Based on his fieldwork in Xinjiang, Mackerras analyzes the impact of PRC government policies on wide-ranging aspects of society, from politics to education, economic inequality to culture, and ethnic relations to terrorism.  Despite the lingering traditional problems of separatist movements and ethnic inequalities, the author argues that the policy of the Great Western Development Strategy has produced much social progress in the region.

Colin Mackerras is the Foundation Professor in the Department of International Business and Asian Studies at Griffith University, Australia. He was educated both in Australia and the UK, receiving his Ph.D. from Australian National University. His teaching and research interests include such diverse areas as the social and political history of China, Chinese language, ethnic relations in China, and Vietnam, North Korea, and China in international affairs.

The Chinese state recognizes fifty-five minority nationalities which comprise 8.41 percent of China's total population, with the Han majority making up the rest. 1  One of China's most significant minority areas is Xinjiang, a province-level “autonomous region” in the far northwest that occupies one-sixth of China's total area (although home to only 1.5 percent of the national population). Because ethnic relations are more strained in Xinjiang than in the rest of the country, the region exemplifies several of the ethnic issues that confront China today.

The most populous single ethnic group in Xinjiang is the Uygurs who, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, comprise 45 percent of the regional population. They are Turkic culturally and ethnically, including their adherence to Islam. The Han Chinese population is a few percentage points behind the Uygurs, but is catching up due to conditions that will be discussed later in this article. There are also a number of other much less populous ethnic groups living in Xinjiang, most of which are Islamic.

Since 1990, there have been several Uygur separatist movements in Xinjiang. The Chinese government's primary reaction has been a stick-and-carrot approach. It has suppressed all separatism immediately and brutally, but has also promoted economic development in a bid to provide material incentives for the minorities to remain part of China.

In this article I argue, through an analysis of China's policies in Xinjiang, that these policies have been generally successful in their own terms. China is winning its struggle to keep Xinjiang within its borders. It has been able to persuade much of the Uygur population to support, or at least not to oppose, its rule and brought about great societal and economic progress that can be seen in a rising standard of living.

This article is based mainly on interviews and other data gathered during my fieldwork in Xinjiang in October and November of 2003. The fieldwork took me to Altay in the far north and, in north-central Xinjiang, the capital Ürümqi and its environs, including the oasis city of Turpan. I also visited several towns in the southwest, such as Kashgar, Yarkant, Hotan and Yutian, as well as Kucha and Aksu, both of which are about halfway between Ürümqi and Kashgar. The south, which includes the Taklamakan Desert, is one of the most arid and impoverished regions of Xinjiang. It is also the part of Xinjiang where Uygurs are most numerous, both in absolute numbers and in relation to the Han.

Sources of Tension

Of all the major ethnic groups in China, the Uygurs are probably the most dissimilar from the Han both culturally and linguistically. The language of the Uygurs is totally different and their arts are more like those of the Turks than those of the Chinese.

The overwhelmingly dominant religion in Xinjiang is Islam. According to official figures for 2000, there were 8.1 million religious believers in Xinjiang, almost all of whom were Muslims, and over 20,000 mosques and some 29,000 clergy. 2  These mosques are officially sponsored, with the government contributing money to their building, upkeep, and restoration. The government also gives salaries or “living expenses” ( shenghuo fei ) to some imams. I could not find any information about underground anti-government mosques. These were once quite numerous, but the government “strike hard” campaigns that began in 1996 have greatly weakened them.

Islam is much stronger in the south than in the north. One reason is that the south is a Uygur area, whereas the north is Kazak, with 76.6 percent of Xinjiang's Kazaks living in the Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. 3  Although there are Kazak mosques, many Kazaks are still nomadic and so are less likely to visit mosques regularly. In any case, Kazaks have the reputation for being somewhat more lax in Islamic observance than Uygurs.

