Introduction²

 

Since time immemorial, the relationships of various Korean states with China have played a pivotal role in Korean history. The Celestial Throne of China extended the Mandate of Heaven, as well as political and ideological legitimacy, to Korean ruling regimes. The Chinese rulers often provided military protection to their Korean allies and occasionally punished Korean provocateurs and challengers by force of arms The Chinese also offered models of socio-economic development that were easy to emulate and presented cultural and moral values compatible with Korean states. Over the years, exiles and migrants fleeing political turmoil and economic hardships on the mainland have resettled in the Korean peninsula. China has also been a recipient of waves of political refugees and economic opportunists from the peninsula at times of social upheaval and economic crisis.

The history of Korean-Chinese relations is also full of controversies, some of which still provoke occasional outbreaks of the so-called “history textbook wars.” Underlying these conflicts are ideologically and politically driven attempts to “nationalize borders,” to re-write and re-map the history of the bilateral relationship at the perceived expense of the other side. Korean-Chinese relations are full of contested myths, loaded symbols, intricate procedures, elaborate rituals, hard bargaining behind the scenes, and tedious institutional routine overall.

The rise and fall of Korean states has been closely related to the rise and fall of Chinese states. Despite persistent claims of authenticity, Korean national identity is deeply rooted and heavily mixed with Chinese national identity. This has profound implications for nationalist claims regarding originality, ideological legitimacy, political authority, and territorial hegemony. Whether Korea and China are described as being close as “lips and teeth,” or as “in-law nations,” or “sharing the same rivers and mountains,” or as “one family – two nations,” it has always been a challenge to determine where China ends and Korea begins, and vice-versa. As Yonson Ahn perceptively observes, “self-concepts of pure difference between Chineseness and Koreanness at the present time appear to exclude creolized and multiple narratives of history within the border regions.” For centuries, borders between China, Manchuria, and Korea have been fluid and permeable, which led to the cultural and historical hybridity of multiple states and peoples occupying the Northeast Asian borderlands.³

 

China and Old Chosôn (Gojoseon)

Chinese and Korean historians battle over the question of the origins of the first Korean state, Old Chosôn. They offer fundamentally different answers to the basic question striking at the core of Korean national identity: namely, where and how was the first Korean proto-state formed, and by whom?⁴ In what comes across as a veiled attempt to question the authenticity and ultimate legitimacy of Korean statehood, the Chinese historiography cites the myth of Gija (Jizi)⁵ as opposed to the myth of Dangun in identifying the founding father and primordial roots of the Korean nation. Gija is said to have been a discontented Yin prince and paternal uncle of the last king of Chinese Shang dynasty, who fled from prosecution into the Old Chosôn domain around the 10th century BC when the Zhou Dynasty (1122 BC - 256 BC) compelled the Yin clan of the Shang dynasty to surrender. The legend maintains that Gija refused to cede power and to become a loyal subject to the Zhou, fled China with his garrison of five thousand men and founded Gija Joseon near modern day Pyongyang, thus giving birth to one of the earliest Korean states. Some later Chinese records praise Gija for introducing the Shang cultural influence to Gojoseon.⁶

In contrast, Korean historians, denying the very existence of Gija Joseon, regard the Liaodong Bronze Dagger Culture as the cultural root of Old Chosôn and believe that the Yemaek cultural zone, which emerged during the Bronze Age, was the foundation from which Old Chosôn (which emerged during the 3-4 century B.C.) and then Puyŏ, Goguryeo, Okchŏ-Tongye, and Samhan were spawned. Koreans are told about the Yemaek tribe culture and the myth of Dangun, a legendary figure, semi-God, semi-human, borne to the bear mother, who is said to have founded the state of Old Chosôn as a loose confederacy of self-governed walled towns in 2,333 BC or over 5,000 years ago.⁷ The difference between these two legends goes to the heart of the question concerning the original legitimacy of the primordial Korean state. Did China bring civilization to Korea and give Korea its original laws and institutions, or did Korea develop them autonomously without initial foreign impulse and much foreign impact? Regardless of historical evidence, these two original myths still fight for the minds of Korean and Chinese peoples, provide the mythical basis for claims about their blood relationship (“like lips and teeth”), and shape their mutual perceptions of each other (“like patriarch father and filial son”).

More Chinese cultural traditions and administrative practices were exported to the peninsula during the Warring States period in neighboring China. The legend maintains that in 196 BC, a high-ranking court official named Wiman (Ch. Wei Man), who sought political refuge from the prosecution by the Chinese state of Yan, submitted himself and his men to the Gojoseon King Jun, who appointed Wiman a commander in the western border region of Gojoseon. But, in 194 BC, Wiman and his followers betrayed the King, rose up in arms, and usurped the Korean throne. Wiman built a new capital in Wanggeomseong, today’s Pyongyang, and his heirs ruled the country until it was overrun by the Chinese Han Dynasty armies in 109 BC.⁸ It is worth stressing that although culturally Sinicized and maybe a small replica of China, Wiman Joseon was not a colony of the Middle Kingdom. On the contrary, during this period, it expanded its territory and became strong economically by controlling trade between China’s Han Dynasty and the outlying regions to the northeast at the expense of China. But Wiman Joseon’s development success proved to be too hard to swallow for its powerful neighbor. Feeling increasingly threatened by the growing power of Wiman Joseon, and fearing it would ally with the Xiongnu in the north, Emperor Wu Di of Han China launched a preventive attack on Wiman Joseon in 109 BC, sending an army of 60,000 men backed by a navy of 7,000 men. After a year of battle, Wanggeomseong was captured and Gojoseon was destroyed.⁹

On the ruins of Gojoseon, Han China established four commanderies (juns¹⁰) in the captured areas covering southern Manchuria and most of the northern half of the Korean peninsula. Three of these commanderies (Lintun, Xuantu and Zhenfan) fell quickly to local resistance, but the fourth, Lelang or Nangnang Commandery, located in northwestern Korea and consisted of 11 prefectures with a capital near Pyongyang, remained an important political, commercial, and cultural outpost of the Middle Kingdom on the Korean peninsula for almost four centuries.¹¹

Chinese colonization of Korea was accompanied by numerous waves of massive Chinese immigrations, mainly from Yan (modern Hebei) via Liaodong and Qi (modern Shangdong) across the Yellow Sea, transmitting Chinese cultural influences in the peninsula, with most of Lelang Chinese speaking the Yan dialect. Chinese administrators boosted Korean agricultural output through the introduction of contemporary irrigation system. They also built a wide network of defensive fortifications. As China was torn apart by raging dynastic and civil wars, the control over the Lelang commandery in Korea changed hands back and forth between various Chinese kingdoms (Han, Liao, Wei, and Jin) until finally Lelang was conquered by the Goguryeo kingdom and Chinese colonists were expelled from the peninsula in 313 AD.¹²

Three Kingdoms and China (1st B.C. – 7th centuries A.D.)

