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May Fourth: Some Fin-de-Siecle Reflections
Volume III, No. 3. Summer 1999
Written by Leo Ou-fan Lee   
While the Chinese Communist Party continues to claim the May Fourth Movement as a crucial event in modern China, the vast majority of Chinese people certainly do not pay attention to the passing of its anniversary. Even the scholarly community in China has shifted its attention away from grandiose discussions about the future of the Chinese nation to more academic discourse. Perhaps this is a good development because it finally allows Chinese scholars to focus on the May Fourth project of "enlightenment."

Leo Ou-fan Lee is professor of Chinese Literature in the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard. His new book, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China 1930-1945 will be published by Harvard University Press this summer.

I was asked by the editors of this journal to write a piece "detailing the continual political and symbolic significance of the May Fourth Movement and perhaps what its anniversary means to various segments of the Chinese population." This is not as easy as it sounds. What can we say about May Fourth which has not already been said before, especially on the occasions of its past anniversaries? These reflections stem from someone who has taught, researched, and thought and rethought about the subject over many years. As each anniversary goes by, my mood has gradually turned more somber and less effusive, while my views have become more critical. At century's end, it seems that what took place in the beginning of the century appears more remote. In a much-changed cultural atmosphere in present-day China (not to mention Taiwan and Hong Kong), the relevance of May Fourth has become diluted.

The significance of public anniversaries depends on what the original event, person, or work means for successive generations. Thus, it becomes inevitably an issue of communal interpretations across time. It also depends on how a people or culture measures time and commemorates what may be regarded as seminal dates or moments in history. The significance attached can vary from time to time and from year to year. May Fourth has been a significant date, like June 4th in recent memory. Now the two are often linked together. For many intellectuals and students in China, this year, 1999, holds a certain polemical significance because it commemorates not only the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre but also the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. By comparison, the 80th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement seems to pale in significance ­ especially as it arrives at the tail end of the 100th anniversary of the founding of Beijing University (which last year stole much of its thunder).

"May Fourth" now finds itself sandwiched between two seminal anniversaries and is naturally claimed by both as a bone of competing ideological contentions. For the students who marched to Tiananmen Square ten years ago, the commemoration of May Fourth was certainly on their agenda; in fact, the early march may have been a symbolic reenactment of the student demonstrations on that memorable Sunday afternoon, May 4th, 1919. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also lays a historical claim on May Fourth in its own interpretation: the Party was founded two years after the outbreak of the May Fourth movement, and official historiography still traces the intellectual origins of the CCP to the May Fourth movement. While the former connection is obvious, the latter is less so. Still, due largely to this official patronage, May Fourth has become a seminal date, one that marked the crucial phase of New Democracy in the Party's version of revolutionary history as well as the formal beginning of the "modern" (xiandai) period of Chinese literature. Consequentially, since the early 1950s, a veritable scholarly industry of modern Chinese literature ­ new textbooks, new materials, and new ideological interpretations emphasizing the dominant role of the Chinese Communist Revolution ­ has been established in the nation's universities.

To what extent can we say that May Fourth marked the beginning of the Chinese Communist Revolution? The word "revolution" with its modern meaning was not invented by May Fourth intellectuals; it came into popular parlance earlier, as promoted by Sun Yat-sen and Liang Qichao in different contexts. Marxism and various strains of socialism were indeed introduced into China during the May Fourth period, but the name of Marx was known earlier. It is true that one of the May Fourth leaders, Li Dazhao, often regarded as the father of Chinese Marxism, wrote some seminal essays on the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution. So did Chen Duxiu, who as editor changed the ideological orientation of the journal New Youth toward a revolutionary path around 1923. Can the CCP therefore claim that it "owns" the May Fourth movement? We know that both Li and Chen died early. Li was executed, which made him a martyr, and Chen was castigated as a "Trotskyist" ­ a "revisionist" school whose proper place in the Chinese revolutionary tradition is still not fully "rehabilitated" to the present day. Then there are quite a number of Chinese intellectuals in Taiwan and abroad who, following Hu Shi, have treasured the liberal legacy of May Fourth and considered the year 1949 as marking the end of Chinese liberalism ­ hence the May Fourth legacy itself ­ on the Mainland.

All these positions have been well known to scholars and intellectuals. However, to the masses of Chinese peasantry at large, May Fourth holds no particular significance ­ certainly not as meaningful a date as the traditional Qingming festival. For the latter-day financiers and businessmen in Hong Kong and Taiwan (some of whom now serve as advisors to the Harvard University Asia Center), given the Asian market crisis, they would be hard pressed to even remember May Fourth, much less attach any significance to it. For that matter, they would not even show considerable excitement about the anniversary of June Fourth (except perhaps for the owner of a clothing company in Hong Kong who made a fortune out of selling sweatshirts with photos of Tiananmen student leaders printed in front or back). I would suspect that for most Chinese people May Fourth is reserved for students and intellectuals and, as such, is strictly an intellectual affair. In the present climate of market economy and global capitalism, who cares about intellectuals except intellectuals themselves?