Xinjiang is the most sensitive politically of all of China's minority areas. Many Uygurs are hostile to the Han and there have been several separatist movements in Xinjiang, notably in 1990 in Akto County in the southwest of Xinjiang and in 1997 in Yining in the northwest. Although Tibet receives greater and more sympathetic media coverage in Western countries than does Xinjiang, the fact is that since the 1990 uprising, which was led by a man committed to the Islamic doctrine of jihad or holy war, 4  the situation has become more serious in Xinjiang.

The Chinese believe that Xinjiang is an integral part of Chinese territory and there are Uygurs who, although they regard the current version of autonomy as totally false, would be prepared to remain within China, provided that they were given far more control over domestic matters and the presence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was reduced. Other Uygurs believe that they should have the right to set up their own nation-state and are deeply resentful of Chinese rule, regarding it as oppressive and anti-Muslim. But any resistance only arouses Chinese ire and brings on worse crackdowns against anything remotely suggestive of separatism. The Chinese believe that resistance to Chinese rule is led and fanned by Muslim extremists, usually egged on from outside China's borders.

Although the differences in ethnicity and religion and the politics of separatism are the most obvious sources of tension in Xinjiang, there are others. Two that stand out are the immigration of Han people into Xinjiang and various kinds of inequality.

The Uygurs consider Han immigration into Xinjiang a means of deluging them with foreign overlords who take land and jobs from local people. The fact that the Chinese are non-Muslims or “infidels” only exacerbates the pain. Han immigration is a growing problem as it has increased greatly in the last decade of the twentieth century and shows no signs of decreasing.

There are several kinds of inequality that cause tension in Xinjiang. One is political, the feeling that the Han have much more power than the minorities, especially the Uygurs. Another is economic, because there is a general feeling that the Han are better off than the minorities and grab the lion's share of increased prosperity. Economic inequalities also imply social inequalities. Many Uygurs feel that they have become second-class citizens in their own land; they feel that the Han treat them as inferiors, looking down on their culture and religion.

Policy

According to the PRC Constitution, China is a multiethnic, unitary country. The basic state policy towards ethnic minorities is one of autonomy within the context of China's national unity. The term autonomy means that the people exercising autonomy are allowed to use their own language and follow their own culture. This includes adherence to their own religion, provided the religious activities pose no threat to the state. The ethnic group exercising autonomy has some say over the budget and the government head for the region must be chosen from among its members. 5  However, this rule does not apply to the CCP, which is actually the most powerful body in China, much more so than the government. In Xinjiang, at all levels, it is customary for the Party head to be Han and the government counterpart to be Uygur.

While there are other strong limitations on the policy of autonomy, the one requiring national unity, with zero tolerance for secessionism, is absolute. In Xinjiang, as well as in other places such as Tibet, the CCP authorities have ruthlessly crushed all attempts to break away from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The leader of the 1990 Akto uprising, Zahideen Yusuf, was killed in the fighting along with many of his followers. The brutal suppression of the 1997 Yining disturbances led to a strengthening of public security in a permanent crackdown on any hint of separatism.

The “carrot” side of the suppression of separatism is economic development and modernization. Although there is nothing new in such a policy, it received a significant boost in 2000 with the beginning of the Great Western Development Strategy ( Xibu da kaifa zhanlüe ). The great majority of minorities live in provinces, such as Xinjiang, which the Strategy categorizes as “western,” and the aim of this strategy is to bring economic growth, investment levels and the standard of living in the “western” provinces much closer to that experienced on the eastern seaboard.

In the 1980s, the government introduced “preferential policies” ( youhui zhengce ) for minorities in China. These included establishing quotas for minorities for university entrance, providing for more relaxed treatment under the population policy, and giving minorities advantages in job allocation and promotion. 6  Most important of all was the training of more cadres (managers, leaders, professionals) from among the minorities, which one official source, demanding planned increases both in the quantity and quality of minority cadres in Xinjiang, described as an essential condition “for perfecting the system of autonomy in the ethnic areas.” 7  Poverty alleviation has also been given considerable focus in the minority areas.

In accordance with state policy, large numbers of Han resettled in Xinjiang in the early years of the PRC. This was to promote economic development and border security, as well as to keep the Uygurs and other Islamic peoples under control. This policy changed in the 1980s, with quite a few Han returning to the east. 8  Since the 1990s, most Han migrants to Xinjiang have gone there for private commercial reasons.

