Niklas L.P. Swanström is the Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, an independent and privately funded organization with offices in Washington, D.C., and Uppsala, Sweden. Dr. Swanström is the author of three books: Transnationell brottslighet: ett säkerhetshot? (Transnational crime: a security threat?), Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific Rim and Foreign Devils, Dictatorship or Institutional Control: China's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. His articles have appeared in the Korean Journal of International Studies, Peace Review, Central Asian Survey and the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. His commentaries have appeared in Svenska Dagbladet, Uppsala Nya Tidning, the Baltimore Sun, Asia Times and Asia Online.

He is also an Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and a frequent lecturer at the Department of Eastern European Studies in Uppsala, Renmin University (China) and the Foreign Affairs University in Beijing. He teaches courses in the Theory of Peace Studies, Negotiation and Mediation, Conflict Management, Regional Cooperation and Central Asia.

Ever since its creation, the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) has come under criticism; the extent to which this organization has improved regional cooperation has long been a subject of debate. Integration has been slow, and cooperation has been primarily at an informal level in the political field and cooperation against non-traditional and trans-national threats has been neglected. It is important to note that cooperation against traditional and non-traditional threats to human and economic security has increased in Southeast Asia, especially since the economic troubles of the late 1990's, and the tragic tsunami disaster of December 2004. In order to better weather future economic crises, Southeast Asian countries have come together through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), an idea which is now being implemented after a long incubation period; its actual impact, however, remains debatable.¹ Similarly, in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster it was decided that an international warning system should be established in the region, and several multilateral attempts to prevent further disasters have since been taken.²  However, despite heroic national responses, regional responses were relatively weak during the disaster. In the aftermath of both the economic crisis and the tsunami disaster, cooperation was deemed necessary to prevent a recurrence of similar crises. However, if preventive structures had been in place at an early stage, these crises could have been partly averted. Unfortunately, the lack of coordinated efforts to work against traditional and, to an even greater extent, non-traditional threats is endemic in the region. This is especially true when dealing with non-state actors, non-military and trans-regional threats. The ASEAN member nations have made a point of avoiding potential political problems in the past, but as the above-mentioned issues surface as major threats to stability, ASEAN's weakness becomes embarrassingly apparent. In light of ASEAN's success in keeping peace among its members, it is somewhat surprising that cooperation is so weak in trans-national crisis situations.

Part of the problem is the informal character of conflict management and especially of crisis management structures in Southeast Asia. Despite the fact that Southeast Asian states have been successful in preventing inter-state conflicts, they do not seem able to handle conflicts that deal with transnational and non-traditional threats. The failure to deal with non-traditional and trans-national threats is a serious problem, as more and more of today's conflicts and threats – such as natural disasters, health problems, or economic collapses – are transnational and non-traditional in character. Most regional organizations in the world have had problems adjusting to this change, as they face an increasing need to look to intra-regional cooperation, and reconsider the handling of crises and slowly emerging non-traditional threats.

More specifically, the tsunami disaster of December 2004 has diverted everyone's attention to natural disasters, while terrorist networks have had a splendid opportunity to regroup, strengthen their organization and recruit new members among despairing people. This problem is accentuated by the lack of regionally coordinated efforts to prevent further terrorist conflicts, as states are refraining from cooperation for political and religious reasons. There are very few coordinated measures in the region, apart from cosmetic cooperation, and this fact has been criticized both within the region and outside of it. The tepid reaction to terrorism still exists, despite the fact that Southeast Asia has become a hotbed for terrorists after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.³ Multilateral cooperation against terrorism in Southeast Asia has come a long way since 9/11, but it is still under-organized in comparison with the terrorist networks that have impressed decision-makers through their cooperation.⁴ Part of the failure to act is explained by the fact that terrorism needs to be dealt with while having the broader picture in mind: strategies cannot be limited to organizations that are put on a variety of terrorist lists; they also need to target supporters of terrorist groups and financial links. Supporters not only finance terrorist organizations, but may also have close military links with them, as exemplified by the training camps for terrorists organized by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Adopting a broad view is essential if we are to get a better picture of the financial side, the smuggling of weapons, etc., and develop effective means of dealing with terrorism and its consequences. The aim of this article is to analyze the structures that work for and against cooperation against terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. Terrorism is defined here as violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.⁵

