Yongwook Ryu is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government, Harvard University. He specializes in the international relations of East Asia, international finance, and international relations theory. His current research focuses on territorial disputes in East Asia, international currency crises, and national identity.

Introduction

The terrorist attack of 9/11 left an indelible mark in history. The graphic images of the two airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center (WTC) and its collapse were broadcasted throughout the world. The incident claimed more than 3,000 victims and left thousands more wounded. The almost universal condemnation of the terrorist attack and the broad international coalition that was formed against terrorism soon after the incident attests both to the seriousness and to the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attack. Beyond the psychological impact, the 9/11 attack had significant foreign policy consequences for the world's only superpower. It single-handedly transformed what would have been an isolationist American foreign policy under the Bush administration into an active, unilateralist one (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America , 2002). Since then, the United States (US) has made the war on terrorism the priority in its foreign policy agenda.

However, 9/11's effect on foreign policy has not been confined to the US. Japan was one of the countries that threw full support for the US throughout the US 's war on terrorism. No stranger to terrorism, Japan has been cooperating very closely with the US 's war on terrorism, contributing both financial assistance and personnel to the international efforts against terrorism. While analysts have focused on the details and extent of Japan 's cooperation, they have thus far failed to locate it into the broad framework of Japanese foreign policy. Japan 's terrorism policy should be viewed within the framework of its broader foreign policy framework of striving to be a “global player,” a shift from its past foreign policy based on the principle of passive pacifism. In the post-Cold War era, Japan seeks to play a greater leadership role in the region of East Asia as well as in other parts of the world, and her contribution to the international war against terrorism is part of this broad foreign policy objective. This new foreign policy objective is in turn brought about by the transformation of Japan 's post-WWII pacific national identity.

The paper has three parts. First, I will provide a brief theoretical overview of identity and role conceptions in the discipline of international relations, and then lay out Japan 's perception of terrorism and the government's policies. The subsequent section will focus on the transformation of Japan 's national identity. The paper advances the thesis that Japan 's counter-terrorism policies should be understood in the broad context of the Japan 's changing international identity. This casts a different light on the future course of Japanese foreign policy.  

Identity and Role Conception in International Relations

One of the most significant developments in the scholarship of international relations in the past decade or so has been the rise of the constructivist paradigm. The constructivist challenge to the mainstream IR paradigms of both neorealism and neoliberalism has been well-documented (Ruggie, 1986; Reus-Smit, 2001). With the constructivist challenge also came the rise of identity as an explanatory concept, reflecting the increased salience of non-material factors in international affairs in the post-Cold War era (Huntington, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996).

Despite the existence of many differences between the mainstream theories and constructivism, for the purpose of this paper, suffice it only to say that they differ significantly in their respective treatments of identity. The mainstream material theories regard identity as epiphenomenal adjuncts of material structures, and thus focus on the strategic incentives of the actors to explain their interaction and the ensuing consequences for international politics. Constructivism, on the other hand, maintains that identity is fundamental to actors in that it gives meaning both to the nature of units as well as the reasons for their actions. Constructivists argue that these non-materials structures condition actors' identities and hence inform their preferences and, in turn, behavior (Wendt, 1999). Furthermore, for constructivists, the analysis of identity offers a way to understand the process of preference formation and transformation, and can hence better explain the dynamics of international politics than the mainstream theories.

Focusing on social identity rather than personal identity, international relations scholars (Abdelal et al., 2003), following Tajfel (1981) and Turner (1987), define identity as ““social categories, attributes, or components of the self-concept that are shared with others and therefore categorize individuals as being similar to others” ( Monroe et. al, 200: 421). The definition emphasizes the intersubjective nature of social identity and the process of self-categorization through which in-group and out-group conceptions get formed and consolidated. Moreover, identity is constituted of two essential components: substance and intensity (Abdelal et al., 2003: 23; Dittmer and Kim, 1993: 19). The substance component refers to the actual make-up of identity, such common attributes as language, history, customs, and membership rules, while the intensity component is about the measurement of identity, the degree of intensity measured through such methods as survey, discourse analysis, content analysis, and cognitive mapping.

National identity can therefore be defined as a logical extension of social identity. National identity has two main components—the nation and the “state” component—an appropriate definition of national identity needs to take both aspects into account (Dittmer and Kim, 1993: 3-5). The nation component can be regarded as the substance of national identity, while the state component sets the outer boundaries of that identity (Dittmer and Kim, 1993).

