Alan M. Wachman is an assistant professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Formerly, he served in New York as president of China Institute in America (1995-1997) and was the American Co-director of The Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies, in Nanjing, People's Republic of China (1993-1995). He earned an A.B. in Fine Arts and an A.M., as well as a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University. In addition, he received a masters degree in international relations from The Fletcher School. Professor Wachman is the author of Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (M.E. Sharpe, 1994) and continues to study and teach about Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and US interaction with East Asia.

Poring over the ashes of the diplomatic conflagration ignited by Lee Teng-hui's interview with Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) on July 9, 1999, students of diplomacy may now be emboldened to draw lessons from what happened. It is probably too soon to determine whether the diplomatic fire is completely out or whether there are embers remaining from the summer's confrontation that may flare up anew. However, it does seem that Lee Teng-hui's gambit succeeded because Beijing exercised calculated restraint. Beijing's pique was pricked by one phrase President Lee used in response to a question about cross-Strait tensions. Seeking to make clear that Taiwan should not be viewed as a renegade province of China, Lee explained that amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1991 cast cross-Strait relations "as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government." This explicit assertion of Taiwan's status reinforced fears in Beijing that Lee Teng-hui is not committed, as he claims, to the unification of China, but is working to ensure that Taiwan's separation from the mainland endures. Beijing views "China" as a nation-state that must be unified under one government and territorially indivisible. It derives legitimacy, in part, from defending the dignity and integrity of "one China" against foreign and domestic forces that threaten to divide it. Imposing its ideal on reality, the PRC does not concede that China is now a divided state. So, Lee's "state-to-state" nomenclature-indicating that each side is sovereign over only those territories it currently governs-conflicts with Beijing's prescription: that there is one China.

Having failed to extend its effective control over Taiwan by other means, Beijing hoped to subjugate Taiwan by fiat: simply by declaring it to be a part of the PRC. For a time, Taipei paid lip-service to the "one China" principle, so Beijing proceeded as if its view was universally accepted. Speaking of a "state-to-state relationship," Lee Teng-hui thwarted Beijing's efforts to monopolize the interpretation of "one China," appeared to abandon a rhetorical framework that Beijing insists is the sine qua non for negotiations, and excited jingoistic responses from those leaders who are motivated principally by nationalistic impulses. Indeed, Beijing has long threatened that a declaration of independence by Taiwan would be a casus belli. Lee Teng-hui's statement detonated an extraordinarily powerful response in Beijing, and for a time, it was unclear whether Beijing would consider it a provocation to war. Evidently, it did not. Reconsidering the summer conflict in a slightly broader context, one perceives Beijing's rationale for restraint.

The Context 

At the start of 1999, the tenor of cross-Strait relations was comparatively hopeful. In 1998, the second round of talks between Taiwan's Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the PRC's Wang Daohan, Chairman of the Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), were noted more for their diplomatic thrusts and parries than for tangible results. However, because neither side drew blood in the encounter, both agreed that more talk would not hurt. Wang Daohan accepted an invitation to visit Taiwan-a breakthrough of sorts-and was initially expected to make his voyage in March, 1999. By contrast, Sino-US relations were quite chilled. It seems axiomatic that cross-Strait relations are as much a function of relations between Beijing and Washington as they are an independent relationship between Beijing and Taipei. When Sino-US relations are poor, cross-Strait relations are likely to suffer. For most of 1999, Sino-US relations have been on a downswing. Beijing was offended and concerned about the steady drumbeat of criticism and hostility that emerged from Washington early in the year. The spring was a season of accusations that came to full bloom with assertions in the Cox Report that espionage directed by Beijing against the United States had resulted in the loss of technical secrets from American research facilities-accusations Beijing denied.

Beijing was also deeply suspicious of discussions about the potential for the inclusion of Taiwan in a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) regime. Beijing rejected the stated rationale that TMD will enhance the security of the Asia-Pacific region and accused the US of masking an effort to contain the PRC. More significantly, Beijing fiercely opposed the US-led NATO enterprise in Kosovo because it rejected the notion that a state's sovereignty can be legitimately penetrated by outside forces whenever the international community opposes the behavior of a state toward its own citizens. The PRC severely distrusts the United States and is eager to prevent it from remaining an unchecked hegemonic power because Beijing fears that the US is ill-disposed toward objectives that the PRC itself holds dear. With Sino-US relations strained, there was some speculation that the leadership in Beijing was divided over the wisdom of Wang Daohan's proposed trip to Taiwan.

