After examining recent reforms of laws regarding non-governmental organizations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, Ms. Prosser concludes that these legal reforms to date have not removed many obstacles to the development of NGOs in these countries.

Sarah Prosser is currently studying at Harvard Law School and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She served as a United States Peace Corps Volunteer in Uzbekistan (1995-97) and later interned with the U.S. Agency for International Development in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, DC.

Due to a shared Soviet legacy, the legal developments in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have been similar in many respects. This article examines the legal environments surrounding local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in these countries. By legal environments, I refer primarily to legal texts, including the constitution, codes, legislation, and decrees. Both the similarities, as well as the particular differences among these countries show that, despite the most-recent round of NGO legislation, the laws do not adequately address the fundamental legal and social problems hindering NGO development.

It is helpful for analytical purposes to consider that the development of NGO legislation has occurred in three stages. First-stage Gorbachev-era legal reforms began the transition from governmental to non-governmental organizations. Following independence, the newly recognized countries created second-stage Public Association Laws, which were near replicas of the Soviet Public Association Law that had been created shortly before the Soviet breakup. These two stages of development are gradually giving way to a third stage of legal reform -- the new non-profit laws. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are at different points of this legal development spectrum, but, as I will show, more legislative activity does not necessarily lead to an improvement in NGOs’ legal position. As I point out in the first section, these new laws are improvements on the re-hashed Soviet laws. Still, despite the unlikelihood of the implementation and enforcement of these laws, there are structural flaws in the legal texts themselves that promote anti-democratic government behavior and discourage NGO development.

The third-stage laws do not adequately address the issues revolving around NGO and government interaction. These issues may be broadly categorized into government controls and NGO confusion. Control mechanisms include registration, taxation, and state supervision. Additionally, control is manifested through inaction, such as the failure to implement reform legislation. NGO confusion may be ascertained through questions of identity and trust. In the conclusion of this article, I offer several recommendations for improved government/NGO/donor interaction.

Introduction--Soviet-era associations

From a Western liberal point of view, NGOs are considered to be one of the main vehicles for the creation of a civil society and democracy. When groups of people can come together to talk about problems, plan strategies, and implement their solutions, societal change can happen. A governmental apparatus may view this kind of "people power" as threatening to its exclusive control. Historically, the Soviet government forbade independent action by "unapproved" citizens groups.

Despite the prohibitions against collective activity, Soviet organizations comprised of people devoted to helping society did exist. They were always approved by the Communist party and the government. Examples include the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society, the Peace Fund, and the Children’s Fund. A stark difference between Western associations and these Soviet associations concerns the fact that the latter were funded through forcible sales of membership stamps. These stamp drives occurred once a year and citizen "members" often had no contact with the organization. The associations were active throughout all the former Soviet republics. Even today, when citizens are asked about their opinions on NGOs, it is often this type of Soviet governmental association to which they refer.

Another forerunner to today’s NGOs are the Soviet-era women’s committees. The government created these organizations to address the specific needs of Soviet women, such as health care, employment, education, and childcare. They continue to function as government structures in Central Asia today. They are referred to as Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) and are supported by government funds and staffed by government officials. However, due to their bureaucratic nature, these governmental structures lack the flexibility, and often the dedication, of women’s organizations that are not affiliated with the government.

The Soviet Union’s declining economy of the mid-1980s was one reason that Mikhail Gorbachev undertook a campaign to empower society. The first public associations law was passed late in the Soviet era. The political climate was ripe for such activity. The citizenry was educated. Communications with international organizations and governments were improving. The United States and the European Union developed well-funded programs to help promote the goals of civil society. The initial legal and societal groundwork was laid.

When the Soviet Union dissolved, the new states’ laws on public associations were nearly copies of the old Soviet law, despite differences in timing. For example, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek laws have been in effect since 1991. Even though the Kazakh parliament passed the Law on Public Associations as late as 1996, it remains remarkably similar to the same Soviet model. It is not surprising that laws passed during the upheaval of independence would be similar to the Soviet model. However, it is noteworthy that five years later the Kazakh government still used the former model.

These second-stage laws cannot be considered an improvement or refinement over the old Soviet law. One could speculate that the new governments decided to keep the old laws rather than dispose of them, and NGOs along with them, out of political inertia. Through the second-stage laws, the effects of the Soviet legal legacy continue to be felt today.

I. Legal infrastructure

Constitutions

Constitutions define the fundamental laws of a state. The Constitutions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan cite the right to associate, while the Constitution of Uzbekistan addresses the regulation of organizations as "public associations." By parsing the constitutions’ words, readers can determine the boundaries of the text and speculate on alternative meanings. For example, the Constitution of Kazakhstan, Article 23, paragraph one, states that "Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall have the right to the freedom of forming associations. The activities of public associations shall be regulated by law." This provision is not very specific, but the reader can observe several points from the language. The second sentence states that "public associations" are those that are regulated by law and therefore formally created. However, the first sentence also grants a right to "the freedom of forming associations," which may be understood as a right to form associations with individuals regardless of whether the association is formal or informal.

Another textual argument is that the verb "to regulate" does not contain the same meaning as "to limit." Despite this, the Kazakh government has limited the activity of NGOs through the Law on Public Associations, the Kazakh Civil Code, and the Decree of the President of the Public of Kazakhstan on the Registration of Legal Entities. As Zhovtis concludes, "the right to freedom of association guaranteed by a constitution may be neither a right nor a freedom in fact." These contradictions within and among the legal texts point to governmental ambivalence towards NGOs.

Civil Codes

The Civil Codes are the compilations of the laws, regulations, and rules of a country. The Civil Codes of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan base their definitions of non-commercial enterprises in opposition to commercial enterprises, i.e. non-commercial organizations do not exist to make a profit. Any income that is generated cannot be disbursed to the membership. Income can only be used to further the NGO’s goals, as stated in its charter. Civil Codes encompass public associations and other types of nonprofit organizations, such as institutions, public and religious organizations, public foundations, associations of legal entities, and consumer cooperatives.

Similarities among second-stage laws

While both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have passed third-stage legislation regarding non-profit organizations, neither of the two have passed the needed implementing legislation to bring the laws into force. Consequently, the three countries’ second-stage Public Association Laws remain in effect. Some provisions have the possibility of liberal interpretation.

Despite the fact that the second-stage laws are in force, at least textually a case can be made that they may not be the final word on NGOs. The Public Association Laws cite that, in the event of a conflict, the normative concepts captured in international agreements and ratified by their respective countries supersede domestic law. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have ratified the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 and Kazakhstan has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989. Of course, many countries have ratified international agreements that they subsequently do not enforce. There is the added complication that these ratification examples occurred when Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan were republics of the Soviet Union. However, the point remains that by ratifying the agreements and citing them in domestic law, these countries have pledged to attain a common standard. This pledge can be invoked by foreign countries and citizen groups alike in attempting to condemn non-compliant states.

Another similarity is that although the Public Associations Laws include a list of permitted activities for public associations, they also state that activities permitted include those that are "not restricted or prohibited by law." Prohibited activities are those concerned with national security, such as public associations whose purpose is the violent overthrow of the constitution or the state territory. This provision may be interpreted as providing that if an activity is not explicitly prohibited, it is allowed. Other liberal aspects of the Public Associations Laws include provisions stating that a citizen’s activities in public associations cannot be used to restrict his or her rights. In addition, foreign citizens can join as members of public associations. These liberal provisions offer potential openings for creative legal interpretation by reformers and activists.

