Piracy has plagued the region of Southeast Asia for many centuries and continues to do so to the present day, in what are some of the world’s most strategically important waterways. This paper will examine the phenomenon of piracy in Southeast Asia, and how it is linked to failed cooperation of many nations to govern overlapping territories in a shared body of water.

Catherine Zara Raymond is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She is currently involved in research into maritime terrorism and piracy, under the Institute’s Maritime Security Program. She is a co-editor and contributing author of the volume Best of Times, Worst of Times; Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific. Her articles have been published in Maritime Studies Journal, the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, the Straits Times and a number of other publications. Her latest paper is to be printed shortly in the Terrorism and Political Violence Journal. She is regularly consulted by the media. Most recently she was interviewed on CNBC regarding security in the Straits of Malacca.

She was previously an analyst at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St Andrews University, Scotland. Her research has been used for a book on the Al Qaeda terrorist network, British Ministry of Defense reports and the latest edition of the Jane’s Counter Terrorism Manual. She has carried out research for Security Risk Management Consultancies and has conducted profiles on terrorist groups for governmental and non-governmental bodies.

Introduction

In Southeast Asia acts of piracy continue to take place on an almost daily basis and show no sign of abating. It has been well documented that incidences of piracy rose sharply at the end of the last century, and although the trend is now slowly beginning to reverse in many of the affected areas, the pirate attacks themselves have taken on worrying new characteristics and it is possible to observe a number of disturbing changes in attack trends.

One of the most significant developments is the drastic increase in the occurrences of kidnap-for-ransom incidents. In the past, this tactic had been the reserve of terrorist groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) which operates in and around the islands of the Philippines’ Sulu and Basilan provinces and in the Tawi-Tawi chain of islands that stretches south to the north eastern coast of Malaysia’s Sabah state.¹ In the last few years ASG has been successfully boarding vessels, kidnapping members of the crew and demanding a ransom for their release. In an alarming development, it now seems that pirate groups have also adopted this tactic. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which collects and collates information on piracy attacks around the world, in 2004 alone there was an unprecedented number of kidnappings in which a total of 43 crewmembers was kidnapped by pirates in Southeast Asia, of which 36 occurred in the Straits of Malacca, one of the world’s most important international waterways.² What is more worrying is that the demands for ransom made by the pirates are in most cases met by the employers of those kidnapped victims in order to secure their release. This kind of response is likely to encourage the pirates to continue carrying out this type of attack since pirates are aware that their tactics will most likely pay off.

What is made clear by these bold and unrelenting attacks is that governmental efforts aimed at curbing the problem are failing. Issues of sovereignty, international law, responsibility and resources (or lack of them) are hampering regional efforts aimed at addressing the problem. As a result Southeast Asia, and in particular the waters around the Indonesian archipelago and the Straits of Malacca, will remain a high risk zone for pirate attacks. Real and comprehensive solutions to the problem must be developed at the regional level before the economic and human costs of piracy increase further.

This paper will examine the problem of piracy in Southeast Asia, with attention to emerging trends. It will focus in particular on the world’s most piracy-prone areas around the seas of Indonesia and the Straits of Malacca. It will then go on to examine some of the anti-piracy measures that have been implemented. Their effectiveness will be analysed and their shortcomings explained. Finally, this paper proposes some recommendations on the direction that future counter-measures should take.

Piracy or Armed Robbery?

From a strictly legal perspective, there is very little piracy per se in the world today. The standard legal definition of piracy that is used in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, states that piracy is:

(a) “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”³

It is axiomatic to the Law of the Sea Convention’s anti-piracy regime that piracy jure gentium (i.e. in international law) cannot occur within the territorial sea, internal waters or archipelagic waters of a State.⁴ The difficulty with this is that most attacks on ships do occur within the twelve-mile limit of a state’s territorial waters or the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state and not on the high seas. Therefore such incidents are not legally considered piracy; they are in fact armed robbery. To overcome this problem the IMB has adopted the following broad definition:

“Piracy is an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”⁵

However this wider definition, which covers all acts regardless of the location of the vessel, is not recognised in international law.

As the majority of attacks in Southeast Asia take place within territorial waters, as is the case along most of the Straits of Malacca, or within archipelagic waters such as those of Indonesia or the Philippines, it is important to note once again that under international law these incidents are in fact considered armed robbery. However, for the purposes of this paper the term piracy will be used in such cases.