The Bombing and the Book 

In April, Sino-US relations hit a rough patch when President Clinton rejected the terms that Premier Zhu Rongji offered to overcome US objections to the PRC's inclusion in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Two precipitous events compounded this embarrassing disappointment for Beijing's moderates. At about midnight on May 7, US aircraft carrying out a bombing raid over Belgrade launched a missile against the Embassy of the PRC, killing three Chinese and wounding others. The United States swiftly apologized for the attack and stated that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planners who selected the target did not realize it was the PRC Embassy because they were using outdated maps. The PRC dismissed the US explanation as preposterous and permitted infuriated protesters to attack and damage US embassy and consulate facilities in the PRC. The anti-American fury that erupted in the PRC and the vandalism carried out under the noses of police and other authorities heralded a new nadir in Sino-US relations.

Then, on May 19, Lee Teng-hui published a political autobiography entitled Taiwan Viewpoints (reissued in English under the title The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity). The book was roundly criticized by the PRC for offering a provocative and naive proposal that China be divided into seven autonomous regions. The PRC press was especially dismissive of Lee's book, characterizing it as an "attempt to demonize China and sow discord between China and its Asian neighbors" and writing that "Lee himself will be pinned on the pillar of shame in history." In the offending passage, Lee observes that as long as the PRC behaves as a hegemonic power promoting a nationalistic vision of a "Greater China," its neighbors will react to it as a threat and regional stability will be elusive. He writes:

Taiwan has its own identity as Taiwan, Tibet as Tibet, Xinjiang as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia as Inner Mongolia, and the Tungbei as Tungbei. Ideally, if each one were allowed to affirm its own existence, we would see Asia's regional stability enhanced. For purposes of effective management alone, 'Greater China' would be better off divided into perhaps seven autonomous regions which could then compete among themselves and with the world for progress.

Had he left off at that point, ridicule might have been warranted. However, the very next sentence states, "But no such decentralization of power is likely to come about soon. That will not happen until Peking recognizes the autonomy and unique culture of each of those regions and gives them due respect."

Lee also negates the PRC's "one China" policy as obscuring "the Republic of China's status as an independent and sovereign state." He sets out the boilerplate argument that the ROC need not declare independence because it has been a sovereign state since its establishment in 1912. Despite assertions about ROC sovereignty, taken as a whole the book voices support for the reunification of China. Indeed, Lee cites a passage from a speech he gave on July 22, 1998, at the closing session of the National Unification Council, in which he refers-no fewer than fifteen times-to the ROC's aim of reunifying China.

The July 1998 speech is instructive and Lee highlights a portion that powerfully attests to his government's commitment to a unified China, even if under conditions that the PRC will have difficulties meeting for some time. Lee states, "We must take this opportunity to once again state clearly and solemnly: China must be reunited." This is unambiguous. Lee makes clear his view that "although there will be only one China in the future, at present there is one divided China." Referring to the present relationship between Beijing and Taipei, he states, "That the two sides are ruled by two separate political entities is an objective fact that cannot be denied." Then, he states, "our policy toward mainland China is to engage in dialogue on the basis of parity and equality." Finally, he writes that, "Taiwan faces mainland China in a relationship that transcends the 'internal affairs of China' thesis, placing the two political entities on a de facto equal footing." In retrospect, one sees that the book is consistent with Lee's "state-to-state relationship" formulation. Lee clearly stated in July, 1998, and restated in his May, 1999, publication the view that the ROC is an "independent and sovereign state." He casts the cross-Strait relationship as one between equals. It is puzzling that Beijing reacted with such unbridled rage to Lee's July interview, but reacted with what had become almost routine disregard when his book was published in May.

The Bombshell 

Although Lee Teng-hui had never used the phrase "state-to-state relationship" before his July interview, the substantive difference between his replies to the Deutsche Welle interviewer and his previous statements is slight. Nevertheless, they set off a conflagration. Beginning on Monday, July 12, PRC officials strongly criticized Lee's malicious "splittism," and there was palpable concern in Taiwan, too, about the significance of the president's formulation.