Differences among second-stage laws and other legislation

There are significant differences among the countries’ second-stage Public Associations Laws, how they were created, and other laws that affect NGOs. As an example of a positive legislative process, the Kyrgyz Associations Law is notable for its development in conjunction with NGOs. Horton and Kazakina applaud it by remarking, "Indeed, it may be the only genuinely successful case of effective legislative lobbying by domestic NGOs in the region." Several local NGOs, including the Foundation for International Legal Cooperation "Ukuk," the International Center Interbilim, the Fund for Legal Initiatives, the Fund for Legal Problems, and the Kyrgyz Bar Association were active in the lobbying efforts. These NGOs continued to be active in the development of the third-stage NGO law that was passed October 14, 1999.

NGO laws are not the only government acts that affect NGOs. Kazakhstan is unique in the region for its use of the Criminal Code to control NGO activity. Article 337 of the Kazakh Criminal Code warns of penalties for activity in an unregistered public association. In addition, Kazakhstan has other laws, including the Law on Labor Unions (1993) and the Law on Political Parties (1996), that are applicable to nonprofit organizations.

The scope of the NGO laws are also different and can also be confusing. The 1996 Kazakh Public Associations Law regulates the creation and activities of public associations, political parties, and unions. Political parties and unions are conflict-oriented groups, and by associating public associations with them, the law is thereby casting NGOs in an adversarial light. The Public Association Law placed heavier restrictions on NGOs than the earlier Soviet law, which had remained in effect until 1996. Like its first-stage law predecessor, it continues to allow no exemptions for tax status and no definition of "charities." Currently, a draft law on Kazakh nonprofit organizations has been submitted to Parliament.

Uzbekistan, too, has been active in creating laws that apply to non-profits, but this legislative activity does not necessarily bode well for NGOs. Uzbekistan has several laws, including On Political Parties (1996) and On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (1998), that apply to nonprofits. In addition, Uzbekistan seems to be the most willing to revise its legislation on public organizations. The second-stage law, On Public Associations, was adopted in 1991 and amended in 1992. Earlier in 1999, the third-stage law, On Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Organizations, was passed. Despite this legislative activity, actual progress has been minimal because there is little if any political will to implement or enforce the laws.

The similarities outweigh the differences among the three countries’ Public Association Laws. All are significantly related to the old Soviet-style legislation, which, while liberal for its period in 1991, still reflects a mindset of state control and intolerance of government criticism. In the next section of the paper I examine recent developments of the third-stage NGO legislation which, once the laws are implemented, will regulate the activities of nonprofit organizations.

Introduction to the New Laws--Definitions of NGOs

As mentioned earlier, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have new, third-stage laws addressing the activities of non-profit organizations. Kazakhstan has a draft law before Parliament. While generally these new laws reiterate the second-stage legislation and the civil codes, there are a few differences. First, the definitions of what organizations are under the law have expanded. In the case of the Uzbek legislation, a non-governmental, non-commercial organization can be a public association, public foundation, institution, and "other forms provided by legislative acts."

The Kazakh draft version is even broader, including organizations in the form of "an institution, public association, joint stock company, consumer cooperative, foundation, religious associations, an association of legal entities in the form of association (union), and other forms stipulated by legislative acts." The current version of the Kazakh Non-profit Draft Law also somewhat strangely includes state institutions, or those established by the state, within the definition of public associations. By including this definition in the legislation for non-profits, one could argue that the Kazakh government is attempting to legitimize or at least associate these state organizations, or GONGOs, with NGOs.

The Kyrgyz legislation arguably provides the clearest definition of the organizational forms of legal entities. These include associations, foundations, and institutions. Property-based foundations are a new creation. In addition, foundations can come into being through a testamentary act. According to at least one observer, when the Kyrgyz law is implemented, it will be the "most progressive NGO legislation in the former Soviet Union."

In each of these cases, the forms of organizations are defined similarly, yet problems of internal consistency remain. As an example of a similar definition, a public foundation is "recognized as an organization without membership, founded by natural and (or) legal persons on the basis of voluntary property contributions. . . Assets transferred to the public foundation by its founders constitute the property of the foundation." There is an interesting inclusion in the Kazakh draft law of a "joint stock company" category, which is defined as a legal entity that issues shares to attract funds to conduct its activities in the form of non-preferred stock only. Joint stock companies are mentioned in neither the Uzbek nor Kyrgyz laws. Their inclusion in a non-profit law muddles the distinction between profit and non-profit. The problem of internal inconsistency has yet to be addressed in the third stage laws.

In reality, the laws do not address all or even many of the societal problems in Central Asia that hinder NGO development. Some issues are not specific to NGOs but rather are part of wider deficiencies of rule of law, transparency, and accountability. The broad problems of government control and NGO confusion make up the next two sections. In order to examine these issues thoroughly, it is useful to consider briefly the general political environment for NGOs and an essential third party, the donor community.

The political environment

Though it may not be obvious from the legal texts, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have undergone changes of attitude regarding NGO development. A decade ago, NGOs would have been greeted with almost universal hostility from their governments. Today, governments are ambivalent about NGO activity. In dealings with NGOs, the government and citizenry have encountered both efficient, energetic activists and lazy, greedy frauds. There exist a few vigorous pro-NGO reformers in government, such as Mr. Sabirov in Kyrgyzstan and Ms. Sevryukova, a deputy in the Kazakh Parliament. However, government sentiment towards NGOs has not reached a consensus.

Some authors assert that the Soviet mentality with its own peculiar thinking, personalities, and "law" still persist. The Russian term for the authorities, vlast’, or "power," refers to forces outside personal control rather than an idea of the authorities also being governed by laws. On the government side, the term legitimizes the anti-democratic behavior of the authorities. On the public side, the idea of vlast’ legitimizes the passivity of the populace. Many factors particular to each country have affected the swings in governmental attitude.

Post-independence, Kazakhstan experienced a relative liberalization of its freedoms of speech and the media. Independent television and radio stations appeared alongside new voluntary organizations and associations. Peaceful demonstrations and meetings were generally allowed, and even political parties in opposition to the government were created. Zhovtis argues that around 1994, two factors caused the regression in the Kazakh government: first, a realization that the human rights rhetoric of Western governments would not result in sanctions or pressure to promote democracy, and second, "a rotation of cadres in the top echelons of power" put traditional orthodox hard-liners back into power. Reform-minded officials either stepped down or were moved elsewhere. The government offered television and radio frequencies for tender at extremely high prices, which forced many of the independent stations out of business. Economic crises led to nation-wide mass protests in 1997-98, and several NGO leaders were imprisoned. The political climate of Kazakhstan has not improved greatly since this time.

The Uzbek government is regarded by NGO observers as second only to the Turkmen government as the most repressive republic in Central Asia. Its harassment is targeted in large part against religious organizations or organizations critical of the government. The Uzbek government labels all Islamic groups that question government policies Wahhabis, the conservative form of Islam especially prevalent in Saudi Arabia, whether or not the groups actually have any connections to the Wahhabi movement. After the bombings in Tashkent in February 1999, President Karimov and the government blamed Islamic extremists for the attack, yet no proof has ever been offered to the public. These bombings led to general suppression of all NGO activities.

The seriousness of this "Islamic threat" remains unclear. Some authors claim that a moderate form of Islam is the only version of Islam that has existed in Uzbekistan. It is this form of Islam that should not be suppressed or endangered because it will only be driven underground and into more violent forms. Others claim that extremist Islamic movements, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and their link to narcotics production, pose a serious threat to the stability of the region in general and Uzbekistan in particular. It is not surprising that the Uzbek government has chosen the path of general suppression of NGO activity by using the Islamic threat, real or not, as a justification.