In fact, even among China's intellectuals themselves ­ professors, writers, artists, journalists ­ a large number have recently renounced their calling and gone into commerce (xiahai); quite a few have become millionaires. The very nature and status of being an "intellectual" (zhishi fenzi), which may be regarded as a May Fourth tradition, is now being challenged from all fronts. This, to me at least, may have been the most remarkable change since we celebrated the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth movement ten years ago. At that time, I could still write with enthusiasm about intellectual debates and "cultural self-reflection" that raged in China since the mid-1980s and about such seminal intellectual figures as Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu, and Gan Yang. Now all three are in this country as voluntary or involuntary exiles. The critical spirit they have embodied and exhibited in their writings seems to have lost in a new money-crazed "post-socialist" (or Chinese capitalist) society. Some years ago, a few young intellectuals based in Shanghai raised the alarming issue concerning the loss of the "the spirit of humanism" in the leading intellectual journal published in Beijing, Dushu (Reading). Their views did not receive even a polemical echo among intellectuals in the nation's capital.

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This does not mean, however, that such May Fourth tenets as humanism, individual emancipation, democracy, and science have been largely forgotten. Rather, the intellectual discourse has changed as the intellectual class itself undergoes a steady process of academicization and institutionalization. That is to say, most Chinese intellectuals have become academics who are teaching in universities. Whereas some of the early May Fourth leaders also taught in the nation's leading universities, their societal renown exceeded their scholarly reputation. Now, most Chinese intellectuals are like their American counterparts who write in a jargon-laden style that is increasingly "pedantic" and less accessible to the general public. Even the essays in Dushu now read like academic articles. May Fourth intellectuals seized upon the print medium to wrestle control from their conservative enemies and to establish their own cultural hegemony, in order to carry forth their self-appointed task of intellectual "enlightenment" (qimeng) and societal transformation. The current debates in the nation's leading journals, however, demarcate a field of contention within itself ­ a kind of intellectual "infighting" generally tolerated by the regime in part because the "masses" are no longer drawn into it. Whereas the level of its intellectual and scholarly quality is much higher than before, it no longer carries the kind of cultural aura and influence which intellectual leaders like Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu could still command in the mid-1980s. Li and Liu certainly considered themselves as carrying forth the spirit of May Fourth because their writings, published at the height of "culture fever," constituted a form of "new enlightenment."

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In this changed context of the 1990s, one could only look at the May Fourth in an "academic" light, and there is certainly no shortage of books and articles which continue to reassess May Fourth authors and ideas, particularly in my own field of modern Chinese literature. In other words, as mentioned before, those who are still obsessed with May Fourth are mostly scholars and students. While this is not the place to delve into details of scholarly reinterpretations, a few observations may be in order.

In this limited sense, the present intellectual scene in China is livelier than ever. At least four intellectual positions can be discerned with their respective spokesmen now locked in fierce intellectual combat with one another. First, a trendy postmodernism attempts to theorize about the current scene of cultural production and consumption. Second, a return to "national learning" (guoxue) advocates vaguely anti-Western, if not xenophobic, sentiments. Third, a semi-official brand of liberalism, with its power-base around some influential Party cadres, seeks to establish their own hegemony among intellectuals. Finally, a loose grouping of what the liberal officials call the "new left" finds dissatisfaction with all of the above three trends. Whether any of these has anything to do with the May Fourth tenets of "science" and "democracy" is a moot question. The two terms have themselves become institutionalized and turned into official slogans. Still, the very fact that these intellectual positions are passionately argued in print and zealously read by a sizable number of readers is a phenomenon worthy of attention.

Unlike Hong Kong or Taiwan, where serious intellectual journals are scarce, the number of scholarly books and journals in China remains large, which seems to indicate that there also exists a fairly large readership. In fact, the publishing scene in China is thriving in spite of the increasing popularity of television and Hollywood movies. This serious readership consists, so I was told, mostly of university students who still buy books in large quantities not for entertainment but for intellectual curiosity and the desire for new knowledge. This was a surprising finding from my informal interviews with book publishers in Shanghai last year, who promptly signed me up for (re)publishing several volumes of my previous writings. This personal experience has led me to a truism about the May Fourth Movement which has received insufficient attention because it is taken for granted: namely that the students who demonstrated were not only activists but also avid readers. They acquired new ideas and "new knowledge" not only from the classroom but from the numerous books and journals they had bought or borrowed. The formation of this new reading public was the precondition for the May Fourth movement.

