Wagner relates how traditional collective patterns of identity once common across Central Asia were reshaped by the shared Soviet past. Now cross-currents of nationalism, internationalism, and the revival of clan heritage work to create a complex new landscape of ethnic, national, and trans-national (or even multi-national) self-definition.

Hélène Perrin Wagner is a Ph.D. candidate in Inner Asian & Altaic Studies at Harvard University. She was formely a Fellow at the Maison Française d'Oxford and a Lavoisier Fellow at Marmara Universitesi, Istanbul, Turkey. She has conducted a total of three years of fieldwork in Central Asia, Mongolia, and Turkey. She is currently completing a manuscript on Turkic communities in Eurasia.  Her personal home page is: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hperrin/

Since the independence of the five republics of Central Asia in 1991, the search for a sustainable definition of collective identities in the post-Soviet era has become a core issue of Central Asian politics. The group identity factor has always played an important role in the political history of the region, fostering loyalties and creating coalitions of clans around a khan in nomadic areas or retinues to emirs in the oases. Today, this basic dynamic of Central Asian political culture has once more come into play in the post-Soviet Eurasian space as a tool for maintaining regional equilibrium. Despite the vastness of Central Asia, which covers more than 4 million square kilometers and is larger than India or Western Europe, the commonality of a shared socio-historical legacy is frequently evident and is often stressed by Central Asian leaders.

The Socio-Historical Legacy

All the republics in the region share a recent colonial past; the Russian Empire advanced to the southeast into the Kazakh steppe at first in the 18th century until it finally established political and administrative control over the Steppe Region and Turkestan in the 1860s-80s. The Russo-British Pamir Treaty of 1895 was a pivotal step in redefining indigenous identities in reference to a modern territorial criterion. After 1917, a Soviet nationality policy took the relay, and the "National Delimitation" plan (natsional'no-gosudarstvennoe razmezhevanie) was put into place in 1924-25. This plan was aimed at shaping new national identities based on language and territory. The Soviet constitution further solidified the new national frameworks in 1936 by granting the republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzistan, and Tajikistan the status of Union Republics.

The implementation of nationality policies has added to the complexity of defining collective identities in the region, rather than eliminating old patterns of identity and replacing them with new ones. The "Homo Sovieticus" model of identity has been superimposed and well assimilated by the Central Asian populations, especially in elite circles, adding new levels to the already multi-tiered Central Asian identities. This phenomenon strengthens a contextual definition of collective identity, which is a particularly key aspect of Central Asian identity dynamics.

Though contemporary responses in Central Asia to the problem of defining collective identities have tended to oscillate between a national framework of reference and a transnational one, a combined approach integrating both levels of identification has started to be clearly articulated. The changes in the way identity is defined have up to now been manifest primarily in terms of policies. The political elites' discourses have made the national-transnational linkage increasingly clear and self-conscious, while also aiming at harmonizing the distinction.

This national-transnational linkage refers to differentiated but simultaneous processes of national and regional integration relying on both old and new definitions of collective identities.¹ "Old" definitions of collective identities such as clanship identity that cut across contemporary national boundaries are alive and well. Such traditional frameworks of identity tend to focus more on social dynamics due to the legacy of weak political centralization and the dominance of confederate types of political alliances in the region. "New" definitions of collective identities have been implemented mainly from the top since the second half of the 19th century and have principally relied on the "new" ideology of nationalism as an instrument to control nationalities.

A family poses outside their yurt

The post-Soviet period, however, has also seen the emergence of a transnational paradigm, which has translated into a policy of "open regionalism" which does not focus on any one preferred regional partner. The leadership in each state tries to maintain a constant balancing act between the Central Asian republics and peripheral countries such as Russia, Belorussia, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, all home to significant populations of the Central Asian diasporas. This policy stand of transnational balance is supported in part by the enduring issues created by having to deal with a multi-ethnic civil society and a political culture of "group politics."

At the level of popular culture, perceptions of nationalism and transnationalism differ from official constructions; traditional definitions of collective identities continue to endure. The political leadership gets significant information and guiding policy principles from this social context, initiating, in Habermas' terminology, a process of "socialization of the state" rather than the reverse the "etatization of society" [italics added]. At both levels of analysis, the political and the social, we find the same dynamic tension influencing regional dynamics of integration: tension between transnational models of identity and an "isolated nationalism," the latter attacked by President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzistan as an obsolete option for the third millenium. In both cases official inclusive definitions of collective identities are critical for regional stability because of the almost overwhelming importance of socio-ethnic groups in Central Asia.² Leaders readily point to the ineffectiveness of relying on economic regulatory mechanisms or on late interventionist actions to solve ethnic conflicts. As a result, "national doctrines" are clearly articulated.