Southeast Asia: the new center for Islamic terrorism

Southeast Asia has emerged as a hotbed for terrorist activities, including training, financial transactions and terrorist acts. If the Rand Terrorism Chronology is used, it becomes evident that there has been a significant increase of terrorist acts in Southeast Asia since 2000.⁶  A visible increase in incidents was recorded between 1968 and 2004. According to Rand, there where 95 recorded incidents of terrorist activities in the regions of Southeast Asia and Oceania between 1968 and 1985. For the period between 1986 and 2004, there where 619 terrorist incidents in the region. Splitting the last period, there was an increase in terrorist activities in the latter half of the 1990's, and then another increase in the latter part of 2001. There were 296 incidents between 2001 and 2004 alone. It almost seems that the attacks on 9/11 inspired organizations in the region to utilize terrorist methods and to fight U.S. interests in the region. In 2001 Rand registered 122 incidents, 157 deaths and 494 wounded; the figure in 2002 was 96 incidents, 339 deaths and 975 wounded. Interestingly, the U.S. had noticed, as early as 2000 that the flow of terrorists was moving towards East and Southeast Asia from other regions. The frequency of incidents rose more than twice between 1999 and 2000 (from 28 to 72 incidents). It should be noted that Rand did not include domestic terrorist activities in its estimates before 1998, and therefore some of the increase can be explained by such domestic incidents. However, figure 2 displays only international terrorist activities, and the upsurge is apparent even in this figure. At the time, this was an estimate that carried little weight outside of U.S. military circles; yet the analysis proved to be deadly accurate over time. Nevertheless, terrorist acts in Southeast Asia are not new phenomena. For example, following the Spanish-American war (1898), the U.S. occupational forces faced armed resistance from the Moros of the Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelagos - which fought prolonged wars against the U.S. with what could now be called terrorist actions.

In addition to the increase in incidents, the lethality (deaths) of the acts has also escalated over time, as the acts committed in Southeast Asia have resulted in an ever increasing number of wounded and dead since 1968. The number of deaths and injuries increased even in years when the frequency of incidents declined. This fact has been explained by tying the acts to religious terrorism: in Southeast Asia, Islamic terrorism is the most prominent form of religiously motivated terrorism. Religious terrorists have shown themselves to be more willing to accept a higher death toll, both among their own and among the victims. Therefore it is important not only to prevent further recruiting, but also to contain ongoing activities in the region.

Southeast Asia has proved a fertile land for terrorists for many reasons. The most important factor is represented by the relatively weak central governments of many of the states, and considerable social and political instability - especially in Indonesia.⁷ Poverty and social inequality have made it possible for terrorist networks to step in and offer hope for the future, something that many states don't provide. Citizens often feel alienated in their respective states, especially in Indonesia and the Philippines – countries that have had the largest number of terrorist acts (204 and 363, respectively) since 1968, according to Rand. The connection between terrorism in Southeast Asia and the Islamic faith has made it easy to gain support in the region, even if most Muslims are moderate, and have no connection to these activities. The cooperation between the MILF, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), and Al-Qaeda is apparent despite no common agenda, apart from religious compatibility and connections often based on joint services in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation of 1979-1989 and the U.S. operations since 2001. However, resistance to U.S. foreign policy and the targeting of U.S. interests in the region has made it appealing even to the more moderate groups. The reason is that the U.S. is highly disliked in the region, especially in Indonesia, where, according to the U.S. Congress, only 15 percent expressed a favorable view of the U.S. and 82 percent were disappointed that Iraq did not put up more of a fight against the U.S.⁸ Such psychological and operational conditions have improved the networks' capacity to exist and expand, while being able to sustain their operations through piracy and narcotics dealings in the region.