From afar, Lee's decision to use the "state-to-state relationship" formulation did not seem one in which the ROC bureaucracy was widely involved. In Taipei and abroad, ROC officials gave the impression of being caught off-guard and could not articulate well the implications of Lee's statement. When asked whether the president's notion of a "state-to-state relationship" precluded the "one China" policy to which the ROC had nominally adhered at a press conference, Su Chi, the Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan, left the impression that Taiwan was, indeed, abandoning the "one China" principle that was perceived as a device imposed by Beijing to control and restrict Taiwan. In what may have been an unfortunate choice of words, Su said ". . . it is unnecessary for us to stick to our previous position. We shall clearly define the equal footing in order to usher in better cross-strait relations toward the next century." In Beijing, the abandonment of the ROC's "previous position" sounded ominously like an abandonment of the "one China" framework. Su never said that the ROC no longer adheres to a "one China" policy, even though he did reinforce the impression that that framework had not served Taiwan's interests and, so, was replaced by the Lee Teng-hui's new formulation. By way of explanation, Su said that the ROC interprets "one China" to mean "that there will be one China in the future . . . . Currently, there are two different governments, and two different states. 'One China' will be meaningful in the future." At one point, Su stated: " we have to dismiss the myth about PRC's "one China," because it has been utilized by the Mainland to our disadvantage. If we want to normalize cross-strait relations, the myth must be left behind."

Understandably, Su's explanations aggravated concerns in Beijing, rather than assuaged them. If Beijing had been listening for the "magic words" that would have enabled them to dismiss Lee's comments as isolated ravings of the president, they did not hear them from Su Chi. What was heard, instead, was an elaborate justification of Lee's remarks-in places less artful than was needed-leaving the impression that the ROC had abandoned the "one China" formula. When Taipei's celebrated diplomatic machinery was not running with its customary finesse, it seemed that Su Chi was scrambling, too.

In Beijing, Zhu Bangzao, the spokesman for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued a scathing condemnation on July 12. Among what Zhu said was that Lee had taken a provocative step "against the universally recognized one-China principle." Zhu spoke as if Lee Teng-hui was solely responsible for causing and fully capable of resolving the conflict between Beijing and Taipei. Zhu suggested further that Lee Teng-hui had deceived "Taiwan compatriots" and by articulating the "state-to-state relationship" formula had defied the "will of the people." Beijing's concern about how the leader of a democratic state comports himself with respect to the will of his electorate is particularly intriguing, considering that it is at liberty to act without reference to popular opinion in either the PRC or in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the most frightful portion of Zhu's statement was the last paragraph. He said: We hereby warn Lee Teng-hui and the Taiwan authorities not to underestimate the firm resolve of the Chinese government to safeguard the sovereignty, dignity and, territorial integrity or the courage and strength of the Chinese people to fight against separation and Taiwan's independence. The reunification of China represents the general trend and the popular will. Lee Teng-hui and the Taiwan authorities should size up the situation soberly, reign in at the brink of the precipice, and immediately cease all separatist activities.

It is worth noting that Zhu warned Lee Teng-hui to consider what he was about to do, pull himself back from the brink, and desist. This was the first indication that the PRC would exercise restraint. Zhu's warning sent this message: you have stepped up to the line, were about to step over it, and should know that to do so has grave consequences. However, the PRC chose not to interpret Lee's interview itself as sufficient grounds for the immediate use of force.

On July 14, the official Xinhua News Agency released a statement denouncing Lee's "naked separatist remarks" as an effort to internationalize Taiwan's problem while deceiving the population of Taiwan. The Defense Minister, Chi Haotian, was quoted as saying that the PLA "is ready at any time to safeguard the territorial integrity of China and smash any attempts to separate the country." On July 15, the PLA's Liberation Army Daily printed a commentary cautioning Lee that he was "playing with fire" and admonishing him that the PLA "will never tolerate separatist conspiracies or sit idly by and watch even an inch of territory being cut off without taking action." On July 17, Xinhua called Lee a "sinner in history." On July 19, Jiang Zemin himself went on record to warn Lee to take heed and described the assurances he had received from Washington that the US policy toward cross-Strait relations were unchanged.

The day before, President Clinton phoned Jiang Zemin and reiterated the US commitment to a "one-China" policy. The message to the PRC was that the US policy was unaffected by Lee's statement. President Clinton addressed the matter publicly in a press conference held on July 21. When asked about the rising tension in the Taiwan Strait, Clinton reaffirmed the US policy. "Our policy is clear: we favor the one-China policy; we favor the cross-strait dialogues. The understanding we have had all along with both China and Taiwan is that the differences between them would be resolved peacefully." As to Lee Teng-hui's statement, President Clinton was rather dismissive. He said, among other things, "I'm not entirely sure . . . exactly what the Lee statements were . . . trying to convey."