Social and political processes in Central Asia, while distinct, interact to define policies. For example, policymakers respect social identities such as clanship affiliation while attempting to make them evolve into forms that are less primordial and uncritical.

To summarize, the particular combined dynamic we are witnessing flows from 1) the pre-colonial history of the region where indigeneous sociological traditions are involved, 2) the political past inherited from the tsarist and Soviet regimes, and 3) new forms of identity derived from the national framework of the new states and from the consciousness that kindred groups sharing common ethnic terms, lifestyles, and potential economic interests are located outside national territorial borders.

A Qurultay gathering

The common point shared by all five republics is a large-scale demographic distribution within the Central Asian region; however, each "titular nationality" is both host to and guest in a neighboring state, and the peripherial host countries exist outside of Central Asia, in China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq to name a few. According to the last all-Union census of 1989, all the major nationalities (in demographic terms) were part of a diaspora. According to a demographic study of ethnic groups in the USSR and abroad conducted in 1991, the Kazakhs were estimated at 6.5 m in Kazakhstan. They also constituted minorities in Uzbekistan (900,000), Kirghizistan (38,000), Turkmenistan, (88,000), and Tajikistan (11,000.) Outside of Central Asia, there were 1 million Kazakhs living in China, 50,000 in Iran, and 100,000 in Mongolia, as well as populations in Afghanistan, Turkey, and elsewhere. The most populous ethnic group in Central Asia, the Uzbeks, were similarly spread out in the region. In 1989, there were 14 million Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, 1.2 million in Tajikistan, 550,000 in Kirghizistan, 332,000 in Kazahhstan, 317,000 in Turkmenistan, 1.8 million in Afghanistan, 15,000 in China, and 10,000 in Saudi Arabia (round figures).

At the political level, the shared socio-historical legacy of the region works toward bringing together closer economic cooperation and enhancing diplomatic mediation. This shared legacy also acts as a

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...erated as a group identity enhancer, while remaining open to transnational dynamics. There were integrative references to other ethnic groups in Central Asia in local officials' discourses, communicating good neighborly relations.

2) Multinational qurultays

Each government organizes an assembly of the different nationalities living in the republic in the capital city. Russians, Kurds, Koreans, Kazakhs, and others gather to celebrate multi-ethnic harmony by dancing, singing, and wearing traditional costumes.

3) Assemblies of the national diaspora

Central Asian governments actively encourage these assemblies. A qurultay is organized each year in the capital city of Kazakhstan. Kazakhs are encouraged to repopulate the republic, which has a very low population density of 6 people per square kilometer, one of the lowest in the world. In Turkmenistan, international associations are set up, such as the "World Humanitarian Association of World Turkmens," established during an international gathering of Turkmens in May 1991. In Tajikistan, the official association Payvand ("The Link") organized an annual meeting of Tajiks from the diaspora.

In traditionally sedentary areas of Central Asia, epitomized by the urban cultures of Samarkand and Bukhara, the mode of identity consciousness was originally very localized and usually circumscribed to an oasis identity. People refer to themselves as an inhabitant of a certain city, as a Kashgarli for instance. The type of collective identity that exists in sedentary regions is less plural and structurally simpler because segmentary divisions are less prevalent, although they do resurface in rural areas. The traditional sedentary culture of Central Asia is embodied by the Uzbek, Tajik, and Uighur ethnic groups.

In Central Asia, identity pluralism is expressed in different ways in the sedentary culture, most typified by the interaction between Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Tajiks speak a language closely related to Iranian Persian, while the Uzbeks speak a Turkic language. In reality, bilingualism, even trilingualism is prevalent. Everyday popular culture is very similar for both groups. Tajiks and Uzbeks intermarry frequently, further blurring identity demarcations. It is important to bear in mind that identifying at one level of group aggregation is not exclusive of another level of group identification. In this sense, in both sedentary and nomadic areas, we find the same multi-tiered definition of collective identity, relying either on context or on personal choice. Saying that one is a Tajik does not mean one is not an Uzbek at the same time; the distinction may not be as simple as an opposition between ethnic nationality and citizenship status. The children of mixed marriages sometimes elect distinct nationalities.

An Uzbeki imam

Research indicates that even among sedentary groups, the older people's favored mode of collective identification is made in reference to the kavum, which can be translated as "people, tribe"⁵. Without entering into a sociological analysis of the kavum category among sedentary populations, it is safe to point out the resilience of pre-modern definitions of collective identities in both nomadic and sedentary areas.

Categories of national collective identity are mainly constructed by nationalist elites. What is remarkable in the Central Asian case is the discrepancy between the national political constructs of the Tsarist and Soviet periods and the conclusions sociological data from Central Asian communities suggests. Although national identity construction influences processes of identity formation at the popular level, the noteworthy element is the resilience of social dynamics.