Regional efforts to curb terrorism before and after 9/11

Historically, there have been very few cases of multilateral measures to prevent terrorist activities. Prior to 9/11, ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) had done little to curb trans-national terrorism; there was no legal commitment, but only a pledge to fight trans-national crime in general and enhance cooperation.⁹ Terrorism was indeed pondered, but the illegal trafficking of narcotics and women was a much more pressing concern for Southeast Asia at the time. Not even during 2000, with an apparent surge of terrorist activities and related deaths and injuries, was it recognized that terrorism had to be targeted specifically on the multilateral level. The failure to take terrorism seriously changed, at least on paper, after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, and even more so after the Bali bombing and the attack on the JW Marriott in Jakarta. Since then, unilateral and bilateral attempts have been made to deal with the situation in the region. These attempts have focused on security coordination of national agencies, and the sharing of information among states. Despite some success, cooperation has so far been weak and at a low level. The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia signed the Southeast Asian Trilateral Counter Terrorism (CT) Agreement in May 2002. The success of this agreement has generally been limited, and in July 2003 the Malaysian government unilaterally set up a regional counter-terrorist center with the assistance of the U.S. The objections of most Southeast Asian states to participation in this project have been strong, and have usually been directed towards the U.S. involvement in the project. Even the director of the Malaysian regional counter-terrorist center, Datuk Zainal Abidin Mohamed Zain, has been reluctant to call his own center a success.¹⁰ In competition with the Malaysian regional center, Thailand and Indonesia have put up their own regional terrorist centers. Thus there are plenty of good intentions but no focus, limited collaboration and significant institutional competition between the different centers and states.

However, Singapore and Malaysia have worked together with some success to break up Jemaah Islamiah.¹¹ The accomplishment should not be exaggerated, though, as the cells disrupted were small and could not offer enough information to lead to the destabilization of the organization as a whole. Needless to say, national and bilateral efforts are important; but as terrorist networks operate trans-nationally, there is a need for committed regional and international efforts to collect and analyze information and execute region-wide actions if there is to be a permanent impact. Attempts that have emphasized multilateral measures to combat terror have focused on training and exchange of information but at a low level, and the cooperation attempts have received limited political support from all states, particularly Indonesia.

There have been several attempts to coordinate regional efforts to combat terrorism, often under pressure and in cooperation with the U.S.¹² Such attempts started when the U.S. virtually forced ASEAN to sign the May 2002 anti-terror treaty.¹³ The external influence has made several states reconsider the regional necessity of supporting a war against terror which they view as the concern of the U.S. There still is reluctance to support the actual war against terrorism, as it is perceived as a U.S. war against Islam. For example, in 2002, 31 percent of Indonesians supported the war against terrorism, but in 2003 only 23 percent were in favor of it - despite the then-recent terrorist attack in Bali.¹⁴ However, the Counter Terrorist Task Force (CCTF) was set up in February 2003 with the task of identifying and assessing counter-terrorist needs, coordinating capacity building and cooperation with international and regional organizations. The success of this attempt has, in line with other regional efforts, been to some extent stalemated; bilateral and unilateral efforts seem to be preferred to regional solutions.

On November 5, 2001, the ASEAN Heads of State signed the Declaration on Terrorism to enhance cooperation in combating terrorism. ASEAN was now to ‘deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing ‘best practices".¹⁵ Moreover, ASEAN established the annual Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Trans-national Crime as part of the fight against terrorism.¹⁶ Unfortunately, these meetings have served as little more than talking-shops, and are not an effective means of dealing with terrorism and organized crime.¹⁷ In May 2002 the states reached an agreement to standardize their criminal laws regarding trans-national crime.¹⁸ The results have not been very encouraging, especially since extradition and choice of laws are problems that have not been dealt with. National legislation and organizational structures are still deemed more important than regional efforts in the fight against terror. It is clear that the importance of ASEAN and ARF will diminish if nothing is done to improve their functionality with regard to terrorism. A few problems can be singled out as essential if ASEAN or ARF are to deal effectively with these questions.

The failure to arrest suspected terrorists is endemic in the region, as information-sharing has failed and extradition procedures are less than functional. Some arrests have been carried out in a number of states, but represent only a fraction of the people involved, and are often only of low-level terrorists who, as foot soldiers, are expendable and whose arrest does not threaten the operational quality of the organizations whose cell structures mitigate against destabilization of the terrorist network as a whole. Even when known leaders are captured, they are replaced by people unknown to security officials, making further arrests and investigations difficult. The uselessness of the laws which have been passed stands as a monument to the lack of political will to engage in the struggle against terrorism, or at least against terrorism outside the context of the individual state. There have been some recent improvements, but it is far from clear that the region has taken the measures it will need to combat terrorist organizations in the region. Legal coordination at a regional level, as well as transnational cooperation between anti-terrorist forces and police forces are needed, but sovereignty and fear of intervention in internal affairs have prevented any deeper cooperation.

