Dick Martin examines the complex phenomenon of Uzbek nationalism and argues that modern nationalism in Uzbekistan seeks to appeal to the long-standing religious sensibilities of the Uzbeks. He conducts a close study of popular texts, slogans, and songs in Uzbekistan to illustrate the ideological foundations of state nationalism.

Introduction

Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan states: "In the Republic of Uzbekistan, public life shall develop on the basis of a diversity of political institutions, ideologies and opinions. No ideology shall be granted the status of state ideology." In reaction to the monopoly political control which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exercised prior to 1991, this article of the constitution promises that in the new regime of an independent Uzbekistan, no single state ideology or belief system will dominate.

This is an interesting proposition given the deeply religious nature of much of the history of Central Asia. While Muslim power was consolidated in the ninth century, even after that time representatives of a number of different religions were found throughout the area. These included Animists, Buddhists, Manichaeans, Nestorian Christians, and Zoroastrians. Bukhara was considered the second holiest city next to Mecca during the Muslim Renaissance during the ninth and tenth centuries, a bastion of Islamic orthodoxy.

Islam, especially in its folk manifestations (based in the roots of Zoroastrianism and shamanism) still plays a major role in the everyday practices, both religious and secular, of most Uzbeks. Indeed, Uzbeks as a whole are proud of their devotion to Islam. Many look down on the Kazak and Kyrgyz, nationalities who, in their mind, have a much more tenuous connection with the religion, largely because they were converted to the Muslim faith long after those who call themselves Uzbeks.

In addition to religious historical roots, Uzbekistan was firmly in the grip of the Soviet Empire for most of the last century and its inhabitants were well indoctrinated in the dogma of Marx and Lenin. In such an environment, is it possible to exist without a state ideology?

Uzbek Nationalism

In fact, Uzbekistan does have a de facto official ideology, one that is not acknowledged as such in any written document, least of all the constitution. While this ideology has distinct religious overtones, its defining feature is neither the old creed of communism nor the even older one of Islam. Rather, it is a doctrine predicated on nationalism.

That this should be so is not surprising. Nations with histories as colonies of other states (as was the status of the former Soviet republics in relation to Russia) have an understandable need to find and assert their own identity in the world community. In their view, every effort must be made to develop the political, economic, and social life of their respective nation to prevent it from being re-colonized, either by a former master or by a new one under the guise of financial investment, trade or other manifestations of economic imperialism.

However, the government of Uzbekistan is not only concerned about the potential threat of Moscow's desire to extend its circle of influence once again into Central Asia. Another major aspect of the promotion of Uzbek nationalism relates to the very real menace of Islamic fundamentalism. For example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ("IMU"), led by Juma Namangani, is popularly believed to be backed by the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. IMU incursions into both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan during the summers of 1999 and 2000 underline the reality of this threat to the current Uzbek regime.

Uzbek nationalism is a complex phenomenon. As noted above, there is the very real and understandable process involved in an independent country emerging on the international scene after years of existing as a colony or neo-colony. Under such circumstances, nationalism is an integral part of the nation-building process. Ironically, it was the Soviets who laid the foundation for this nationalism to emerge. Indeed, there was no Uzbek (or, for that matter, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Tajik, or Turkmen) form of nationalism before the Soviet period. The residents identified themselves either on the basis of their local, tribal affiliations or in terms of a trans-national identity (Islam or pan-Turkism). Thus Uzbek nationalism is in some sense a legacy of the Soviet period.

As a result, the nationalism that is emerging in Uzbekistan could be viewed as merely a continuation of the old Soviet "love for the motherland." However, it is certainly not as pervasive or strident as the patriotism that was mandated of all Soviet citizens. On the contrary, it is less dogmatic and more subtle. Elements of the way it is presented to the people of Uzbekistan reflect an interesting synthesis of old-style Moscow and modern-day Madison Avenue, the black and white dogma of the Soviet era combined with the colorful wizardry of the advertising and entertainment industries.