From their early days up until their disappearance in the 7th century A.D., the kingdoms of Silla, Baekche, and Goguryeo, known as the Three Kingdoms, maintained rather intensive economic ties and close cultural contacts with China. They showed no hesitation in adopting any elements of a more advanced Chinese culture that could be useful for their own development, including Chinese legal and administrative institutions, the Chinese written language, Buddhist and Confucian ideologies and traditions. In this regard, Chinese academics maintain that “the Gaogouli (Goguryeo) regime, all three capitals of which were located within Chinese-controlled lands, was a local ethnic political power paying tribute to the central government within the overall administration of Chinese dynasties from the Han to the Tang Dynasties.”¹³ Wei Cuncheng, a professor of Jilin University and expert on Goguryeo history , said, “Goguryeo was a regime established by ethnic groups in northern China some 2,000 years ago, representing an important part of Chinese culture.”¹⁴

In contrast, Korean academics regard Goguryeo as “a true multi-ethnic empire and the most powerful armed force in Northeast Asia,”¹⁵ which grew out of a despotic military garrison state with the Maek tribe cultural identity and occupied five main strongholds in the Yalu River basin, Tumen River basin, Taedong River basin, Liao River basin, and the Sungari River basin. Goguryeo considered itself the center of the world, and founder Jumong the son of Heaven.¹⁶ For seven centuries, the Goguryeo rulers pursued territorial expansion through military conquest in search for horses and iron, which resulted in their takeover of Northern Okcho, their attempts to secure iron supplies in the Liaodong area, as well as their attempts to invade Puyŏ, Didouyu in Eastern Mongolia and the Khitan, all of which were known for their fine horses.¹⁷

As a rule, the Three Kingdoms tended to maintain friendly relations with the more distant Chinese states, whereas they tended to be engaged in military confrontation with those Chinese states that were closer to their borders. Moreover, whenever the nearby Chinese states displayed belligerence towards Korean kingdoms, as an act of defiance, the latter befriended more remote parts of the Chinese Empire.¹⁸ In light of this traditional Korean realpolitik strategy, one can better understand Kim Il Sung’s intuitive efforts to expand relations with Vietnam and Cambodia when the Maoist China began to treat the DPRK in a high-handed manner in the late 1960s.

In the process of fighting for their Lebensraum (i.e., geopolitical living space) and mapping out their unification strategies, the Three Kingdoms did not hesitate to take advantage of the ongoing conflict for domination between the Northern and Southern dynasties in China in the 5-7th centuries.¹⁹

In particular, from the 5th century onwards, the international order in Northeast Asia was led by five major powers: Goguryeo; Northern Wei (the strongest of the North dynasties); the South dynasties; Rouran (Jujan state); and the Tuguhun, which maintained a certain balance of power allowing each of these five states to enjoy a period of relative stability. With time, in order to counter growing Northern Wei ambitions, the South dynasties, Rouran, and the Tuguhun formed a loose defensive trilateral anti-Wei alliance, which compelled Northern Wei to placate Goguryeo as a way to secure its rear. Goguryeo rulers took advantage of this situation to expand their military conquest policy to Eastern Mongolia widely regarded by all as a “geo-strategic heartland” from which they intended to exercise control over all of Mongolia and establish a stable and long-lasting hegemony over Manchuria as well as the “Western barbarians,” which would have allowed Goguryeo to play a role of regional balancer of power in Northeast Asia.²⁰

Since the kingdom of Goguryeo pursued expansionist policies on the Korean peninsula and in Manchuria, it frequently found itself in a state of warfare with neighboring Chinese states. The Goguryeo-Chinese border area was fluid, porous, and often turned into a bloody war zone. It is the 70-year war between Goguryeo and the Sui (598 A.D. and 612 A.D.), and between Goguryeo and the Tang (642 A.D., 668 A.D.) that marked the climax of this violent conflict. The historical significance of these border clashes is interpreted differently by contemporary Chinese and Korean historiographies. Chinese academics refer to them as “internal clashes that happened between the central government of China and a local regime established by an ethnic minority group, which should have been caused by central attempts at control and the local entity’s resistance.”

That is, it was “a matter of internal politics of the Chinese empire,” requiring “punitive actions by the Celestial Throne to enforce the suzerain-vassal relations, civilize barbarians, and tranquilize the Middle Kingdom.”²¹ In contrast, North Korean historiography lauds the Goguryeo victories over the Sui and Tang invasion armies as a special contribution to the Korean people’s resistance to foreign aggression. Koreans, who interpret these battles as “struggle for independence,” believe that the Goguryeo resistance put an end to the Sui’s and Tang’s attempts to achieve hegemony over all of East Asia and saved the kingdoms of Silla and Baekche from Chinese domination.²²

In general, since the early 2000s, the Chinese government-funded Northeast Asia Project has revived Sino-centric claims that historical development of Gojoseon, Goguryeo, and Barhae occurred as part of Chinese national history, and that there is almost no link between the people of the Korean peninsula and the people of Gojoseon, Goguryeo, and Barhae. It is worth noting that a majority of these studies regard most parts of the contemporary DPRK as traditional Chinese territory because of its subordination to the jurisdiction of Four Han Commanderies and frequent massive migrations of peoples between mainland China and northern part of the Korean peninsula. Further, they make a historical connection between Chinese and Korean territory, arguing that the area around the Cheongcheon River in present DPRK was taken from China under the Joseon dynasty’s northward policy, while claiming that the cradle of the Korean civilization proper lies in the Three Han states in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.

Whether the Northeast Asia Project is defensive or offensive in nature, it is clear that many Chinese scholars like historians Sun Jinji and Quan Zhezhu are concerned with territorial integrity of China’s Northeast and potential political instability in the border regions in the event of disintegration of the North Korean state, particularly a flood of refugees and territorial boundary disputes.²³ It goes without saying that such Chinese arguments cause anxiety among many Korean historians that it may be part of Beijing’s pro-active attempt to develop moral justification, both for internal propaganda and strategic communication overseas, for gaining preemptive territorial rights to the North Korean lands in question in the event of the collapse of the North Korean regime or reunification of two Koreas.²⁴

Unified Silla and China (668 A.D. – 10th century A.D.)

The nature of relationship between the kingdom of Silla and Tang was radically different from the nature of the Gogureyo-Chinese relations. First, Silla forged a diplomatic and security alliance with Tang. Then, its rulers used the Chinese military and diplomatic assistance to defeat Baekche and Goguryeo in the 660s A.D. and to unify the Korean peninsula in 668 A.D. Following Goguryeo’s fall, almost 300,000 of its residents fled to China’s central plains and 100,000 of its 700,000 populace relocated north to form a part of the future kingdom of Balhae. Tang initially attempted to set up a military occupational government in Goguryeo’s stead, but this did not last, because the kingdom of Silla was able to push its former ally out of the peninsula.

Following the first China-assisted unification of the Korean peninsula, the unified Silla became an integral part of the Sino-centric world and China’s worldwide tributary system. Economic exchanges between Korea and China flourished. Korea exported raw materials and handcrafted articles to China, and imported luxury fabrics and handcrafted goods from China. The importation of luxury goods from China reached such proportions in late Silla that it began to drain significantly local resources, undermine local craftsmen, and cause popular displeasure. As a result, in 834 A.D., King Hungdok was compelled to issue a decree restricting and regulating ostentatious display of wealth brought from China. It is noteworthy that during the Asian financial crisis in the middle of the 1990s, the Kim Yong-sam administration in the ROK also launched a campaign against the importation of luxury goods from the United States, as a means to save hard currency for the country and prop up local industries.