Moreover, new forms of terrorism have emerged in the region and they do not follow the traditional structure of terrorism, even if MILF and GAM have traditional independence motives.¹⁹ Most groups are trans-national, with fundraising, training, political structures and activities each in different states. This calls for increased regional and international cooperation, and the creation of regional structures that can handle these issues. Unfortunately, the existing counter-terrorist structures have been constructed in response to traditional forms of terrorism, i.e. terrorism with structure, form and usually a geographically defined objective.

Regional structures: but for whom?

The implications for the Southeast Asian region have primarily been negative, even if increased cooperation and the ever rising need to stand up to the challenge from a militant minority have created a feeling of “commonness" among the Southeast Asian states in the face of international terrorism. Unfortunately, some states have been reluctant to act - especially Indonesia where several terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiah have strong support even among the elite. There have also been problems in determining if the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the Thai group of Pattani United Liberation Army (PULO), Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF), Kampulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and even – to a certain extent – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are terrorists, freedom fighters or anything else. These national discrepancies and a lack of consensus create a dead-lock for regional cooperation.

As noted in the previous section, there is almost no regional structure that can take up the challenge against trans-national, religious terrorism in the region. This is due to several factors, but one that is embarrassingly evident, both in the region and internationally, is that cooperative structures are weak when looking at new security threats; it could even be argued that structures among terrorists are better than among the states.²⁰ 

Anti-U.S. feeling has been growing in most of the regional states as a result of the war against terror and the war against Iraq, despite initial sympathy and support after 9/11. Such feeling has stalemated initiatives in the region, while terrorist networks have increased their cooperation. Collaboration has increased significantly among different militants in the region, as a result of the Afghani connections but also due to religious compatibility.²¹ The same networks for fund-raising are used, and there is significant cooperation in the field of organized crime. Moreover, training facilities, for example in Mindanao, are used to train militants from other organizations. JI and MILF have been tied to Al Qaeda on several occasions.²² For example, MILF was asked in 1999 to increase the number of students at their training camps. MILF denied that the request had been made, but admitted that “Foreign Visitors" had been trained at the MILF camps. Moreover, the fact remains that MILF has sent Mujahidin to Afghanistan, possibly up to 1000 men over several years, and that personal connections have been established with several international terrorist groups, the most widely known being Al Qaeda.

The lack of formal government structures has made such cooperation among terrorist organizations possible. ASEAN has been successful in preventing inter-state conflicts through its informal structures, but a military threat from an invisible enemy calls for formal cooperation and organized efforts on a regional scale – in order to both eradicate the base for new members and terrorist activities through education, social equality, and economic improvement, and to combat the existing terrorist cells. ASEAN has ‘failed' to formalize its earlier cooperation, and most of the conflict management and collaboration efforts have been on an ad hoc basis, and based on conflict avoidance (musgrawarah).²³ Needless to say, maintaining weak regional structures is not an option if social and military efforts are to be coordinated on a regional scale, as it would be immensely expensive and likely to fail due to internal conflicts and disputes over definitions. Moreover, ASEAN is now in a weak position, having recently accepted new members, and it is debatable whether it has the political strength and willingness to initiate a politically controversial attempt such as formalized and active counter-terrorism. The formal structural weakness threatens to prevent any effective measures being taken. Moreover, the discrepancy between national views regarding the U.S. involvement in anti-terrorist activities only adds to the internal weakness of ASEAN. Vietnam and Myanmar have argued that U.S. involvement poses too much of a challenge to their national sovereignty, but more states are reluctant to let the U.S. control regional involvement.²⁴ This division stands to stalemate the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-terrorism in Malaysia when ASEAN members begin to move away from the formal structures. There is also a lack of leadership in ASEAN: prior to the economic crisis, Djakarta was the natural leader, owing to its impressive resource base, large population and political will to integrate the region. This has changed after the financial crisis, and today ASEAN is a ship without a captain.²⁵ Before ASEAN can move forward to establish an effective organization to combat terrorism, it needs to be strengthened and to acquire leadership.