However, Uzbek nationalism is more than just tired old propaganda or slick advertising campaigns. What renders the efforts of the current regime so effective is the appeal to the religious sensibilities of the Uzbeks. It is not hard to find religious equivalents for the many components of Uzbek nationalism. Although there are many different definitions of what a religion is, for the purpose of this article I shall define it as a system of belief or worship with several or all of the following components: sacred places, sacred times, sacred personalities, and sacred texts.

Sacred Places, Sacred Times

There is no doubt surrounding the sacred place in contemporary Uzbek nationalism. In fact, a ubiquitous slogan that one finds in Uzbekistan states it in unequivocal terms: "The fatherland is sacred like a place of prayer." The Uzbek words used in this slogan are normally only used in a religious context to describe holy places, such as a mosque or other place of prayer. Another popular slogan, "Love of the fatherland comes from faith" deliberately uses the pull of religious obligation to enjoin patriotism on Uzbek citizens. The state of Uzbekistan itself is taking the place of mosques and other holy places. One could even say that it is taking the place of heaven, based on some popular patriotic songs which speak of the country in those terms (a theme to be explored below).

The way in which national holidays are celebrated is also indicative of this trend. These are holidays which have sprung up since the Soviet era, most notably Independence Day and Navruz, the Persian New Year. The spectacular stage shows that occur in Tashkent at these times, complete with mass choirs, singers, dancers, and elaborate light shows, demonstrate how the current rulers of Uzbekistan are using a form developed during the Soviet period and adapting it for the purpose of promoting Uzbek nationalism. Interestingly, there are two explicitly religious holidays that are also promoted by the government: Roza Hayit (Id al-Fitr) and Qurbon Hayit (Id al-Adha). This may be largely due to the fact that both these holidays focus on visiting graveyards to say prayers for the departed and therefore do not pose a potential threat to the government in terms of arousing a religious fervor that could be hijacked by extremists.

Prophets, Patron Saints, and Priests

Sacred personalities abound in modern Uzbekistan. Although there are references in the press and in everyday conversation to "our prophet" (meaning Muhammad), it seems clear to most observers that President Islam Karimov is the real prophet of Uzbek nationalism and its primary spokesman. In addition, there are other sacred personalities from the past who have been invoked from time to time as patron saints of the Uzbek people, especially the national figures in Uzbek history who are chosen each year as the focus of speeches, books, conferences, and other academic-political events.

To date, the historical figures that have been highlighted in this way have included Amir Temur (the Central Asian conqueror known in the West as Tamerlane), Imam al-Bukhari (a major compiler of the hadith, the sayings of Muhammad), Ahmad al-Farghoni (a famous mathematician), and Jalollidin Manguberdi (who fought against Chingiz Khan when he invaded Khwarezm, the area around Khiva). Although none of these figures would have referred to themselves as Uzbeks since the group bearing this name did not appear on the scene until around 1500, they are all claimed as such by the current regime (as was the practice during the Soviet era). Statues are erected in their honor, books and journal articles are written about their lives, new coins and bills are minted featuring their images, and songs and movies appear extolling their virtues.

A final category of sacred personalities are the high priests of contemporary Uzbek pop culture, specifically the singers and songwriters who record the hits that most Uzbek young people are listening to. The interaction between these two very different types of sacred personalities, namely historical figures and contemporary artists, will be explored in more depth below.

Slogans and Songs

There are a number of sacred texts associated with Uzbek nationalism. The most basic texts are the works of President Karimov himself. Books such as his Uzbekistan Towards the 21st Century are treated in much the same way that the Bible or the Qur'an are treated. They have a revered status, they are kept in an elevated place in all government offices and public buildings, and everyone is expected to read and quote from them.