I also began to rethink Li Zehou's well known formulation of the May Fourth legacy some years ago ­ that its "enlightenment" project remains unfinished because it has been subsequently subsumed under the patriotic need for "national salvation." True, but not exactly so. "National salvation" (jiuwang) was an ideological imperative arising out of nationalism and war, whereas "enlightenment" was an intellectual and educational enterprise. The two are conceptually not compatible with each other because they belong to different categories. Thus, in theory at least, the one does not necessarily rule out the other. Although Li deplores to some extent such a substitution, he also recognizes the necessity of national salvation for obvious reasons. In my view, the problem lies with the May Fourth formulation of "enlightenment" itself, particularly on the part of its leaders who took upon themselves the task to "enlighten" the people and succeeded perhaps only in converting some of their students. This highly elitist attitude has done more harm than good. If we read through some of the manifestos of the "study societies" (xueshe), which mushroomed in the May Fourth era and were organized mostly by students and other followers of the May Fourth causes, we can feel the poignancy of their plight. Having been "enlightened" by their teachers, they wished to do something about their nation and society for which they were singularly unequipped by their idealistic rhetoric. Without sufficient knowledge and the capacity for self-reflection, they easily succumbed to the clarion-call for "national salvation." In other words, the task of enlightenment ­ as manifested not so much in the elitist penchant of the teachers as in the students' continued quest for new knowledge ­ had barely begun in the May Fourth era and remains unfinished. Ironically, it is only now that intellectual life has finally achieved some degree of normalcy in the universities so that at least for some students the educational system and the publishing industry have provided enough incentive for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. How long will this last before the global wave of consumer culture takes over books and learning, no one can tell.

As a final reflection, when we reread the works of May Fourth leaders at century's end, it is no longer possible to share their naive faith in progress and rationality and in an utopianism based on a teleological conception of time and history ­ that the future must be better than the present and the past. The following effusive paeans by Chen Duxiu to a new century in the pages of the New Youth could only have been uttered at the beginning of this century (1916):

The epoch in which we are living, which epoch is this? It is the beginning of the sixteenth year of the twentieth century. The changes of the world are evolutionary, different from month to month, year to year. The shining history is unfolding, faster and fasterTo live in the present world, you must raise your head and proudly call yourself a person of the twentieth century; you must create a new civilization of the twentieth century and not confine yourself to following that of the nineteenth. For the evolution of human civilization consists of replacing the old with the new, like a river flowing on, an arrow darting forth, constantly continuing and constantly changing.

His statement was well put but also alarming for those of us still living at the end of the twentieth century. Part of Chen's statement proves prophetic: things are indeed constantly changing, faster and faster, but not necessarily for the good of "human civilization." Chen and his generation of May Fourth intellectuals clearly did not share Max Weber's deep-seated ambivalence concerning the Western process of modernization. The few conservatives of the time who raised some serious concern about the progress of Western civilization after the First World War elicited nothing but scathing criticism from the May Fourth radicals. Ironically, eighty years later, the most eagerly discussed book among Chinese intellectuals is a biography of the last years of Chen Yinque, a scholar of traditional Chinese culture and certainly not a radical Westernizer. This may have been a reaction against the radical excesses under the Maoist regime. In fact, Chen Yinque is now seen as one of the few who dared to defy Mao. Some would regard it as marking a return to Chinese tradition. In my view, the Chen Yinque phenomenon bespeaks a peculiar nostalgia about a bygone era in which scholarship, not politics, was the sole criterion that defined the identity of a Chinese intellectual. Chen was one of the very few scholarly masters eminently qualified for this definition ­ a rarity amidst a century of ideological polemics. If some Chinese intellectuals now find themselves in a scholarly and even pedantic mood, it is because they have paid too much for the glory of "national salvation," a stance which led directly to their victimization under Mao. Their nostalgia for Chen Yinque may signify their own "withdrawal syndrome" or perhaps a belated dedication to intellectual enlightenment without any ulterior purpose. If so, the academicization of Chinese intellectuals may have done something good. Now that the May Fourth project of enlightenment itself is subject to scholarly scrutiny and criticism, it is no wonder that May Fourth has indeed become an official date ­ a historic symbol somewhat shorn of its intellectual substance.

Perhaps this somber view may prove to be a sober antidote to the festive and self-congratulatory mood which usually accompanied past May Fourth anniversaries. I would like to suggest that we all forget about May Fourth for the next nineteen years and then gather again for a final summation of its legacy at its 100th anniversary ­ in the year 2019. At that time, I may or may not be around to write another commemorative article.

 
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