The reaffirmation by President Clinton probably went a long way to reassure Beijing that regardless how offensive Lee Teng-hui's comments seemed to them, neither the United States nor other influential powers were inclined to disrupt relations with Beijing by adjusting their policy toward Taiwan. Throughout July and August, tensions remained high as scathing pronouncements were made in a well-orchestrated propaganda campaign against Taiwan. The PRC press kept up a steady barrage of invective aimed at both Lee Teng-hui and his statement. The assaults were published in daily doses of hyperbolic claims and denunciations, ad hominem attacks, and relentless efforts to employ Beijing's reading of history to demonstrate the lack of foundation in Taipei's claims. The Xinhua News Agency released a commentary in late July calling Lee Teng-hui "an inconstant [sic] and capricious Machiavellian," and a "sophist who uses specious words to cover his true nature as a deep-rooted separatist." In another newscast, he was called a "political hyperactive child." In the most extreme example of this tirade, Peng Guangqian, a PRC military analyst, was widely quoted as denouncing Lee as a "deformed test tube baby cultivated from the political laboratory of international anti-China forces."

Intended or Unintended Restraint? 

Beyond rhetoric, the PRC also flexed its military muscles. On August 2, the PRC announced that it had successfully test-fired a long-range ground-to-ground missile of the sort that would enable it to attack Taiwan. These and other provocations intensified the sense of crisis, prompting the US to urge both sides to avoid elevating hostilities. In August, The New York Times reported that Chinese government officials warned that the PRC may find itself compelled to "punish" Taiwan for Lee's statement. This threat coincided with an increasing assertiveness by PRC pilots who were flying threatening sorties ever closer to the center of the Taiwan Strait, the accepted dividing line between the airspace of the PRC and that of Taiwan. Evidently, the US made quite clear that PRC aggression would be greeted with US military retaliation. It also issued six demarches to Beijing and Taipei demanding that the two desist from elevating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Still, on August 11, Hong Kong's South China Morning Post carried a story that quoted an unnamed "Beijing source," who indicated that The Chinese leadership has decided to use an appropriate degree of force against Taiwan, possibly including the occupation of an outlying island, should Taipei authorities refuse to abandon President Lee Teng-hui's "two states theory." Top units including the party's Central Military Commission and the Leading Group on Taiwan have been empowered to decide on the timing as well as severity of the military action to be taken.

According to the unnamed source, hardliners at Beidaihe wanted to take action soon after the October 1st National Day celebrations. One press report claimed that "hundreds of belligerent generals had written to the Communist Party leadership demanding a tougher stand against Taiwan." More moderate figures in the leadership wanted to step up psychological warfare immediately while deferring a decision to use force until after March of 2000, when a new president would be elected in Taiwan. If the new leader renounces Lee Teng-hui's "two states theory," military action can be avoided.

The Washington Post reported on a sequence of meetings held in the US between non-governmental specialists on China and emissaries from military and research institutions in the PRC. The message from the Beijing visitors was that the PRC was itching to respond to Taiwan with force, but sought to understand how its punishment of Taiwan would be viewed in the United States. This story was the subject of discussion at a White House press briefing on August 13. Journalists questioned National Security Council spokesman David Leavy about the article and about a report that the PRC Embassy in Washington had been stating that the PRC was "going to take action." Leavy said "I would steer you away from that report . . . we have not received any threats or ultimatums from the PRC." When pressed, Leavy stated even more clearly, "It's our intelligence community's best judgment that there aren't any signs that there is PRC military activity underway." This was a significant clue that the elaborate rattling of sabers by the PRC likely formed a response that would be restrained to psychological warfare.

Among professional observers of the PRC, there was a sense that Beijing had its hands full. It had already begun to confront the Falun Gong movement. It was eagerly preparing for the fiftieth anniversary celebration in October and was deeply troubled by the plight of negotiations with the US over the question of admission to the WTO. This constituted ample reason to avoid involvement in a military showdown. Moreover, the PRC's relationship with Washington had already hit bottom and was showing signs of slow recuperation. On August 12, for the seventh time in seven years, Taiwan launched a bid to reenter the United Nations. What differed this time was that the United States actively opposed the bid. "We wanted to make clear that our 'one-China' policy is unchanged," one US official explained.

