Staff summarize Asia-related events at Harvard, including presentations by Nancy Chen, Donald Clark, David Shambaugh, Xin Chunying and Jeffrey Sachs.

Donald N. Clark: "Protestant Christianity and the State: Religious Organizations as Civil Society in South Korea"

Jin Chen

Professor Donald Clark gave a comprehensive overview of the Christian organizations as civil society at work in South Korea. He first characterized important features of a civil society, followed by an explanation of how Christianity in South Korea fits in a model of civil society. He subsequently described a rather sharp distinction between Protestants and Catholics in the context of Korea, which mirrored Korean history and attitudes. He traced back the origin of Christianity in Korea and described five or six phases of Christian civil society experience in South Korea. He detailed the confrontation between Christianity and the state in the North Korea between 1945 and 1948, as well as the evolution of this relationship in South Korea up to the present day. He concluded that Korean Christianity has gained enormous vitality in opposing the authoritarian state and that it now faces a greater test to maintain its vitality in a time of unprecedented freedom and prosperity.

Korea's Christian churches include representatives of all social strata and are autonomous and "democratic" in their structures. People’s right to meet and practice their religion is guaranteed by the state and protected by the legal structure within certain limits. Thus, observing Christian activities in Korea is one way to study civil society in relation to the state. Korean Catholics and Protestants both were built up by missionaries from abroad. Catholics have practiced under the umbrella of one central church authority since Catholicism reached Korea in the late 18th century, while Protestants groups in Korea reflect the many missionary organizations that have operated in Korea since 1884. The Koreans identify the term "Christianity" with Protestantism and refer to Catholicism as something very different, "the religion of the Lord of Heaven." In the beginning, Korea's Catholics had to meet underground and were often caught and killed by the state for practicing a dangerous heterodoxy. When Korea's first Protestant community was founded in the 1860s, believers thought that they were beginning a new religion. The Protestant experience has diverged sharply from the Catholic through most of the twentieth century, and Professor Clark mainly focused on Protestants.

In their formative period (1884-1910), Korea's first Protestants and Protestant missionaries had to deal with the legacy of Christianity as an outlawed religion. They built Christian schools as centers of modern education and the independence movement, as well as religious institutions. The reputation of these schools much enhanced the prestige of Christianity. At the same time, Christianity directly addressed the political and social crises that confronted Korea as it was succumbing to Japanese colonial domination. The early part of the Japanese occupation (1910-1920) tested Protestantism in confrontations with the new colonial regime. Professor Clark described three episodes which represented cases of Korean Christians negotiating the terms of their religious and organizational autonomy from the Meiji constituted system that at least provided for religious freedom on the surface. Following the 1919 independence movement, Korean Protestant leaders operated schools and sought to bolster Korean consciousness through education, and Christian writers contributed to magazines that spread an enlightened vision of Korean freedom. They pursued their "cultural nationalist" activities of language and history studies in an attempt to protect Korean culture from obliteration by Japanese colonial policies. Korea's Christians in the last years of the Japanese occupation were forced to practice Japanese Shinto worship as part of Japan's policy of assimilating Koreans. Those who accepted the Japanese proposition were condemned by other Koreans as collaborators who betrayed their Korean identity. Much enmity was generated among Christians because of individual decisions in this crisis.

Professor Clark went on to describe Cho Mansik's loss of power to Kim II-sung, which represented the domination of the Soviet-backed Communist leadership over the Korea Democratic Party, founded by Cho Mansik, which brought together many Christians and other factions of anti-Communist North Koreans. Cho's removal was a serious blow to North Korea's Christians and non-Communists. They migrated southward to escape persecution, burdened with a whole range of grievances against Soviet-backed leftist regime. As a result of this history, Protestant Christianity and the South Korean state have maintained a tense but mutually supportive relationship. The Christian community supported the South Korean government's posture of military opposition to North Korea yet fought against domination by the state. They largely supported Syngman Rhee's leadership as President Rhee cultivated the "Christian government" aspect of his presidency, even though many Americans found Rhee dictatorial and undemocratic in many ways. They generally supported anti-Communist regimes until President Park Chung-hee's military rule. They opposed the undemocratic tactics of the Park regime and criticized the low-wage, export-driven development model which provided little labor rights but privileged the emerging business class. The confrontation between church and state became particularly acute in the 1970s, after Park Chung-hee declared a state of national emergency and began ruling by decree.

During the 1970s and 80s, there was an "explosive" growth in the rate and scale of all Korea's Christian churches, as well as a proliferation of secondary organizations and institutions to give expression to every kind of interest and impulse in the church. The division and subdivision of Korea's Protestant churches, however, were detrimental to the political power of the overall movement. More importantly, increasing middle class prosperity and democracy posed a grave threat to the future of South Korea's Protestant community. Many churches have grown rich and are even suspected of corruption.

