizens.

The reason I offer these two examples is to illustrate that not every bureaucrat in the Communist Party is a hard-liner and not every Falungong follower wants to take to the streets to protest. Rational and moderate officials and peaceful followers still account for the majority. And there are millions of ordinary people who support neither side and are merely worried about the effect of the struggle on their livelihoods.

China is gradually evolving into a modern society. This modernization is apparent in the political systems and among the rulers and the ruled. During this process, what the establishment represents are often ideas that are being examined, criticized, and eliminated. And society’s progress still entails facing numerous obstacles and tremendous sacrifices. Those in power obviously play a big role in the process, but so do those who are progressive, forward-looking, and idealistic.

If you are only representing an individual, or if your opinions are only expressed in thoughts and words, I adhere to the idea that you should exercise your freedom of expression. However, if your choice will affect others, and the others could number in the thousands, you should carefully consider the consequences of your actions, for you have to bear the responsibility for them. Because of this, I look down upon Li Hongzhi; my sympathy only goes to the millions of followers of Falungong. I harbor the same sentiments for the Tiananmen Incident. I looked down upon the radical student leaders; my sympathy only went to the students and ordinary people who persisted through the protests. These same sentiments follow for the May Fourth Movement as well. I do not respect those evil-minded radicals and rioters; I only pity those who sacrificed their wealth and lives for the movement.

I leave my respect aside. No matter if you are a street protester or a high official in the government, it is important to have ideals and personal opinions. Yet it is more important to consider the impact of these ideals and opinions on your followers and on society as a whole if your views are blindly pursued. You should not act on temporary surges of passion and gamble on your future. China has entered the only path to modernization, which according to Professor Zhou Dang, includes a formation stage in which there are bound to be clashes, negotiations, compromises, and settlements between the government and the people.

Li Hongzhi pronounces apoliticalization of the movement on one hand and organizes political resistance on the other. I distance myself from his duplicity. I insist on my political rights, and I insist that every citizen can speak out on important political issues. However, it is important to use caution when one does so. There is a Chinese saying that "one should not smoke in a forest in dry weather no matter how addicted one is."

I know that my speech will displease both sides of this struggle, just as what I said did so ten years ago during the Tiananmen Incident. But precisely because I have learnt the lesson over this last decade, I know that when one feels that there is danger lurking beneath eloquent language and legitimate passions, one has to speak up and stand up to criticisms and consequent isolation.

I hope that all patriots and friends would continue to support China’s gradual reforms and peaceful evolution, and guard against all those who, within the country’s current political and cultural context, seek to exploit the people’s legitimate demands and discontent to satisfy their personal ambitions for power and wealth.

Epilogue

Between my lecture at the Fairbank Center in 1999 to Buddha’s birthday(as well as Li Hongzhi’s self-selected birthday) this year, half a year has elapsed. In this half a year, we Chinese intellectuals, who managed to keep a clear head despite living on a powder keg, have paid close attention to the development of events. We worry that either the Falungong or the Communist Party would take sudden action and escalate the conflict.

If we do not take into account those outside police officers who have arrested Falungong believers to extract foreign exchange, the quality of the regime’s suppression and judgment have not changed. While the sphere of activity and fame of the Falungong has increased, the level of conflict has remained the same. We always worried that those groups of believers who were arrested in Tiananmen Square would, according to the sayings of their teacher, collectively carry out a hunger strike or even a mass suicide. Fortunately, this fear has not come true.

The lack of escalation does not mean that both sides have acquired the basic concepts of negotiation and bargaining essential to a modern society. As long as the Communist Party unreasonably insists that it is the only organization to be respected and Falungong followers blindly worship and unconditionally follow their master, many frightful scenarios can still occur. Politicians’ opportunistic decisions will decide which scenario will take place.

Rapidly deteriorating situations in China have never tolerated or waited for any voice of reason. The tragic cycles of suppression/rebellions that has taken place in this territory for the past two hundred years attest to the futility of reason. Besides worrying, what else can we do?

Endnotes

1. Falungong literally translates to "the art of the wheel of law."
2. Zhongnanhai is the official residence of the top officials in China, where Falungong demonstrators gathered for the protest.
3. Qigong is translated roughly to "the art of breathing," which is an ancient Chinese art to control the flow of energy around the body to improve one’s health and to gain extraordinary powers.
4. The result she refers to is the Tiananmen Square Massacre where hundreds of students and civilians were massacred by Chinese troops on June 4^th, 1989.
5. This is reflected in the letter from a member of the Central Discipline and Inspection Committee, Wang Youqun, to Party Secretary Jiang Zemin.
6. Patience (ren) here does not mean the silence in the face of authoritarian suppression that your Teacher Li has taught you. Patience here means respect for others in the spirit of freedom of speech.