This study analyzes the dynamic historical relationship between socialist reform and traditional Confucianism in the process of North Korean state formation. From the period of liberation to the 1970s and afterwards, the North Korean state tried to integrate the entire society by initiating a “domestic revolution” policy through the use of organic metaphors. Through the domestic revolution policy, the counter-socialist traditional kinship community and institutions and their economic and cultural bases were destroyed. However, even in the midst of institutionalized state reform, the cultural tendency of individual family groups was dominated by the basic principles and values of traditional Confucianism. This means that the domestic revolution policy in North Korea faced the disparity between the socialist ideal and cultural reality. Thus, the North Korean socialist regime began to accept the basic principles and reality of residual traditional Confucianism, and utilized them more actively through the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. It accepted the logic of filial piety with the emphasis on the state’s predominance, and it accepted tacit gender inequality in familial patriarchy even though it mobilized women to participate in social activities with the socialist slogan of gender equality. This ideological strategy of the state and social cultural transformation in North Korean state formation was possible due to the roots of traditional Confucianism in Ch’ung-Hyo (loyalty and filial piety) and patriarchal rights. Through in-depth interview methods and ethnographic archival analysis, this study will explore the historical changes between socialist reform and traditional Confucianism in North Korean state formation.

 

The “Domestic Revolution” Policy and  Traditional Confucianism in North Korean  State Formation: A Socio-cultural Perspective

Jin Woong Kang is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Sociology, the University of Minnesota.  He specializes in North Korean state formation and cultural transformation in terms of state power.  He is also doing research on the origin and development of North Korean nationalism through in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors and archival analyses.

Introduction

The North Korean regime tried to establish a strong base for its state system through the socialist reform of perceived counter-socialist traditional institutions and culture during both the pre-war and post-war periods. The policy of “domestic revolution” was initiated under socialist reform after liberation in 1945, and it was strengthened through strong reform movements such as agricultural collectivization and the Ch’ŏllima movement after the Korean War. The initial socialist reform used many ideological slogans calling for the abolition of so-called “feudalistic” familial institutions and ideologies, but did not directly challenge the ideological roots of Confucianism¹ in Korea. This was a swift campaign of edification designed to purge the remnants of the “counter-socialist” pre-modern system from the society rather than to reject Confucianism completely.

After the Korean War, however, the implementation of tremendous reform movements throughout Korean society represented the socialist tendencies of the economic foundation, political institutions, and ideologies that would change North Korea into a socialist state. “Domestic revolution,” or in other words the “making of the socialistic family,” focused on creating the family as one cell and the state as one organism via reform of the inherent feudal order and culture of society. Actually, the North Korean government was successful in eradicating the material base of Confucian patriarchal kinship traditions and abolishing archaic counter-socialist familial and kinship institutions. However, attempting to do away with all vestiges of the so-called feudalistic social institutions, the North Korean domestic revolution policy was incompatible with the dominant patriarchal ideology, creating a social-cultural disparity between the idealistic socialist policies on the one hand, and the reality of a patriarchal social order on the other. This social and cultural tension implied development contradictory to the significant change in what was supposed to be a purely ideological approach to socialist state construction. While an attempt was made to strengthen the organic connection between the state and society, eventually the patriarchal system based on loyalty and filial piety and substantive gender inequality in family life was accepted through the inclusion and exclusion of the traditional Confucian principles by the state. Moreover, the North Korean regime went beyond cultural acceptance and actively began to absorb and utilize the logic of filial piety and gender issues in patriarchy as ideological means to form a more stable state system and ruling ideology. This ideological strategy in state formation was possible due to the roots of traditional Confucianism in loyalty and filial piety and patriarchal rights. The so-called “family-state” (Lee 1975; Cumings 1993) in North Korean society could be seen as the ideological utilization of Confucian cultural principles to create a stable socialist state system and to mobilize society effectively. Slowly, the North Korean state began to change into a type of patriarchal family state, thereby leading to a dominant emphasis on loyalty and filial piety as well as social problems of gender inequality. In this sense, the North Korean state interpellated, restored, and utilized traditional Confucian culture ideologically and politically.