Until lately, Kyrgyzstan had been considered more politically progressive than its neighbors. One measure of this development was the rapid growth in the number of NGOs. From 1991-1996, over 800 NGOs were established, which greatly outpaces both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Government/NGO cooperation has produced generally good results. For example, President Akayev and the government have publicized NGOs and their active role in government-sponsored initiatives, such as the National Program to Overcome Poverty "Araket" (1998-2005). Also, since 1991, all but one of the NGOs that have sought registration received it. While the national government has been generally supportive of NGO activity, excessive caution by some officials may be a factor in the registration delays that some NGOs experience. Kyrgyzstan has had incidents of police brutality and freedom of the press infringement. The authorities have been known to pressure journalists who criticize members of the Government. In addition, the recent Kyrgyz elections have come under fire from international observers, such as the OSCE and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Their charges of restricting opposition access to media and harassment of opposition candidates have cast a shadow over what had been some encouraging signs of democratic development in Kyrgyzstan.

Other actors—Foreign aid

A variety of Western aid groups are active in Central Asia to help facilitate the development of new NGO legislation. These groups consult with both governments and NGOs. The idea is to bring together the many interested parties. Out of the drafts laws they generate, one final version may be hammered out.

These Western consultants tread a fine line as they try to assist both sides of the negotiation table while having an interest in promoting a free and open society. Due to their access to funds and information, foreign consultants can obtain access to government officials with less difficulty than most NGO groups. This access comes at a political cost, and established goodwill must be used sparingly. For example, foreign groups cannot blindly advocate for NGO rights and freedoms without understanding that some NGOs, like some government officials, are working for individual gain. With so much to lose politically and financially, these foreign consultants have learned and continue to learn the pitfalls of providing legal services to both NGOs and governments.

One prominent legal consulting group is the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). This Washington, DC-based private voluntary organization has offices in the Central Asian capitals and is sponsored by the World Bank and the Open Society. Besides facilitating negotiations, ICNL helps draft models of non-profit legislation. Also drafting legislation for the World Bank and the Open Society is the German Gesellschaft fur technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). The work of both ICNL and GTZ reflect the Anglo-American and European styles of non-profit legislation. However, in drafting the laws, ICNL Central Asian Regional Director Richard Remias points to international legal norms as the background principles from which the discussions with governments and NGOs are based. He also emphasizes the importance of tailoring any such background ideas to the needs of the local situation. The tension between reference to established international norms and the need for creative local solutions is always relevant in the drafting of such legislation.

The aforementioned World Bank has recognized NGOs as important to the delivery of services worldwide. The involvement of NGOs in World Bank-financed projects increased from an average of 6% in 1973 to 48% in 1996. In 1995, the World Bank commissioned ICNL to conduct a survey of existing NGO legislation worldwide and to determine principles for legislation and lessons of good practice, while still recognizing "that the characteristics of the NGO sector and society vary from country to country, as does the capacity of governments to implement detailed legislation." The World Bank Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations was created to "encourage an unfettering of the NGO sector" through the development of "laws where they are non-existent at present, but such laws should be designed to foster an environment of independence, professionalism, and transparency within the sector and enhance the climate for self-regulation." (emphasis in original) This text recognizes the complexities of working toward liberalizing the NGO sector at the same time that such liberalization may increase tensions within NGOs themselves.

II. Government controls of NGOs

The government controls the life and death of an NGO—from the time before it is officially registered, during its active existence, and finally during its "liquidation," the term used to describe the official disbanding of an NGO and its activists. The new laws on non-profits do not greatly change the restrictions of the old Public Association Laws. As one exasperated Western observer describes the issue of government control in Uzbekistan, ". . . the people seem to understand the concept (of NGOs) very well, and are indeed eager to proceed. The government is another matter! They find it almost impossible to relinquish control over anything." While giving some structure for regulation, legal controls also provide the basis for government corruption and disincentives for NGO development.

Registration fees and paperwork

Each country mandates a registration fee for the granting of official status. The amounts of the fees change occasionally, and they are often very expensive for local activists. For example, in 1998, the registration fee in Kazakhstan was approximately US$170, equaling more than an average month’s salary. Several legitimate questions are raised by such registration: How is the registration fee used? While the government could argue that the registration fee covers the expenses of documentation, is it necessary to charge a fee for a constitutional right? How is the level of the fee determined? Such a high amount is certainly a barrier to many organizations.

Registration fees, like taxes, are sites of potential corruption. Local officials may be tempted to change the rates according to their personal economic needs. If the NGO attempts to report such activity to a higher authority, it may be that the higher authority is part of the scheme. Certainly, there is no guarantee that the offending official will be punished.

On the positive side, the Kazakh Draft Non-profit Law and the Kyrgyz Non-profit Law specify that "officials of state bodies" will be held accountable for violations of the non-commercial organization legislation. The Uzbek Non-profit Law points out that, "Participation or non-participation of citizens in non-governmental, non-commercial organizations cannot be considered as grounds for restriction of their rights and freedoms." While these are progressive developments, the Kazakh law remains in draft form, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek laws have yet to be implemented, and the "violations" and "restrictions" have yet to be defined.

The new laws list the paperwork that must be completed and approved by the NGO registering body. The countries carefully define, arguably to extremes of micromanagement, what should be in the charter and founding agreements. Charter features common to the laws of all three countries include the organization name, procedures for acquiring/terminating membership, procedures for reorganization or liquidation, location or territory of activities, and sources of property and funds. Because some NGO laws limit fund-raising or other public activities to the extent of their charter-stated goals, the wording of the charter is extremely important. To draft a charter that would give an NGO maximum abilities, its leaders would almost need to be lawyers or have the money to hire them.

The requirements for the founding agreement again reveal similarity in the countries’ laws. The Kazakh Draft Non-profit Law states that the founding agreement must include the definition of its activities, management of its activities, and property transfer to the organization’s ownership. The Uzbek non-profit law asks that the "establishing agreement" define the order of activities, terms of property transfer to the organization, and terms of membership termination. Like the requirements for the charter, the detail necessary for the founding agreements presents another bureaucratic hurdle for NGOs.

With each revision of the NGO legislation, re-registration is often required of NGOs. Registration is a time-consuming, expensive process. These disincentives ensure that if an NGO survives the registration process, it certainly does not want to go through it again. As an example, the Samarkand Regional Language Center was registered as an NGO in 1996. It went through the re-registration process in 1999 under the new Non-profit Law. According to Jennifer Brick, a Peace Corps Volunteer who worked at the Center, the new law "makes life more difficult [for NGOs that go through] endless paperwork [and need a] ridiculous amount of signatures and stamps." She also noted that the director of the Language Center "had all the contacts he needed and was able to pay off (through services or promises or whatever) all the necessary officials involved to do it more quickly. I don’t know how long it would take a ‘normal’ person to do all that." (parenthetical comments in original) Registration, through fees and bureaucratic paperwork, acts as a disincentive to register officially, and because unofficial NGOs are illegal, the result is that NGO formation is discouraged overall.

Taxes

As Horton and Kazakina point out, one method to promote NGO growth is to create a system of tax exemptions and benefits. These benefits encourage individual and corporate giving to support NGO activity. The governments of Central Asia seem to be in no mood to take the legal steps to work toward this goal.

The issue of taxation is a massive problem for the Central Asian states in general. Tax evasion is rampant. As an issue of government control, the main problem for NGOs is that there is little consideration for granting NGOs a special tax status. None of the laws that regulate NGOs in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan provide exemptions for NGO income derived from economic activities. Kyrgyzstan does allow an exemption for "income from charitable activities," but there remains no definition of "charitable activities" in Kyrgyz law. Consequently, the income tax rate, 30% in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and 33% in Uzbekistan, takes a severe bite out of an NGO’s revenue.