Southeast Asia – A Hotspot for Attacks

Southeast Asia, with its vast and complex coastlines encompassing both the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos - whose islands total over 20,000 in number - is a fertile ground for the growth of piracy. Targets are never in short supply. Approximately one-third of the world’s trade and half of the world’s oil passes through the Straits of Malacca, a waterway of great strategic importance that has been described as one of the arteries of the regional economy. Around 60, 000 ships transit the Straits on an annual basis. These vessels are particularly vulnerable when making their passage through narrow waterways of the Straits, and the high volume of maritime traffic helps to provide cover for a perpetrator’s attack. The tankers are easy prey for smaller boats with outboard motors that can travel up to three times faster than many of the tankers.

Despite a slight decrease in the number of reported pirate attacks, Indonesia continues to record the highest number of attacks in the world with 93 reported incidents in 2004.⁶ The Malacca Straits ranked second highest with 37 reported incidents, which was an increase from last year. Together, these two areas account for over a third of the total pirate attacks worldwide. There was also a surprising increase in the number of attempted and actual attacks which took place in Singapore. Whereas there were only two in 2003, eight were reported in 2004. Malaysia also witnessed an increase. The only area in Southeast Asia that saw a dramatic decrease was the Philippines, which recorded four attacks in 2004 as opposed to 12 in 2003.⁷

The Modi Operandi of Piracy Categorized

Harbour and Anchorage Attacks

This type of attack is most common in Indonesian waters and consists of the opportunistic boarding of a ship while it is berthed or at anchor in or near a harbour. 51 actual attacks out of a total of 72 that occurred in Indonesia fall into this category.⁸ These attacks generally take place at night between 0100 and 0600 hrs. The criminals board a ship, steal what they can immediately lay their hands on - for example cash or electronic equipment - and escape, often without the knowledge of the crew. There is evidence of selective opening of containers or holds with high value cargoes, implying prior knowledge of the cargo manifest. This may be due to the fact that the perpetrators previously had access to the ship as employees of a shore-based contractor.

In Southeast Asia, these attacks tend to be less violent, as the robbers are not interested in serious confrontations. In some cases it has been reported that the pirates fled empty-handed when intercepted/confronted by an alert crew. The average take is less in this type of attack than other more sophisticated operations, and ranges from US$5,000 to US$10,000.⁹

Attacks Against Vessels at Sea: Robbery

This kind of piracy is often referred to as ‘Asian’ piracy. The sea areas dotted with islands and rocks which characterise the region form ideal hiding places for these ‘hit and run’ attacks which have in the past taken place quite frequently.

In this type of attack, the pirates come alongside a ship underway, usually at night, again most often between 0100 and 0600 hours, board it using grappling hooks and then take the cash and valuables from the ship’s safe and the crew, including high-tech navigation equipment or whatever else they can seize quickly. In this type of attack the value of the stolen goods can be between US$10,000 and US$20,000.¹⁰ In recent years there has been an increase in the number of incidents where several vessels intercept a target and open fire on the ship, forcing it to stop. In this style of attack the ship can be taken over for up to a few hours by around five to ten pirates, although many attacks can be over within half an hour.

This mode of attack requires a certain amount of capital investment in boats and arms, and a certain degree of organisation is necessary in order to coordinate a large group and to obtain inside information regarding what a particular vessel is carrying.
For the past one and a half years there has been a drastic reduction in the number of robberies taking place in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. In 2004, there were eight reported robberies at sea out of a total of 41 attacks, whereas in 2003 there were 20 robberies out of a total of 36. The decrease in robberies at sea, as opposed to other types of piracy, of which some saw an increase over the same period, may be due to an increased awareness on the part of some crewmembers of the threat of piracy following the introduction of new maritime security requirements for vessels.

Attacks Against Vessels at Sea: Hijacking

This brand of piracy involving a vessel underway may be less common but is far more serious. It involves the long-term seizure or hijacking of a vessel, perhaps for several days, while the cargo is unloaded at ports selected by the pirates or transferred to another vessel. In Southeast Asia, particularly in the late 1990’s, the favourite cargo to steal was fuel oil, which was easily sold onto a booming black market.

This type of incident was not seen at all in 2003. It is believed that China’s crackdown on black-market activity and the disruption of some of the international crime syndicates believed to be involved in piracy in the region (several of which were thought to have been run by Indonesian-Chinese bosses) was a contributing factor. However, this positive development was short-lived, as such an operation was recently carried out in an attack which took place on 22 April 2005. At 5 am, gun-wielding pirates hijacked a vessel carrying a cargo of tin worth $4.6 million just off the Lingga Islands in Indonesian waters. The vessel, which was en route to Singapore, was boarded by the pirates, who then ordered the crew to sail the ship to Pasir Gudang port, in Malaysia's southern Johor state. The vessel docked in Pasir Gudang port for two days while the crew unloaded the tin into a warehouse under threat of being killed if they did not cooperate. On 25 April, the pirates ordered the ship back to Indonesian waters and escaped in a speedboat, leaving the crew uninjured. After the incident was reported, authorities checked the warehouse and found the cargo of tin intact. The investigation continues.¹¹

This kind of operation requires good intelligence gathering and careful planning as the risk of being caught is greater. However, the potential rewards are also great. There is a need for the pirates to have secured a location to dock and unload the cargo, or another ship to which to transfer it. Reliable access to markets for their stolen cargo is also required. There must be a plan to deal with the hostages. The pirates may also in some instances gain the compliance of the local authorities. Bribery is often used to achieve this goal. In some extreme cases, it is believed that officials may even provide pirates with information on vessels and cargoes in their areas of jurisdiction.