Early Socialist Reform and the Collapse of Counter-Socialist Traditional Kinship Institutions

From national liberation to the Korean War, the regime’s fundamental social reform was processed through land reform which destroyed colonial feudalistic land ownership and institutions, and also through socialist cultural reform centering on legislation against counter-socialist tradition and in support of equal rights for both men and women. The central government confiscated land and properties possessed by the Japanese, pro-Japanese officials, Korean landlords, and pre-modern kinship institutions and clans, thus eradicating the economic base of the traditional kinship community. Therefore, socialist reform was geared toward revolution of the entire society through changes in the feudalistic social order and values, which would in turn impact gender inequality and discrimination.

However, the initial stage of socialist reform, from the time of liberation to the time of war, used many ideological slogans calling for the abolition of established feudalistic familial institutions and ideologies, but did not directly challenge the basic ideological roots of Confucianism in Korea. This shows that socialist reform after liberation consisted mainly of a rapid edification campaign to purge the remnants of the feudal system from society, rather than an utter rejection of Confucianism. More importantly, unlike China, North Korea never tried to break up the family unit even though it did attempt to weaken the value of family and abolish cultural resistance to socialist idealism (Armstrong 1994:191). A male defector, Byon Young Du, 81 years old, who worked as head of a cell committee in the County People’s Committee and defected in 1950 right after the breakout of war recalled North Korean socialist reform as follows:

During land reform after national liberation, most peasants were pleased to get their own land. Most peasants supported North Korean land reform even though the tax was oftentimes troublesome. Socialist reform was successful in abolishing the feudalistic culture and institutions. Because of an overall coercive social atmosphere, people could not conduct feudalistic meetings and activities even though the state did not punish it visibly. They were gone naturally. This means that the state tried to abolish the residuals of feudalism officially and visibly and unofficially and invisibly. However, it did not control basic traditional rituals. There was neither control over ceremonial occasions nor any rule.

As shown in the above interview, even though the state did not try to abolish all traditional values and institutions, the state’s coercive reform was successful in abolishing feudalistic culture. It is also evident that it weakened overall traditional culture and institutions. An anonymous male informant, 73 years old, born in Dŏkch’ŏn County of South P’yŏngan Province (defected in 1950), stated:

The above interview also shows that feudalistic and traditional culture was weakened and that women’s social activities increased significantly. However, women’s actual equality was not realized and the basic Confucian culture remained in spite of state reformation work. This socialist reform was followed by post-war reforms such as agricultural collectivization and Ch’ŏllima movement. Through these reforms, the degree of the state’s coercive reform increased significantly compared to prewar reforms.

As a result of pre-war land reform and subsequent post-war agricultural collectivization, the kinship system—centering on family lineage and clan—and its economic foundation collapsed almost completely. The institution of agricultural collectivization in the 1950s and the Ch’ŏllima movement in the 1960s together formed a complete national mass movement extending from the lowest levels of society to the state. State-led mass mobilizations and mass movements succeeded by inducing internal correspondence between state and society and by mobilizing families as a means of social control. Through the state’s strong socialist reforms, the existing practices of traditional Confucianism began to change again in form and content. A scholar on folk customs of North Korea, Chul San Hwang (T’ongbo April 1960:50-4), explains the domestic revolution policy that took place during the agricultural collectivization:

This opinion expressed right after the completion of the collectivist agriculture movement did not imply a substantial change in family consciousness, but was actually set up as a desirable image. In effect, the idealization of the whole socialist society as one extended family was one aspect of the state’s dominating strategy. That is to say, integration of the socialistic family-extended family was connected to the integration of the cell and organism. This was intended to lead to the collapse of traditional society kinship systems and family culture to allow for the process of socialist reconstruction. The abolition of traditional familism through the regime’s social control policy originated in the reformation of pre-modern kinship and family lineage. In fact, research (Munhwa Yusan April 1960:65) that analyzed the case of the Chosŏn-China Agricultural Cooperative Association in Sangyang City, South P’yŏngan Province shows that traditional social systems weakened significantly with the influence of the Korean War and socialistic reformation.

If we look at the family form of the cooperative peasants’ association in present-day South Pyŏngan province, it is a small family unit. It is rare that a four-generation family (parents, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren) lives together. Usually, families are composed of two or three generations such as parents, children, and grandchildren or parents and children. According to my research these families are usually composed of five to seven members… In the past it was customary that the parents and first son live together even after marriage but when the second son got married then the first son would live separately. Now in the countryside the average age for marriage starts from eighteen for men and women… Among many families, even if the family name is the same but from a different origin then marriage is possible (Munhwa Yusan May 1957:59).