ARF is possibly in a worse position than ASEAN, since ARF will not only have to coordinate polices within an organization, but also coordinate efforts between two different cultures of interaction, i.e. the more direct and formal U.S. culture, and the more informal Southeast Asian culture.²⁶ The ARF has also been largely inactive, except for a few statements and workshops that have generally failed to yield operational results.²⁷ Many members have been reluctant to formalize ARF, and the much-politicized question regarding terrorism has only accentuated this trend.²⁸ The mediocre results of ARF, coupled with a lack of support among states for a U.S. dominated war against terrorism, account for the weak impact of ARF on the problem.

A more formalized structure, with far-reaching powers, is a necessity in order for regional organizations to function effectively in the fight against the forms of terrorism that have emerged during the past two decades. This will not be possible under the control of the U.S., as agendas differ widely between Washington and Southeast Asia, and there is a reluctance to accept U.S. definitions of terrorism in the region. It should be noted that several groups that are considered extremist by the U.S. have substantial support in the region – e.g. Indonesian Vice-President Hamsah Haz's support for Laskar Jihad; the low punishment for convicted terrorists is another instance of diverging views between the U.S. and the region.²⁹ The Philippines, however, is the state that has the most to gain from the war against terrorism, and thus gave the strongest support in the form of logistics, airspace, access to Subic Bay, strengthening laws against terrorism and finally stepping up the war on terror in the Philippines.³⁰ The war against terror in Mindanao has been less successful, and the influx of “foreign visitors" seems to have increased since 2001. In short, the ARF ‘s support for the war against terrorism has been more in theory than in practice, due to the internal differences among its member states.

Hands tied

Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has generally been characterized by non-intervention, conflict avoidance, and consensus. These characteristics focus on handling conflicts at a low level and not dealing with the political and operational aspects of cooperation among the different states in the region. The combination of the above-mentioned factors, together with a strong focus on sovereignty, has made many of the regional attempts to fight terrorism and trans-national security threats unsuccessful.

Combating international terrorism at the regional level calls not only for coordination of policies, but also for the abandonment of some sovereignty in favor of trans-regional cooperation. The principle of non-intervention needs to be dealt with, as it creates immense problems for regional cooperation over terrorist conflicts. Non-intervention has been the golden rule in ASEAN, and to a certain extent in ARF and all other Asian cooperation attempts.³¹ Anti-terrorist groups need to be able to monitor and develop strategies that might even impact the domestic affairs to be fully effective. As the sovereignty principle has been so strong in Southeast Asia, there is very little cooperation that threatens to breach the sovereignty principle, and traditionally most serious conflicts have been internal.

The culture of conflict avoidance and consensus that has characterized ASEAN since its creation has prevented the organization from dealing with terrorist conflicts, and threatens the potential to effectively deal with these multilaterally. International terrorism is by definition trans-national; even traditional forms of terrorism have proven to be trans-national and require trans-national solutions.

ASEAN is potentially not without tools to deal with terrorism, outside of the U.S.-guided attempts. The High Council in ASEAN was created to take ‘cognizance' of existing disputes or situations that could potentially threaten regional ‘peace and harmony'.³² The High Council has not been implemented despite a few attempts, for example, at the Hanoi Summit in 1998, to make it more operational.³³ Since 2001 we have also seen a rapid increase in organizations and charters that could potentially impact the creation of regional legal structures positively, if there is enough political support to implement such organizations. The greatest obstacle has been that there has been insufficient trust to override the sovereignty principle and foster cooperation on security issues. Faced with the trans-regional threat and terrorism in the region, ASEAN countries need to realize that they can trust their neighbors the extent that they can accept the fact that the main threat to their sovereignty is not their neighbors, but the lack of cooperation among them.