There are two other categories of sacred texts associated with Uzbek nationalism that are worth exploring. The first is a tried and tested method that has been used to great effect across regime types, although it probably reached the apex of its development as a political art form in the communist world: the political slogan. The second is a much newer method, one that was little used during the Soviet era and in fact was repressed until the time of glasnost and perestroika. This method is pop music, especially in the form of music videos, which have become a main staple of the global youth culture that is sweeping Uzbekistan.

As noted above, slogans are a time-tested method of getting across a political message, promoting an ideology, or simply selling a commodity. They are often combined with images (for example, Marx, Engels and Lenin in the USSR, Mao in China, Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba), but this is rarely the case in Uzbekistan. As a general rule, the sayings adorning billboards and public buildings are almost never accompanied by pictures of President Karimov.

Instead, Karimov has chosen to rely on the power of the written word itself, without any icons or images, possibly in deference to the Islamic tradition of eschewing graven images. Although many of the popular slogans displayed in prominent places throughout the republic are not credited to anyone (such as "Blossom and flourish, free Uzbekistan!" "May your future be bright, Motherland!" "May your independence be blessed, Motherland!"), a large number are specifically attributed to Karimov. These include the slogans, "Uzbekistan is a nation with a great future!" "You must live with the burning sense that this is your country!" "This dear country is all of ours!" and the more recently conceived, "My greatest desire is the well-being of those who trust me and the peace of my homeland." The implication is that those who do not trust Karimov to guide Uzbekistan into the future are on the same level as those who do not desire the peace of the motherland. This is an unmistakable reference to the Muslim fundamentalists who want to topple the Karimov regime and establish an Islamic republic in its place.

Political slogans are everywhere, appearing in train stations, bus stations, universities, colleges and all manner of government buildings. Their ubiquitous presence ensures that the citizens of Uzbekistan are being constantly bombarded with the message that love of the motherland is of the utmost importance. In the same way that traditional Muslim societies have often used quotations from the Qur'an, especially on religious buildings, to exhort the faithful to fulfill their religious duties, so the current Uzbek regime is appealing to the Uzbek population to heed the new message of patriotism. It has even become common to see quotations from the hadith on certain signs in government offices (invariably appealing to people to "do good works," rather than presenting any specific Islamic content). Again, a major aspect of the government's strategy seems to be the desire to channel the religious devotion of the population away from those like the IMU, who are promoting a much more political form of Islam.

The second category of sacred texts consists of hymns and prayers of devotion, namely the use of popular music to get across the government's patriotic message. Though one may question the effectiveness of billboard slogans (how many people actually believe what is written on them?), there is no doubt that this music is immensely popular, especially amongst the youth of Uzbekistan.

Over the last couple of years, with what can only be described as evangelical zeal, the government of Uzbekistan has gone out of its way to woo the young people of the country and to convert them to the doctrine of Uzbek nationalism. The government has followed several strategies in order to achieve this goal. First, it formed a new political party focused on young people, the Fidokorlar National Democratic Party. Further, the new "Youth" TV channel (definitely the most entertaining TV channel in Uzbekistan) was formed. In addition, the rapid proliferation of pop songs about Uzbekistan, along with their attendant music videos, has become one of the staples of Uzbek TV.

Uzbek popular music is probably more developed than anywhere else in Central Asia. Artists like Larisa Moskalyeva, Setora, Shahzod, Ruslan Sharipov, and Yulduz Usmanova have managed to synthesize traditional Uzbek melodies and instruments with the rhythms and electronic wizardry of Western pop music to produce a type of world beat music that is quite popular with the young people of Uzbekistan.

In the midst of traditional folks songs remixed with disco beats and a multitude of songs about love, there are a growing number of songs celebrating the glories of the motherland. At any one time at least one of these songs are among the "top ten" of Uzbek pop music, something one would not be likely to see in the West. The songwriters are assisted in this by the rich diversity of Uzbek words that can be used to refer to their native land, including el (country, land), jannat (paradise), mamlakat (country, nation), o'lka (land, country), vatan (motherland, nativeland), and yurt (native land, native country).