In light of the reassurance Beijing received from Washington about its unwillingness to allow Lee Teng-hui's remarks to alter the US posture, the PRC began to ease up. On September 9, Jiang Zemin announced two conditions that Taipei would have to meet before Wang Daohan would be permitted to go to Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui would have to retract the offensive "two states" formulation and Wang would only agree to meet with Lee Teng-hui if Lee appeared in his capacity as chairman of the KMT, not as president of the ROC. The significance of these machinations was not the actual conditions, but rather that Jiang was still prepared to see Wang Daohan go to Taiwan. However, despite signs that Beijing was prepared to resolve the crisis, the military continued to threaten. They were accompanied by press reports concerning naval exercises conducted by the PRC late in July. As images were broadcast on television of exercises off Fujian province, other reports indicated that the PLA was staging exercises off Zhejiang province in order to prepare for the take-over of small islands, such as those under Taiwan's control.

One may legitimately question what the PRC was planning for in the fall. In the aftermath of a KMT party convention on the last weekend of August, the PRC implied that if the KMT or the ROC codified Lee's "state-to-state relationship" in any official form-such as an amendment to the ROC constitution, the PRC would invade. As it happened, the KMT forum did not endorse a proposal to codify Lee Teng-hui's "state-to-state" formula into the ROC constitution, although the party clearly backed Lee's assertion.

Early in September, Jiang Zemin set off for a tour of Southeast Asia that ended with his attendance at the APEC conference in New Zealand. When he arrived in Thailand on September 4, Jiang was quoted as saying to a group of Thai Chinese businessmen that Lee Teng-hui's statement of July 9 had courted "grave danger and [was] a great challenge to the "One China" policy, which the world recognizes." In Auckland, Jiang met with President Clinton and the two evidently discussed the cross-Strait tension. In the press conference that followed their meeting, President Clinton made an odd statement that was either an effort to quell the PRC's anxieties or a simple slip-of-the-tongue. In any event, rather than reaffirm the US' "one China" policy, as he was wont to do, President Clinton announced that: We favor one China. We favor a peaceful approach to working out the differences. We favor the cross-Strait dialogue. Our policy has not changed and will not change. [emphasis added]

If Clinton meant what he said, stating that the US favors "one China" was an extraordinary rhetorical gift to Beijing. Even if he simply intended to reaffirm the "one China" policy, Clinton's remarks surely helped Jiang Zemin calm fears in Beijing that the US was working against the PRC's interests.

Still, the PRC kept up its pressure against Taiwan. In mid-September, the PLA conducted a mock invasion of Taiwan that was widely covered in the PRC press. The September 14th issue of People's Daily carried an article in which it warned that if Lee sought to formalize his statement by writing it into law, ". . . a fatal attack is a certainty. Today Lee is dragging Taiwan into a war, and the biggest victim will be Taiwan." Despite the inflamed rhetoric and signals of bellicosity, nothing further happened. One may never know what Beijing's strategy was because while Taiwan focused its energies on the potential for man-made calamity, nature struck instead.

Earthquake The earthquake of September 21, and the terrifying aftershocks, seemed for a brief moment to put the tit-for-tat bickering between the two sides of the Strait into sober perspective. At 1:47 a.m., Jiang Zemin issued a statement of concern and offered condolence to victims of the earthquake, as well as the assistance of the PRC. For an instant, one wondered whether the natural disaster would compel both sides to overcome their incessant gamesmanship. However, it soon became clear that the rivalry was too ingrained for either side to forego the opportunity for mutual criticism. Taipei expressed thanks but refused the PRC's assistance. In the days that followed, the question of Beijing's sincerity became a separate subject of dispute. Beijing did back away from its campaign-by then nearly two months old-of vitriol and dander. The PRC press underscored the commonality of the Chinese "flesh and blood" by emphasizing the intimate ties between those on both sides of the Straits. On September 24, ARATS sent a letter to the SEF asking for an account of Taiwan's needs. The letter also informed Taipei that the PRC expected foreign donors of aid to funnel their efforts through Beijing. Taipei severely denounced the latter point as "sprinkling salt on the wound" --an effort to politicize otherwise humanitarian efforts to rescue and rebuild in the wake of catastrophe. Beijing, however, was incapable of realizing how its actions were insensitive. The spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing responded to the criticism by lamenting that, "Some people in Taiwan still stubbornly view the motherland as an enemy." Beijing backed its verbal support for Taiwan with a donation of $300,000 in aid and also thanked foreign donors for the aid that they sent.