Choice of laws and policies

As mentioned, there is a discrepancy of views among different states regarding U.S. engagement, but this is not the only issue to be dealt with. The question of who is a terrorist remains one of the main obstacles against effective cooperation. It is telling that the Philippines, which is arguably hardest hit by terrorist actions together with Indonesia, has no legal code regarding terrorism. Furthermore, the issue of who is a terrorist has not been dealt with effectively by regional organizations. The Joint Declaration between the U.S. and ASEAN merely states that terrorism should be fought in ‘all its forms and manifestations'.³⁴  The lack of definition opens up further controversy, leading to stalemate in the question and threatening to minimize the success of anti-terrorist work. It is due to the diversity of definitions that Southeast Asia has been forced to accept an ad hoc definition and a U.S. interpretation. The problems with a definition are primarily based on national considerations and the support some organizations and their supporters have gained in individual countries. If terrorism is to be effectively fought, the struggle needs to be widened to include organizations and structures that provide financing and training facilities to terrorist organizations. Strikingly, many of the apprehended and convicted terrorists in, say, Indonesia, received relatively lenient verdicts that are nothing like the verdicts they would have received in countries like Singapore or the U.S.

Common legal structures are needed; despite a few attempts to coordinate the regional legal frameworks, the creation of regional legal structures has been less than successful.³⁵ Terrorist organizations have used the legal chaos to move between different states. When JI was outlawed in Indonesia, it simply moved to Malaysia, where it could function within the country's legal framework. This lack of judicial cohesion is actively used when moving people, money and weapons throughout the region, and any state that remains outside a regional framework will potentially be used by JI as a base. The legal confusion is closely related to the intelligence sharing and regional anti-terrorist groups that need to be established within Southeast Asia and strongly connected to a regional code of conduct. Currently there is a problem of information-sharing between states, as it could breach national legislations. These regional drawbacks need to be changed, and not only at the bilateral level – as between Malaysia and Singapore.

There is also lack of agreement among the members of ASEAN on how to deal with the terrorists with regard to negotiations or military force. The problem is not so much the course of action decided upon, but more that the regional states have a consensus on how to deal with terrorists. Sanctions are another issue that the regional powers have not agreed how to deal with. Who should be sanctioned? And how can sanctions be coordinated throughout the region? Part of the problem lies in the fact that some states have been using the pretext of terrorism to fight political and religious competitors within the states and the region. This complicates the picture and paradoxically strengthens terrorist organizations, as it creates suspicion of the government and the U.S. – which is perceived to be behind the crack-down on domestic political organization in Southeast Asia.

Conflict of structures and lack of structure

The lack of structures in Southeast Asia has worked as much in favor of the terrorist organizations as against regional governments. States and organizations are often limited to attacking terrorist cells that rarely have information concerning the whole organization. It is the lack of structure among terrorists that makes all traditional forms of anti-terrorist activities less effective and unilateral action an inadequate means with which to respond to and resolve the threat. The absence of formal structure among the terrorists has proved to strengthen their defensive ability. However, non-structured cooperation with regard to counter-terrorism measures does not promote efficiency or defensiveness in dealing with the threat of terrorism. Non-structural problems need further structural measures, as they increase dependence on information gathering, multilayered analysis and operational measures.

It seems obvious that the regional structures in Southeast Asia, and probably in most regions, are not up to the challenge of trans-national, religious terrorism. The cleavages between the different national policies and the reluctance to cooperate over the issue of trans-national, religious terrorism have given terrorists leeway to move between different states as the policies change. There is no regional structure, neither within ASEAN nor ARF, and it seems unlikely that Southeast Asia will develop an effective regional mechanism in the short term. This is partly due to the failure to agree on a definition of terrorism and partly due to domestic considerations. It is not impossible to combat terrorism without a regional definition of terrorism, but it creates loopholes which terrorists use, and increases their ability to utilize different legal structures. The lack of structure and the network formations of terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiah should be met with strong, formalized, structural cooperation on a regional scale. There is no other way to deal with an enemy that, in essence, lacks structure.