The Uzbek non-profit Law has a provision on taxation, but the Kazakh draft law does not. The Kyrgyz non-profit law has a provision for reporting financial information that arguably is related to taxation. In 1998, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan discontinued the tax benefits on NGO revenue obtained through statutorily legal activities. As in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan has no definition or distinction of charities and mutual benefit organizations. This leaves tax benefits scattered about the various legal codes and decrees. The new Uzbek law does have a minor improvement in tax reporting. An NGO is now required to "submit annual reports about its activities to tax and statistic bodies," which is less burdensome than the previous requirement to report on a quarterly basis. An Uzbek NGO leader, who was part of the negotiating team that created the draft legislation, related that the "quarterly financial reports to tax committees [were] just humilation." [sic] To wit, the new law will not materially change the situation for NGOs until new incentive provisions are worked into the tax laws.

The new Kyrgyz non-profit law allows NGOs to pursue commercial activity. This will benefit NGOs, particularly in regard to attracting grant money. Donors can consider an NGO’s commercial activity as part of an overall plan to achieve sustainability. However, the taxing of this commercial activity remains an impediment to NGO self-reliance. The Kyrgyz tax code allows only 2-5% of cash donations to be tax deductible, and in-kind donations are not deductible. In all three countries, the general public or business community is hesitant to ask for tax deductions because this may draw the attention of tax collectors. Most people either do not declare the entirety of their income or avoid paying taxes altogether due to the high percentages taxed. The result is that the tax structure does not provide enough incentives for people and businesses to give donations at all.

As far as the taxing of grant income, the NGO itself does not have to pay taxes on grants. However, the paid staff of the NGOs must pay income taxes averaging 40%. For salaries that are not high to begin with, this income tax level is painful. In general, one of the reasons that tax collection in Central Asia is ineffective is because the average citizen cannot pay such high tax rates and expect to survive. The consequence is tax evasion on a massive scale and citizens who simply hope to avoid the notice of tax collectors.

Changes to the Kazakh tax system, passed December 10, 1999, and effective January 1, 2000, have greatly clarified the status of grant transfers from international to local NGOs. The amendment defines a grant, a definition which had been missing in the previous tax decree, and emphatically clarifies that international grants are not taxable income. In addition, salaries paid out of international grant funds to NGOs are exempt from "social tax," a kind of social security. These developments promote a more effective system of taxation for NGOs and may even encourage NGOs to pay their legitimate share of taxes. A recent addendum to this "positive" development is that the Kazakh government has undertaken a complete revision of its Tax Code with the ostensible goal of smoothing out internal inconsistencies. This draft Tax Code includes provisions for the increased taxation of NGOs and international organizations and even potentially renders the December 10 changes useless. The turmoil of the Central Asian legislative systems keeps everyone guessing.

State supervision

Through decrees and legislation, NGOs in Central Asia must open their doors to government officials whenever requested. In Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) adopted in early 1998 an instructional letter limiting NGO rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. Requirements include: 1. an obligation to inform the MIA and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) of any meetings or events, 2. an obligation to allow representatives from the MIA and/or MOJ to attend any meetings or events, 3. a prohibition on NGOs from discussing issues that are not within the purview of their charter goals, and 4. a prohibition of unregistered NGO meetings. The Ministry of Internal Affairs went on to state that

the leaders and activists of some public associations violate the Constitution and existing legislation by conducting closed (secret) meetings and sessions, on the pretext of discussing current affairs of their organizations. The fact is that they gather to discuss the political, social and economic situation in the country and to plan protest actions not specified in their charters."

The conclusion from this statement is that if an NGO meeting takes place without a government official present, it is "secret" and thus illegal.

Similar to the Kazakh instructional letter, the Uzbek law contains a provision regarding government access to NGOs. An NGO must "insure the access to information on the usage of its property and monetary assets; insure the access to all activities to the authority, which carried out the registration of a non-governmental, non-commercial organization." This legislation, like the Kazakh letter, gives officials "access to all activities," which can be interpreted to include meetings and other events. The new Kyrgyz non-profit law lacks this state supervision provision. The intent of this form of intrusive legislation is to keep an eye on any NGO that could be considered unfavorable to the government.

These laws seem to imply a presumption of political guilt and generate a sense that no NGO is safe from government intrusion into their meetings. It is easy to imagine that access to meetings would result in a government voice in the meetings. Government monitoring of discussions may lead to reprisals for any criticism of the government. Consequently, NGO members would be afraid to speak freely or organize public events at all. In sum, the rationale for an NGO’s existence, to empower individuals, is undermined by these supervisory laws.

Access to government

Since government officials are (or are perceived to be) oppressive and overbearing, many NGOs do not know sympathetic government officials, who would assist in promoting their efforts. In Uzbekistan, in particular, there seem to be few official channels for NGOs to present their ideas for social change or concerns regarding NGO legislation to the government. However, some aid providers feel that NGO access to government is not a problem. NGOs can contact the relevant ministry directly. In the alternative, some governments create structures to aid NGO efforts in general. For example, Kazakhstan has created an Information Center for NGOs within the Ministry of Culture, Information and Social Harmony. Ironically, this ministry was formerly the Ministry of Information, the structure that collected information on what the NGOs were doing and planning. Still, it is a point of access for NGOs to voice their concerns.

Bad experiences with government officials can dissuade an NGO from seeking further cooperation. For example, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, I worked with an NGO leader who was previously a city government worker. When a Western grant organization distributed free computers to NGOs in 1996, this city worker was informed by her supervisor that she was to create an NGO and go to collect her computer. She did as instructed and spent the next year attempting to create an employment and business information bulletin for the women of Samarkand. With continual intervention from government officials, she eventually left the government position (leaving behind the computer) and formed her own independent NGO. She has no desire to work with city government officials again.

Other groups have had better experiences with government officials. The leader of another Uzbek women’s NGO reports that she has maintained contacts with the Deputy Prime Minister on Women’s Issues, the Ministry of Justice, which assisted her organization in re-registering under the new non-profit law, and the Minister of Human Rights.

Among the many factors that can influence the access of NGOs to government officials, entrance into official circles is smoothed by a public commitment to NGO reforms from the president. In fall 1998 and again in spring 1999, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan mentioned in public addresses his commitment to and the need for NGO law development and a law on charities. In August 1998, President Karimov of Uzbekistan made a similar public address when he called on Parliament to draft a new NGO law. Working groups of government officials and NGOs, often facilitated by foreign aid support, discuss each other’s viewpoints in the creation of various draft laws. When a working group is officially recognized, the drafts can be considered for legislation. Foreign aid groups often receive government attention more readily than local NGOs. Support and cajoling from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Counterpart Consortium, ICNL, GZT, and a host of other international organizations can greatly influence who sits at the negotiating table when laws are drafted.

Finally, NGO access to government officials may not even be an important factor regarding whether legislation can become workable. Even though the new third-stage laws do have minor improvements and still maintain some of the major problems of the old laws, looking for progress within them may be moot because the implementing legislation is what actually brings the laws into force. For example, the new Uzbek Non-profit Law, passed on April 15, 1999, remains controversial within government circles. The future of the law’s implementation thus remains uncertain. Government internal politics plays a large role in NGO legislation.

Positive view of government progress

In opposition to the idea that governments overly control NGOs, another viewpoint would argue that while governments are not open, they have made great progress in their relations with NGOs. Earlier, the government misunderstood the role that NGOs could play in society. The government skepticism has given way to an appreciation of what NGOs can accomplish, even with limited resources. The positive view goes so far as to claim that "former skeptics are now receiving NGOs as partners in helping communities meet social needs and nurture small businesses." This view is also shared by some government officials.