Identity is closely connected with role conceptions. In particular, the analysis of justifications put forward for policies can inform us of the role conception(s) actors have in their minds. Hence the study of role conceptions offers insights into how the identity of the actor has changed ( Johnston , 2002: 78). In analyzing Chinese national identity, Van Ness conceives of national identity as a pyramid of four levels of variables: policies (at the top), principles, “basic line”, and world view, and looks at role conceptions as evidence of its identity (1993). The four variables can represent a collectively determined official position regarding the nation-state's role in the world. Indeed, national identity enacts itself by assuming various national roles, and can be captured by the kind of role conceptions of the nation-state.

National roles, like their individual counterparts, perform functions of mobilizing, testing, and consolidating an identity through interactions with other players in the same arena. The state has a greater ability to construct, shape, and change national role conceptions than any other social actors because of their privileged access to information (De Figueiredo and Weingast, 1999; Fearon and Laitin, 2000). This power to define national role conceptions provides government officials with greater legitimacy to represent their countries, which generates a greater power to construct a particular discourse that benefits their particular causes (Runier, 1995).

In sum, the analysis of role conceptions offers a way to document identity transformation. The analysis of identity change in turn informs us how and what preferences are constructed and their change over time, enabling us to understand the dynamics of international relations. The rest of the article will apply this theoretical underpinning to the analysis of the change of the Japanese national identity in the context of its counter-terrorism policies.

Japanese Perception of the Threat of Terrorism

Immediately after the 9/11 attack on the WTC, the Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi announced, “The government of Japan is firmly resolved to strive for the eradication of terrorism.” He continued, “ Japan strongly supports the US and is determined to do its utmost to offer assistance and cooperation.”¹  While such a response is not all that surprising from the US 's most important Asian ally, it reflected Japan 's deep-seated fear of terrorism.

There are two types of terrorism that have affected and can affect Japan. One is indigenous terrorism from certain religious cult groups, and the other is external organizations such global networks like al-Qaeda as well as such regional networks like Jemaah Islamiyah. Both are real threats to Japan 's security, and I briefly examine each below.

The threat of indigenous terrorist groups became apparent in March 1995 when a religious cult group known as Aum Shinrikyo released extremely toxic sarin gas in a busy subway station in Tokyo , killing 12 people and hospitalizing more than 5,000 people. The group consisted of people obsessed with the apocalypse and built up the organization by recruiting bright young university graduates, especially scientists. Before the 1995 subway assault, Aum Shinrikyo had tried several biological and chemical attacks, including the 1994 attack that killed 7 people. While most members of the cult were subsequently arrested and sentenced, the organization still lingers on in the country and has not totally abandoned its dangerous dogma. Its members still seem to be under the mind control of the organization's leader Asahara Shoko, and pose a real indigenous terrorist threat.

Another indigenous terrorist group is called the Red Army. The Red Army was founded by members of the Red Army Faction of the Communist League and successfully implanted itself abroad (Mizukoshi, 2003). Several of its members went to Lebanon in 1971, which served as a training camp away from the hostile domestic environment. The group was part of several terrorist operations in Middle East , beginning with the Lord Airport Massacre of May 1972. While the group has been weakened considerably due to both Japanese and Lebanese governments' sustained crackdowns, the authorities continue to be on high alert and still seek to arrest the members of the Red Army (Mizukoshi, 2003: 56).

In addition to the indigenous terrorist groups, there are international terrorist groups that pose external threats to Japan. Global terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda or other Islamic fundamentalist groups pose a significant problem because they are extremely difficult to eliminate due to their acephalous command structures and their ideological and religious commitments (Stern, 2003: 221). The elimination of the head of the organization does not do much damage to its cells that operate in many different parts of the world. Although al-Qaeda has never explicitly named Japan as a possible target country, Japan 's contribution to the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq made their threat to Japan a real possibility. The kidnapping and execution of several Japanese citizens by the extremist Iraqi groups highlighted the security issues not just at home but abroad, and the vulnerability of the citizens of the countries that are part of the coalition.