One thesis is that the earthquake offered the PRC just the opportunity it needed to back away from an impending military strike against Taiwan that might have cost the PRC more political capital than it was worth. However, on the basis of public information, there is evidence that the PRC was exercising restraint even before the earthquake. President Clinton's comments in Auckland and his consistent affirmation that the US policy had not changed may have helped. The US statement on September 15th that it would not support the proposal at the United Nations to endorse Taiwan's bid for membership may have also helped. The vocal opposition by the administration to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act proposed in Congress may also have appeased the PRC. As indicated, cross-Strait relations are a function of Sino-US relations and when Beijing's relations with Washington are warmer, cross-Strait relations may be less hostile.

In the wake of the earthquakes on Taiwan, the campaign against Lee seems to have dissipated. In addition, Jiang Zemin evidently recognized the futility of trying to accelerate the pace of unification. Relinquishing the objective of speeding up the process that he evidently had at the beginning of 1999, in October Jiang told an interviewer for The Times of London that "By the middle of next century . . . we will resolve the question of Taiwan and accomplish the great cause of national reunification by adhering to the policy of 'peaceful reunification' and 'one country, two systems,' after the successful return of Hong Kong and Macao," fifty years hence. Taipei, too, found marginal means of offering accommodation. Koo Chen-fu offered to return to Beijing to underscore how much he and his compatriots hope Wang Daohan will visit Taiwan. As another gesture of accommodation, Lee Teng-hui agreed to greet Wang Daohan as chairman of the KMT, not as president of the ROC.

Considering the relaxation of hostilities in mid-September, it was interesting that in early November the PLA conducted military exercises off Shandong province. According to the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Zhang Wannian, the exercises were meant to reflect the PLA's determination to "safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity," a thinly veiled reference to Taiwan's challenge. It is possible that the announcement of the exercises coincided with the publication in Foreign Affairs of an article by Lee Teng-hui, in which he again articulated Taiwan's position, again using measured terms that were aimed at appealing to the sympathies of the cosmopolitan reader.

Tentative Conclusions 

The risk Lee Teng-hui took in July seems to have paid off. By introducing the phrase "state-to-state relationship" into the lexicon of cross-Strait relations, Lee has succeeded in forcing Beijing and the international community to acknowledge the message that Taipei had been broadcasting for some time. That is, the Republic of China (ROC) is a state the sovereignty and independence of which is equal, not subordinate, to that of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Thus far, Taiwan has not lost much in exchange for the renewed international attention to its claim to sovereign equality.

Lee Teng-hui's gambit was by no means assured when he framed his response to the German interviewer. Indeed, reconsidering the reaction of the PRC since July, it seems entirely plausible that the PRC came close to exacting a heavy toll for what it regards as Lee's impudence. To date, Beijing has not done so. A tentative conclusion about the PRC's behavior is that Beijing has a greater capacity for calculated restraint and is skilled in the employ of a more extensive range of diplomatic machinations than that with which it is commonly credited by its critics. Beijing evidently understood it had more to gain by refraining from, rather than by engaging in, the violent clash its rhetoric and diplomatic posturing otherwise suggested was imminent.

On the basis of information available in the public domain, it is not really possible to know whether Beijing intended from the start to exercise restraint while engaging in psychological warfare or whether it was impelled by the earthquake that struck Taiwan on September 21st to reassess its initial determination to use more bellicose actions. If the PRC attacked Taiwan or territories under its control after the earthquake, Beijing's action would surely have been perceived as dastardly. Alternatively, pulling in its horns and refraining from the use of military force against Taiwan, allowed Beijing to maintain the moral high ground while waiting to see whether its chillingly stern warnings to Taiwan have any effect. It is quite likely that the leadership in Beijing intended no more than a show of force, not a use of it, from an early moment in the imbroglio. A skeptic might conclude that Beijing simply assessed its probability of successfully using force, determined that its capacities fell short of even limited objectives and, thus, contented itself with a propaganda campaign. Considering the PRC's ill-considered decision to use force against Vietnam in 1979 and the counterproductive missile exercises it staged in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, the PRC's actions last summer suggested a greater capacity for restraint than had been manifested earlier. By affecting hostility through contrived exercises and bellicose reports planted in the press, Beijing also demonstrated its deftness in deceptive diplomacy that was quite masterful.