But the new NGO legislation defies that view. The strict requirements for government access to meetings and events, coupled with the bureaucratic nightmare of registration and a tax system that inhibits NGO development all point in a negative direction for NGO growth. Only the new Kyrgyz legislation has overcome the issues of government access and re-registration, and it has not yet been implemented. The legal environment of suspicion and distrust for non-governmental activities continues to inhibit public activity. Many of these fundamental issues are remnants of a Soviet legacy, in which elections were manipulated, professionalism was lax, and individual rights carried low priority. Still, these are the major challenges that the governments and citizens of Central Asia must overcome if the goals of a democratic society are ever to be more than rhetoric.

III. NGO Confusion

On the NGO side of the equation, local activists demonstrate a wide range of attitudes about their goals and capabilities. Regarding activist interactions with governments and foreign aid groups, NGO leaders often encounter structural problems, such as confusion over NGO laws and questions of organizational sustainability. Corruption problems are exemplified by fraudulent uses of donor funds and outright denial of transparency. The actual motivation of NGO activists is sometimes not a noble cause.

Regardless of their interests, there is a great deal of confusion among NGOs. Most NGO activists do not know their rights under the law. Since the laws change so frequently, this is understandable. NGOs generally cannot afford to hire lawyers to interpret the new laws. The possibility of taking legal action against a fraudulent government official is unrealistic in countries where bribery is the common way to get things done. These legal questions may be a site for effective foreign aid.

NGO identity

As P.J. Simmons points out, defining an NGO is not as important or useful as understanding "what they do, who their members are, and where their money comes from." The lack of understanding on these very issues is what creates confusion in society regarding NGOs. From the pre-independence period, the Soviet public associations did not simply fade away with independence. They were co-opted into government structures. Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) are supported by government funds and staffed by government officials. They are sometimes referred to as Quasi-NGOs, or QUANGOs. Governments keep them in existence, or sometimes even create them, to take advantage of foreign aid money and divert attention from actual citizens’ groups. Governments also use these groups to hold discussions about democracy issues with international donors. Still, these GONGOs and QUANGOs actually represent the views of the government and presumably are trusted by the government not to promote alternative agendas. Not only does this undermine the efforts of independent citizens' groups, but it also leads to confusion in the general public, and even the government itself, as to what an NGO is. Because GONGOs serve government interests and undermine citizen groups, which might be critical of the governments, GONGOs are extremely useful to former-Soviet leaders who refuse to lessen societal controls.

As an example of this NGO identity confusion, the government of Uzbekistan has been unwilling to register human rights NGOs or any NGO that speaks critically of the government. From 1992 to 1997, the government denied the official registration application of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan because of its ties to exiled opposition leaders. Another human rights group, the Committee for Protection of Individual Rights (CPIR), was formed with government support and was granted registration. According to Abdummanob Polat, a former leader of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, the CPIR was registered within four days. The CPIR’s leader claims that there are no political prisoners or state-sponsored human rights abuses in the country and that most of the critical assessments of human rights practices of the government are false. Indeed, a recent report by the Uzbek government admits that only one human rights group, the aforementioned CPIR, has been registered. In reply to critics it states, "Two or three other groups, claiming they are human rights protection organizations are considered ideologically biased and politicized, which contradicts national laws and international standards for NGOs." This begs the question of who determines what is "ideologically biased"? Why is it that only the human rights GONGO is registered and presumably not ideologically biased? The question of what constitutes an NGO continues to muddy the legal waters.

Despite the difference between independent and governmental NGOs in the human rights field, GONGOs and QUANGOs are often more than simple stand-ins for the government. In the area of women’s issues, for example, Women’s Committees were a feature of Soviet-era public associations. Post-independence, these committees were granted the title of NGO simply because they were issue-specific, yet they continued to work out of government offices, under government sponsorship, and with the same leadership. The status of these and other women’s groups that were organized by the government following independence is unclear. Ikramova and McConnell provide the following information:

The authors do not provide an explanation for their findings. While it may be that the financial situation of the countries mandated an end to the funding, one could also posit that these GONGOs might have become more outspoken in their activities. Apparently, in yet another example of the complex definition of an NGO in Central Asia, a GONGO does not always remain a GONGO.

NGOs themselves add to the identity confusion by working within various group categories. For example, the Kyrgyz NGO "Tabiyat" is an environmental NGO but is also very active in electoral politics. For citizens who are unclear on the endorsement of candidates by NGOs, this dual function might make it seem like Tabiyat is attempting to act as a political party. Likewise, some NGOs engage in commercial activity unrelated to their goals. While this may seem like fundraising and therefore should be granted tax-free status, it may also be a departure from a reasonable standard of relatedness if the NGO becomes too focused on profits. In a political and social environment of rapid change, the complexities of NGO identification may be lost on the average citizen.

Tax codes add to the confusion by creating restrictions on NGO development and sustainability. As mentioned earlier, there are far too many taxes on NGO commercial activity and far too few tax deductions for individual and business donations to NGOs. However, tax benefits have been granted to organizations on an ad hoc basis. Foreign NGOs and grantors have often been the beneficiaries of these benefits. With such an uncertain, unfair system, NGOs almost appear reasonable in their avoidance of tax collectors.

Issues of Trust

NGOs, which for the sake of argument we can define as groups of citizens whose activities are determined by what the members perceive as the needs of the community, sometimes have underlying goals that ensure that governmental distrust of NGOs will continue. These range from purely self-interested groups or individuals who create an NGO to obtain funds from donors to the more benign groups that simply do not want to be transparent in their accounting procedures. In addition, competition and distrust among NGOs prevents the benefits of networking from being realized. Such benefits could include collaborating on projects and presenting a united front to the government. These negative characteristics of NGOs contribute to the post-Soviet tendency of governments to be wary of NGOs. This distrust adds to the argument of those in government who argue against NGO legal reform.

Considering questions of trust, the role of foreign aid is central. International aid to NGOs has had obvious beneficial effects in that local NGOs are better empowered to achieve their goals. As Keck and Sikkink point out, material leverage helps NGOs in that they can use money to call attention to issues of social importance, or, in the case of powerful international NGOs, they "link cooperation to something else of value: money, trade, or prestige." The goals and methods of these aid programs are complex and often controversial, but, regarding NGOs in particular, the fundamental goal has always been the empowerment of citizens to create civil society.

Yet even the best intentions have resulted in unintended consequences. Some individuals have formed NGOs to obtain donor funding for personal use. This negative occurrence happened more frequently during the early 1990s than in recent years. Stories of fraudulent aid recipients have had a negative impact on Western perception of aid efforts. Additionally, the "throw money at it and hope it sticks" perspective hurt the few viable NGOs. Instead, it helped the NGOs that formed for the sole purpose of receiving aid money. As became evident to the donor groups, there were many NGOs trying to get a piece of the funding pie. The organizations became "less creative in fundraising, less dedicated to issues and less likely to affect change in society." Donor organizations have learned from these early errors and have become more aware in terms of understanding the local society and making an effort to invest in sustainable NGOs that they can trust.

New NGOs have been plagued by the problems that face new organizations worldwide, such as who is the boss and how to handle disagreements. Issues of power and control of finances have split apart many NGOs. The groups that formed rapidly with the intention of taking advantage of donor funding, regardless of their intentions, have found themselves caught in personnel, management, and accounting conundrums. Examples of these internal factions are numerous and generally lead to disintegration of the NGO into two or more NGOs. Despite the emotional and organizational difficulties, this is often a good resolution for the NGOs and the individuals involved.