Cultural borrowing from China increased dramatically, too. The Unified Silla imported the Tang civilization en masse. In particular, the Unified Silla imported plenty of books, including Buddhist sutras and Confucian texts, as well as various art works from Tang. Korean monks and students traveled to Tang in general to study Buddhist and Confucian scholarship. One can compare the intensity and magnitude of these cultural exchanges to the Chosun borrowing of the Meiji innovations from Japan in the late 19th century; to the North Korean adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet way of life from the USSR in the 1950s; and to the South Korean importation of Western liberal values and institutions from the United States of America in the second half of the 20th century. One may wonder whether there will be a similar intensification of Korean-Chinese economic, political, and cultural exchanges and re-Sinification of Korea in the aftermath of Korean reconciliation and possible reunification in the 21st century.

Goryeo and China (935-1392 A.D.)

Chinese academics usually argue that there is no historical linkage between the Goguryeo founded by Jumong (Ch. Zhu Meng) in 37 B.C. and Goryeo, which was founded by Wang Kon, a descendant of the Samhan tribe of the Silla dynasty, almost a thousand years later.²⁵ In contrast, Korean historians assert that there is ample historical evidence confirming that not only the people of Goryeo, but also the Han Chinese of that day, identified Goryeo as the descendant state of Goguryeo.²⁶ According to Dr. Ahn Byoung-woo, the fact that the majority of the population of Barhae migrated to Goryeo following the downfall of their kingdom can be understood as having been based on a common perception of a shared historical lineage to Goguryeo.

For centuries, the kingdom of Goryeo had a harmonious relationship with China during the Song dynasty. Through the visits of official embassies and travels of private merchants, Goryeo exported gold, silver, copper, ginseng, pine nuts, and such handcrafted items as paper, brushes, ink, and fans. Goryeo imported from Song China silk, books, porcelain, medicines, spices, and musical instruments. The economic exchanges between Goryeo and Song made a significant impact on Goryeo’s culture and the way of life of the Goryeo aristocracy. The latter admired and tried to copy the advanced civilization of Song China.

In the 12th century A.D., Goryeo rulers began to advocate a delicate readjustment of their security alliance with China. Specifically, when the military pressure exerted by the Khitan and Jin mounted, Goryeo refused to abide by the demands of the Song rulers to attack the Khitan and Chin from the rear. The primary reason for Goryeo’s reluctance to extend full military support to its Song ally was its fear to provoke the unpredictable “barbarians.” Goryeo even remained neutral when two Song emperors were taken prisoner by Jin. When the Song armies retreated south of the Yantze River and asked the Goryeo rulers to intercede to secure the release of the two Song emperors, Goryeo refused to provide assistance and inject itself into the confrontation between Jin and Song. Consequently, the Song dynasty ended all relations with the disloyal Goryeo rulers.

After the Mongols proclaimed the Yuan Dynasty in China in 1271, they occupied Goryeo in 1274 and began to impose the “two nations - one family” ideal on the Korean people. In particular, a succession of Goryeo kings (from Ch’ungnyol on) were forced to take princesses of the Yuan imperial house as their primary consorts. Sons born to these Yuan queens would normally succeed to the Goryeo throne. Thus, Goryeo became the “son-in-law” nation to the Yuan.

For all practical purposes, the Goryeo royal house was an appendage under the Mongol Imperial House. Goryeo crown princes had to reside in Peking as hostages until summoned to the kingship. Goryeo kings had to pay frequent tributary visits to Peking. Goryeo kings assumed Mongol names, Mongol dress, Mongol hairstyle, and even used the Mongol language. The Yuan emperors determined the succession in the Goryeo dynasty. The Yuan representatives in Korea purposefully downgraded the terminology related to the Korean kings, weakened the institution of the kingship and other government offices in Korea. In addition, the Yuan exerted huge economic levies on Korea, forcing the government to send to China as tribute gold, silver, cloth, grain, ginseng, falcons, young women, and eunuchs. The Chinese used Koreans for construction of warships and procurement of military supplies in preparation for their invasion of Japan. The Yuan politically and culturally repressed traditional Korean aristocracy, its values, way of life, and status in society. Thus, the Yuan-ization of the Goryeo royal household was complete. At its peak, some Goryeo royal radicals initiated a move to abolish the Goryeo kingdom altogether and attach it directly to the Yuan kingdom as one of its provinces, subject to control by the Yuan’s Eastern Expedition Field Headquarters.²⁷

However, due to the stubborn opposition of the Goryeo officialdom, this “royal coup” failed. Moreover, growing aristocratic resistance and grass-roots opposition to the ubiquitous Yuan-ization of the country led to the alienation of the Goryeo royal household from the rest of the Korean ruling class and society. Although relations between the Yuan and Goryeo households were that of “one family,” the people and the aristocracy of Goryeo came to hate the Yuan and rejoiced when the Ming overthrew the Mongols. They immediately took advantage of the change of ruling dynasty in China and dethroned the Goryeo Royal Household that had lost its legitimacy because of its collaboration with the Yuan. A new Yi dynasty was established in Korea in 1392.

It is noteworthy that in the first half of the 20th century, in total disregard of the lessons of history, Japan attempted to colonize Korea and assimilate the Korean people and society in a similarly ruthless and culturally nihilistic manner as the Yuan did in the 12-13th centuries. No wonder its policy of “one family – one nation” towards Joseon also failed with dramatic consequences for the Japanese Empire in 1945.

 

Yi Joseon and China (1392-1910 A.D.)

Yi Korea used the term sadae (i.e., “serving the great”) to describe its foreign policy toward the Ming China. It made every effort to maintain a friendly relationship with Peking. In the beginning, the pro-Ming policy pursued by the Yi founder, Yi Song-gye, in the course of his struggle with the Goryeo royal household, made it necessary to get the Chinese to confer legitimacy on the authority of a new dynasty and ruler in Korea. Since Yi was of unremarkable family background and despised by the old Goryeo aristocracy, he needed an authoritative sanction for his new regime – he chose Ming China to this achieve this end.

The Yi kings adopted the Confucian value system that justified their “Mandate of Heaven” to rule Korea. The original Confucian worldview, which they espoused, placed China at the center of the world order and put Korea in a peripheral and subservient position to the central kingdom.

The investiture of the Korean ruler by the Son of Heaven (i.e. Chinese Emperor) had real and symbolic significance for Koreans. On one hand, it stressed the commitment of the Yi state to Confucian ideals and Confucian model of development. Things Chinese were emulated. The Ming calendar year and Ming court dress were used by the Yi court. On the other hand, the investiture symbolized the tributary status of Yi Korea to China. It symbolized peace and good will between two countries and mutual protection against foreign invasions. It gave Yi Korea a sense of psychological and military security.

Economic and cultural exchanges between the Yi Korea and Ming China flourished. Korea exported to China horses, ginseng, furs, clothes, and straw mats, and, in turn, imported from China silk fabrics, Confucian books and Buddhist sutras, medicine, and porcelain ware. Three times a year, the Yi court dispatched official embassies to the Ming court to congratulate the Son of Heaven on the Emperor’s birthday, Chinese New Year, and the birthday of the Crown Prince.

The only complication that clouded the relationship between the Korean and Chinese courts at the time was Joseon’s request that the Ming scholars “clarify the royal lineage” of Yi Song-gye in the Ming Dynasty Administrative Code. After two centuries of scholastic debates, the Chinese acquiesced to the Korean request and settled the issue by inserting an appropriate footnote in the Code in 1584.