In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, the government's recognition of this resilience has prompted policies increasing the socialization of the state. These policies integrate a social framework of reference, as in the case of the "mahallization" (mahalla = neighborhood) of the Uzbek state, which is a transfer of a communal structure to the state. Throughout the region, this realization has led to an emphasis on the national-transnational linkage in nationality policies as a more accurate reflection of Central Asian identity dynamics.

...and women

Building a National Identity in Post-Soviet Central Asia

The feelings of Central Asian leaders toward the process of national independence were mixed from the start. In spite of culturalist and demographic arguments predicting that the fall of the USSR would be initiated by the Southern Muslim republics, the Central Asian republics were perhaps paradoxically amongst the slowest to declare independence from the USSR.

The Central Asian leaders benefited for a time from the option of remaining within a loose union and had in that spirit started to issue declarations of sovereignty in 1990. President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan consistently attempted to mediate efforts in the direction of a reformed Soviet Union, standing by Mikhail Gorbachev. However, the demise of the Soviet Union on December 8, 1991 in Minsk and the ensuing creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forced the Kazakh President to abandon any attempts at preserving the status quo. Kazakhstan declared independence very late, on December 16, 1991. The other republics gradually became independent in the fall of 1991, starting with Kyrgyzistan on August 31, Uzbekistan on September 1, Tajikistan on September 9, and Turkmenistan on October 27.

At the level of public opinion, the data reveal that reluctance toward national independence was shared by both government officials and citizens. It also shows that a large consensus existed in Central Asia in favor of preserving the Union across national divisions. This indicates that it is appropriate to view the region in terms of a regional Central Asian identity. As it turned out, Central Asians were actually more supportive of the Soviet Union than the Russians. A referendum conducted by the Central Commission on Referendums on March 17, 1991 indicates that the percentage of Soviet citizens wishing to remain within the Union was the highest in the Central Asian republics. The percentages were distributed as follows: Turkmenistan 97.9%, Tajikistan 96.2%, Kyrgyzistan 94.6%, Kazakhstan 94.1%, Uzbekistan 93.7%. In Russia the percentage, although still high, was significantly lower than in Central Asia, at 71.3%, and was explained in general by the differences in development and urbanization⁶. On the whole, the population of the USSR showed conservative tendencies regarding a change of regime, but nowhere else was it more conservative than in Central Asia.

The figures regarding Central Asia are supported by empirical observation. A national form of identity has been constructed that is not deeply rooted in individuals' consciousness. As far as loyalty is concerned, it is clear that family, community or clan will come first.

The pervasiveness of clan allegiances in present state structures is also an indication of a predominantly group-oriented society clad in national disguise. Uzbekistan is one republic, in particular, where regional "clans" dominate the state apparatus. Another example is Turkmenistan, where President Sapermurat Niyazov or "Turkmenbashi" (the head of the Turkmens) merged a Soviet-style personality cult with traditional Central Asian hero worship traits by crystallizing national unity around his personal figure.

What are the perceptible repercussions of post-Soviet nation-building on collective identities in the region? The resurgence of post-Soviet national identities has led individuals to search for their own identity and has given rise to new antagonisms. However, nation-building efforts also helped maintain national cohesion to some extent. Tajikistan is a major example of the failure of the nation-building process in the immediate post-Soviet period, a failure which led to a civil war.

More negative developments in the post-Soviet era include radical nationalism, increased anti-semitism, "russophobia", and Islamic militancy. These extremist tendencies are held in check by the authoritarian governments of Central Asia, sometimes in cooperation, but they are not entirely suppressed; such extremism provokes out-migratory fluxes of threatened minorities. In March 1999 the Russian government created a Ministry Department for the Ethnic Problems of the Russian People to acknowledge the situation for Russian minorities living in the "Near Abroad".

Post-Soviet nation-building has reinforced the position of the titular nationality in each of the republics. Russian is kept as a second language and as a regional lingua franca, but the state language is now that of the titular nationality. The so-called politics of "De-Russification" have expanded control of the titular nationality over organs of power, administration, education, and the media.⁷

At the same time, primordialist notions, that is, an unquestioned allegiance to the group with which one identifies, are also an issue. In Kazakhstan for instance, some portions of the population cannot yet come to terms with the notion that non-ethnic Kazakhs can be considered as "Kazakhstanis." The distinction between nationality and citizenship appear confusing and unacceptable for many.