Transparency becomes an issue for NGOs when they realize that they will be held accountable for the funds they raise, the activities they pursue, and any conflicts of interest. As NGOs progressively work to initiate community action, they must understand the necessity of transparency of proceedings, especially by creating a system that would be accountable for funds earmarked for particular projects. Of course, accounting procedures are also required for reporting to donor groups. There must be guarantees of fiscal responsibility to the donors.

During negotiations for NGO laws, the issues of accounting and transparency sometimes become divisive between NGOs and government. In developing the new Kyrgyz NGO law, some NGOs argued for expelling draft provisions regarding conflict of interest and self-regulation. However, provisions on conflict of interest did enter into the final version. Conflict of interest could mean be buying a new vehicle for your NGO from your brother. An example of self-regulation is the lack of "outward reporting requirements" or required reports to the government. Alternatively, there is an international standard to maintain "open books," meaning that citizens should be able to find public accounting figures on NGOs without NGOs being legally required to report to the government. However, NGOs would often rather maintain closed books to avoid attracting the notice of the tax authorities. While most NGOs have a clear understanding of the societal problems they wish to address, very few NGOs actually maintain transparent financial systems.

Trust is a fundamental issue that reaches far deeper than NGOs themselves. Soviet society was built on lack of trust. Looking further back into history, the tribal or clan culture of Uzbekistan and the nomadic cultures of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue to affect how people and groups interact. Trust, of course, is earned. Both sides, governments and NGOs, have reasons for distrust of each other. The NGO laws, the building blocks from which NGO efforts can be constrained or promoted, contain restrictions that inhibit freedom of speech and assembly. Governments’ restrictive practices in no way encourage NGO growth. The duplicitous and defensive reactions of some NGOs do not encourage either a positive view of NGOs or willingness on the part of citizens or the government to aid their activities.

To bridge this gap of trust, individuals must make leaps of faith. NGO activists are creating a culture of trust, which generates what Fukuyama has called "social capital." As Alexis de Tocqueville observed of Americans in 1831, the ability to make associations benefits society by creating citizens who see themselves as public-spirited and capable. Fukuyama takes de Tocqueville’s thesis a step further by arguing that participation in associations accustoms people toward working together, which increases productivity and economic well-being. It may be too much to place the social and economic future of Central Asia on the shoulders of NGOs, but working towards a culture of trust would further function to grease the wheels of society and lessen the need for restrictive laws.

Recommendations

NGOs need to work together. With more communication, understanding, and agreement among NGOs, a united front could be presented to governments during negotiations for new NGO laws or requests for attention to societal issues. NGOs themselves have formed to provide this essential coordination function. The Interbilim Center is a clearinghouse for NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. It supports the NGO sector by providing information and training. It also publishes a newsletter for and about NGOs of Kyrgyzstan and of other countries. As donors grow more attuned to the support requirements of the local conditions, and as NGOs sort out their organizational difficulties, cooperation rather than competition will become more normal.

Should governments be active within NGOs themselves? There are differing views as to whether inviting governments into NGOs is a positive development. Kasybekov cites the example of the head of the local Kyrgyz NGO "Umut," who invited the mayor and the deputy of the town to sit on the NGO’s board of directors. The officials provided moral support and public relation benefits to the NGO. Their support helped to increase awareness of the NGO’s activities within the community and within the local government. The counter-argument to this type of cooperation is presented by RPCV John Smart, who related that local NGOs used methods such as "buying in to powerful people who could help their causes, not necessarily with bribes, but often just with allowing these individuals to have power within their organizations," to serve nefarious ends. It seems that the invitation from NGOs to government officials to join their organizations can have positive and negative effects. Arguably, this kind of NGO/government alliance-building may be a creative method for gaining access to and fostering support of government authorities. The potential for abuse, however, seems especially great considering the legal provisions that require government access to NGO meetings. Negotiating the boundary between an invitation to a meeting and a requirement to allow meeting access is an important question of who controls the space and power boundaries of NGOs.

NGOs should continue to connect with international donor groups and service providers. ICNL has already been cited as an organization committed to bringing NGOs and government officials together for the creation of draft NGO legislation. In Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE designed a plan to conduct quarterly roundtable discussions that would bring together officials from several ministries and NGO leaders to discuss human rights issues in Kyrgyzstan. International aid groups perform an essential function in enabling governments and NGOs to sit together and discuss their concerns. Through these discussions, governments can learn to support NGOs as vital sources of information and action within their communities and constituencies. Another benefit that foreign aid groups can provide is professionalism and a commitment to international standards of transparency. Frequent contacts between developed democracies and the Central Asian NGOs can improve the structure and organization of such NGOs. In addition, international groups can promote the activities of NGOs in the media to increase public awareness of NGOs and their projects.

In one sense, legal reform is the societal basis from which all NGO activity can occur. The problems of a destructive tax system and invasive government access to NGOs are serious ones. However, the legal texts contain the potential for positive developments. Even more importantly, the fundamental issue of trust is what is driving government controls and continual NGO confusion. Building trust is a difficult, slow, trial-and-error process, yet it is the only path available for those who desire a better future for Central Asia.