In the above situation, with the traditional family and kinship relationships being dissolved, there were many cases that allowed for the mother to take on the role of head of household when there was no son. In addition, discrimination between men and women and the traditional system of giving priority to the first son weakened. With regard to marriage, the role of go-between, usually taken on by an old woman in traditional society, was taken over by workers who were responsible for cooperative associations (Munhwa Yusan May 1957:60). It was now generally the custom to have a simple engagement party or marriage ceremony with only fellow farmers, close relatives, and work colleagues. Research concerning a mining area in Taeyu Dong, North Hamgyŏng Province demonstrates that the relationships between father and son, husband and wife, man and woman, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law were beginning to change to include more equality (Munhwa Yusan May 1960:37).

In the case of laborers, inheritance for the first son did not originally exist. The relationship between parents and children was not dependent like that of peasants. Neither was the relationship between siblings. The wife-husband relationship was not as subordinate as that of peasants. After liberation on August 15, 1945, as the level of consciousness of laborers was heightened and communist morals were inculcated, domestic disputes between husband and wife and divorce were especially rare.

Even though the folk research contains propaganda, the content of the description above allows us to assume, to a certain degree, the changes in family culture brought about by socialist reformation. Moreover, the influence of the socialist reformation affected not only the husband and wife relationship but also the parent and daughter-in-law and the father and son relationships. An anonymous woman defector, 77 years old, who worked as a government official, described general family life and culture during the era of the socialist reform as follows:

The above interview describes the overall reality of social culture centering on traditional Confucianism and gender inequality during this period of social change. This interviewee asserts that the feudalistic culture and institutions that the North Korean regime emphasized as the object of reformation were cleared out, and many women began to participate in social activities, but the gender inequality and social patriarchy remained. Another woman female defector Kim, 60 years old, who was a college student at that time said:

The point is that the ambience of the socialist reform guaranteed institutional equality between men and women, but not actual cultural familial equality. We can see that the social status of North Korean women in the 1950s and 1960s could be improved to a certain degree socially and institutionally by facilitating the husband and wife relationship in the family and by loosening the social hierarchal structure between men and women (Lee 1975:123-36). However, this gender equality was institutional, and it was superficial in the actual cultural life.

Similarly, the Confucian principle of filial piety had long been an important integrating mechanism in the traditional family, but the son’s duty to his parents in socialist North Korea after the Korean War was no longer blind or absolute. According to Lee’s (1975) ethnographic study, the young were taught to consider what their parents had done for the state in their lifetimes. A parent could be an enemy of society if he had been a reactionary. There were some incidents of sons publicly criticizing their fathers’ conduct, principally the sons of men of the former privileged class (Lee 1975:129). A male defector Lee, 72 years old, who worked as a lathe man stated about this:

Although such phenomena were relatively rare as shown in the above statement, the authority of parents decreased overall. Also, the traditional expression “show filial piety to parents” was not used officially in the state’s suppressive mobilization (Lee 1989:73). Nevertheless, the basic principles and values of Confucianism centered on filial piety and patriarchal rights based on gender inequality remained persistent.

The Domestic Revolution Policy and Traditional Family Culture: The Mechanism of Inclusion and Exclusion

In the early stages of the social reform through the prewar land reform, the subsequent agricultural collectivization, the Ch’ŏllima movement, and the policy of domestic revolution, the traditional social kinship community collapsed and the economic and cultural bases of counter-socialist traditional kinship institutions were broken down. However, the family group and its culture were important for the socialist regime as they were the basic unit and an important mechanism of social control and regime maintenance. Therefore, the family unit and its culture was the object of support, mobilization, and control by socialist political and economic reforms. In this context, the North Korean regime initiated its domestic revolution policy strongly.

Actually, the policy and ideal of “domestic revolution” were already initiated with other socialist reforms before the Korean War. Mechanisms for social integration and control centering on the domestic revolution policy, the metaphorical use of the family, and the family ideology allowed for ideological mobilization of the whole country. The notion of an “organism” and the metaphor of the family as one “cell” became the dominant socialist ideology of the family. This notion of the “organic” family is clearly indicated as a metaphor in North Korea’s 1946 and 1972 constitutions:

Both the older and the more recent versions of the North Korean constitution emphasize the state’s devotion and obligation to the family as well as the state’s protection and assistance for the family. The constitution itself identifies the family as a cell in the body of the society and the state as an organism looking after its cells. Based on this organic familial ideology, the North Korean state used the domestic revolution policy as a dominating strategy over the whole of society. The primary goal of using the socialist family cell ideology was to integrate the family into the state. In the Modern Korean Dictionary (Science and Encyclopedia Press 1981:35) the term “domestic revolution” is defined as follows: “All families are to be educated to have unending devotion to the party and Suryŏng (leader: Kim Il Sung) and all traces of old ideas remaining in their minds should be thoroughly uprooted. Families should always work and learn for the purpose of the revolution and in order to live life they should each dedicate their whole body to becoming a fighting revolutionary and communist for the party, Suryŏng, fatherland and people.” This description signifies the elimination of all traces of feudalism and the importance of focusing on the party and Suryŏng while being in revolutionary service to the socialist state. This domestic revolution policy was officially disclosed in a 1961 speech by Kim Il Sung (1981:399-42), entitled “The Duty of Mothers in the Education of Children”:

Through this kind of domestic revolution policy, the socialist state was able to pursue integration. The domestic revolution policy for the reconstruction of the society with family units as social cells was an essential goal for North Korea in the move toward national integration and the formation of a strong foundation for the socialist state. For this, the domestic revolution policy was closely connected to strong social control policies that aimed to control family groups. In this process, the domestic revolution policy of organic integration of the state and family with the social control policies began to be mixed with family backgrounds related to traditional values and Confucian blood ties.

Park Yong Ho, from an agricultural background, was to have a marriage arranged with a woman teacher from the middle school where his brother worked but the teacher refused for an unknown reason. Park’s brother explained that she already had a boyfriend. It was found out later that the teacher’s brother investigated him secretly and found out that the teacher’s brother was a high-ranking cadre member in the Provincial Party Committee. The father of Park Yong-Ho’s brother’s wife had been an experienced law enforcement officer during the Japanese colonial period and therefore was thoroughly controlled and isolated from the whole society, and as a result of this connection Park Yong Ho and his brother’s family were discriminated against. So Park Yong Ho’s brother introduced the vice principal’s daughter to him, and, although there was some difficulty, they were able to receive permission for marriage. However, the marriage was opposed by the County Party Committee for the same reason. Park Yong Ho’s brother appealed the matter to the chief of the County Education Organization and the chief persuaded the County Party Committee to repeal the decision saying that “a good party member has simply become a victim of the doings of relatives and family from the past.” Therefore permission was granted (Lee 1975:208-9).

The domestic revolution policy that centered on social status and control of family groups attempted to form a stable society by controlling the inner relations of family groups. Thus, the family unit was an important base for the ruling mechanism in North Korean society. In North Korea, the so-called “family background” was everything to people for political, economic, and social success and survival. The domestic revolution policy went side by side with the logic of social control and integration with the emphasis on family background. The following interviews explicitly describe the importance of family backgrounds in North Korean society.

The domestic revolution policy with socialist reform and social control through family background was followed by social discrimination, surveillance, and control of antagonistic class and family groups and social conflicts and discord centering on these problems. Therefore, it was possible to strengthen the policy of domestic revolution through the parallel policy of control over the individual family group. Control of family groups was realized on the basis of a holistic social control policy, which led to the integration of the entire society. In reality, after the Chongp’a incident (Sectarian Strife), which occurred in August of 1956, the North Korean regime strengthened active ideological control through the principle of guilt by association, and the policy of domestic revolution.² The regime was able to strengthen the policy of family control centering on social-class background through bureaucratic control that utilized social monitoring and citizen-level administration. The state’s central, local, and lower level groups, etc., and the bureaucratic control of administrative organizations, which actually focused directly on the family unit, aimed at vertical style monitoring of the whole society and a mobilization system. A male defector Kim, 55 years old, who was a high-ranking official of the central government, introduced some system of family control in North Korean society as follows:

In this way, the central government was able to control all the families and their members throughout society. In this control system, the social tension existing between the state and the families centered on the family and its background brought about many social problems, but they became an important mechanism used to maintain the North Korean-style socialist system. Ironically, the North Korean state’s reform and coercive control through family backgrounds shows that it accepted the traditional cultural factor in order to control and dominate society. This implies a disparity between the socialist ideal and its reality as well as the contradictory development of the domestic revolution policy. Originally, the cell-based domestic revolution policy emphasized the concept of equality between men and women, which led to the increasing of women’s political and economic activities.