A variation of this category of attack is the permanent seizure of a vessel by pirates, wherein the vessel is turned into a “phantom ship”; the key difference being that once the pirates have disposed of the vessel’s cargo, they do not abandon the vessel. In this type of attack the ship is repainted and the crew dumped or killed. The ship then sails into a new port with a false name and forged documentation. Maritime certificate fraud is common in the maritime industry. The problem lies in the fact that it is possible to acquire, relatively easily, the legal documents needed to command a vessel, without any proof of qualifications. In these types of operations the vessel is often given a temporary six-month registration under a flag of convenience.¹² This allows the vessels’ owners to hide behind a wall of secrecy created by the dubious ownership structures of flag of convenience shipping. These vessels are then often used in various maritime criminal activities, such as conducting pirate attacks and smuggling goods and people.

The most famous case of this kind was the hijacking of the Singaporean-owned Petro Ranger, in April 1998. A large tanker carrying a cargo of diesel and Jet-A1 fuel, the Petro Ranger was on its way from Singapore to Ho Chi Minh City. The vessel was taken over by pirates three hours out of Singaporean waters. The ship’s name was painted over and it was renamed MV Wilby. Its Malaysian flag was exchanged for a Honduran one. A day later most of its cargo was transhipped into two other tankers in the Gulf of Thailand. The ship was sailed into port on China’s Hainan Island, where the pirates passed themselves off as the ship’s rightful crew. Despite the fact that the Chinese authorities arrested the pirates, they were released after only a few months in jail.¹³

In recent times there has been a shift away from the hijacking of larger freighters and tankers, and an increase in attacks against tugboats. These vessels can avoid suspicion given their small size and the fact that they are a common sight in ports and international waterways In 2003, according to IMB statistics, a total of 13 vessels were hijacked in Southeast Asian waters. 10 out of the 13 hijacked ships were tugs either sailing alone or pulling barges.¹⁴ Although the figures are lower for 2004, they show the same pattern of targeting: out of the eight hijackings that took place, five of the vessels were tugboats.¹⁵ There was a concern that the stolen tugs could be used by terrorists to carry out attacks against shipping in the Straits of Malacca. Stories circulated in the media that these vessels could be packed with explosives and rammed into tankers carrying gas or petroleum products, or into port facilities close to large cities.

Kidnap-for-ransom

This category of piracy first emerged in 2001 and in the last two years there has been a rapid and worrying increase in the number cases in Southeast Asian waters. In 2004 alone there were 14 kidnap-for-ransom attacks in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. This was more than triple the number that occurred in 2003.

In a typical operation of this kind the attackers perform an armed takeover of the vessel (often the vessel is a small one, for example a tug boat) followed by the abduction of two or three senior crewmembers who are held ashore pending negotiations. The result is normally the release of the kidnapped crewmembers following the payment of a ransom by the crew’s employers.¹⁶ According to Noel Chong of the IMB, many of these attacks are likely to go unreported as ship owners want to avoid a backlash from the industry for giving in to the demands of the pirates.¹⁷ Ransoms demanded for the release of crew members can range from US$100,000 to US$200,000. However, the sum of money eventually paid to the attackers following negotiations is usually substantially lower, somewhere in the region of US$10,000 to US$20,000.

This new brand of piracy drew considerable media attention when two incidents occurred consecutively within a few days in the Malacca Strait. In the first attack, which took place on 12 March 2005 (the target was an Indonesian chemical tanker), 35 gunmen, who according to reports were armed with rocket launchers, stormed the tanker and kidnapped the captain and the chief engineer. The second attack took place two days later on 14 March. The target this time was a Japanese-registered tugboat, which was towing a construction barge from Indonesia to Burma. Pirates in three fishing boats opened fire on the tug, forcing it to stop. The pirates stole US$7,000 worth of navigational charts and documents and kidnapped three members of the crew. The attacks sparked a considerable reaction from the littoral states, Indonesia and Malaysia, which launched rescue operations thereafter.