The Role of the State in Regulating Transnational and Multinational Identities in Central Asia

The newest approaches toward a re-definition of collective identities from the top have thus attempted to integrate both national and transnational paradigms more or less harmoniously. Central Asian leaders are acutely aware of the fragile state of multi-ethnic relations, which combined with the economic crisis could evolve into a serious upheaval. The deeply set transnational character of the region also means more vulnerability at the frontiers. Most of the hitherto local ethnic conflicts have been provoked by unresolved border issues coupled with disputes over access to natural resources such as water and land. One striking illustration of this occurred in February 1999, when President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan was targeted by a terrorist attack with links to the Afghan Islamists, the Talibans. Because the region is fraught with potential explosiveness, the major guiding policy principle on the nationality question is "stability." Nazarbaev expressed his concern that had the Uzbek president been killed, one would have seen general regional unrest, possibly spreading northward to Russia.⁸

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the firmest believers in regional integration, not only with the other Central Asian partners but also with the rest of the CIS members. Nazarbaev, the most creative leader in the region, proposed a plan in 1994 for a Eurasian Union to replace the CIS. For the time being, less ambitious projects are implemented such as a Central Asian Union (CAU) involving Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan stays aloof, preferring bilateral accords, partly to maintain control over its oil reserves. Tajikistan has to recover from its civil war.

Karimov makes it a point to stress that the CAU is not meant to be a political structure but an economic one. While there are differing degrees of participation in the integrative process in Central Asia, the whole project is motivated by two main factors, the economic situation and the nationality question.

Akaev has recently developed a foreign policy doctrine termed the "Diplomacy of the Silk Road" which downplays nationalism in favor of regional and sub-regional forms of integration. He is bringing in a multi-culturalist metaphor, the Silk Road, the ancient bridge of communication between countries and civilizations (from China to Rome initially) in an attempt to re-construct an extremely vast space of cooperation. He calls it the "Region of the Road", reflecting the Central Asian version of the politics of globalization. As he points out, "the geography of the Great Silk Road knows no limits or restrictions."⁹

Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan expressed his views on the question of nationalities in January 1999 after his reelection. He has castigated nationalism as a "selfish" option and the mono-national state as a dead end. He has reaffirmed the regulatory role of the state in nationalities issues, in association with "sponsors" in the civil society, who finance projects that should not be dependent on the national budget. At the same time, Nazarbaev has stated that the state should not refuse to defend the "national interests of the Kazakh people." Finally, he elaborated on a distinction between a collective Kazakhstani identity which is "external", and an "internal" one where people should keep their sense of identity intimate, implicitly drawing on a model of secularism.¹⁰

Leaders of the Russian, German, and Korean communities were present and approved of the presidential address to the parliament, while calling for more foreign investments. Economic development for the minority communities would enable the regime to evolve from a pluralisitc one to a consociational one, where leaders representing each of the "cultural pillars" in the society secure bargaining and vetoing power.

As we can see, a pluralistic definition of collective identities is key to understanding post-Soviet Central Asia. Despite the importance of nation-building, one should not neglect the social dynamics upon which such efforts depend. Furthermore, this approach allows us to seriously consider the national-transnational linkage. In contrast to the plural reality of identity dynamics in the region, Central Asian leaders tackle the issue of regional stability in a remarkably consensual way. Finally, Central Asian politics should be read in terms of self-imposed regulatory mechanisms, both political and economic, introduced to avoid the potential costs of an unsuccessful transition to full-fledged national independence. It is a matter of regional security for the Central Asian states to work out consultative and cooperative solutions if only because uncontrolled and violent expressions of collective identities could potentially spread out in the region and in its periphery. 

Notes

1 We will not enter here into a debate on the naivete of substantialist accounts of group identities. We will accept them as useful categories in practical terms, since they are real to the people who are confronted with concrete identity choices. In the Central Asian context, identity choices are, for that matter, quite varied. See Brubaker, R., Nationalism Reframed, Cambridge UP, 1996, for a critique of the critiques of substantive definitions of group identities

2 Bruk, S. I, Narody SSSR v strane i za rubezhom, Moscow, 1991

3 The Kongrat are a clan located both in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Interestingly enough, members of Kazakh clans in southern Kazakhstan do not consider them to be Kazakh although they live in Kazakhstan and speak Kazakh. The Dulat are a Kazakh clan of southern Kazakhstan

4 The social segmentary system, consisting of clans, sub-clans, and even finer divisions, is notionally equivalent in the social sphere to a political nation

5 Rakhimov, R. R., K voprosu o sovremennyx tadjiksko-uzbekskix mezhnatsional'nyx otnosheniiax. Sovietskaia Etnografiia, 1, 1991

6 Zdravomyslov, A. G. Mezhnatsional'nye konflikty v postsovetskom prostranstve, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 1997

7 Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 3/24/99

8 The recent series of terrorist attacks in Moscow demonstrates that the danger is real

9 Nezavisimaija Gazeta, 3/10/99

10 Panorama, 1/22/99