Finally, the election of Kim Dae-jung as President in December, 1997 marked a striking departure from the troubled 1970s and 80s. The economic crisis and the urgent need to widen communication with North Korea have forced even the most conservative elements in South Korean society to open their minds to new possibilities. In the 1990s, while Koreans in general are enjoying unprecedented prosperity and freedom, the rate of growth for churches has slackened. In some churches, membership has even fallen. For the first time in its history, Korean Protestantism faces a test of how to maintain its vitality in the absence of strong adversity.

Prof. David Shambaugh: "The United States and China: Strategic Partners or Strategic Competitors?" November 19, 1999

Edward Cunningham

In an illuminating talk, Prof. Shambaugh criticized the bilateral use of the phrase "constructive, strategic partnership" in characterizing US-China relations into the new millennium, and effectively highlighted the most important aspects of the US strategic agenda for the near future. Arguing that in effect "strategic" is in many ways synonymous with "security," Prof. Shambaugh reasoned that the disparity in world-view and regional security goals between the two countries leads to a current relationship based on competition and not partnership. While competition needs not mean adversarial stances, the best that the two nations could hope for is to be future cooperative partners. Such status is still, however, a far cry from the strategic partnership identified by the current American and Chinese governments. Strategic concerns have been dominant, but not constant, throughout the Sino-US relationship since 1949. Prof. Shambaugh argued that the relationship has progressed from one of strategic adversaries in the 1950s and 1960s, to partners in the 1970s and 1980s, to competitors in the 1990s and on. The declining Soviet threat that served as the glue that brought the two nations together in the first place produced a need for the two countries to find a new strategic rationale for their relationship following Sino-Soviet détente in the late 1980s. They have had a difficult time establishing strategic commonality ever since. While both the US and the PRC knew that they collectively stood against the USSR, they now lack the vision to construct what they stood for in common. A long-term, stable bilateral relationship needs a strategic floor to under-gird dialogue and not allow other peripheral interests to dominate the relationship. In the current presidential campaign, Sino-American relations has been referred to by George W. Bush as one of strategic competition, while other Republicans use harsher language. Even former Clinton officials, such as Winston Lord, argue that the term should "be struck from the vocabulary of US-China relations." Prof. Shambaugh expressed that on an empirical basis, "strategic competitor" is indeed the better word for describing the PRC. However, he cautioned that competitor is distinct from the term "strategic rival" or "adversary." In his attempt to analyze the semantics of such terms, Prof. Shambaugh proposed a relationship continuum which progresses from "harmonious" on the left to "antagonistic" on the right and consists of six separate segments. Under the "harmonious" umbrella on the far left, one would have a fully institutionalized allied relationship. The next type of relationship, moving a notch to the right, would be a "strategic partnership," such as that shared between the US and France or the US and Singapore. Such a partnership would include extensive military training, intelligence sharing, a shared world-view, and similar political systems. Farther to the right and approaching the median of the continuum is a "cooperative partnership," which means a more limited cooperation level in certain defined areas without a strategic dimension. According to Prof. Shambaugh, this is the most Sino-US relations can hope to achieve, at least in the near future. Transcending the median and entering into the realm of antagonism, strategic competitors share some element of cooperation but are often troubled by strategic friction caused by differing views and national security interests. Shambaugh saw the current relationship between the two nations to lie somewhere within this range. Farther to the right, classic Cold War-style strategic adversaries/rivals define their opposite as an explicit strategic threat and devote resources (usually military) towards countering one another, continually contesting the other's attempt to expand their own sphere of influence. Finally, outright enemies harbor the potential for full-scale war. However, the current situation is not reminiscent of the Cold War, according to Professor Shambaugh. China lacks the desire, political influence, and the military power to contest the US globally. The PRC seeks a multi-polar world in which American hegemony is diluted and dissolved, viewing US hegemony as "the major threat to world peace." The US does not oppose the construction of a multi-polar world but speaks consistently of the importance of US leadership in such a world order. As a result, the US has been working to expand and strengthen bilateral and multilateral security alliances around the globe, while official Chinese policy calls for the abrogation of all such alliances. A prime example of the strategic disagreement between China and the US is their opposed views on the expansion of NATO and the five bilateral alliances maintained by the US in East Asia. China is especially opposed to the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. From the Chinese perspective, such international actions are mere relics of the Cold War and zero-sum in nature. It is further evident that the definition and goals of sovereignty in international security affairs, especially in regard to humanitarian interventionism, differ greatly between the two nations. Another significant security problem in the relationship is Taiwan. However, China's greatest discomfort is the US security architecture in the Pacific Region, i.e. the Five Alliances, possible TMD capability over Taiwan and Japan, as well as the over 100,000 troops stationed throughout the region. Of course, such concerns exist in addition to various peripheral clashes over non-strategic issues such as human rights, trade, China's political system and so on. There are, therefore, many elements of strategic competition within the relationship. The primary ones include the competition over the nature of the world in which we want to live, the role of sovereignty, the legitimacy of intervention, and the role of alliances. The above-stated friction is basic, not peripheral and is at the core of US-China relations and cannot be negotiated away. According to Shambaugh, we can anticipate increased friction over Taiwan, the issue of TMD and NMD, the US-Japan alliance, NATO activities, the US dual containment of Iran and Iraq, and other issues. Such a reality does not preclude cooperation, however. In terms of security, both nations are opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to North Korea and South Asia. They also oppose chemical and biological warfare. In terms of "low security," they are united in fighting narcotics production and smuggling, organized crime, alien smuggling, and in engendering environmental security and economic security - particularly in the wake of the financial crisis. In short, the strategic ledger contains elements of both cooperation and competition. In light of these considerations, Prof. Shambaugh discussed the Sino-American strategic agenda for the near future. The first issue concerns Asian security: both nations seek peace and stability in the region, but they hold differing views of the sources of instability and stability and how to shape such a future. Maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait is a commonality, as are restraining the nuclear capability of Pakistan and India, regulating the North Korea situation, and maintaining the freedom of navigation throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. A related point concerns the US military posture in the region. The US regards such a presence as a deterrence to aggression in the Pacific Rim. China sees the maintenance of such forces as a tangible show of US willingness to interfere in international matters. Such a fundamental difference has the potential to worsen bilateral relations. China has to understand that the US is unlikely to withdraw from Asia and is in fact welcomed by other Asian nations. Another subject on the future strategic agenda should be China's own military development. While the US recognizes the PRC's legitimate right to modernize its military capabilities and the US worries little about the development of the Chinese military, save in ballistic missile development, it is an area ripe for discussion within the context of military-military exchanges. In more concrete terms, there is a need to create a dialogue between both sides at an operational officer level and to conduct visits to installations. Finally, nuclear arms control should loom large in future discussions. There has been good progress in counter-proliferation over the past few years; the issue now is how to move into strategic arms control dialogue and then bring the Chinese into bilateral or multilateral control talks. While the agenda discussed above offers several signposts of progress, the road ahead still requires intensified engagement. Despite the existence of numerous differences, the relationship between the US and the PRC enjoys the potential for constructive dialogue in a number of arenas. However, reality should not be ignored in an effort to force a strategic partnership, when in reality competitive forces are indeed molding the arena in which the two nations interact.