Finally, Ming China and Yi Korea always fought together against foreign invaders, especially the Jurchens and the Japanese. For instance, during the Imjin Wars (1592-1598), in order to fulfil its suzerain obligation to provide Korea with military protection from foreign attacks, the Ming sent a one hundred thousand men army to defend the Yi Korea from the Japanese Hideyoshi-led invasions.

When the Qing (or “barbarian Manchus”) overthrew the Ming and came to power in China in 1644, China’s relations with the Yi Korea soured. The Yi Royal household never accepted the Qing as legitimate rulers of China. Instead, it took upon itself the role of the sole custodian of a classic Confucian tradition and ideal.²⁸ From then on, the Yi policy toward the Qing China displayed intense hostility. Consequently, the Manchus invaded Yi Korea twice in 1627 and 1636. Although Korea was defeated and forced to recognize Qing power, it continued to view the Qing court as its primary nemesis.

After Korea lost Chinese protection in the mid-17th century, the Yi rulers decided to isolate themselves from the outside world. They closed the country and transformed it into a so-called “hermit kingdom,” which lasted until the 1870s. In this regard, an interesting question comes to mind: what will North Korea do, should China abandon Kim Jong Il’s regime? Will it close itself again in a manner similar to the reaction of the Yi rulers in the 1640s after they had lost China’s patronage?

Facing the prospect of irrevocable departure from the Korean peninsula under persistently growing pressure from the Japanese Empire at the outset of the 19th century, the Vice-Roy of China, Count Li Hung Chang, summarized the centuries-long history of traditional Korean-Chinese relations in the following way:

“With scarcely a tribute that was worth while in all these hundreds of years, Corea has ever been independent and even resentful of our influence or interest; but just as soon as trouble looms up on the horizon, from causes having their source either within or without the kingdom, she comes begging for help. And help has never been denied, for the people of the country are our people, and they share with us the ever-lasting dislike for the pigmy Nipponese, with their strutting ways and ignorant presumptions.”²⁹

 

Korean-Chinese Relations on the eve and during the Cold War (1945-1990)

During the Japanese colonial era (1910-1945), there were no official relations between Korea and China. However, this does not mean that Korean and Chinese peoples did not interact at all. Being parts of the extended Japanese Empire, the colony of Joseon in the Korean peninsula and northeastern China were developed into a well integrated and mutually dependent industrial economic complex with duty-free exchange of goods, relatively free transfer of technologies, unimpeded migration of labor, and unified Japanese administration and regulations throughout the region.

At the same time, what was more significant for the future of Korean-Chinese relations, the anti-Japanese, pro-independence movements in Korea and China unfolded in a parallel manner in the 1930s and 1940s. It was during those years of anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle for power on the Chinese mainland and in the Korean peninsula that personal loyalties among future communist guerrilla elites (the Kim Il Sung – Mao Zedong generation) were forged and cemented. Korean communist guerrillas were members of the Chinese Communist party and fought in the People’s Liberation Army during the Chinese Civil War. Later on, the Kim Il Sung-led Yenan faction became the most powerful force in Korean domestic politics.

Following the liberation of Korea from the Japanese colonial yoke in August 1945 and the U.S. and Soviet occupation of the southern and northern halves of the Korean peninsula respectively, China found itself frozen out of Korea. The Sino-Korean borders were blocked by the Soviet and American troops. As a result, for almost three years from 1945 to 1948 all economic and cultural exchanges were interrupted – no trade, no postal or telegraph communications, no popular movements. Millions of Chinese Koreans, who wanted to return to their fatherland in the wake of the collapse of the Japanese Empire, got stranded in Manchuria. The United States did not want to let the Chinese Koreans into the southern part of Korea by sea because they feared that the latter were pro-communist, whereas the Soviet Union refused to allow them into the northern part of Korea by land out of fear that they were pro-imperialist.

Only after the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), respectively on September 9, 1948, and October 1, 1949, were the North Korean-Chinese ties partially restored. Bilateral relations began to develop again under the watchful eye of Soviet political and military advisors stationed in abundance in both Korea and China in the late 1940s. At the same time, Syngman Rhee’s regime in the ROK initiated a rapprochement with nationalist Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan under close guidance of American advisors.

China returned to the Korean peninsula in big way during the Korean War (1950-1953). Even before the hostilities erupted, in summer 1949 and spring 1950, the PRC transferred almost fifty thousand Chinese-Korean troops, well seasoned in the battles of the Chinese Civil War, from the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into the ranks of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Without Mao Zedong’s explicit consent to support Stalin and Kim Il Sung in their Korean armed unification plans on May 15, 1950, there would have been no Korean War as we know it. China entered the Korean War on October 16, 1950, when Kim Il Sung was desperate and cornered by the U.N. forces and pleaded without much success with all his allies for military assistance.³⁰ Taking into account its own national security considerations, traditional ties with and roles in Korea, and its newly acquired sense of communist solidarity and internationalist duty, China sent more than two million Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPVs) to Korea and lost more than 1.2 million CPVs on the Korean battleground in the course of three years of war. During the war, the Chinese political leaders in Beijing and military commanders in the field acquired unprecedented influence in the formulation of war strategy and operational decision-making in Korea. Upon Mao’s insistence, Kim Il Sung was forced to take orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the CPVs, PLA Marshal Peng De Huai. Finally, Mao Zedong strove to prolong the Korean War as long as he could, in order “to bleed Americans to death,” despite Kim Il Sung’s ardent pleas to stop fighting from 1951 on. In other words, CPV’s last minute rescue of Kim Il Sung and their steadfast contribution in the Korean War allowed China to once again regain its lost presence and influence in Korea and to begin to call the shots not only in Korean domestic politics but also in the international games of power in the Korean peninsula.

After the Korean War was over in July 1953, China took an active part in the post-war reconstruction of North Korea. In November 1953, during Kim Il Sung’s visit to Beijing, the PRC’s government cancelled all war debts of the DPRK. Moreover, in five years (1953-1958), China granted North Korea with more than 800 billion yuan in economic aid. In addition, the PLA left several hundred thousand CPV troops in Korea to assist the North Korean government in rebuilding its socio-economic infrastructure devastated during the war. In short, the post-war North Korea was rebuilt with abundant Chinese labor supported by Soviet money and technology.

It was the time when the DPRK’s leadership tended to follow the ideological lead of the Chinese Communist Party and copied Chinese methods of labor mobilization, i.e. the Ch’ollima (or “Flying Horse”) movement modeled after the Maoist Great Leap Forward and the Soktojon (or “Speed battle”), as well as adopted some Chinese-like forms of organization of industrial and agricultural production processes known as the Taean system.

From the 1960s to the early 1980s, the DPRK was faced with unpleasant strategic and policy choices dictated by the growing Soviet-Chinese schism and deepening ideological divisions between Moscow and Beijing within the world communist movement. The key question was whether the North Korean leaders should display international communist solidarity and pursue a policy of equidistance by taking a neutral stance in the ideological disputes between their two closest allies or if they should be guided by political realism and seek to play off the Soviet card against the Chinese card to their own advantage.

