Border disputes have hampered regional integration between Central Asian countries following their independence from the Soviet Union. Although large-scale territorial claims and border conflicts have been avoided, small disputes are causing these countries to drift further apart from each other. An analysis of these issues reveals that only closer economic ties and greater cooperation can provide solutions for resolving the region’s growing problems, such as poverty and insecurity.

Zainiddin Karaev is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department of the Central European University, Budapest. His research interests are political economy of development in Central Asia in the post-communist period, politics of water resources management in Central Asia.

Background

Fifteen years after they became independent from the former Soviet Union, the five countries that form Central Asia are by no means closer to becoming an economically and politically integrated region. If anything, the gap between political rhetoric and actual integration has become wider as each of these countries has taken an independent way of development. With the exception of Kazakhstan, all of these countries are landlocked and mutually dependent on each other in many aspects, such as water resources and transportation. A closer look at other economic and geographical realities of the region reveals that economic and political integration is the only way forward for the region’s development.

This article explores the link between the problems resulting from mutual dependence and failed attempts towards regional integration. It is argued that border and regional disputes hamper regional integration efforts. While the leaders and governments in all these countries realize the need for regional integration and occasionally make statements that propose initiatives, in reality, little has been done. Regional leaders fear that closer ties and integration will intensify border and territorial claims.

Today’s Central Asian countries have little or no previous statehood experience. They were created in the late 1920s by the Soviet regime. Their creation and their boundaries were arbitrary and did not follow any natural geographical or ethnic lines. Borders were nothing more than administrative lines and were not demarcated during the Soviet rule. It has been argued elsewhere¹ that the policies of the Soviet planners were deliberate and were designed to prevent any separatism attempts by any republic. Highly centralized Soviet planning and economic and transportation links ignored boundaries between the republics. More importantly, strict political control by the center managed all affairs in the republics and suppressed any border or territory related disputes.

Newly independent countries of the region have faced many difficulties stemming from arbitrary borders. In drawing borders, Soviet planners deliberately left large numbers of different ethnic groups in each of the five countries. In particular, significant number of Uzbeks - the largest ethnic group in the region - are present in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajiks make up the majority of at least two provinces in Uzbekistan. More importantly, two major Tajik cities of Bukhara and Samarqand were included in Uzbekistan as a result of a decision by Stalin. Similarly, the largely Uzbek populated province of Osh was included in Kyrgyzstan. Complicating these difficulties, several enclaves are located in territories of each of these countries, in particular in the Ferghana valley which was divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan². Enclaves represent a particularly difficult problem for these countries, especially due to their frosty relations with each other. With independence, all of these problems resurfaced, claims and counterclaims have been put forward, and all related issues have been politicized.

Roots of border tensions

Current borders between Central Asian countries were drawn in the 1920s by administrative decisions from Moscow. A separate commission was formed in 1922 to oversee the process of division of the region into the new republics. Unique circumstances and urgency with which the Soviet planners undertook this task created borders that are far from ideal and neglect ethnic geographical and other features of the region³. In addition to these, political reasons also influenced the deliberate distortion of ethnic and geographical realities.

However, it is worth noting that even before the Soviet rule created borders between these countries there was no previous history of border limitations in the region. The region was divided between the khanates of Khiva and Kokand and the emirate of Bukhara. Borders between the khanates and emirates that ruled the region before the Russian expansion in the 19th century were not clear and frequently shifted as the balance of power between them changed. Also, nomadic traditions of the ethnic groups paid little attention to the concepts of borders and states.⁴

This arbitrary process of border creation became the source of future tensions. Soviet planners did not draw border lines along ethnic lines, but instead imposed artificial borders on the newly created republics. Mixed ethnic composition of ethnic groups in the region and Moscow’s desire to deter separatist movements were the government’s main motivations. It should also be noted that during the Soviet rule these borders were simply administrative lines that served only economic needs of specific regions determined by the central authorities in Moscow.

During Soviet rule, there were numerous territorial exchanges between the republics. Also, there were cases of leasing territories and facilities in the territory of other republics for the use by one of them. For example, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan leased land from each other that still remains a point of friction between the two countries. Uzbekistan also leased gas fields and a water reservoir in Kyrgyzstan and gave pasture lands in exchange⁵. It is worth noting that majority of these cases still remain unresolved and represent a source of discord between the region’s countries. Both of these situations further complicated the already existent problems once these republics have become independent states and accepted Soviet-drawn borders as their international borders. Claims and counter-claims for different parts of territories in each of these countries have been raised frequently during the last fifteen years.