In the past, it was believed that, rather than pirates, terrorist groups such as ASG and the Free Aceh Movement, also known as GAM, were responsible for carrying out these attacks. GAM in particular was singled out as being responsible for the dramatic increase in attacks in Indonesian waters at the northern end of the Malacca Straits, off North Sumatra; this is traditionally one of its areas of operation. Since the 1970s GAM has been fighting a separatist war against the Indonesian Government, with the aim of creating an independent Islamic kingdom in the province of Aceh. The group is said to finance its terrorist activities in part through sea piracy and smuggling.¹⁸ However, GAM has only ever admitted to carry out one attack against a boat being chartered by Exxon Mobil in 2002.

Additionally, another such attack attributed to GAM was the hijacking of the Penrider, en route from Singapore to Penang, in August 2003. Approximately 12 pirates boarded the oil tanker 12 miles from Port Klang, Malaysia, in the Malacca Straits and kidnapped three crewmembers.¹⁹ After protracted ransom negotiations, the hostages were returned unharmed. According to one member of the crew, the pirates wore military-style fatigues, spoke the Acehnese language and claimed to be Aceh soldiers. Some of the hostages were even taken to jungle hideouts in Aceh and, according to the statements made by the victims, the pirates made no secret of the fact that they belonged to GAM.²⁰ Despite evidence pointing to the involvement of GAM, officials remain undecided. It would have been their first such attack so close to the Malaysian coast and so far south of Aceh. GAM also vehemently denied any involvement.

The rapid increase in incidents of kidnap-for-ransom has prompted many players in the maritime security industry to come to a new conclusion - that these attacks are not necessarily perpetrated by terrorist groups but are the work of crime syndicates operating from fishing boats and staging copycat kidnaps which they see as an easy way to make money.

The Pirates

Small-scale Criminals

Pirate attacks in Southeast Asia are carried out by a variety of groups. However, small-scale petty criminals perpetrate the majority of these attacks. For this reason, their attacks are less organised and more opportunistic in nature. Their targets are mostly small vessels in port or anchorage, or those on local voyages between, for example, one Indonesian port and another. This category of pirate is also least likely to be well armed. Most will carry knives or machetes but occasionally guns may also be used.

Those suspected of being involved in small-scale pirate attacks in and around the Straits of Malacca are believed to be mainly of Indonesian nationality, living in coastal settlements. They use piracy as a way of supplementing their inadequate living. (There are also speculations of involvement by certain members of the Indonesian’s military)

Criminal Syndicates

The IMB believes that about five criminal syndicates – probably based in Indonesia and Malaysia – are responsible for most of the larger-scale hijackings in the Straits of Malacca.²¹ These attacks involve well-trained personnel using fast boats, modern weapons and in some cases, sophisticated communications.²² These groups are likely to have established links to the black market, where they would be able to dispose of their stolen cargo. They may also be in collusion with local authorities, who would be needed to guarantee a safe port for cargo to be unloaded or in some cases a secure berth where a vessel can be given a new identity. These pirate groups may have connections with warlords and political movements that are linked to terrorism. This is particularly the case in the Southern Philippines where individuals kidnapped by pirates are then often sold on to the ASG.

Terrorist Groups

As noted above, although there is often very little hard evidence to substantiate the claim, the terrorist group GAM is frequently held responsible for pirate attacks in the Straits of Malacca, the waters around Indonesia and even Malaysia. In the Philippines the line between piracy and terrorism is even fuzzier. ASG, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) engage in maritime piracy to generate much needed funds.²³ There has even been speculation that some segments of ASG and GAM are undergoing a process of criminalisation.²⁴ In other words, they are becoming increasingly motivated by pecuniary rewards rather than ideological or political goals.²⁵

The targets of these groups are often small, vulnerable vessels such as tugs or fishing boats. This is due to the fact that the target is not the vessel itself, or its cargo but the crewmembers, who are kidnapped and held for ransom. In such cases, when the attack takes place in the Straits of Malacca or the waters around Indonesia, it is most likely that the hostages will be released unharmed. However, in the waters around the Philippines some of these attacks are carried out by the ASG which has been known to kill hostages in the past.²⁶

Equipment

Pirate boats are usually equipped with several outboard motors on the back, allowing them to go almost three times as fast as tankers. They often make use of modest radar systems to help them locate their targets. Pirates also use a low-tech version of stealth technology by using wooden boats which are hard to spot on radar.²⁷ According to reports, pirates can be armed with weapons ranging from knives to rocket launchers, AK47 and M16 rifles.²⁸ However, in a typical attack the most common weapons used are still knives and guns.