On balance, there were ups and downs in both bilateral relationships. But, Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing over time proved to be somewhat closer and warmer than with Moscow. Kim Il Sung never made an explicit effort to play off Moscow against Beijing and always tried to appear even-handed with his both allies. But, he was obviously opportunistic and accepted support from wherever he could get it, without committing himself fully to Soviet or Chinese ideology. He was able to maintain his relative independence in policy, despite occasional economic, political, and military costs that he had to incur. In this sense, the concept of self-reliance (or Juch’e) in the DPRK’s foreign policy can be viewed as a by-product of the Soviet-Chinese schism.

In general, Kim Il Sung had very little leverage over either the Chinese or Soviet leaders. As a whole, it was the Chinese or Soviets who tended to take the initiative in changing the course of their bilateral relations with the DPRK. Beijing supported Pyongyang only when it suited its own economic, or political, or military purposes. Hence, Kim Il Sung’s own attitude to Chinese leaders oscillated back and forth. But it never deteriorated beyond repair.

A major milestone in the institutionalization of the DPRK-PRC inter-state relations was the Sino-North Korean Alliance Treaty signed on July 7, 1961, in Beijing. It is still in force. Both sides began to work out the provisions of this mutual defense treaty, which committed the PRC to the defense of the DPRK against an unprovoked aggression, on the eve of the withdrawal of the CPVs from the DPRK in 1958. But it was signed only after Moscow persuaded Kim Il Sung to conclude a mutual defense pact with the Soviet Union on June 7, 1961, in Moscow. As a matter of fact, Kim Il Sung signed the Alliance Treaty with China on his way from Moscow to Pyongyang by train. His unexpected action caught by surprise and dismayed the Soviet leader Khrushchev at the time. Although it undermined the newly developed trust towards Pyongyang in Moscow, it nonetheless restored the balance and equidistance in the DPRK’s relations with Moscow and Beijing. Following the conclusion of the mutual defense treaty, Chinese military supplies and economic assistance to North Korea were increased substantially.

However, the Cultural Revolution in the PRC in the second half of the 1960s led to a significant deterioration of relations between Pyongyang and Beijing. The Chinese leaders increasingly complained about the so-called “aggressive nationalism” of North Korea. For example, in his major public address in Shanghai in December 1967, Yao Wen-Yuan criticized the DPRK’s policy of self-reliance in national defense and foreign policy, as well as its policy of parallel economic modernization and military build-up. In addition, The Red Guards were blamed for a series of killings of North Korean students in Beijing. The Chinese government reportedly condoned a widespread mistreatment of ethnic Koreans residing in northeast China, who even tried to flee to North Korea to escape Chinese prosecution. In 1967-1969, border skirmishes erupted along the Yalu River; Kim Il Sung is said to have issued defense orders; and division-size battles took place in the DPRK-PRC border area, although it is still not known which side was to blame for the initiation of these hostilities.

After the Cultural Revolution faded away in the PRC, North Korean-Chinese bilateral relations improved steadily throughout the 1970s. In April 1970, the PRC Premier Zhou Enlai paid a historic visit to Pyongyang to restore cordial and friendly ties. He offered greatly expanded military and economic aid packages to the DPRK, which were gladly accepted. A bilateral Treaty on Economic and Technical Assistance was signed on October 17, 1970. An Economic Cooperation Treaty was concluded on August 15, 1971.³¹

In general, in the 1970s, the PRC-DPRK relations improved dramatically. The PLA sold to the North Korean Air Force some combat aircraft and other weapons and armaments. It assisted the KPA in a missile technology development program. In the economic sphere, the Chinese government opened substantial credit lines to finance the DPRK’s PRC-bound exports. Beijing increased the amount of petroleum that it delivered annually to North Korea at the so-called “friendship prices” to almost 1.2 million metric tons. And, yet again, it cancelled a large portion of the DPRK’s debt obligations to China, incurred in the 1960s. Political contacts flourished, too: Chinese delegations to Pyongyang outnumbered the North Korean delegations to Beijing by a two-to-one margin, including such historic visits to the DPRK as Hua Guo-Feng’s in May 1978 and Deng Xiaoping’s in September 1978. In the international arena, the PRC government regularly expressed its unequivocal support for the DPRK’s unification proposals and demands for withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea, as well as for the DPRK’s proposal to have three-party talks in 1978-1979.

Some analysts believed that these Chinese gestures were aimed at further detaching Pyongyang from Moscow, which may have been true, considering the fact that the USSR-DPRK relations gradually deteriorated throughout the 1970s. But others interpreted these developments as mutual attempts to keep the Sino-North Korean alliance on a solid ground when Beijing was negotiating the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan. For in 1971-1972, in response to China’s early moves to improve relations with the United States and Japan, Kim Il Sung hoped that the DPRK might be able to benefit from a new power realignment in East Asia by gaining the U.S. and Japan’s recognition, too, as a consequence of the PRC-U.S. and PRC-Japanese rapprochement. In line with these expectations, he even moved to improve the North-South relations by signing a Joint Declaration on Principles with the ROK government on July 4, 1972.

But, the Chinese “shocks” of 1978-1979, when the PRC signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, normalized relations with the United States, and abrogated the Sino-Soviet Mutual Alliance Treaty, dampened these unrealistic hopes. By 1979, Kim Il Sung had become afraid that the PRC-U.S.-Japan triangle would freeze out the DPRK and give it up to the ROK’s mercy. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979 was an even more staggering blow. The DPRK leaders were shocked, expressed dismay and fear, and all but condemned their Chinese ally. The invasion revived dormant fears of traditional Chinese domination of neighboring countries, including the Korean peninsula. The North Korean government began to send military and economic assistance to Vietnam and Cambodia. Consequently, the “special relationship” between North Korea and China was severely damaged.

 

China and Two Koreas in the Post-Cold War World

The end of the Cold War in East Asia was heralded by the loosening of the PRC-DPRK alliance and normalization of the PRC-ROK relations in the early 1990s. In the wake of these dramatic changes, the North Korean-Chinese-South Korean strategic triangle was formed, with China’s beginning to play the role of the moderator, mediator and final arbiter in the accelerating process of intra-Korean reconciliation and rapprochement.

It is worth mentioning that South Korea had been striving to normalize relations with China since the early 1970s. Already on March 16, 1973, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a proposal for talks with the PRC regarding a demarcation line for exploration of continental shelf in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea. But, there was no response from Beijing at that time. In the wake of the so-called “fishermen diplomacy” in September-October 1974, when Chinese seamen rescued South Korean fishermen, and China repatriated them to the ROK, Beijing began to display some signs of interest in Seoul. But, following Kim Il Sung’s visit to the PRC in April 1975, Chinese attitudes towards the South hardened again.

In the next ten years, the ROK sent a number of trial balloons to the PRC, but to no avail. The New Zealand Prime Minister and the U.K. Foreign Secretary, who visited Beijing respectively in April and May 1976, delivered “messages of peace” from Seoul to the Chinese government, but were unable to ignite any interest in their counterparts. In June 1976, the ROK officially proposed to open negotiations on a fishery agreement with the PRC, but there was no response from China. On January 16, 1979, the U.S. government passed to Deng Xiaoping during his American journey the ROK Memorandum outlining the willingness of the ROK government to normalize relations with the PRC government. But Beijing ignored it again. In the 1980s, Seoul made a number of friendly gestures towards Beijing in an attempt to solicit its good will. Specifically, in 1983, the ROK authorities returned a hijacked CAL airplane and a mutinous Chinese naval ship to the PRC. In June 1989, they declined to condemn the CCP leadership for the Tiananmen Square Massacre, despite significant pressure from the international community.