The new challenges posed by this form of terrorism, as well as trans-national threats in general, have to be acknowledged and prepared for. The current strategies for combating terrorism are based on the experience of more traditional forms of terrorism, with structures and organization. The danger is that since the trans-national nature of religious terrorists is not noticed and acted upon nationally, regionally and internationally, such terrorists receive relatively high levels of freedom to operate and spread. Attention from the states in the region has mainly focused on domestic terrorism, yet many of the domestic terrorist organizations have trans-national elements such as weapons deliveries and financial support. If more in-depth cooperation is undertaken regarding religious and trans-national terrorism, it is likely that the laws and engagement over these issues will have positive implications on the combat of internal terrorists / extremists.

Despite its shortcomings, regional (and international) cooperation is the best way to combat trans-national religious terrorism, not only by military force but also by increasing economic development, social stability and political participation. In the short term there is a need to increase cooperation between regional police and military forces to combat the terrorists, to eradicate their bases and prevent further destruction of resources and human lives. In the long term, however, there is a need to work for more structural changes (socio-political and economic), as this will be the only way to eradicate the terrorist threat over time. In the short-term, religious terrorists have to be combated ruthlessly. This ruthlessness does not necessarily have to take the form of military force, but greater determination on the part of governments, religious organizations and regional organizations to take this threat seriously and work for the eradication of terrorism.

Implications for national and regional security

The implications of the lack of cooperation regionally against terrorism for regional and national security are apparent and are mostly directed to the critique that terrorist organizations are given more leeway than they should be, due to the lack of cooperation and coordination of policies. The relatively uncoordinated environment would not only strengthen the currently operating terrorist organizations, but also open up the possibility for new organizations to operate from Southeast Asia due to its weak enforcement capacity at a regional level. The failure of regional cooperation in these matters can be seen in the increased use of Southeast Asia for training, money laundering, etc., for terrorist organizations. It also seems that ASEAN is pressured to do a better job at cooperation, or else the legitimacy of the organization will suffer significantly and increased reliance will be put on external powers.

It is evident that the region has been pushed back into the U.S. orbit, much as during the war against communism. Southeast Asia as a unit has not been able to stand up against the new threat to the level that has been expected domestically and internationally. U.S. involvement has had both positive and negative effects; the U.S. is increasingly seen as an imperialist power that seeks to expand its own interests in the region. The results are seen in many states, but especially in Indonesia, where anti-U.S. sentiments are rising quickly – a fact which could potentially increase support for organizations that are attacking U.S. interests in the region and internationally.

Nevertheless, the ongoing situation cannot be dealt with through regional organizations without external support in the short run. The U.S. seems to be the only power that is equipped to assist the region, both politically and militarily. However, the current focus from the states in Southeast Asia has been relatively narrow and there is a need to broaden the focus to include groups as GAM and MILF – independence movements which are closely linked to terrorist organizations (and could arguably be classified as such) and assist them both in operations and training. The broader picture is not without problems and in some cases there is an apparent risk that many states will crack down on domestic movements that do not share the national “ideology" in some way. We have seen several cases where it's debatable whether the organizations dealt with are really linked to terrorist organizations or not. Nevertheless, there is a need to look closer and more widely at what constitutes a terrorist organization and include support organizations.

There is also a risk that problems will be created through an increased focus on non-traditional security threats and specifically terrorism. It is very feasible that increased anti-terrorist activities could boost the image that terrorism is the major threat to the region, which is not the claim here, or that terrorists groups are everywhere. This would increase the perception of insecurity and as a result resources could potentially be invested in the wrong measures.

Despite their shortcomings, regional structures are the best way to combat trans-national terrorism and non-traditional threats at large. Combating regional terrorism should not only be conducted with military means, but more importantly by increasing economic development, political participation and social stability. In the short term there is a growing need for legal coordination, and cooperation between police and military forces through information exchanges and operational cooperation. On the structural level and over a longer period of time, there is a need to work for socio-political and economic changes, as well as to include support organizations and limit the possibilities for terrorists to gain resources, both human and financial. Effective combat of terrorism is only done by targeting the structures that support terrorism. Focused targeting of terrorists will be problematic as there is still no common understanding of who is a terrorist. Increased cooperation need to start with a common definition of what constitutes a terrorist and then apply this to true regional cooperation.

Endnotes

 1 Niklas Swanström, Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management (Uppsala: Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2002).

 2 “Tsunami early warning ‘next year'" BBS World (12 January, 2005); “Row over Tsunami Warning System", BBC World (30 January 2005).