The Targets

The vessels most commonly targeted by pirates in Southeast Asia are bulk carriers, which accounted for a third of all the attacks in the region. This is due to a number of factors: bulk carriers may travel at a limited speed when making their way up the narrow waterways of the straits and they are also minimum freeboard ships. Thus the vessel is more easily boarded by pirates when it is underway. These vessels are vulnerable while at anchor or at berth because there is likely to be a reduced crew while they await the next cargo. Pirates have also attacked bulk carriers during cargo operations, when the crew is preoccupied with the task of loading the new cargo.

In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore specifically, over the last five years the most common targets have been product tankers and general cargo vessels. These vessels are likely to be attacked firstly because they are numerous in these waters, and secondly because they are frequently engaged on local voyages closer to the coast, thereby making them easy targets for pirates lying in wait.

Understanding the Recent Rise in Attacks

Piracy has always been endemic in Southeast Asia; indeed, the colonial powers that came to the area in the 19th century were faced with managing the problem. However, in the past the incidences of piracy were kept at lower levels than today. It is believed that frequent naval patrols and the political/military presence of colonial powers in the region, followed by the increased US-Soviet presence during the Cold War, were both contributing factors to the reduced levels of piracy up until the last decade.

The high rates of piracy currently seen in the region are believed to have been caused initially by the harsh economic impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when many people lost their jobs, adding to the poverty that already existed in some parts of the region. The deteriorating financial situation forced people, especially those in coastal areas, to use piracy as a way to supplement their income. The economic collapse also caused widespread political instability, in particular in Indonesia. As a result it was easier for people to pursue illegal methods of income generation. In addition, the Asian financial crisis caused the value of the Indonesian defence budget to decline by 65 percent from 1997 to 1998. This worsened the already tight fiscal problems and prevented the country from allocating more to its maritime security force.²⁹

The increase in the amount of commercial traffic traversing the region’s waterways is another factor which accounts for the rise in incidence of piracy. Sea-borne trade has doubled every decade since 1945 and shipbuilding tonnage worldwide has doubled since 1990.³⁰ This has substantially increased the number of potential targets for pirates to attack.

Another problem is the growing trend towards the use of ‘skeleton crews’, in other words ships staffed with the minimum amount of people necessary. These crews are asked to carry out multiple tasks at the operational level and will find it difficult to perform anti-piracy security measures. Thus, ships are more easily boarded and taken over by the pirates.

The Impact of Piracy

Besides the obvious and increasing human toll, piracy is responsible for aggravating economic and financial damage to countries as well as the international shipping industry. Fraud, stolen cargoes, delayed trips, and increased insurance premiums are all consequences of piracy and have a direct economic effect on those at the receiving end of the crime.³¹ The impact of piracy is hard to gauge in monetary terms. Estimates of global piracy costs range from as low as US$250 million³² to US$16 billion a year.³³ However, the frequency and fiscal damage of piracy is less than that of shore-based crimes in many countries in Southeast Asia; therefore there is a tendency to place piracy low on the list of law enforcement priorities. This is true particularly for Indonesia whose defence and security resources are already stretched due to continued internal security problems and defence budget constraints. In addition, Indonesia benefits little from the trade that transits the Straits of Malacca. Unlike Singapore and Malaysia it does not have a major port serviced by these pirate-infested waterways. The eastern coast of Sumatra, along which the Straits run, remains largely underdeveloped. For this reason amongst others, Indonesia has traditionally lagged behind its neighbours when it comes to maritime security.

One final and perhaps often understated issue is the potential for a pirate attack to cause a major environmental disaster. In the Philip Channel, in the Singapore Straits, the interval between ships proceeding in any one direction is only approximately twenty minutes.³⁴ During a pirate attack the crew is most often rounded up and held captive, and consequently unable to maintain look-out and other navigational responsibilities, which are essential when transiting the region’s narrow waterways. The environmental consequences of a collision involving an unmanned oil tanker could be enormous.

Indeed, it is believed that an incident of this kind may have already taken place. In 1992, the Japanese super tanker the Nagasaki Spirit collided with the Ocean Blessing, which was zigzagging through shipping lanes at the northern end of the Straits of Malacca and possibly under pirate control. The accident and resulting fire killed all of the crew aboard Ocean Blessing and all but two of the tanker’s crew. Fortunately, although 12, 000 tons of oil spilled into the sea, because the oil was the light oil which evaporated, diffused, and disappeared rapidly in the tropical climate major environmental damage was avoided.³⁵

The Response

As most piracy is legally considered armed robbery, any counter-measures are the responsibility of the state. The investigation, capture, prosecution and punishment of pirates who operate within territorial waters therefore varies due to the diverse national legal systems of the states in the region. However, given the transnational nature of piracy, multilateral cooperative measures are needed to effectively deal with the problem. Unfortunately, obstacles to cooperation are numerous. These may include concerns over the erosion of national sovereignty and differing political and economic priorities.