The domestic revolution policy idealized the organic integration of state and society and promoted successful economic mobilization of women, institutionalizing social integration and gender equality in the basic family unit. The dominating discourse of the domestic revolution policy was activated by the equal participation of women in political and economic activities. From the late 1960s onwards, “women’s revolutionization” led to an increase in overall “social revolutionization.”

In this way, the policy of domestic revolution of North Korea ranged from “domestic revolutionization” to “woman’s revolutionization” to “whole societal revolutionization.” Domestic socialistic reconstruction and the integration of the whole socialist state were pursued through women’s active participation in social mobilization. However, unlike socialist slogans about active women’s social activities, an actual woman’s family life hardly maintained gender equality. This was due to the existence of strong traditional culture. This is expressed in the following excerpt from an essay (Ch’ŏngnyŏn Saenghwal October 1964:50-1):

As implied above, even in the slogans of social reform, the basic discrimination between husband and wife and between men and women continued to exist. Notions of “intimate friend” and “object of respect” insinuate basic and inevitable inequality. This implies that women in the family group can never achieve equality in a patriarchal system. The traditional patriarchal system showed a tendency toward being reproduced in the face of challenges from the central state, and contrary to the propaganda of North Korean policy. A woman defector Kim, 69 years old, who was a college dance student and political prisoner, described this:

As we can see in Kim’s interview, the patriarch’s authority was tremendous, and women’s rights and social status was weakened in this context. This was because of the state’s dualistic ideological strategy that distinguished the woman as a housewife from the woman as both a party member and a social activist. This brought about the paradoxically tacit acceptance by the state of the patriarchal system at the base of society in the process of the domestic revolution policy. Thus, the traditional patriarchal system began to be increasingly strengthened in interfamily relationships and the actual social mentality. What can be paid attention to here is the disparity between the social institutional gender equality and the actual cultural familial gender equality. A male defector Lee, 73 years old, argued as follows:

The above interview of Lee represents the social phenomena of the disparity between the social institutional gender equality and the actual cultural familial gender equality. Even in the process of thorough state suppression of feudalistic systems and strong reforms, the legacy of patriarchy in family units did not change. Therefore, this represents the state’s emphasis on women’s social participation and accepted institutional gender equality for social mobilization along with its disregarding of actual social, cultural familial gender equality.

This mechanism of inclusion and exclusion can be also found in the value of filial piety. The familial attachment of children to their parents against the predominance of the state was incompatible with the original state socialist ideal, and it continued to be the object of reform efforts. However, the strong persistence of such traditional family culture disproves the effectiveness of reform efforts. In particular, the North Korean regime supported filial piety between father and son as a good custom, but clarified that blood relationships with parents should not be of greater importance than the relationship with the state. In an official state guidebook on socialistic morality, Socialist Moral Education (Mass Culture Press 1964:87-93) filial piety is explained as follows:

As indicated above, the state view of parental responsibility towards the education of their children was very important for domestic revolution. The socialist education of the basic values of traditional culture such as filial piety was important for the socialist regime to attain socialist ideals through promotion of a society centering on family units. By emphasizing the importance of the state and the society rather than individuals or individual family, disrespectful behavior among children, or failure to take care of parents in old age were criticized as ungrateful. As implied above, filial piety toward parents was not to be shown recklessly or absolutely, but could be justified if it served the interests of the state and the party (Ch’ŏllima April 1964:53). However, even though the domestic revolution policy forced children to accuse their parents in regard to doubtful loyalty to the state, most North Korean defectors collectively agree that there were no instances in which this was successful. Thus, we can see that the culture of filial piety of family groups and gender inequality had a strong life force that the state could not reform. These socio-cultural life forces reflect the existence of family culture rooted in a patriarchal system. The emphasis on children showing respect for parents and wives serving husbands reflects the fact that the Confucian patriarchal system in North Korean society was still strong. Even though reform had partial influence on the relationships between husband and wife, men and women and parents and children, the fundamental patriarchal system remained unchanged (Halliday 1981:48). Moreover, it began to be strengthened slowly and significantly, diverging from ideal socialism and meeting traditional Confucianism.