While al-Qaeda itself seems to have neither the capacity to reach as far as Japan, nor the desire to expand its operation beyond the western civilization and the secular states within the region of the Middle East (Stern, 2003), they acquire a greater potential to strike in the region when it can find and cooperate with regional terrorist networks. This is precisely what has happened in Southeast Asia , a region where terrorist groups have preceded the formation of al-Qaeda. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is responsible for the Bali bombing in October 2002, receives both financial and technical support from al-Qaeda.

JI dates back to the 1940s when it was called Darul Islam. It was originally focused on a their local separatist agenda, but its activities have become more extreme and radical in the recent years when the local programs were merged with al-Qaeda for world jihad. Al-Qaeda provides these regional terrorist groups with necessary training in Afghanistan and with logistical and financial support. The group has also declared that it would target US citizens as well as those of her allies, including Japan. The bombing of the Toyota showroom in Sulawesi , Indonesia , in December 2002, is a clear sign that they pose a threat to Japan 's interests.

Japan 's Counter-Terrorism Policy

In this section, I briefly analyze the Japanese government's official policy on terrorism. Although there is a tendency to view Japan 's counter-terrorism policy in its own right, it is in fact a part of Japan 's overall foreign policy direction.

There is no doubt that the Japanese government has been committed and sincere in its counter-terrorism efforts. In the wake of the 9/11 attack, Japan 's Cabinet approved a supplementary budget for that fiscal year, totaling $10.41 billion, of which $416 million was earmarked for emergency anti-terrorism measures. The clearest example of Japan 's commitment to counter-terrorism efforts can be found in the APEC Leaders' Statement on Counter-Terrorism.²  The Statement outlines the approaches to be taken by the member states to suppress and eliminate terrorist activities, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373. Abiding by the tasks stipulated in the Statement, the government of Japan has targeted six areas in its counter-terrorism efforts: immigration; aviation security; customs cooperation; export control; law-enforcement cooperation; and anti-terrorist financing.

Japan 's own counter-terrorism efforts can be divided into two kinds: global and regional. Japan global cooperation is based on its domestic Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law approved on 29 October 2001. According to the Law, Japan implemented refueling assistance activities for vessels engaged in the interception of ships as part of the “Operation Enduring Freedom” led by US forces in the Indian Ocean, and concluded 12 counter-terrorism conventions and protocols such as the above mentioned APEC Leaders' Statement. Furthermore, in accordance with the Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1390, asset freezing measures against Taliban-related and non-Taliban terrorists have been carried out in accordance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law against a total of more than 400 individuals and organizations (as of December 2003).

Its regional cooperation has been more extensive and thorough. In the ASEAN Regional Forum, Japan signed the Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorism Action on Border Security adopted at the 10 th ARF Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia, and held the 1 st ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in Bangkok in January 2004, where the institutionalization of activities concerning transnational crimes including counter-terrorism was agreed upon. More specifically, in line with the stipulated tasks in the APEC Leaders' Statement, Japan in its regional counter-terrorism efforts, also commenced a program to accept trainees from developing countries to promote the conventions and protocols related to the suppression of terrorism and to counter biological and chemical terrorism, especially in terrorist financing, immigration control, aviation security, customs control, export control, and police and law enforcement cooperation.

Japan has so far made good progress in all of these areas. To weaken the financial basis of terrorists, the Japanese government has frozen the assets of those associated with terrorists including the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions, targeting 334 individuals and entities in total. It has also committed $1 million to the newly established trust fund within the Asian Development Bank (ADB) at the Bangkok APEC Leaders Meeting, which aims to strengthen the capability of the ADB and its borrowing members in the areas of anti-money laundering and port security. Another notable contribution of Japan 's is its financial assistance of approximately $300 million to the Pakistani Government as well as technical assistance to Southeast Asian countries. The purpose is to suppress the existing and newly forming terrorist organizations and to enhance airport and seaport security.

In terms of military contribution, the Japanese Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law on 29 October 2001 , which permitted the Maritime Self-Defense Force of Japan to dispatch destroyers and supply ships to the Indian Ocean , primarily to provide at-sea replenishments to the American forces. The Air Self-Defense Force has provided airlift support to the US forces with C-103Hs and U-4s. As for Afghanistan , where the international counter-terrorism efforts have been mainly focused, Japan hosted an international conference on Reconstruction Assistance on January 21-22, 2002 , where the Japanese government pledged up to $500 million in aid over the next 2.5 years. Furthermore, after the inauguration of the Afghanistan Transitional Administration headed by President Hamid Karzai, the Japanese government decided to extend an ODA package of about $42 million to support the Administration. In addition, Japan has contributed a total of approximately $144 million to assist activities of the UN agencies and other international organizations for Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons.