Despite these problems, the region witnessed the introduction of two new important maritime security measures in 2004. One was the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which was created by the International Maritime Organisation to introduce worldwide a range of new security requirements for vessels and port facilities. The other was the launch of the Trilateral Coordinated Patrol, which involved the navies of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore patrolling in a coordinated fashion in their respective territorial waters. Following the introduction of these two new measures in mid-2004, there was not, however, any significant reduction in the total number of incidents of piracy in the region in the second half of 2004. The figures for the first quarter of 2005 are more promising; for example, Indonesia only recorded 16 attacks as opposed to 21 over the same time period last year.³⁶ However, this reduction is most probably a result of the devastation caused by the tsunami, which is likely to have either killed some of those involved in piracy or destroyed their boats and weapons, rather than because of any anti-piracy measures.

Although the ISPS Code significantly increases security awareness in the maritime industry, the standard of enforcement of the new IMO regulations varies from country to country. This is especially true in the case of states that have on their shipping registers flags of convenience vessels. These states ‘lack the resources or people with sufficient expertise to enforce the standards that are acceptable to the shipping community at large’.³⁷ In fact in the majority of cases, one could argue that although security plans may be in place and security officers designated, the unfortunate reality is that it is often crewmembers of a fairly low rank and with limited training who are tasked to implement the Code.

The Trilateral Coordinated Patrols are also insufficient to reduce piracy. The main problem being that there is a lack of a provision for ‘hot-pursuit’ into each others’ territorial waters. Although arrangements were put in place for communication to be established between the navies in the case of a cross-border chase to allow one navy to hand over to the other, they are unlikely to be as effective as the employment of ‘hot-pursuit’.

More recently in 2005 a number of new measures have been or are in the process of being implemented in the region. In the latest development the littoral states, with Thailand as an observer, begin joint air patrols over the Malacca Strait in a bid to boost security in the waterway. The three states will each donate two planes for the patrols, which have been dubbed the ‘Eye in the Sky’ plan. It is hoped that the aerial patrols will provide a valuable supplement to the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols carried out by the navies of the littoral states. One significant advantage of the aerial patrols is that they will be able to fly for up to three nautical miles inside the territorial waters of the participating states, thus allowing for a reasonable “transgression” of boundaries. In the sea-patrols the navies were limited to patrolling in their own territorial jurisdiction or on the high-seas.

On a less optimistic note, the ‘Eye in the Sky’ plan has already been criticized as being merely ‘for show’. It is estimated that 70 sorties per week need to be carried out by the aerial patrols in order to effectively monitor the Strait 24/7. However, currently only 8 take place.³⁸ There is also a lack of sea-patrol vessels available to carry out investigation and interdiction if necessary, following the sighting of a suspect vessel by the aerial patrols. Although the ‘Eye in the Sky’ plan clearly has room for significant improvement, the valuable deterrent effect it will have on potential attackers cannot be dismissed.

Singapore, Japan, Laos and Cambodia became the first four states to formally adhere to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy (ReCAAP). Once six more participating states sign on, ReCAAP will enter into force and a new Information Sharing Centre will be set up in Singapore. The centre will facilitate communication and information exchanges between member countries and will improve the quality of statistics and reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region.³⁹

Malaysia has recently announced a number of new maritime security initiatives. Armed police officers will now be placed on board selected tug boats and barges traversing the Malacca Strait. In addition, an escort service initiated in March will now be provided for vessels carrying valuable cargo in the Strait. In the same month Kuala Lumpur also declared that it will start 24-hour radar surveillance of the Strait.⁴⁰ Due to become operational in November is Malaysia’s new Maritime Enforcement Agency. The new agency, made up of personnel from the navy, police and other government agencies, will be responsible for ensuring the security of the country’s maritime zone against threats such as piracy and terrorism.⁴¹

Singapore’s new maritime security measures include the creation of Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT), which are tasked with boarding and escorting vessels singled out through shipping data analysis in order to detect and deter any criminal activity onboard these vessels and ensure that the threat is minimised . Singapore has just completed the installation of new radars at Changi Naval base to increase the radar coverage of its territorial waters. In addition it has increased navy and coast-guard patrols in its waters.⁴²

The Singaporean and Indonesian navies have launched a system that provides real-time radar surveillance for the Singapore Strait. The new system, known as SURPIC, or the “Surface Picture, Surveillance System”, will be located on Batam Island in Indonesia.

Although still at the discussion level, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines are considering allowing their naval forces to pursue pirates into each other’s waters. If implemented, this new agreement would be an unprecedented step in the fight against piracy.