Traditional Confucianism and its Ideological Transformation

Despite the bold initiatives of the domestic revolution policy, the traditional Confucian cultural system centered on patriarchy was still strongly maintained in socialist North Korea. The regime succeeded in reforming the counter-socialist traditional kinship system and the related traditional systems through the policy of domestic revolution. However, the fundamental Confucian system, the subordination of women, and the notion of filial piety in patriarchy persisted in family groups at the base of society and basically did not change, thus conflicting with the ideal logic of state reform. Seeing this discordance in values between the state and society, the state had to recognize patriarchal authority and the systems existing within the family and society.

This dilemma suggests that the policy of domestic revolution experienced a dualistic change. This indicates an ironic contradiction to the original policy of domestic revolution. It is possible to see a process of selective acceptance of traditional Confucian culture by the state through an emphasis on “socialist morality” (Rodong Sinmun June 4, 1958). When the agricultural collectivism was completed and the Ch’ollima movement moved forward, North Korea absorbed traditional Confucian culture known as “fine culture,” and displayed efforts to apply it rationally to its own socialist system. The regime absorbed and justified the traditional culture of Confucianism under the slogan of “socialist morality.” A column in the Rodong Sinmun (May 31, 1958:2) insists:

The state’s reform process, in trying to absorb fine customs and worship of ancestors, was connected to the traditional values that gave importance to filial piety and patriarchal right. Such changes of consciousness developed even to the point where Confucian culture became a topic of propaganda. In his speech “On Questions about Dealing with Our National Cultural Heritage,” Kim Il Sung (1983:24-5) insists:

In Kim Il Sung’s speech the essential aspects of feudalistic Confucian ideology that have remained within the popular culture is the logic of traditional Confucian culture centered on patriarchal authority. The dominating discourse came to involve the state’s increased effort through the process of social reform to absorb the traditional system and culture as influenced by Confucianism. Confucian culture became a propaganda tool to increase the regime’s stability beginning in the late 1960s. The policy of domestic revolution was in direct opposition to the reality of dominant patriarchal ideas, and the occurrence of refractions and the process of justification expanded to the state level so that the policy would be more readily accepted. The content of a memoir (Ch’ŏllima January 1969:119-21) from the late 1960s looks at the dignity of patriarchy and its social reality as expressed by the title “head of the household.”

In a story I thought of from a local area, I asked how a father and mother could be so enthusiastically involved with neighborhood meetings and get the whole family to achieve the party’s policy and how they could make such effort… I came to see the importance of the head of the household’s role in domestic revolution. If the head of the household is making an effort to establish a revolutionary family tradition then the family becomes harmonious and furthermore the neighborhood meetings and the revolutionary enterprise at work can be better carried out.

As in the excerpt above, the frequent occurrence of the expression “head of the household,” which manifests male-centered patriarchal power and its social importance, contradicts the logic of state socialist reform. Such references imply the traditional system’s need for children to show obedience to the patriarch, and the subordination of women to him. That is to say, the notion of the head of the household, used by the government along with the slogan of domestic revolution, implies tacit support for the patriarchal system along with efforts to utilize the traditional patriarchal system for the stabilization of the socialist state system. As for the domestic revolution and Confucianism, the defector Lee, 72 years old, said:

Lee stated that the domestic revolution policy in North Korea was influenced by traditional Confucianism centering on the patriarchal right of the head of family. Like Lee, another woman defector Lyu, 59 years old, described the situation at that time as follows:

Like Lee, Lyu emphasized the role of family and the head of the family. Also, she argued that this social system came from both socialism and traditional culture. Lyu’s statement is important for the analysis of the socialist reform’s reality. It represents the contradictory development of the domestic revolution policy based upon both socialism and Confucian tradition. As we can see in examples such as the head of family or socialist morals, this dilemma represents the dual logic between socialist ideals and practices in the domestic revolution policy. In this context, the socialist state tried to utilize basic Confucian values and practices as ideological means to do.

From the late 1960s the state-dominated discourse about Confucian culture, expressed in public sentiment at the grass-roots level, entered into active political discourse (Suzuki 1994:183). For the first time “Ŏbŏi” (Father or Parents) discourse emerged and was linked to full-scale ideological legitimization of the stable socialist family-state. Some official North Korean literature shows the process of change to this system of discourse. The state’s changes in the system of discourse reveal the changing patterns in the dominant political discourse that eventually led to the formation of the “father” discourse. First of all, there are changes in the titles used to refer to Kim Il Sung (Arts Press 1978a; 1978b).

The adored comrade leader Kim Il Sung said that the Chosŏn people have to show the best example for national reconstruction after the war (1954, Chief of Workers Alliance).