Finally, the South Korean persistence and flexibility vis-à-vis the Chinese, embodied in the revolutionary Nordpolitik pursued by the then ROK President Roh Tae-woo, paid off. The ROK and PRC exchanged trade representatives in April 1991, signed a bilateral trade agreement on January 31, 1992, and exchanged diplomatic missions on August 24, 1992.

One should stress that in the final bargaining on the modalities of mutual diplomatic recognition, China clearly got its way. The ROK government agreed to recognize the PRC as “the sole legitimate government representing all of China,” as well as to consider Taiwan as part of China. In return, Beijing issued a promise to support Korean unification through peaceful means by Koreans themselves. In essence, the ROK pledged to support Beijing’s “one China” policy, thereby abandoning its long-time ally of Taiwan, whereas the PRC only reaffirmed its long-standing de-facto “two Korea” policy.

Although still nascent, the Sino-South Korean economic relationship has been rapidly intensifying throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The bilateral trade skyrocketed from USD 2.8 billion in 1990 to over 89 billion U.S. dollars in 2005, and is expected to top 100 billion US dollars in 2006. The ROK imports food, fuel, and labor from China and exports machinery and capital to the PRC. The ROK direct investment into the special “Korean Industrial Zones” in southern and northeastern China exceeded 4.4 billion U.S. dollars in 2005. The PRC has become the ROK’s largest trading partner, whereas the latter has become the fourth largest trading partner of the PRC. The number of South Korean travelers to the PRC increased from 2.84 million in 2004 to 3.54 last year, up 24.6 percent, overtaking Japan’s 3.39 million.³² The “Hallyu” cultural wave swept China’s popular culture. The two countries periodically exchange presidential and prime ministerial visits, and regularly send senior government officials and military delegations for consultations to each other’s capitals. Despite the restrictions in place because of the U.S.-ROK alliance, military cooperation between Beijing and Seoul is also on the rise.

It goes without saying that a new relationship causes new problems and poses new challenges to policymakers in both capitals. The PRC’s trade deficit with the ROK ballooned to over 15 billion U.S. dollars in 2005. Trade conflicts like a “garlic war,” “kimchi war,” “Intellectual Property Rights war,” periodically roil the markets. Cheap Chinese products squeeze South Korean goods from the U.S. and Japanese markets. The scramble in Korea to set up manufacturing bases and to outsource in China led to the hollowing out of many traditional industries back at home. The economic integration is becoming so tight that should China devalue its currency, fragile economic recovery in the ROK may be undermined: “when China sneezes, Korea coughs,” as some Korean economists put it.

From a strategic point of view, China’s continuous support for the North Korean regime, escalation of strategic competition between Beijing and Washington, growing tension between China and Japan, and its growing belligerence toward Taiwan worry Seoul and are deemed threatening to the ROK’s long-term national security interests. This notwithstanding, one can state with confidence that although South Korea’s eyes and nose are still turned in the direction of Washington, its ears are already tuned to Beijing. Seoul’s stance on the questions of the controversial theater missile defense and national missile defense is a good example of its willingness to take into account Chinese sensitivities in strategic matters.

Of course, Pyongyang resents Beijing’s de-facto “two Korea” policy. Although they cannot afford alienating their sole ally in the region, the North Korean leaders sometimes remind their Chinese counterparts of the Taiwanese card that they can play if Beijing puts too much pressure on them, which is best demonstrated by Pyongyang-Taipei trade exchanges, nuclear waste disposal talks, and bilateral aviation agreement.

The Sino-North Korean relationship based on hardened revolutionary traditions and lasting historical ties is still strong, although it has grown much more controversial and ambivalent in recent years. The ruling regimes of the DPRK and PRC still adhere to a similar communist ideology and function within the confines of similar Marxist-Leninist socialist political system, albeit increasingly wrapping themselves in traditional nationalist colors. Leaders of both countries also share similar notions regarding the nature of the post-Cold War world order and the need to counteract the growing U.S. hegemony in East Asia. Their primary goals include modernization of their respective economies and preservation of their own one-party rule. The strategic objectives of both regimes remain the same – independence, economic development, and reunification on their own terms. China still offers military protection to North Korea and extends a diplomatic hand to Pyongyang in times of great need, as seen during the near-nuclear crisis in the summer of 1994 and the second nuclear crisis from 2002 up to the present date. Beijing still grants a sense of legitimacy to the North Korean rulers and political regime. Kim Jong-il’s acceptance in Beijing after his father’s death was instrumental in his consolidation of power back at home. The PRC still serves as a developmental model for the DPRK: Pyongyang seems to be interested in following the Chinese governing style of “neo-authoritarianism,” i.e. gradual market-oriented economic reforms and political tightening under Chinese security umbrella.³³

The message that Chinese leaders seem to be sending to Pyongyang at present is that a ruling party can adopt market reforms, open up and take advantage of globalization, and still stay in power and maintain political control for generations to come, as the “Chinese model” convincingly demonstrates. North Korea must first catch up with the South economically, and only then it can pursue its reunification goals on an equal or favorable footing in accordance with its own terms. Taking a longer-term outlook, Chinese analysts like to compare the Korean situation with the balance of power between PRC and Taiwan in 1978 and 2006, suggesting that despite its seemingly dire straits, the game is not yet over for the North. Dramatic reversals of fortunes and balance of power on the Korean peninsula cannot be precluded.

Chinese academics maintain that North Korea is currently undergoing profound changes, especially in the micro-economic behavior of individuals and firms, which is now aimed at profit-seeking and rent-seeking, and in the newly pro-business government policy. Kim Jong Il is reported to have been “shocked” at the Chinese accomplishments and what he saw in Southern China during his January 2006 trip (which is compared to a similar trip down South made by Deng Xiaoping in 1984) and to have “fully embraced” the Chinese reform model. The Chinese say that after his five trips to the PRC, Kim Jong Il demonstrates a “strong desire for reform,” and they expect the DPRK government to introduce by the end of 2006 a second, more far-reaching, phase of market-oriented reforms, which will include banking and financial sectors, public finance sector, gradual privatization of some state-owned enterprises.

Despite these prospective economic reforms, the DPRK’s economic dependency on the PRC grows steadily. North Korea increasingly becomes an economic liability for China, with its external debt to Beijing mounting and pleas for food and energy assistance escalating. This notwithstanding, China seems to have decided recently to help “rebuild, reinvent, reform, and reinforce” its North Korean ally through increasing official development assistance (reported to equal about two billion U.S. dollars in 2006-2010). This assistance takes the various forms: state subsidies; guarantees for Chinese corporate investments in infrastructure modernization; expansion projects and resource exploration ventures in the North; stepped up bilateral trade; all sorts of exchanges (party-to-party, between local and provincial governments, inter-bureaucratic at the central government level, mil-to-mil, between corporate entities, cultural ties, etc.); and extension of diplomatic cover and support on the international arena, especially in the six-party talks.