Most of Xinjiang's minorities have their own languages. According to Chinese government policy all citizens should be able to speak, understand, and be literate in the national language, which in this case is modern standard Chinese ( putonghua or literally “the common words”) for the spoken language and Chinese characters for the written. In minority areas, including Xinjiang, longstanding policy is that all peoples should learn each other's spoken and written languages. In September 1995, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee adopted its “Spoken and Written Languages Work Regulations,” which continued this tradition. However, the regulations gave much more attention to the desirability of minorities learning Chinese, 9  and seemed to shift the emphasis away from any even-handedness concerning language.

In some areas, policymakers aim to overcome the perceptions and realities I described as sources of tension in the section above. Authorities are well aware of the social tensions caused by economic inequalities and aim to correct them. The preferential policies go some way towards empowering minorities and increasing the number of minority cadres. The system of autonomy does have some benefits for the minorities. But the highest priority policy is to keep Xinjiang within China, and that can produce the effect of countering good intentions on the part of the government.

The Economy

Xinjiang is undergoing a process of rapid social and economic modernization. In 2002, Xinjiang posted an overall household consumption value of 3,150 yuan, against the national average of 3,791 yuan, 10 ranking fifteenth out of thirty-one province-level units (not including Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan). 11  This means that Xinjiang is somewhat below the national average but among China's province-level units, nowhere near the bottom. We can gain some idea of the improvements in historical terms by noting that, measured against constant 1978 prices, Xinjiang's annual per capita income multiplied by 15.65 between 1978 and 2002 in the rural regions, and by 23.37 in the urban. In 2002, urban incomes were four times as high as rural incomes. 12 

By the time of my fieldwork in 2003, the Great Western Development Strategy was already producing some effects. Towns everywhere are being modernized, with clean and up-to-date shops replacing old-fashioned ones. Old houses are being demolished and replaced by new ones. Investment from eastern China and from foreign countries is raising the people's standard of living and increasing annual incomes all over Xinjiang, especially in the cities. The capital Ürümqi now has modern freeways, highways, supermarkets, and high-rise apartments. A town like Aksu, which not so long ago was a backwater, has assumed a modern appearance with clean and modern shopping malls, where recordings of Beethoven's symphonies conducted by Herbert von Karajan compete with the latest Harry Potter films. The customers include both Han and Uygurs, though more of the former than the latter.

One of the aims of the Great Western Development Strategy is to reduce the disparities between the highly prosperous eastern seaboard provinces of China and the great interior. Investment has focused initially more on the cities than on the countryside, with the short-term result that economic disparities have tended to widen. There is also growing economic disparity within Xinjiang between the richer north and center and the poorer south, even though government policy is that investment should be directed more to the south. There are also disparities among different ethnic groups, with Han doing better than Uygurs and Uygurs much better than Kazaks. However, development benefits almost everybody and, in the long term, it is expected that the disparities will narrow.

It is difficult to be specific about these ethnic economic differentials. Several studies have suggested that Uygurs do not feel they are receiving their fair share of the benefits of modernization. 13  My impressions based on interviews and casual conversations in 1999 and 2003 confirmed that this is how Uygurs feel, although less so in 2003 than in 1999. I also gained a strong impression based on the same kind of evidence that Kazaks feel they are well behind both Han and Uygurs.