The "vatan" songs that have resulted from the patriotic fervor of the songwriters of Uzbekistan include the following titles: "I Have a Country," "My Heaven," "Fatherland," "My Uzbekistan," "My Homeland," "My Dear Country," "Enjoy Yourself, Uzbekistan," "Youth of Uzbekistan" and, the theme of a major patriotic music festival this past summer, "I Won't Give You Up To Anyone, Uzbekistan." This last one is sometimes accompanied by video footage of Muslim fundamentalists in various places engaged in jihad, offset by images of "the good life" in Uzbekistan that is threatened by these "extremists." None of these songs are oddities occurring on the fringe of the Uzbek musical scene. To the contrary, it seems that any of the performers who are serious about a national recording career understand that it is their duty to crank out these "vatan" songs on a regular basis.

Setora and Radio Sezam

One of the most popular groups in Uzbekistan currently is Setora, three muses who manage to produce hit after hit, several of which play effectively on the "love for the motherland" theme. Throughout 2000, probably the most popular song and music video in the country was their "Sen borsan" ("You are there"). On the surface it is a touching love song along the lines of the Titanic theme, "My heart will go on." The video, however, reveals a very pointed political message. A recent article in the Central Asia Caucasus Analyst describes the video:

- The trio, dubbed the Tashkent Spice Girls, are again in tight khaki, heavily influenced by Russian fashion, singing, dancing and draping themselves over various athletic looking soldiers. However, this video also comes with a story. One of the girls, in love with her soldier, reads his letters in class whilst girl friends eagerly peer over her shoulder. Meanwhile we see the soldier in question on a mission to a derelict block of flats in search of something. Later in the video we discover that a mother and her three children have been kidnapped and that our soldier is attempting to rescue them.

- The kidnapper is a fat, bearded, leering Islamic fundamentalist, wearing a Palestinian headdress just in case anyone hasn't made the connection. When discovered, the fundamentalist clutches a vulnerable looking small child with a knife to his throat. However, our hero dives to the rescue, being gunned down in the process, but saving the little boy's life. The three grieving (and still singing) girls mournfully droop over his coffin at the military funeral, whilst the little boy gets slow motion treatment, romping free and happy in the park.

- The message is clear; and has trickled down from speeches by the President into popular programming. Uzbekistan is gearing up for armed conflict. Islamic fundamentalists are all evil terrorists and we must make sacrifices to defend our nation. This is a message which also has the tacit approval of the West, despite embarrassment at their previous sponsorship of the Taliban, and the more active commitment of Russia, attempting to re-establish their presence in the region.

A more recent video by Setora tugs even more strongly on Uzbek nationalist sentiment by calling to mind an important event in the history of this part of the world. Filmed with period costumes and settings, as exciting as any video clip one would see on MTV, "Ajdodlar ruhi" ("Spirit of the Ancestors") is an excellent example of how the party line is communicated using modern technology.

Unnamed invaders (presumably Mongols, based on the ending of the video) kill the adults in an encampment of peaceful locals dressed in medieval Central Asian garb. All that is left are three baby girls and the weapons that belonged to their dead parents. Over the succeeding years, these three warrior-women teach themselves to use the weapons left to them by their kinsmen (all the while singing about the spirit of their ancestors). Years later, the three come across a group of the same nasty invaders. Indeed, they are the very villains who slew their kinsfolk years ago. Our heroines easily dispatch the evil villains, thus avenging their people. Suddenly the video cuts to a modern-day scene of the three girls laying wreathes at the statue of Jalollidin Manguberdi, which was erected in his honor in 1999. At the very end of the video, our muses turn around and see in the crowd the face of one of those they slew in their former existence, reincarnated with (you guessed it) a beard and a wicked smile. Alas, the enemy has returned, after nearly 800 years.