Finally, Indonesia, traditionally the weakest link in terms of maritime security in the region, has initiated a multi-faceted approach to improving security. This includes programmes aimed at alleviating poverty and improving welfare, in particular in those remote areas which border the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and increasing local people’s awareness of law and regulations and strengthening sanctioning institutions.⁴³ It also announced that its navy plans to buy up to 60 modern patrol vessels over the next decade in order to strengthen maritime security in its waters.⁴⁴

These new measures, if successfully implemented, should significantly improve security in the region’s waterways since they display a greater level of regional cooperation than seen previously. The implementation of ReCAAP and Indonesia’s internal development programmes is also a welcome move away from the tendency to focus countermeasures on tackling the problem solely at sea.

In the meantime however, pirate attacks will continue in the region’s waterways, and ship owners are increasingly looking elsewhere for ways to enhance their security. One solution that has rapidly gained popularity in recent months is the employment of private security companies who are offering armed escort services through the Straits. For between US$10,000 and US$100,000 a shipping company can have armed Gurkhas, escort vessels and helicopter scouts securing its passage through the Straits.⁴⁵ Despite assurances that the escorts merely act as a deterrent to potential attackers, they have provoked a strong response from the littoral states. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have declared that these companies should not provide armed escorts through their waters. Malaysia even announced its plans to detain ships with private armed escorts.⁴⁶ However, the Malaysian Defence Minister subsequently stated that armed escorts would be allowed to pass though Malaysia’s stretch of the Malacca Straits, provided that their passage is continuous and expeditious.

Recommendations & Conclusions

Piracy in Southeast Asia is likely to remain a major security concern for governments and the shipping industry for some years to come. It also acts as a constant reminder of the potential ease with which terrorists could use similar tactics to carry out an attack. As long as piracy continues, it clearly illustrates that a certain amount of anarchy or lawlessness prevails in the region’s waterways. Piracy levels are therefore an indicator of the overall security in the region.

America’s war on terrorism following 9/11 put maritime security under the spotlight and prompted the region’s states to begin improving maritime security. This assertive posture must be maintained. Cooperation between the region’s states must be enhanced to include agreements on ‘hot-pursuit’ and more mechanisms for intelligence sharing.

In the Straits of Malacca the need to address the problem of piracy has just become even more urgent. Following a risk assessment of the area, the Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s Market Association declared the Straits a “high-risk zone” and added it to its list of areas which are at risk to war, strikes, terrorism and related perils. Others on the list are countries such as Iraq, Somalia and Lebanon. Indonesian ports along the Straits were also added to the list.

This move by the JWC could result in higher insurance premiums for the ships that transit the Straits or call at some Indonesian ports. When war risk premiums were applied to the Yemeni port of Aden, container shipping lines were forced to divert to neighbouring ports. The resulting impact on the Yemeni economy was severe.

Major users of the region’s waterways must begin to accept a greater responsibility for enhancing maritime security. Japan is one user state that has contributed significantly to efforts to improve safety and security in the Straits of Malacca. For example, it is currently providing support to Indonesia in order to help it implement the ISPS Code in its ports. Japan’s efforts could be used as a model for other states wishing to provide assistance - in particular in the areas of maritime enforcement capacity building, personnel training and resources - in the future.

It would be advantageous if all the Southeast Asian states signed the IMO’s 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation: “Ratification of the convention gives signatory governments the power to prosecute people caught in their own territorial waters for acts of piracy committed under another country’s jurisdiction.”⁴⁷ Although the SUA Convention has been signed by 126 out of 166 IMO Member states, which is a high number of contracting states in comparison to many other maritime conventions, a number of countries are conspicuously missing from the list, given their important position as guardians of strategically important waterways. In Southeast Asia, only Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, Myanmar and Brunei are signatories to this convention. ReCAAP should also be signed by those regional states that have not yet done so.

Finally, long-term solutions need to be found to address the root causes of piracy, which include poor socio-economic conditions. Indonesia’s efforts in this area are a step in the right direction but more will need to be done in the near future, if the problem of piracy in Southeast Asia is to be resolved.