While official data do not subdivide statistics by ethnic group on matters that might tell us about the standard of living, such as income or consumption expenditure, there are figures that distinguish between rural and urban incomes and consumption (see Table 1). These tell us that the cities are considerably richer than the countryside and that the gap has grown. This is revealing since we also know that the Han tend to concentrate in the cities, while the minorities are concentrated in rural areas. For example, in 2002, the population of the city of Aksu was 37.86 percent Uygur and 60.54 percent Han, while in the whole of Aksu Region Uygurs were 72.84 percent. 14  Among the minorities, the Sinic Muslims or Hui are the most likely to live in urban areas, while more Uygurs live in the cities than do Kazaks, Kirgiz, or Mongols. While it is true that the urban/rural ratio for household consumption in 2002 was larger than the national average, there are several more or less entirely Han provinces with ratios larger than that of Xinjiang. The ratio between urban and rural areas has grown significantly all over the country, rising from 2.8/1 in 1980 to 3.5/1 in 2002. 15 

One of the issues at the heart of Han-Uygur income differentials is the growth of the cotton industry. Cotton is a traditional Han Chinese crop but Uygurs also grow it. Cotton production rose from 294,700 tons in 1989 to 1,477,000 in 2002, 16  making Xinjiang the foremost center of cotton production in China. 17  Some scholars, such as Nicolas Becquelin, have suggested the cotton industry constitutes a major focus of division between the Han and the Uygurs because it is a mechanism for Han migration into Xinjiang, which gives advantages to the Han and the state, not to the Uygurs. Becquelin bases his claim on his fieldwork in southern Xinjiang. 18 

My own research only partly confirms Becquelin's argument. The Aksu Region, in the northwestern part of southern Xinjiang, is one of the primary centers of the cotton industry in Xinjiang. I traveled by road in this area and interviewed people at random about their participation in growing cotton. One of them was a Uygur shepherd, who told me that he had earned a great deal of money over the past years from cotton. As we were talking, another Uygur rode up on a rather large motorbike. At first I thought he was a public security agent but it emerged that he was another cotton-grower. He had earned even more than the shepherd from growing cotton, enough to buy an expensive motorbike. He was expecting to make nearly 40,000 yuan in 2003 for his cotton, or over twenty times the average 2002 rural income. Although he expressed satisfaction at his income, he also said that the cotton industry was bad for Han-Uygur relations, because the Han had better access to the investment and land necessary for cotton growing.

Increasing wealth and modernization are creating the conditions for a burgeoning middle class in Xinjiang. Although it is mostly Han who belong to these wealthier classes, the Uygurs and other minorities are both able and willing to take advantage of the new and more prosperous conditions. This means that there is an emerging Uygur middle class whose members have better jobs, are more prosperous than their parents, and are accessing better education for their children than they themselves received. Not surprisingly, they are becoming more globalized and outward-looking in their thinking. They are still Muslims, but the younger generations pray and fast less assiduously than their elders. They continue to feel very strongly about their Uygur identity, but may not be quite as ready to take up arms for a secessionist movement. It is in their interest to “get along” with the majority Han.

Along with greatly expanding wealth, some serious poverty still remains in Xinjiang. This is especially true in the south. While it is more severe in the countryside, I was also aware of bad poverty in the back streets of the cities. I saw dilapidated housing, extremely cramped living spaces, and narrow unlit lanes without running water or garbage disposal services. On the other hand, I saw no sign of serious under-nourishment anywhere in Xinjiang.

The Chinese government formalized a new program to eradicate poverty in 1994, with measures such as investment of money, special irrigation schemes, and attempts to eradicate illiteracy and improve infrastructure, particularly in the rural areas. According to material distributed at an international conference I attended in Chengdu in September 2001, the Xinjiang government has sponsored a campaign to “Open Up the Desert” and civil servants have been encouraged to make voluntary contributions to seriously impoverished families. 19  At a government conference on October 21, 2001 it was claimed, using the official Chinese measure that earning less than US$1 per day constitutes absolute poverty, that the impoverished population in minority areas all over China had fallen from 45 million in 1994 to 14 million in 1999. 20  But success in reducing poverty varies from place to place. Reasons for this include differences in the natural environment and enthusiasm or corruption among local officials. Extreme dryness hampers poverty alleviation in many parts of Xinjiang, especially in the south. However, some areas have reported great successes, including the Aksu Region, where the number of people below the poverty line fell from 113,910 in 1994 to 16,200 in 1999. 21 