Again, the message is clear. In the same way that their great ancestor Jalollidin Manguberdi defended the motherland from the wicked Mongol invaders, the youth of modern Uzbekistan are being called upon to protect their homeland from evil forces that are seeking to invade and take over it. This message is backed up by a recent billboard, sponsored by a cellular phone company with words taken from the national anthem of Uzbekistan, "May the spirit of our courageous ancestors be with you!" Certainly, venerating the memory of one's ancestors has deep roots in the Turkic psyche, stretching back to the animistic and shamanistic practices of the old Turks. This is also evident in many of the contemporary Uzbek customs associated with rites of passage, and national holidays such as the two Hayits mentioned above. As such, they provide a rich source of propaganda material for the Uzbek regime; material that is undeniably Uzbek while not necessarily Islamic. It is therefore less risky than other aspects of Uzbek culture that are more closely linked with orthodox Islam.

The use of Mongols as the enemy in the video described above raises a number of interesting questions. How is the vilification of the Mongols reconciled with the exaltation in Uzbek nation-building of the legacy of Amir Temur and Babur, both of whom claimed some form of descendence from the Mongol Chingiz Khan? And what does one say about the group that later on displaced both Babur and Temur's descendants, namely the nomadic Uzbeks who descended from the Russian steppe to capture much of Central Asia at the beginning of the sixteenth century? As Babur himself commented in his memoirs, "For almost 140 years the capital of Samarkand belonged to our family. From where came the Ozbek foreigner and enemy who made himself master of it?" Are all invaders automatically evil? If not, which ones are and which ones are not? How does one distinguish between them in a place whose history has been marked by legacies of foreign invasions? What does one say about the fact that Manguberdi and his dynasty, the Khwarezmshahs, were devout Muslims who adhered to Sharia law, the very thing which the IMU and their allies want to see re-established in Uzbekistan?

Without a reference to any objective historical reality, there is a very real danger of the development of Uzbek nationalism becoming an arbitrary creation which serves the immediate interests of the ruling regime. The nation's long-term interests are better served by contemplating history in a more informed way and learning the lessons of past failures as well as successes.

It is perhaps tempting for some in the West to dismiss the effectiveness of such songs and videos in galvanizing the people of Uzbekistan to support the government's position. After all, the form of Uzbek nationalism that is being promoted has no place for the strong political role that Islam played in Central Asia for well over a millennium prior to the Soviet era. However, the tactics seem to be working, as a recent article on this phenomenon points out:

Such singers were brought together in what was called a 'Military-Patriotic Song Festival' at a stadium in Tashkent on July 1st this year, packed out with 15,000 young people. Involving military displays, sporting heroism and songs, it was named "I will give you up to no-one, Uzbekistan," the title of a song by leading singer Yulduz Osmonova. Once forced into exile abroad after making disparaging remarks about her country, she has since been reborn as a true patriot in line with the all-pervading ideology of state nationalism.

The event was highly charged. One weeping spectator said, "I am a guy, I have never cried... however for some reason, when listening to the songs at this festival, tears ran down from my eyes. I did not hide my tears. With my heart bursting over and together with all my comrades, I sang 'I will give you to no-one, Uzbekistan.'" A journalist for the popular youth magazine Darakchi wrote solemnly, "It started on July 1st. It will continue for ever." Amidst scenes of mass emotion and flag-waving televised across the country, a festival organizer declared triumphantly, "I believe our nation is a very strong nation. There will never be a nation like it."

Further evidence of the government's intentions of using popular culture to promote Uzbek nationalism can be found in a recent article from the newpaper Pravda Vostoka:

A popular Uzbek FM radio station, Sezam, has gone back on the air after a "technical break", the 'Pravda Vostoka' newspaper reported on 4th November. The paper quoted Igor Fedorenko, the director general of the Rubicon Radio Systems joint venture, the radio station's founder, as telling a news conference on the occasion, that the station was now going to give more time for propagating national ideology.

"We are well aware of the fact that radio is not a means of entertainment, but above all is a mouthpiece for propagating national ideology," he told the news conference. "In this connection, it is Radio Sezam's priority to propagate constantly the republic's achievements over the years of independence, healthy life style, our ancestors' cultural heritage and secular education," Igor Fedorenko said.