Xin Chunying "China's Signing of the Two UN Covenants on Human Rights: Implications for Domestic Legal Reform"

Suzanne Yao

On November 12, 1999, the Fairbank Center and East Asian Legal Studies hosted a talk by Xin Chunying, Acting Director of the Institute of Law and the Institute of Political Science of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. Ms. Xin discussed China's signing of two landmark international human rights covenants -- the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, signed on October 27, 1997 and the Civil and Political Covenant, signed on October 5, 1998. She stressed that China's recent acknowledgment of international standards of human rights signifies substantial progress in China's understanding of human rights as something other than "extrinsically given rights." Indeed, Ms. Xin traced the history of development in the field of human rights in the PRC and concluded that until a decade ago, "human rights" as a concept did not encompass citizens' or peoples' rights but instead referred to the rights as obligations of Chinese citizens to the state. According to Ms. Xin, the 1990s marked a decade in which China participated in various international human rights events, including the Vienna Conference in 1993, organizing the landmark UN Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995, and supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1995.

Though Ms. Xin acknowledged the role of international pressure on China's recent demonstrations of support for human rights, she cited "domestic demand" as the dominant factor in propelling progress in human rights. She stressed that market reforms and economic development generated a feeling of empowerment among the urban populace, encouraging a new sense of assertiveness in demanding respect for rights. Similarly, the legal reform of the last two decades created a framework of legal protection for citizens' rights. According to Ms. Xin, the Administrative Litigation Law, which permits citizens to sue government agencies, is but one example of the "beginning of modern constitutionalism in China." The growth of legal education and the legal profession in China also demonstrates the increasing potential of law to function as a stimulus for human rights development.

The need for domestic legal reform following China's recent acceptance of these international instruments is evident in several areas. The use of the death penalty in China for a broad range of crimes, including nonviolent ones, conflicts with the Civil and Political Covenant. Also, the practice of re-education through labor, which is an administrative rather than a judicial prerogative in China, violates current international regulations on due process. The absence of the right against self-incrimination in China is likewise an area requiring reform in order to conform to international standards of criminal procedural law. Although Ms. Xin acknowledged that China's restriction of the rights of citizens to move freely within the country does not accord with the covenants, she warned that this practice will not be easily modified, given the already serious problem with the floating population (now estimated to comprise about 10% of Beijing's total population.) However, Ms. Xin underscored the need for China to use these two UN covenants as opportunities to scrutinize and reform its current domestic legal framework. She concluded that although the ratification of the covenants in the National People’s Congress may be a time-consuming process, by signing the covenants, the government has thus acknowledged that the time may now be ripe for China to join the mainstream in human right practices.