Despite the variations, in general China does quite well internationally in its efforts to eradicate poverty. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) stated in 2000 that, since 1978 when China initiated major economic reforms, “it has achieved remarkable successes in reducing abject poverty – successes that provide many lessons for countries with less developed programmes.” 22  The context of this statement was a major UNDP call for a new global strategy against poverty amid criticism that “fewer than a third of countries have set targets for eradicating extreme poverty or substantially reducing overall poverty.” 23 

Political and Employment Inequalities

Despite the official policy that Xinjiang is a Uygur autonomous region, serious political inequalities exist. The Han occupy most of the positions of power, especially in the CCP, with the Uygurs somewhat below. To be fair, the CCP government has made a conscious effort to educate minorities so that they can occupy positions of influence in society, but it has encountered great difficulties.

In accordance with policy, the proportion of minority cadres has gradually risen over the years. In 1984, the proportion of minority cadres was 43 percent, but in the first half of the 1990s it stood fairly consistently at about 46 percent. In 1997, it was 48.3 percent and rose to 48.9 percent in 1999. 24  So the proportion of minority cadres is still well below their percentage of the population, which is about 60 percent.

Minorities are even less represented in the body that matters most: the CCP. In 1997, minorities accounted for only 37.37 percent, 25  which is considerably less than their proportion among the population. Moreover, the percentage shows no breakdown among the ethnic minorities. It is quite possible that the Hui or Kazaks, both of whom are less hostile to the Han than the Uygurs, are better represented than other minorities.

One of the reasons for under-representation in the CCP is that the great majority of minorities are Muslims, for whom membership in an atheistic political party poses difficulties. There are a growing number of Uygurs who no longer believe in Islam, especially among intellectuals, and some are happy to join the CCP, even if ethnic nationalism prevents others from doing so on the grounds that it is a Han organization. Again, several Uygur CCP members told me that they still had some belief in Islam, despite the fact that CCP rules require belief in Marxism-Leninism. Still, the fact remains that the Uygurs are greatly under-represented in the CCP and thus do not hold a fair proportion of political power.

By contrast, in the highest local government organ in Xinjiang, minorities are actually better represented than in the population. The Ninth Xinjiang People's Congress, which came into office in 1998, had 542 members, of whom 355 (65.5 percent) belonged to one of the minority nationalities. 26  While the People's Congress does not possess power even remotely comparable to that of the CCP, these figures do show some attempt to put minorities into positions of influence.

For ordinary Uygurs, their success or failure in the job market is of great importance. Most accounts quote individual Uygurs as claiming they suffer discrimination, and my conversations with the locals confirm the existence of this complaint. One writer claims, based on interviews carried out from 1999 through 2002, that the Uygur elite is having increasing difficulty fitting into the system. According to the writer, more Uygurs are competing for the good jobs, resulting in a perception that their opportunities are actually on the decline. He states that many young Uygurs of working- or middle-class origin “reproach the Chinese regime for not providing them with job opportunities commensurate with their training and, instead, for favouring the appointment of Han to management posts.” 27  However, as shown above, significant numbers of Uygurs do get jobs and preferential policies have helped create an emerging management class of Uygurs.

Population

Demographic matters have a significant impact in Xinjiang because minorities are exempt from the one-child-per-couple policy and Han migration is highly controversial.

The 1990 census puts Xinjiang's population at 15,155,778, 28  which had expanded to 18,459,511 by the November 2000 census. Males were 51.7 per cent of the population. 29  The population expansion represents a growth rate of 2.1 percent per year, faster than the national total. In terms of population, Xinjiang is one of China's most rapidly growing province-level units.

Table 2 shows the population statistics of the main ethnic groups in Xinjiang, according to the 1990 and 2000 censuses.