The paper said that 60 per cent of the station's programmes and 70 per cent of its news and analytical programmes would be in Uzbek. Several years ago, shortly before closing two of the three then operating FM stations, Yevropa Plyus (Europa Plus) and Moy Gorod (My City) - the third was called Grand - the official press criticized the FM stations for a lack of patriotism and advocating "foreign" music. It was said that up to 80 per cent of the stations' air time were taken by Russian and foreign music.

For the time being, it appears that Uzbek nationalism is well-entrenched, at least amongst that portion of the population that is influenced by popular youth culture. The choir is singing the hymns of salvation and the congregation seems to be soaking it all up. Only time will tell if the nationalist fervor that is being stirred will offset the religious sentiment that the government fears the IMU and its allies may be capable of arousing.

Endnotes

1. Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, English translation (Tashkent: Uzbekistan Press, 1993), 11.
2. Unlike Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, where the titular nationalities are barely a majority and there are large Slavic populations, the Uzbeks form 70% of the population of Uzbekistan. Other Muslim ethnic groups, mostly Turkic, bring the overall non-Slavic population up to nearly 90%. In this context, nationalism in Uzbekistan is nearly synonymous with the promotion of the Uzbek ethnic identity.
3. The origin of the ethnonym "Uzbek" is a matter of controversy among scholars. The original tribe bearing that name was part of the steppe federation of Chingiz Khan that came to play a major role in the Golden Horde. This tribe invaded the territory of modern Uzbekistan in the sixteenth century. Those who call themselves Uzbeks today are a mixture of the original Iranian population (known as Soghdians, the forebears of the Tajiks) and a multitude of Turkic tribes that have invaded over the past two millennia, including the original Uzbeks. As noted below, the lumping of all these ethnic origins under the rubric of "Uzbek" was part of the Soviet strategy of "divide and conquer."
4. Bennigsen, Alexandre and Marie Broxup. The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 135 - see 136-140 for further discussion of this issue.
5. Two other national holidays, New Year’s Day and Remembrance Day (formerly Victory Day) date from the Soviet Union.
6. All students in institutions of higher education are required to take several courses on the works of Karimov and most scholarly works that are published in the country include a fair representation of quotations from the President’s works. One of the works ascribed to Karimov, "Allah is in our Hearts," has been specifically written to answer the charge by the IMU and others that Karimov and his regime are neo-Communist secularists who are merely using religion as a means towards the end of maintaining their regime.
7. This is unlike the situation in neighboring Turkmenistan where President Saparmurat Niyazov has promoted a cult of personality similar to that of the Soviet Union under Stalin, (summed up by the slogan Xalq, Davlat, Turkmenbashi - the People, the State, the Leader of the Turkmen). Niyazov is known as "Turkmenbashi," at the top of the Turkmen Trinity. He has even had an enormous revolving golden statue of himself erected in Ashgabat, bringing to mind the story of Nebuchadnezzar’s image of gold spoken of in the Old Testament book of Daniel, chapter 3.
8. Fidokorlar means "the unselfish or self-sacrificing ones"
9. There is some debate among observers as to whether or not it is the government or the artists themselves (eager to curry favor with the regime) who are the major impetus behind this trend in patriotic music. At any rate, the government not only permits it, but actively encourages it.
10. Aslan, Chris. "Military Music Videos as Uzbek Pop Propaganda." Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, July 5, 2000 (http://www.cacianalyst.org/).
11. Babur. Le Livre de Babur, translated by J.L. Bacque-Grammont. (UNESCO 1980), p. 123.
12. Megoran, Nick. "Remembering Batken: Militarism and Pop Concerts." Eurasianet November 23, 2000 (http://www.eurasianet.org).
13. "Uzbek Radio Shifts Towards Propagating National Ideology." Pravda Vostoka November 4, 2000 (reported on Uzreport.com)