Chinese military analysts regard the “military-first politics” as a “reform enabler” and not an obstacle to genuine socio-economic transformation in the DPRK. They say that “North Korea does what China did,” i.e. “they strive to reform economically while upgrading their military capabilities, which is their legitimate right.” Now at the time of sensitive transition, in order to maintain political stability, Kim Jong Il needs the full backing of his omni-present and powerful military to promote economic changes. But, when the time comes, he may well order the KPA to exit from all non-military activities just like the CCP advised the PLA to disengage from all economic activities in the mid-1990s. In addition, they point out to the positive role of military elites in orchestrating and shepherding the economic miracle in South Korea in the 1960s-1970s. The Chinese believe that the “military-first politics” is just a political cover for the “economics-first policy” pursued by Kim Jong Il. Moreover, some suggest that in 2004-2005, the DPRK’s military expenditures actually decreased both in absolute terms and as a proportion to the country’s GDP. China recognizes the KPA’s military inferiority vis-à-vis South Korea, aligned with the United States, but does very little about it to the displeasure of Pyongyang. Moreover, the DPRK’s schemes of military-led unification seem to fall on deaf ears in the PRC for now.

The Chinese analysts show considerable ambiguity regarding the North Korean nuclear programs. There seems to be a consensus that for Kim Jong Il, nuclear programs are not negotiable, not “bargaining chips.” Nuclear North Korea is here to stay. Many Chinese scholars repeat the well-known North Korean arguments about the DPRK’s energy needs and security concerns, stressing that the nuclear option is quite rational because it offers a cheaper alternative on both counts. Others highlight decades of mistrust and betrayal in relations between the DPRK and the West, bureaucratic politics in the North, and political legitimacy concerns for Kim Jong Il as possible drivers of North Korean nuclear ambitions. Some draw attention to the still undeclared status of the Israeli nuclear programs, perhaps, implying that China could make and live with a similar type of arrangements for its ally that the United States made for Israel. At present, the Chinese seem to discount the threat of the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation to international terrorists or the threat of either Japan or ROK going nuclear as a result of current North Korean actions. It is noteworthy that some of them regard the North Korean nuclear and missile deterrents as useful checks on Japanese power in the region, perhaps applying the logic similar to the Chinese views of Pakistani nuclear deterrent against rising India.

Overall, as long as China is behind North Korea and its leaders, the latter’s regime survival is assured. Beijing is primarily interested in maintaining geopolitical stability on the peninsula and is likely to give enough aid to Kim Jong-il to keep him afloat and to prevent an avalanche-like unification of Korea at the expense of China’s interests and rights on the peninsula.

The general question is how bilateral and trilateral relationships within the DPRK-PRC-ROK triangle are likely to evolve once the geopolitical pieces begin to move on and around the peninsula in the future. First, one wonders whether the South Korean model of socio-economic development (i.e., a “hard state, soft economy, and open society”) can and will be transferred to China, and, subsequently, passed onto the DPRK? Or, on the contrary, can and will South Korea be Sinified in the neo-authoritarian style as a consequence of growing integration of Chinese and Korean economies, societies, and cultures? Second, one wonders under what conditions and in what form China may be willing to intervene directly in Korean conflict and to support and accept unification of the Korean peninsula. Will China stand behind Pyongyang to the end, or will Beijing acquiesce, if not assist, to Seoul’s bid for Korean unification on its own terms? In the event of radical regime change or collapse of state authority in the DPRK, will China “standby and do nothing” because of possible policy paralysis in Beijing, or will the PLA move in to establish a “buffer zone,” perhaps 20-30 miles inside North Korea, or will China move in, possibly, in a big way, in order “to restore its lost territory and re-establish its sovereignty” over the northern part of the Korean peninsula? In the case of an emergency, will China try to orchestrate an outright takeover of the North, possibly as a Chinese “protectorate,” or will Beijing be more predisposed to set up a remotely-controlled “puppet regime” in Pyongyang with one or some of the relatives of the new North Korean leadership residing in Beijing along more traditional lines? Whatever happens in Korea, it is likely to be messy and tumultuous, and, if history offers any guidance at all, one should suppose that Korea is likely to go the way China will go. Hence, the world should watch out for the Chinese.

 

Conclusion

It is obvious that the Chinese have begun to look beyond the Six-party talks as a format for finding a long-term resolution of the Korean problem, including the settlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear program. They see the US as being bogged down in the Middle East for many years to come and expect no fundamental policy changes or major new initiatives from the “lame duck U.S. President” with respect to the Korean peninsula. They do not believe that the current U.S. administration is interested in striking a mutually acceptable deal with Pyongyang or is even sensitive to helping Beijing “save face” as a host of the six-party process (quite predictably, they regard the counterfeit issue almost unanimously as a U.S. tactic to put a squeeze on Pyongyang and alienate it from the international community). Therefore, they express increasing reluctance to continue to play out the perceived “American scenario” for North Korea, as exemplified by the six-party talks.

As a strategic alternative, the Chinese hint that China and the two Koreas, which both have excellent relations with Beijing, can resolve any problems – including the issues of peninsular security, regional stability, socio-economic development, and nation-building – amongst themselves within the circle of Chinese civilization without the interference of third parties from outside the region.

It is worth pondering whether the Six-party talks can survive economic revival in North Korea. The original premise of the Six-party process was that the North Korean state had failed and was rapidly approaching its demise. Thus, if the international community applied unified pressure, then Pyongyang would give up its nuclear weapons and might even end up in the dustbin of history under the burden of its intractable problems. Now that that original premise seems to no longer hold true, and North Korea has begun to recover and grow again (with or without the help of the Chinese and South Koreans), why should we expect any compromises from a usually intransigent but now domestically stronger North Korea at the six-party talks at all? Unless the PRC and ROK moderate their economic engagement with the DPRK, which is highly unlikely, no positive breakthroughs will be possible at the nuclear talks. The bottom line is that the DPRK’s economic revival may only cement the stalemate at the six-party talks.

Finally, do the U.S. and Japan really want an economically reformed and rebuilt North Korea bent on reunification with South Korea on its own terms with the full backing of and in close alignment with China? Make no mistake about it: the message that China sends to Kim Jong Il is that he can successfully reform his economy along the market principles and still rule his country with an iron fist twenty years from now when he can start pushing his own reunification agenda again with a much stronger hand. A capitalist authoritarian North and a capitalist democratic South, both increasingly pulled into the Chinese economic orbit, security sphere, and cultural zone, may find hard to resist the mutual desire for reconciliation and accommodation in close alignment with the Chinese regional hegemon at the expense of the United States and Japan.

Does this prospect correspond with the long-term objectives of the United States and Japan on the Korean peninsula? Maybe yes, maybe no. As the end goals of the six parties begin to diverge, the Six-way talks appear to be doomed to failure. Therefore, the U.S. must start exploring alternative approaches to the long-term settlement of the Korean problem, including the nuclear issue, in order to prevent the possibility of being presented with an undesirable fait accompli by its strategic competitors in the region a few years from now.