Independence and attempts at regional integration

Independence from the former Soviet Union has brought about new opportunities and problems for these countries. Immediately following independence, these countries accepted the old administrative borders drawn by Soviet planners as their state boundaries. This decision has proven to be a very important step towards avoiding territorial claims and possible large-scale conflicts over territory. However, these boundaries were not fully demarcated during the Soviet rule and it was not clear where the actual border line was drawn. Thus, all of these countries have become independent with thousands of kilometers of their borders in dispute.

The region’s countries have managed to avoid large-scale territorial claims. This has been made possible with signing the Almaty Declaration in 1991, the signatories of which agreed to adhere to the Soviet-drawn borders and recognize them as their international boundaries. All of the region’s countries signed the declaration adhering to the old Soviet-drawn borders and opted to avoid redrawing borders. However, there have been numerous cases of small territorial disputes. Riots at the end of 1989 and 1990 in Ferghana valley were earliest border disputes between different ethnic groups living in the valley, especially in its intersecting parts. Only 140 disputed border points exist between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Negotiations over the actual boundaries have started early in 1990s and proved to be very complex and have often resulted in deadlocks. While Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan managed to complete the demarcation process, there appears to be no end in sight for this process between Uzbekistan and other countries of the region.⁶ These territorial disputes often revolve around control over resources. As such, all countries have quickly recognized the high stakes involved in the process of demarcation of borders. This is especially true in the case of such valuable commodities as water and energy.

Soviet economic planners treated Central Asia as a single economic unit within the broader all-Union economy. The region primarily served as the raw materials base for the industrial center. Among the key resources that the region produced for the Soviet economy were cotton and energy products such as coal and gas. Administrative borders did not play a significant role in a highly centralized single economic bloc. Free flow of trade, goods and people was ensured by the center and for the benefit of the entire Union.

Additionally, Soviet economic planners wished to ensure that economies of the union republics would remain interdependent. The entire infrastructure was built to serve the industrial center and not to allow the republics to integrate. Railroads and other transportation links were built in such a way that neglected republican borders. For example, in many cases, residents of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan had to cross the territory of neighboring republic to reach their capitals. Goods flowed freely and easily from one republic to another.

In early 1990s, Central Asian states expected that borders would remain open as they used to be during the Soviet rule and free flow of goods and trade would continue. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991 was the first initiative towards regional cooperation and integration. Although the CIS was primarily designed to give political independence for individual states, its signatories also hoped to retain the unified Soviet economic space and maintain common economic policies in investment policy and other monetary aspects.⁷

Another attempt at regional cooperation was the creation of the Eurasian Customs Union which included some Central Asian countries as well as Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The union was expected to create a free-trade zone between its members by setting common tariff rates and standards. However, it quickly became clear that all of these initiatives were destined to fail and preserving unity in the economic sphere was not easy.

However, fifteen years after independence little has been made towards regional integration. Countries of the region have chosen different ways of transition from a Soviet planned economy to a market based economy. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have advanced towards free market, albeit with different pace and outcome, while Uzbekistan has opted for a closed economy focusing on the restrictions over import and promoting its own producers. Tajikistan is slowly emerging from a bloody civil conflict which resulted in great losses both in lives and economy. While the rhetoric used to describe the market economy and integration with other countries of the region has been extremely regular, the reality has been very different. Uzbekistan – the most populous country and a key player in the region -has chosen import substitution over an open economy. This choice has meant isolation from its neighbors. Kazakhstan which has large natural resource base, especially oil and metals, has increasingly turned towards other countries and regions. Turkmenistan has largely been cut off from the region and has little contact with its neighbors. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which have poorer resource bases and are isolated due to their remote geographical location and poor transportation links, suffer most from this lack of regional integration.⁸

Since the creation of the CIS, there have been over 400 agreements signed between the former Soviet countries. However, there have not been any tangible results. Individual states continue to reject certain provisions of agreements or interpret them in their favor. Many of the ideas and initiatives only remain on paper. These countries have undertaken different policies and measures towards economic cooperation with their neighbors. Unfortunately, these measures have not been beneficial to the population at large. Border crossing between any of these countries exemplify the problems that the regional integration faces. For example, Uzbekistan has virtually closed its borders to its neighbors, significantly hampering flow of trade, goods and people. Its leaders cite various reasons for this action ranging from security to the need for import substitution and economic self-sufficiency. Meanwhile the country’s population suffers from excessive state interference. If this trend continues the country then loses its potential to become the main driving force behind the region’s economic development, owing to its strategic position and well-endowed natural resources.⁹