The Japanese counter-terrorism policy reflects the broad direction of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The three main pillars of Japanese foreign policy are stated in its Foreign Policy Handbook. First, Japan takes the Japan-US Security Arrangements as the key cornerstone in its security. Secondly, Japan pursues diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and security. And lastly, it seeks to moderately build up its defense capability. While the first and second goals are not new, the last is a new development in Japanese foreign policy.

Japan has systematically upgraded its defense capabilities under the National Defense Program Outline of 1995 and the Mid-Term Defense Program of December 2000. In December 2003, the Japanese Government decided to introduce Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, and the majority of the current Diet members favor a revision of the Constitution, especially Article 9, which renounces the use of force to settle international disputes. The Japanese Government has also passed the Three Laws regarding Response to Armed Attacks on June 6 2003 , with the broad consensus of both the ruling and opposition parties.

This new foreign policy direction is based on new international activism and assertiveness, which represents a sharp departure from its past policy characterized as one of passivism and pacifism. In other words, Japan 's new foreign policy activism is only a recent phenomenon, and was not associated with the general character of Japanese foreign policy in the past. It is imperative to understand the nature of this change in Japan 's foreign policy orientation, in order to understand the significance of Japan 's counter-terrorism policies and to put this in the context of the current Japan 's foreign policies on various issues.

The Transformation of the Japanese Post-WWII National Identity

Although analysts have thus far focused on the details and extent of Japan 's cooperation on the war against terrorism, I argue that Japan 's policy on terrorism needs to be understood in the broader context of Japan 's foreign policy framework change, especially her new role conceptions in the international arena. The new role conceptions were engendered by the transformation of the post-WWII national identity based on pacifism and passivism into the new national identity seeks that seeks to achieve the status of a ‘global player' with a more active and assertive foreign policy. In this section, I analyze the transformation of Japanese Post-WWII national identity.

It is well known that following the defeat of Japan in WWII, Japanese foreign policy came to be heavily dependent on the US on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration and the so-called Peace Constitution. The constitutional limitation, couple with the US-Japan Security Alliance, ensured the “abnormality” of Japan by depriving her of a key function of any “normal” state, namely, to maintain its own defense force for its security. Hence the basic tenet of Japan 's Cold-War foreign policy, as formulated by the Yoshida administration, was to pursue rapid economic development and to focus on nation-building under the US security umbrella, without having to maintain a standing military that would drain resources badly needed for the reconstruction of society.

The combination of the historical experiences of failed imperialist ambitions and the Allied occupation generated two characteristics of Japanese post-war foreign policy: pacifism and passivism. Japan 's pacifism has its roots in its defeat in WWII and the atomic tragedies. This pacifism was constitutionally guaranteed through Article Nine, which states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” (Constitution Quoted in Cooney, 2002: 5). The end result was the passionate disapproval of any military capability that could be deemed offensive in nature. Royer describes this phenomenon as the following (1993: 782):

Pacifism represented and popularized by Article 9 rapidly developed into a popular cult. Pacifism became the object of fervent devotion among large numbers of Japanese. It became deeply instilled in their hearts incomparably faster than did nay of the democratic principles of government also proclaimed by the new Constitution..... Thus, the post-war Japanese were emotionally devoted to the ideal of peace at almost any cost.

This cult of pacifism was also coupled with an attitude of passivism in its foreign policy within the region. Throughout most of the Cold War period, as a result of its historical guilt, Asia was generally regarded as an object of negative identification (Steffensen, 2000: 135). The constant reminder of Japan 's past by the neighboring countries kept a firm diplomatic lid on the parameters of Japanese foreign policy; Japan should be kept within the economic sphere of her foreign policy, and should stay out of political and military aspects of regional affairs.

In this regard, the US-Japan Security Alliance has had an overwhelming influence on Japanese foreign policy passivism. The Alliance has given Japan the basic template for its foreign policy and set the parameters of Japanese foreign policy, largely within the confines of economic roles. In a candid statement, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs admits the passivity of its foreign policy. In an article, “Current Issues Surrounding UN Peace-Keeping Operations and Japanese Perspectives,” the Ministry states that Article Nine of the Constitution fostered the view that “ Japan cannot be involved directly in any armed conflict.” “Such views,” it continues, “led to the formation of an inward-looking, ‘don't want to be involved' mentality.” (MOFA, 1997: 2). As one writer opines, the importance of the Alliance and the US factor was so predominant in Japanese foreign policy that “ Japan 's policies toward other countries and regions have been largely derived from its policy toward the United States ” (Inoguchi, 2002: 4).