1. References
2. Soviet Law on Public Associations, October 19, 1991.
3. Because there is relatively little empirical information available on Central Asian NGOs, the points of this paper are illustrated with first-hand experiences of representatives of international donor organizations, Returned U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers (RPCVs), and local NGO leaders.
4. Erkinbek Kasybekov, Government and Nonprofit Sector Relations in the Kyrgyz Republic, in Civil Society in Central Asia 71, 71 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999).
5. I examine GONGOs, as a symptom of NGO identity confusion, more closely in section three.
6. Ula Ikramova and Kathryn McConnell, Women’s NGOs in Central Asia’s Evolving Societies, in Civil Society in Central Asia 198, 207 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999).
7. S. Frederick Starr, Civil Society in Central Asia, in Civil Society in Central Asia 27, 29 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999).
8. Jay Cooper, The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia, in Civil Society in Central Asia 214, 215 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999).
9. Scott Horton & Alla Kazakina, The Legal Regulation of NGOs: Central Asia at a Crossroads, in Civil Society in Central Asia 34, 34 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999). Another explanation may be that governments recognized that the economic situation would be slow to improve. Because of the declining economy, NGOs are picking up the slack from government by delivering some social services to the citizenry. NGOs can blossom under a weak state apparatus, and this argument is sometimes put forward to explain the relative success of NGOs in Tajikistan, a politically unstable country at best.
10. Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (with amendments) adopted May 5, 1993, Article 16.2; Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted Aug. 30, 1995, Article 23.1. (All quotations from Central Asian legal texts are English translations of the official version.)
11. Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted Dec. 8, 1992, Article 56, lists these organizations as "trade unions, political parties, and scientific societies, as well as women’s veterans’ and youth leagues, professional associations, mass movements and other organizations." Article 58 provides that "the state shall safeguard the rights and lawful interests of public associations and provide them with equal legal possibilities for participating in public life."
12. Evgeny Zhovtis, Freedom of Association in Kazakhstan, in Civil Society in Central Asia 57, 61 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 47. See e.g. Civil Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted December 1995, amended December 1996, Articles 73-76 on Consumer Cooperatives, Social Associations, Social Foundations, and Institutions.
16. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) document, Overview of the Legal/Regulatory Environment for NGOs in Uzbekistan 1 (1997).
17. The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic "On Public Associations," adopted Feb. 1, 1991, article 29 [hereinafter Kyrgyz Associations Law]; the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "On Public Associations," adopted Feb. 15, 1991, as amended, art. 25 [hereinafter the Uzbek Associations Law]; the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Public Associations," adopted May 31, 1996, art. 3 [hereinafter the Kazakh Associations Law].
18. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 41.
19. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 42. In the case of Uzbekistan, prohibited NGO activities are enshrined in the Constitution. "The formation and functioning of political parties and public associations aiming to the following shall be prohibited: changing the existing constitutional system by force: coming out against state sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the Republic, as well as the constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens; advocating war and social, national, racial and religious hostility, and encroaching on the health and morality of the people, as well as of any armed associations and political parties based on the national or religious principles." Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 57.
20. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 39.
21. ICNL, Kyrgyzstan Update to the Country Report—1996, 1 (1998).
22. The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Non-Commercial Organizations, final version dated October 1, 1999.
23. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 39-40.
24. Id. at 39.
25. Supra note . Similar to the Kazakh Public Association Law, the Constitution of Uzbekistan also groups public associations with political parties and trade unions, supra note .
26. Lecture by Richard Remias, Central Asian Regional Director of ICNL, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, November 3, 1999.
27. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 40.
28. Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Non-governmental, Non-commercial Organizations, Article 10 (1999) [hereinafter Uzbek Non-profit Law].
29. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan On Non-commercial Organizations (Draft), Article 6, (1999) [hereinafter Kazakh Draft Non-profit law].
30. Kazakh Draft Non-profit law, Art. 9.
31. Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Non-Commercial Organizations, Articles 2 and 24 (1999) [hereinafter Kyrgyz Non-profit Law].
32. Richard Remias, Kyrgyzstan President Signs Long-Awaited NGO Law: "On Non-Commercial Organizations (unpublished), October 1999.
33. Uzbek Non-profit Law, Art. 12. See Kyrgyz Non-Profit Law, Article 2—"A foundation shall be a non-membership organization founded by individuals and (or) legal entities on the basis of voluntary property fees, which pursues social, charitable, cultural, educational and profit-for-public goals."
34. Kazakh Draft Non-profit law, Art. 15.
35. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 39-40.
36. See generally Zhovtis, supra note .
37. M. Holt Ruffin, Introduction, in Civil Society in Central Asia 3, 23 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999).
38. Zhovtis, supra note , at 59.
39. At the end of 1996, there were approximately fifty private television stations and twenty-five radio stations. By 1997, there were only fifteen television stations and ten radio stations. These reductions occurred because only a few stations were able to pay the high prices for the right to broadcast. Through purchase and control of stations which broadcast to the entire Kazakh territory, the president’s daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, created a virtual monopoly on the Kazakh broadcast industry. E-mail from Oleg Katsiev, Managing Director of Internews Kazakhstan (March 28, 2000).
40. For a recent example, the independent newspapers, "XXI vek" and "Nachnem s ponedelnika," were unable to publish for weeks when none of Almaty’s publishing houses would do so. "Dozens of Kazakh intellectuals and opposition politicians have appealed to (President) Nazarbaev to intervene on behalf of "XXI Vek." They condemned the refusal by all publishing houses in Almaty to print that newspaper as a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 3, No. 233, Part I, December 2, 1999.
41. E-mail from Jennifer Brick, Peace Corps Volunteer, Samarkand, Uzbekistan (October 20, 1999).
42. Abdummanob Polat, Can Uzbekistan Build a Democracy and Civil Society?, in Civil Society in Central Asia 135, 142-144 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999). Polat notes that 1988-1997 saw a religious revival in Uzbekistan with most Uzbeks following the Imom A’zam maz’hab or Hanifit interpretation, which was the liberal interpretation of Islam that was officially permitted by the government under Soviet rule.
43. Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, Foreign Affairs 22-35 (November-December 1999). See also Sarah Prosser, Taliban Dogma and Power: Looking for the Sources, 16 PRAXIS—A Journal of Development Studies, (forthcoming spring 2000).
44. Kasybekov, supra note , at 73-74.
45. U.S. Department of State, Kyrgyz Republic Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999. The one NGO not allowed to register is a Uighur organization with the stated goal of creating an independent Uighur state in northwest China.
46. Id.
47. Liz Fuller, Backtracking in Bishkek, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report, February 15, 2000.
48. In addition to the pitfalls between the local governments and NGOs, foreign aid groups must keep a careful eye on where their funds are being spent. Various "expose" pieces in the recent years have publicized wasteful foreign aid expenditures. Considering foreign aid money usage is beyond the scope of this paper. See infra note 103. For a reply to a critique of wasteful USAID expenditures in Central Asia, see Susannah Wood, "Gravy Train" Speeds by Ordinary Central Asians: But Are All American Programs in the Region Guilty by Association?, Surviving Together, Fall 1997, 5-6.
49. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 35.
50. Supra note . Indeed, there is a public dialogue in Central Asia regarding the influence of international legal aid organizations and international norms on new NGO legislation. For an example of local criticism against international legal aid, see The Legal Regulation of NGOs: Central Asia at a Crossroad, The Times of Central Asia, March 24, 1999. This article argues that ICNL and GTZ muddy the legal waters by advocating for competing draft legislation and that ICNL works toward an Anglo-American approach. For a reply to this article see Letters From Our Readers, The Times of Central Asia, April 29, 1999. In this reply, ICNL president Dr. Leon Irish and Program Director for the NIS/FSU Natalia Bourjaily state that they work in collaboration, not competition, with GTZ, the Council of Europe, the Open Society Institute, and other international organizations. Also, they stress that ICNL "encourages countries to study NGO regulation from different countries in order to understand what the key issues are and to avoid problems."
51. World Bank Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to Non-governmental Organizations (Discussion Draft) 1, citing Cooperation between the World Bank and NGOs—FY96 Progress Report (1997).
52. World Bank Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to Non-governmental Organizations (Discussion Draft) 2 (May 1997).
53. Id. at 4.
54. E-mail from John Smart, RPCV 1995-97, Bukhara, Uzbekistan, and former director of Aid to Artisans in Uzbekistan, 1998, (November 27, 1999).
55. Zhovtis, supra note , at 62.
56. Draft Kazakh Non-profit law, Article 42.
57. Uzbek Non-profit Law, Article 18.
58. Draft Kazakh Non-profit Law, Articles 21 and 22; Uzbek Non-profit Law, Articles 16 and 17; Kyrgyz Non-profit Law, Articles 10 and 11.
59. Id.