 

Endnotes

1. This question can be attributed to the 27th monarch of Silla, known as Tongman, also posthumously called Great Queen Sondok. She ascended to the throne in 632 AD and reigned for sixteen years, forging a Silla-Tang alliance that defeated Beakche, forced the demise of Goguryeo, and played a pivotal role in the Silla-led unification of the Korean peninsula. Great Queen Sondok is known for making three prophesies. The first prophesy was when the Tang Emperor T’ai-stung (627-649) sent her a painting of peonies in three different colors – red, white, and purple – together with three toe measures of seeds. The queen saw the painted flowers and said, “These flowers are probably with no fragrance.” Then, she ordered the flowers to be planted in a garden. When the flowers bloomed until the petals dropped, it was just as she said – there was no fragrance. Later, she explained to the court officials that “Because in the painting of flowers there were no butterflies, I knew there would be no fragrance. This was the Tang emperor teasing me for having no husband.” See Peter H. Lee and Wm. Theodore de Bary, eds., “Sources of Korean Tradition, Volume One: From Early Times Through the Sixteenth Century,” Columbia University Press: New York, 1997, p. 62. One may interpret the general meaning of this fable as describing something “beautiful on the outside, but not wholesome or substantive on the inside.” With respect to Korean-Chinese ties, since the Great Silla queen wanted to make an alliance with the Tang emperor, but refused to marry his son, which would have cemented the Silla-Tang blood ties, the prophesy may have the meaning of something which is transient and short-lived like beautiful colors, but lacks the staying power, vitality, and reproductive capability like an intimate husband-and-wife relationship.
2. The views expressed in this article are personal opinions of the author and may not reflect the official positions of the APCSS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
3. Yonson Ahn, “The Korea-China Textbook War – What’s It All About?” Japan Focus, February 9, 2006, p. 15.
4. Park Kyeong-chul, History of Goguryo and China’s Northeast Asia Project, International Journal of Korean History, Vol. 6, December 2004, pp. 1-28.
5. Ssu-ma Ch’ien (Sima Qian), Records of the grand historian of China, Translated from the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Ch’ien by Burton Watson, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.
6. Sun, Jinji 1986, Dongbei minzu yuanliu (The Ethnic Origin of the Northeast), Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe.
7. Ilyon, Samguk Yusa (Legends and History of the Three Kingdoms of Ancient Korea, translated by Ha Tae-hung and Grafton K. Mintz, Yonsei University Press: Seoul, 5th edition, 1997, pp. 32-33.
8. Byeon Tae-seop, Hanguksa tongnon (Outline of Korean history), 4th ed., 1999.
9. Ilyon, Samguk Yusa, op. cit., pp. 34-36.
10. Juns are territorial domains for the emperor’s sons or dukes, governed directly by the imperial court.
11. Sun Jinji, “Guanyu gaogouli guishu wenti de jige zhengyi jiaodian” (On Some Contested Issues Concerning the Problem of Gaogouli’s Affiliation ), Dongbei minzushi yanjiu (Study on the History of Northeast Nationalities), Vol.1, Zhengzhou: Zhengzhou guji chubanshe ( Zhengzhou classics publishing house).
12. Quan, Zhezhu 2003, Kaizhan Dongbei bianjiang wenti yanjiu de jige wenti (Several Problems in the Study of the Northeast Borderlands), in Ma Dazheng ed., Zhongguo Dongbei bianjiang yanjiu (Studies of the Northeast Borderlands in China), Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe.
13. Ma Dazheng, “Gaogouli Role in Chinese History Traced,” China Daily, June 24, 2003, p. 9
14. See “China’s ancient Koguryo Kingdom site added to World Heritage List,” 2 July 2004, People’s Daily Online, accessed on 15 March 06
15. Im, Ki-hwan, “Koguryo, An East Asian Hegemon”, Kim Lena, ed., Koguryo Tomb Murals, Seoul: ICOMOS-Korea & Cultural Properties Administration, 2004.
16. Lee, Soon Keun 2005 “On the Historical Succession of Goguryeo in Northeast Asia”, Korea Journal, Vol. 45, No.2, Spring 2005, 172-201.
17. Park Kyeong-chul, op.cit.
18. Park Kyeong-chul, “Critique of China’s view of Koguryŏ’s 70-year war with the Sui and Tang dynasties (Chungguk Hakgyeŭi Koguryŏ Tae Su·Tang Chŏnjaeng Insikŭi Pipanjŏk Kŏmt’o)”, The Studies of Ancient Korean History (Hanguk Kodaesa Yŏngu), Vol. 33, Society for Korean Ancient History (Hanguk Kodaesa Hakhoe), March 2004.
19. It is worth noting that in the pursuit of their own unification agendas in the late 1940s and in the late 1990s, both North and South Korea played out the Taiwan card vis-à-vis the PRC in a similar manner.
20. Park Kyeong-chul, op. cit, pp. 14-15.
21. Li Dianfu and Sun Yuliang, Brief History of Goguryeo, 1990, pp. 128-129
22. Song Yeong-jong, Goguryeosa (The History of Goguryeo), Pyongyang, DPRK: Gwahak Baekgwa Sajeon Jonghap Chulpansa, 1990
23. Sun, Jinji, “Zhongguo Gaogoulishi yanjiu kaifang fanrong de liunian (Six Years of Opening and Prosperity of Koguryo History Research)”, paper presented at the conference titled Koguryo yoksawa munhwa yusan (History and Cultural Heritage of Koguryo), March 26-27, 2004, Seoul History Museum (accessed January 25, 2006). Also, see Quan, Zhezhu, Kaizhan Dongbei bianjiang wenti yanjiu de jige wenti (Several Problems in the Study of the Northeast Borderlands), in Ma Dazheng ed., Zhongguo Dongbei bianjiang yanjiu (Studies of the Northeast Borderlands in China), Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2003.
24. Yoon Hwy-tak, “China’s Northeast Project: Defensive or Offensive Strategy?” East Asian Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, winter 2004, pp. 99-121
25. Li Dianfu and Sun Yuliang, Brief History of Goguryeo, 1990, pp. 22-23.
26. Song Ki-ho, China’s Attempt at “Stealing” Part of Ancient Korean History, The Review of Korean Studies, Academy of Korean Studies: Seoul, ROK, Vol. 7, No. 4: 93-122
27. Lee Ki-baik, A New History of Korea, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
28. It is noteworthy that in a similar manner, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and defeat of communist doctrine world-wide, the DPRK unilaterally assumed the role of the center and sole embodiment of pure communist world view.
29. See Li Hung Chang, Memoirs, March 17, 1882.
30. Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Washington, D.C., issue 6, Winter 1995-1996, pp. 94-119.
31. Following the conclusion of these agreements, economic and military exchanges intensified considerably between the two countries. On June 25, 1970, the PLA Chief of Staff, Huang Yung-Sheng, visited Pyongyang. His visit was reciprocated by the KPA Chief of Staff, O Jin-u’s visit to Beijing in July 1970. In June 1971, the PRC Vice-President, Li Xiennien, visited Pyongyang, and the DPRK Vice-President, Chong Chun-taek, visited Beijing in August 1971. Finally, on September 6, 1971, O Jin-u went to Beijing to sign a military technical cooperation agreement between the governments of the two countries. As a result, of these exchanges and implementation of the above-mentioned agreements, by 1973, Beijing had become Pyongyang’s Number One military supplier, and by 1977, China had become the Number Two trading partner of the DPRK.
32. See “Koreans Top List of Foreign Visitors to China,” Chosun Ilbo, Seoul, February 1, 2006
33. “Giving Lip Service with an Attitude: North Korea’s China Debate,” APCSS Special Assessment on Asia’s China Debate, APCSS: Honolulu, HI, December 2003, pp. 9-1 to 9-10