A well-known example of Japanese passive foreign policy is its “checkbook diplomacy” during the first Iraq war. During the Gulf Crisis, Japan contributed about $13 billion to the UN-led international coalition against Iraq 's aggression in Kuwait (Woolley, 1998: 104). Despite this substantial financial contribution, Japan received a harsh criticism from the international community for doing too little. While one can be sympathetic toward the Japanese government, which was caught between the critics who wanted more from Japan and the alarmists who found disconcerting any signs of a newly assertive Japanese government, it was clear that the practice of passive foreign policy was deeply internalized within the psyche of the policy makers and diplomats.

Although the experience embarrassed the Japanese government and bewildered ordinary Japanese, who simply could not understand the international lack of appreciation for its contribution, it also provided an important catalyst for the transformation of Japanese foreign policy attitudes by changing the perception of Japanese officials and people as to what role the international community was expecting from Japan. The use of the phrase “international contribution” became increasingly popular among politicians and diplomats, and in an interesting study of a computer search for the phrase “multilateral diplomacy” in MOFA and Diet documents resulted in a significant increase in the usage of the phrase following the end of the first Gulf War (Fukushima, 1999: 84).

Indeed, Japanese foreign policy underwent a visible change in the 1990s, with an extensive involvement in peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance and participation within international frameworks. The passive foreign policy was transformed into one of activism that aimed to give a greater voice to Japan in the international community, redefining the role(s) Japan should play vis-à-vis other powers. One of the first indications of the changes of Japanese foreign policy was an article published in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs journal, Gaiko Forum. The paper envisions a trilateral international leadership shared between the US , the European Union, and Japan , all of which are committed to the preservation of democratic values and the capitalist system, and argues that cooperation between these three poles is the key to world peace and prosperity (Leitch et al., 1995: 36).

This change in policy also brought about different role conceptions, which is clearly seen in and advanced by another article from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in 1999, titled “Challenge 2001-Japan's Foreign Policy Toward the 21 st Century” (MOFA, 1999). The article is a collaborative proposal from seven leading Japanese academics³ and reflects the foreign policy course Japan wishes to take in the 21 st century. While recognizing the importance of the US-Japan Security Alliance, it nevertheless suggests a new role for Japan in light of the new trends and emerging challenges. The article states that the overarching goal of Japanese foreign policy in the next century is to become and act as a “global player” by securing a greater voice in international frameworks. To this end, the authors recommend that Japan should push for the reform of the United Nations Security Council with the goal of attaining a permanent seat in the Council. Furthermore, they also see the need to begin an open discussion on the role of the Self-Defense Forces, implicitly alluding to the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, and on what concrete measures beyond economic assistance should be taken to contribute to international efforts to resolve conflicts, alluding to Japan's political and military participation in international operations.

The change in the perspective and role conception of Japan is also visible in the Ministry of Defense. The figure below is the summary of the cognitive maps of the National Defense Program Outlines of 1976 and 1995. There are the twin goals of Japanese defense policy, namely, achieving international stability and Japan 's national security. The + sign denotes a positive causal relationship between the two variables, while the arrow denotes the direction of causation.

Figure 1.The Comparison of the Cognitive Maps of The 1976 and 1995 National Defense Program Outlines

a. International Stability

1976: Military Balance of US and USSR

---> (+) International Stability

1995: International Participation ----> International Stability

Regional Security Framework (+)

b. Japan 's National Security

1976 & 1995:

US-Japan Alliance ----> Japan 's National Security

Japan 's Defense Capability (+)

Source: National Defense Program Outlines of 1976 and 1995 at http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs.

The figure confirms the change that has taken place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It suggests that the means to achieve international stability during the Cold War era is different from that in the post-Cold war era, while the means for achieving Japanese national security remains largely unchanged. In the post-Cold War era, the main emphasis of Japanese defense policy is not on balance-of-power politics, but on the active participation (i.e. diplomacy) in international frameworks, multilateralism, and regional security organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Stated simply, Japan now sees an enhanced activism in the international community as the crucial way to achieve its key national defense goals.