As for the titles of Kim Il Sung, he was called “General” after liberation, and “Leader” or “Premier.” However, this began to change after the mid 1960s:

The use of such terms as “Ŏbŏi Suryŏng” (The Father Leader), “Home is in the Bosom of the Party,” and “Son/Daughter” in the discourse structure was a result of the North Korean state’s ideological interpellation of the traditional filial piety/loyalty of Confucianism to strengthen its socialist state system. This is similar to what Althusser (1971) called the “ideological interpellation of subjects.” The use of this political discourse is also confirmed in the songs “We Praise the Father Leader” (Ch’ŏllima April 1970:53) and “The Bosom of Mother’s Party” (Ch’ŏllima July 1970:81) that were taught in the elementary schools. Therefore, the filial piety shown to parents at home was transformed into filial piety shown to the state’s “Father.” Actually, part of children’s dining etiquette at that time included expressing thanks to the “Father Leader” every day (Cumings 1997:408):

Orphans in North Korean society start new lives recreated as workers for the socialist revolution. For them, the “Father” of home and the state is Kim Il Sung the Leader, and they even use Kim Il Sung’s family name. School education also emphasizes that the deified Kim Il Sung is greater than a physical father and he is “Father” of the state. This Confucian cult developed the political logic for the transfer of absolute power from Kim Il Sung to his son. A male defector Shim, 57 years old, who worked as a military officer, recalled his adolescence in the 1970’s as follows:

The ideological interpellation in North Korea of Confucian culture is linked to a political stratagem to enhance and strengthen the stable political system. Kim Il Sung’s exclusive power was moralized in his being the people’s “Father.” Also, Kim Jong Il, who inherited Kim Il Sung’s supreme political power, tried to theoretically justify his own absolute power and advocate a new Confucian form of socialism (Suzuki 1994:160). This can be confirmed in the thesis “Theory of the Socio-Political Organism” by Kim Jong Il (1987).

The supreme “Suryŏng” brain, connected to the party and the masses with the Suryŏng as “Father” and the party as “Mother,” personifies this political power. That is to say, socio-political life is not the physical life given by parents but means the political life bestowed by the supreme leader, Suryŏng who is the Father. The state’s power personified as “Father” Suryŏng, means absolute loyalty to Kim Il Sung and this relates again with loyalty to Kim Jong Il. The extreme nature of this dominating political discourse can be seen in a passionate speech given by Kim Jong Il (1997:303) that emphasizes the theories of Ch’ung-Hyo (loyalty and filial piety):

In the process of the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il father-to-son transfer of power, the North Korean regime restored the traditional logic of “loyalty and filial piety” in political discourse. The transformation of North Korean society’s Confucian culture revealed in the process of ideological justification a type of Confucian family-state that went to extremes in the union of loyalty and filial piety. Justification was accomplished when the filial piety at home extending to the filial piety in the one social family was in accordance with loyalty to the state.

Concluding Remarks

North Korea’s socialist reform, which continued from liberation through the post-war revolution, was centered on a policy of domestic revolution. However, the actual process of socialist reform was at odds with the original ideal of the domestic revolution policy. This contradiction originated in the discord between traditional culture and forced reform. The realities of life were inconsistent with the pure ideology of the domestic revolution policy, which sought to integrate the state as a whole organism through socialized family cellularity by reforming the social patriarchal system and creating gender equality for state reform and social mobilization. The domestic revolution policy in North Korean state formation accelerated the collapse of traditional “counter-socialist” kinship institutions and culture. However, in the context of traditional family culture, socialist reformation from above created social tension from below. Eventually, the patriarchal system was accepted and adopted by the state, and even elevated to use as an ideological tool to justify its Confucian form of socialism. The North Korean regime actively utilized the logic of filial piety in patriarchy in accordance with the logic of loyalty as the ideological means to stabilize the socialist state system and ruling ideology. In addition, it excluded actual familial and social gender equality while it accepted the institutional equality for women’s social activities and economic construction. In this respect, the ideological interpellation of Confucian culture in the process of stable state formation in North Korea was a type of cultural justification by selective ideological strategies through the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. The ironic outcome was that the ideal of integration of the cellular family and the state into a socialist society resulted in the very patriarchal family state it was supposed to displace.

References

Source and Periodical Publications (Pyongyang)

Articles and Books

Endnotes