Endnotes

1. "Abu Sayyaf Group", FAS Intelligence Resource Program
2. Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report, ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2004, p. 10.
3. Article 101, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
4. Justin Chenevier, "Piracy under the Law of the Sea Convention: Conceptual Basis and Practical Limitations", MLAANZ Journal, Vol.15 Part 2, 2000, p.50.
5. "Co-operation for Law & Order At Sea", CSCAP Memo 5, p. 14
6. Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report, ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2004, p. 16
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Adam Young & Mark Valencia, "Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 25, 2003, p. 272.
10. Anthony Davis, "Piracy in Southeast Asia shows signs of increased organization", Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 June 2004, p. 2.
11. Worldwide Threat to Shipping Mariner Warning Information, Office of Naval Intelligence Civil Maritime Analysis Dept, 18 May 05
12. A flag of convenience ship is one that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership. Cheap registration fees, low or no taxes and freedom to employ cheap labor are the motivating factors behind a ship owner’s decision to use flags of convenience.
13. Anti-Shipping Activity Messages, 1998
14. Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report, ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2003, p. 27 – 44.
15. Ibid., p. 29 – 43.
16. Anthony Davis, "Piracy in Southeast Asia shows signs of increased organization", Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 June 2004, p. 3.
17. Ibid.
18. Ralf Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific, Eastern University Press, p. 37.
19. New brand of piracy threatens oil tankers in Malacca Straits, ICC Commercial Crime Services, 2 Sept 2003
20. Kate McGeown, Aceh rebels blamed for piracy, BBC News Online, 8 Sept 2003
21. Simon Elegant, ‘Dire Straits’, Time Asia, 6 Dec 2004, p. 2.
22. Piracy and maritime terror in Southeast Asia, Strategic Comments, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 6, 2004
23. Eduardo Ma R Santos, "Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships: Philippine Perspective", paper delivered at ISEAS conference: Maritime Security, Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in Southeast Asia, 23-24 September 2004, p. 5.
24. If a group becomes motivated by pecuniary rewards, the acts that it carries out no longer fall under the definition of terrorism, which states that: Terrorism is “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.” [Definition taken from the Global Security Web site]
25. Stefan Eklof, "Political Piracy & Maritime Terrorism: A Comparison Between the Southern Philippines and the Straits of Malacca", paper delivered at ISEAS conference: Maritime Security, Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in Southeast Asia, 23-24 September 2004, p. 5.
26. The use of piracy by terrorist groups must not be confused with acts of maritime terrorism. It has been well documented that terrorist groups have resorted to criminal activities in order to generate funds for their political campaigns. However, these criminal acts are not in themselves acts of terrorism.
27. Keith Bradsher, "Threats and Responses: Seaborne Trade; Warnings from Al Qaeda Stir Fear that Terrorists May Attack Oil Tankers", New York Times, 12 Dec 2002, p. 3
28. Special Press Summary: Piracy in the Malacca Straits, Virtual Information Centre, 16 Feb 2005, p. 7.
29. Robert Dillon, Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1379, 22 June 2000.
30. James Boutilier, "The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: The Global Maritime Outlook 2004", paper delivered at IDSS conference: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, 20-21 May 2004, p. 1.
31. Mark Valencia, "The Politics of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Terrorism Responses in Southeast Asia", paper delivered at ISEAS conference: Maritime Security, Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in Southeast Asia, 23-24 September 2004, p. 4
32. Joshua Ho, Maritime Counter-terrorism: a Singapore Perspective, IDSS Commentary
33. John Brandon, Protect Asia’s Shipping, PacNet News Letter, 24 May 2002
34. Jayant Abhyankar, Piracy, Armed Robbery & Terrorism at Sea in Southeast Asia; A Global & Regional Outlook, paper delivered at ISEAS conference: Maritime Security, Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in Southeast Asia, 23-24 September 2004, p. 9
35. Jamie Shutzer, Piracy in Indonesia
36. Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report, ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2005, p. 5.
37. K. Matthews, "Trade and Shipping: A Common Interest of the Asia-Pacific", Australian Maritime Affairs, 10, 2003, p. 54.
38. G. G. Ong & J. Ho, "Maritime Air Patrols, A New Weapon Against Piracy in the Malacca Straits", IDSS Commentary, 13/10/2005.
39. Julia Ng, Singapore, Japan, Laos and Cambodia Sign Pact to Fight Piracy, ChannelNewsAsia
40. Malaysia to boost Malacca Straits Security with 24-hour radar system, ChannelNews Asia
41. Ibid.
42. Interview with Col. Chng Teow Hiang, Commander of Coastal Command on 24 February 2005.
43. Robert Mangindaan, Maritime Terrorist Threat: An Indonesian Perspective, Observer Research Foundation Report, p. 3
44. Indonesian Navy Plans Fleet Expansion to Boost Maritime Security, ABC News Online, 12 Feb 2005
45. Tracy Sua, ‘For hire: Guardians of the sea; Several firms now offer escort vessels and mercenaries’, The Straits Times, 15 April 2005.
46. W. Soewriaatmadja, ‘Indonesia Rules Out Private Armed Escorts in Malacca Straits’, Bloomberg News, 3 May 2005
47. Ronzitti, N., Piracy and International Law, Martinus Nijhoff publishers, 1990, p. 21