We have already seen the increased participation of Japan in international PKO. The enactment of the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations(UNPKO) Law in 1992 paved the way for the Self-Defense Force to participate in PKO and humanitarian relief activities for the first time in its post-war history. In addition to the PKO activities, the new activism of Japanese foreign policy can be seen in its Asia policy, especially toward ASEAN. ASEAN is an obvious target for the new Japanese foreign policy, since ARF is the only existing regional security framework in which Japan could participate without posing any threat to its neighboring countries and thereby ease its historical baggage by offering constructive dialogues on regional security issues.

Beginning with the Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's proposal in 1991 that the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences be used as a forum for political dialogue leading to mutual assurances on security matters (Sheah, 2002: 86), Japan has become extensively engaged in the region. Its exports to ASEAN has almost tripled from 5.6% of its total GDP in 1986 to 14.3% in 2002 (Leitch et al, 1995: 98). In particular, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which created an opportunity for Japan to deepen its interdependence with ASEAN, Japan announced the so-called Miyazawa fund of $30 billion to assist the hard-hit Southeast Asian economies. Furthermore, it proposed the creation of the Asian Monetary Fund in order to lessen the effect of short-term capital flight (Sheah, 2002: 98). Although the idea was quickly thwarted by the US , it suggested Japan 's willingness to take on a leadership role in the region.

Japan 's Counter-Terrorism Policy and Its Future Foreign Policy Direction

This paper has argued that Japan 's counter-terrorism policy should be viewed in the broad context of Japan 's new foreign policy orientation toward activism and assertiveness. This new foreign policy orientation was brought about as a result of the changed national role conceptions. Catalyzed by the international criticism of its checkbook diplomacy, Japan's past role conception of passive pacifism was changed into the new role conception of acting as a “global player” through participation in international institutions, resulting in more active and assertive foreign policy.

In close cooperation with the other industrialized countries, Japan has thus far made good progress in all areas of counter-terrorism policies, namely, terrorist financing, immigration control, aviation security, customs control, export control, and police and law enforcement cooperation. It has provided financial and logistical support for the developing countries of East Asia and has participated in the international coalition against terrorism. Japan 's counter-terrorism policy is not only the result of its close relations with the US but also of its changed role conceptions in the international arena.

This does not necessarily mean a greater independence of Japanese foreign policy from the US foreign policy, however. Despite the changed role conception, Japan still takes the US-Japan Security Alliance as a key pillar of its national security and wants to maintain a close relationship with the US. This entails that its broad foreign policy framework would not deviate too much from the US foreign policy framework, and that the Japanese government will cooperate closely with the US on the war against terrorism in the future, as it has done so far.

But we expect to see a more self-confident Japan in the international arena in the future, a Japan that is not afraid to assert itself in controversial issues. Signs of this have already emerged. In March 2005, when a number of high officials from Japan met with American counterparts in Washington D.C. , they issued a press statement, which stated that Taiwan is a security concern for Japan. It was the first time that Japanese government officials mentioned Taiwan in pubic and that it was part of Japan 's security concern. Japan 's recent effort to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is another clear example of Japan 's new role conception. Wanting to position itself on the equal status as the other great powers in the Security Council, Japan has been launching an aggressive diplomacy in the UN to convince other nations of the need for Japan to gain a permanent seat in the Security Council. The controversial history textbook issue is yet another sign of the new Japanese foreign policy orientation that asserts its own voice in a forceful manner.

What does all this mean for the future of counter-terrorism policy and East Asia ? Despite the inevitable conflict the rise of Japan will bring about, the regional countries would still continue to closely cooperate in countering terrorist activities, as they share the common interest of eliminating the subversive element. However, the more assertive Japanese foreign policy will significantly affect the US-China relations and Japan-China relations in the future, as the countries adjust themselves to the structural changes in the region of East Asia.

Endnotes

 1 The Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 2001.

 2 The Statement can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011023-17.html.

3 The seven academics are Takashi Inoguchi, Masayuki Yamauchi, Shinichi Kitaoka, Susumu Yamakage, Akihiko Tanaka (all from University of Tokyo), Ryosei Kokubun from Keio University, and Shigeki Hakamada from Aoyama Gakuin University. For the actual document, please visit http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/challenge21.html.

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