60. Draft Kazakh Non-profit Law, Article 22.
61. Uzbek Non-profit Law, Article 16. While the charter requirement remains, the Kyrgyz Non-profit Law has no provision for founding agreements.
62. E-mail from Jennifer Brick, Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV), Samarkand Uzbekistan (October 20, 1999). For a historical perspective on this particular NGO, I was working with the Samarkand Regional Language Center in 1996 when it first gained official registration. The Center Director was overjoyed when, months after the 1996 registration, he received his official stamp. Being able to put an official stamp on documents is the mark of power and legitimacy in post-Soviet societies.
63. An exception to these burdens is included in the Kyrgyz Non-profit Law, which provides re-registration free of charge. See Article 40.
64. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 35.
65. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Economic Activities in Central Asia, November 3, 1999.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Uzbek Non-profit Law, Article 32, "A non-governmental, non-commercial organization shall pay taxes, duties, and other payments to the budget and non-budgetary funds, and shall also benefit from advantages according to the procedure established by the legislation."
69. Kyrgyz Non-profit Law, Article 17, "Information on revenue return structure and the amount of property of a non-commercial organization shall be submitted to the state bodies in accordance with the current legislation."
70. Supra note .
71. Uzbek Non-profit Law, Article 8.
72. ICNL New Changes for NGO’s due to the adoption of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Non-governmental Non-Commercial Organizations (1999).
73. E-mail from local NGO activist in Uzbekistan (December 1, 1999). I do not use the names of local NGO activists per their requests.
74. Supra note .
75. Joyce Connery, NGO Community at Risk: So Much Money, So Little Sustainability; Horton and Kazakina, supra note 8, at 53.
76. Horton and Kazakina, supra note 8, at 53, citing Kazakh Tax Code, Article 34, cl. 6. Currently, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek tax laws do not address the issue of grants from foreign or local donors. The Kazakh legislation states that taxes will not be levied on grants to nonprofit organizations. However, the Kazakh legislation also points out that grants received for charitable purposes, but then not used for the intended purposes, will be subject to taxation.
77. Cooper, supra note , at 216.
78. I had several conversations in Uzbekistan from 1995-1997 with local grant recipients and locals who work for Western organizations. The consensus opinion was that the tax collection system was in shambles. Targets of tax collection, most often small commercial businesses, were greeted in their shops with the tax collector and members of the militsia, who would intimidate the businessowner into paying some amount so that the tax collector would leave the business in peace. Tax collection is one symptom of the rule of law problem.
79. "Kazakhstan Tax Changes Effective of January 1^st, 2000," International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1.
80. Id. at 2.
81. E-mail from Richard Remias, International Center for Not-for-profit Law, March 8, 2000.
82. Supra note .
83. Zhovtis, supra note , at 64, citing Bulletin, "Human Rights in Kazakhstan and the World," no. 10, October 1997.
84. Uzbek Non-Profit Law, Article 8.
85. Zhovtis, supra note , at 64.
86. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 41. Also, interview with Uzbek government official.
87. E-mail from Western aid provider, who preferred not to be identified, December 8, 1999. He gives the example that an environmental NGO could approach the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources.
88. E-mail from local NGO activist "When our Center begin work-we work as Women Information center by Women’s Committee n Chokimiayt (governmental structure). All our work (publishing Information Bulletin) was very control, people check all materials, and deleted all, that had some negative moments. And my friends and me organize new independent Non-governmental Women Center. . . we collaborate with Institutes and university and librarians of our city, we distribute for them our Bulletin, and they distribute its [sic] for other people."
89. E-mail from local NGO activist, December 1, 1999.
90. ICNL document, Overview of the Legal/Regulatory Environment for NGOs in Uzbekistan (1997).
91. Telephone interview with a Western aid representative, October 18, 1999. The importance of implementing legislation is confirmed by a second Western aid representative, who writes, "The real problem in Central Asia is implementation. Certain countries can have decent laws on the books, and they do not operate at all. The new law in Uzbekistan, which is an improvement on the former law, for example, has not shown any effect positive or negative on the operation of NGOs." (E-mail to the author, November 17, 1999)
92. Ikramova & McConnell, supra note , at 201.
93. Interview with a Central Asian government official, who preferred not to be identified, October 21, 1999.
94. Zhovtis, supra note , at 66.
95. P.J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, 112 Foreign Policy 85 (Fall 1998).
96. Connery, supra note , at 1.
97. Horton & Kazakina, supra note 8, at 43, citing Memorandum from Acacia Shields, Human Rights watch, to Scott Horton, re: Freedom of Associations Concern in Central Asia (Mar. 4, 1998); Human Development Report—Uzbekistan 1998. Report prepared under UNDP auspices by the government of Uzbekistan.
98. Polat, supra note , at 149.
99. Human Development Report—Uzbekistan 1998. The report was prepared under UNDP auspices. It is slightly unclear who exactly prepared this official report. V.A. Golishev, the State Advisor to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, writes in the Foreword, ". . . global human development reports (are) prepared annually by many countries under the auspices of UNDP. . . Many academics, civil servants, and independent experts have been involved in the preparation of this report." The tone of the Foreword and its author imply that the Human Development Report was approved by the Uzbek government.
100. Ikramova and McConnell, supra note , at 201.
101. Kasybekov, supra note , at 80.
102. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 23, (1998).
103. Critiquing international donor efforts is beyond the scope of this paper. However, see e.g. Thomas Carothers, Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy 4 Democratization 109-132 (Autumn 1997); Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy 76 Foreign Affairs 22-43 (November/December 1997); Janine R. Wedel, A Few Favored Cliques, in Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998, 83-119; Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, Evaluating NGO Strategies for Democratization and the Reduction of Ethnic Conflict, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1999), www.ceip.org/programs/democr/NGOs/index.html.
104. The term "civil society" has itself been controversial. For a good analysis of its academic and political development, see Starr, supra note , 27-33.
105. Connery, supra note , at 3. See also Mendelson and Glenn, supra note 102. Anecdotal examples of such opportunism includes experiences of Returned Peace Corps Volunteer Fred Denker, (Namangan, Uzbekistan, 1995-97) "I quickly found out that the Orphan’s Fund and the Women’s Group. . . were in it strictly for what they could get out of it. I was rather put off by their greed." (E-mail, November 16, 1999) Sometimes the NGO leader simply takes the granted money or thing for his or her personal use. PCV Jennifer Brick of Samarkand, Uzbekistan (1997-99) related that the Director of the Samarkand Regional Language Center had requested Peace Corps funds for a satellite dish for the center’s educational use. The result was that the only person to use the satellite dish’s capabilities was his daughter (E-mail, October 15, 1999). RPCVs Angela Rivers Bernhardt and George Bernhardt, with experiences from Ust Kamenagorsk, Atyrau, and Taldy Korgan, Kazakhstan (1995-97), found that "the "local activists" were interested in getting money and jobs for themselves, their friends and their family versus any other goal." George Bernhardt had to discontinue his relationship with an Ust Kamenagorsk NGO because "they were using all of their funding for other things not related to the NGO." (E-mail, November 14, 1999).
106. Connery, supra note , at 1.
107. Because they work directly with local NGOs, Peace Corps Volunteers and other foreign aid volunteers are often the most likely individuals to speak about such NGO internal power disputes. Some consultants and foreign aid donors hear about or are manipulated by local NGO leaders trying to win support, and consequently donor approval, against their rivals. John Smart, RPCV (Bukhara, Uzbekistan, 1995-1997) supports this view—"I had a problem with a crafts association in Bukhoro: they developed factions within, and split into two separate organizations. I tried to work with both, and for a time they both recognized me as a neutral party, but eventually I had to take sides."
108. From 1995 to 1997, I had two such experiences with women’s NGOs in Tashkent and Samarkand, Uzbekistan. In the end, the rival leaders of the Tashkent women’s group split, through the mediation efforts of a U.S. donor organization. One woman stayed as leader; the other formed her own group. In Samarkand, the two rival leaders of a women’s organization also split, with the one out of control forming her own group, as well. Once these crises are resolved, the groups tend to continue successfully. All the women’s groups mentioned here are still functioning.
109. Kasybekov, supra note , at 78.
110. Kyrgyz Non-profit Law, Articles 13-14.
111. Telephone interview with Western aid donor, October 18, 1999.
112. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Richard D. Heffner, ed., 1956).
113. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995).
114. Organizations, in Civil Society in Central Asia 270 (M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, eds., 1999).
115. Kasybekov, supra note , at 82.
116. E-mail from John Smart, Uzbek RPCV and former director of Aid to Artisans, November 27, 1999.
117. Cooper, supra note , at 222. Roundtable discussions between NGOs and governments are also suggested by Zhovtis, supra note , at 68.
118. Kasybekov, supra note , at 67.
119. Zhovtis, supra note , at 68. This effort at NGO promotion is being addressed by USAID Central Asia Office of Democratic Transition’s constituency-building project. For six months in 1998, I worked as an intern on this project conducted by Counterpart Consortium. Various project activities included the creation of television and radio public service announcements, articles about successful NGOs in local newspapers, and project contests to spur NGO activity.