Increased border control and difficulties with crossing boundaries within the region have significantly reduced regional cooperation and trade in particular. Lack of political wills to undertake and complete the process of demarcation of borders has further complicated the situation leading the region’s countries further apart from each other. For example, Uzbekistan has virtually closed all its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and imposed a strict visa regime for fear of terrorism and smuggling. This decision was also made to defend the Uzbek government policy of import substitution. As a consequence, the petty or shuttle trade which offers one of few sources of income and employment in the region has significantly been reduced driving a large portion of the country’s population to poverty or migration to other countries, in particular Russia and Kazakhstan.

The most recent and visible attempts at regional cooperation have been the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) signed in October 2001 and the Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CACO) in 2002. The EEC is designed to build upon the unsuccessful Central Asian Union created in 1994 which never materialized. The main goals of the CACO are to establish a common economic space through harmonizing trade, customs, tax and visa policies in the Central Asia. The CACO aims at expanding cooperation in economic and political spheres as well as creating consortia that will deal with such issues as water and energy resources. It remains to be seen whether these attempts will bring about visible results.¹⁰

Early rhetoric of the regional integration and closer economic ties between the countries of Central Asia has largely not materialized. This has been evident in the numerous failed attempts at regional cooperation. The result has been that borders have increasingly become closed, hampering cross-border trade and close economic ties between countries. Due to their countries’ landlocked position and interdependent economies, the regional leaders realize the benefits of integration. However, the reality of today’s Central Asia is that these countries have closer economic ties with counties from other regions of the world than with each other. The primary export partners for the Central Asian countries are Western Europe and Russia. Little bilateral or regional trade exists, except the state traded commodities such as gas and coal.

Economic policies of these countries seem to contradict the verbal commitments to regional cooperation and integration. Political friction among the region’s states and their preference for state trading in staples and energy products, such as natural gas, coal and oil, significantly hamper any regional integration effort. The little shuttle trade that exists between the countries suffers heavily from interference on the borders. High levels of corruption and tight state control over economy along with state interference in the private sector further complicate the situation and drive the region’s countries apart from each other.¹¹

The path towards the region’s long term development and prosperity lies only through integration both politically and economically. Of course regional integration will not immediately result in economic development and bring about prosperity. Integration will certainly be beneficial for all countries of the region. A free trade area or a common market will serve as catalyst for development insofar as these countries have a natural complementarity in terms of natural resources. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess abundant water resources for producing cheap electricity, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are well endowed with natural gas and cotton, and Kazakhstan is supplier energy products, such as gas, coal as well as chemicals and non-ferrous minerals. This co-dependent relationship will be further strengthened with growing cooperation between the region’s countries especially in the manufacturing sector.

Developments over the last decade demonstrate that the countries of Central Asia have not made sufficient progress towards regional cooperation. Today’s leaders and Central Asian governments fear that closer economic ties and integration with their neighbors may arouse border disputes. Thus, they prefer to close their borders and avoid negotiations over myriads of border disputes. Security is often cited as primary reason behind limiting cross-border movement and cooperation. However, as the rationale for regional cooperation shows, benefits resulting from closer economic cooperation and regional integration will outweigh security concerns and indeed resolve the problems that create security concerns, such as unemployment and growing social problems. This is an issue which will need to be recognized by the region’s leaders sooner rather than later.

Endnotes

1. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, Asia Report 3, Brussels, April 2002
2. International Crisis Group, op. cit., p.2
3. International Crisis Group, op. cit., p.2
4. For more detail on the history of Central Asia under the Russian and Soviet rules, see: Edward Allworth (ed.), Central Asia: 120 Years of the Russian Rule, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1989
5. International Crisis Group, op. cit., p.2
6. International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 8
7. Spechler Martin, Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Promises and More Promises, PRAXIS (The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies), Volume XVI, 2000
8. Spechler, op.cit. p. 5
9. Richard Dion, “The Decline of Central Asian Integration”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 29, 2000
10. Spechler, op.cit. p. 8
11. Richard Dion, op. cit.