 3 Niklas Swanström & Emma Björnehed, “Conflict Resolution of Terrorist Conflicts in Southeast Asia", Terrorism and Political Violence (vol. 16, no. 2, 2004: 329-331).

 4 Statement by Matthew Daley, “Increased Cooperation Needed to Combat Transnational Terrorism", usinfo.state.gov (29 October 2003).

 5 Rand Corporation.

 6 See the Rand Terrorism Chronology. For further clarification of the nature of the incidents included in the statistics, the RAND/MIPT have formed a Vetting Committee that oversees the inclusion of what RAND researchers consider “borderline" incidents. This Committee also provides guidance and determines criteria for including or not including incidents. To date, the Vetting Committee has decided the following: General rioting, hoaxes, cyber-vandalism, or unsubstantiated threats do not constitute terrorism incidents. Bombs that detonate as a perpetrator is building them do not count as terrorism incidents, once the perpetrator moves towards a target the detonation counts as terrorism. Bombs defused by authorities at the target do count as a terrorism incident. Attacks on police forces do not count as terrorism incidents in areas and/or countries in which the police and the military are synonymous. “Foiled" bombing plots do not count as terrorism incidents.

 7 Mark Manyin, Terrorism in Southeast Asia , CRS Report for Congress (November 18, 2003:8).

 8 Mark Manyin (2003:22).

 9 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997); Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime (1998); Joint Communiqué of the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (1999) 23 June 1999, Yangon, Myanmar.

 10 Ioannis Gatsiounis, “Southeast Asia's center-terror industry", Asia Times Online (March 10, 2004).

 11 Center for Defense Information, "In the spotlight: Jemaah Islamiah", 18 Dec. 2002.

 12 Niklas Swanström & Emma Björnehed (2004:340).

 13 It should be noted that many people in Southeast Asia has been angered by the war in Iraq, and what have been seen as an attack on Muslims, especially given the perception that North Korea has been dealt with silk gloves. See Niklas Swanström & Mikael Weissmann, ‘The Chinese Impact on the Negotiations with North Korea', Peace Review, (vol 16, no, 2, 2004).

 14 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003) p. 201.

 15 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, 2001.

 16 Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002, ASEAN.

 17 Zachary Abuza (2003).

 18 Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002, ASEAN.

 19 Niklas Swanström & Emma Björnehed (2004).

 20 Dana Dillion, “Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism", Heritage Lectures (December 20, 2004).

 21 Dana Dillion (2004).

 22 Niklas Swanström & Emma Björnehed, (2004).

 23 Niklas Swanström (2002: 146-151). Musgrawarah (Malay) is based on the notion of conflict avoidance and seeks to decrease open tension and minimize loss of face for states and individuals. It aims at dealing with conflicts informally and in a way that diffuses them before they have become open; the drawback of this approach is that it is difficult to resolve issues and look for underlying reasons for conflict. The members of ASEAN have recently agreed to disagree and abandon the principle of conflict avoidance, but Musgrawarah remains the guiding principle, as old habits die hard.

 24 Zachary Abuza (2003: 250).

 25 Acharya Amitav, ‘Collective Security and conflict management in Southeast Asia', in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000) pp.198-219.

 26 Niklas Swanström (2002: 218-238).

 27 ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing, 30 July 2002; ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Prevention of Terrorism, Bangkok 17-19 April 2002.

 28 Niklas Swanström (2002: 95-106).

 29 Zachary Abuza (2003:196); Dillion (2003:4).

 30 Zachary Abuza (2003:202).

 31 Bangkok Declaration, August 8 1967, paragraph 2 (c).

 32 Amer, Ramses, ‘Conflict management and constructive engagement in ASEAN's expansion', Third World Quarterly, 1999, Vol. 20:1031-1048; Palmer Ronald D & Reckford Thomas J, Building ASEAN: 20 Years of South-east Asian Cooperation, The Washington Papers, Nr 127, New York, Praeger, 1987; Rajendran, ASEAN's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective action, Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku Sdn. Bhd, 1995.

 33 The Hanoi Plan of Action, December, 1999.

 34 ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 August 2002.

 35 Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, 3 November 2002; Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 27 January 2003.