Exemption from the one-child-per-couple policy does not mean no rules at all. Uygur couples in urban areas are allowed a maximum of two children. Rural couples are allowed three. During my fieldwork in 1999, I came across several families of nine children. In 2003, I did not come across any such large families and gained the strong impression that implementation of the rules had become stricter in the intervening years. Han people in Xinjiang are subject to the same one-child-per-couple rule as elsewhere in China. Despite the stricter atmosphere, the fact that there are so many minorities in Xinjiang is one of the reasons for the relatively high population growth rate. 30 

It is clear from the above table that the Han population has been growing much faster than that of the minorities, even though the Han are subject to the one-child-per-couple rule. The reason for this is extensive immigration. The 2000 census figure of 18,459,511 includes all those who had lived in Xinjiang for six months or more. Another figure for the same census, 19.25 million, counts all those people who were actually in Xinjiang on 1 November, including those who had been there for less than six months. 31  No doubt most of those staying only a short time are Han, which means that immigration is even higher than the figure of 18,459,511 would suggest. The higher figure also points to a substantial turnover of migrants in Xinjiang.

There is still government-sponsored Han migration into Xinjiang, aimed at economic development and at strengthening Chinese control over the region. Becquelin has produced documentation suggesting that Han migration remains official policy in some contexts, such as using rural labor from impoverished regions in central China to open up desert areas in Xinjiang. 32  However, today most of this Han migration is private. In other words, Han people go without being forced by the government because they believe they can make more money in Xinjiang. A major category of these “private” immigrants is the “drifters,” many of whom are escaping poverty and unemployment in their own areas. Some specialists have estimated the number of these “drifters” to be as high as 250,000 per year. 33  A significant proportion of them stay only a short time, just long enough to make some money.

Policy and Islam

Under the policy of autonomy, the peoples of Xinjiang are free to practice their own religion. However, there are many restrictions. For example, all people under the age of 18 are forbidden from entering “religious places” ( zongjiao changsuo ). The official reason for this is that young people should be studying at school, not going to pray. They are not allowed to pray at school, but can pray at home if they wish. I asked several lay people and clergy what they thought of this rule. Nobody would denounce it, and I always received the stock answer that young people should be getting an education. Such answers may have been based on fear of what might happen if they criticized government policy. I did see many young people, even children, in the grounds of mosques in Xinjiang, but not in the prayer halls. Even if the rule does cause resentment against the authorities, current signs are that the Chinese have both the will and the ability to enforce their policy.

Many mosques contain schools for training future imams. These vary in size from about a dozen to a couple hundred students, judging from those I visited. Tuition is free for the students and all costs are borne by the government-sponsored local Islamic Association. The curricula include politics, ideology, Arabic, the Koran and Islamic history and doctrine. The politics and ideology portions of the curricula are a government requirement aimed at ensuring the students remain loyal to the Chinese state and do not become influenced by separatist or terrorist ideas.

The fact that Islam has formed a basis of the separatist movement makes it an object of serious suspicion to the government. It also causes both anxiety and resentment among many ordinary Muslims, because it brings the suspicion of terrorism on them, even though neither the government nor anybody else is suggesting that more than a small number of Muslims in Xinjiang are in fact terrorists.

Islam is intrinsic to Uygur identity. Many Uygurs believe they should be loyal Muslims simply because they are Uygurs, even though Islam is a universal religion that commands adherence among peoples of many nationalities, both in Xinjiang and worldwide. This link between Uygur ethnic identity and Islam is one of the reasons the Chinese state is suspicious of Islam. It is also a factor that will not change, regardless of the wishes of the Chinese state.

On the other hand, the Uygurs are not necessarily united as Muslims. There are competing Sufi and non-Sufi factions among the Uygurs. There are also age-old territorial loyalties and linguistic discrepancies. In May 1996, Uygurs attacked the imam of the great Idkah Mosque in Kashgar, and there have been other cases of religious conflict, even in more recent times. 34 

Identity is frequently contextual. People may disagree among themselves but unite against a common foe. People of the same religion may form a united front against people of a different religion, even as they fight amongst themselves. And although Islam is a major marker of Uygur identity, it is certainly not the only one. Others include common cultural heritage, diet, architecture, and language. What is very clear is that the Chinese government makes use of its brand of religious freedom, which includes restrictions, to increase its control in Xinjiang and help keep the region in China.

Culture: Music

There has been a great deal of speculation about the impact of Chinese policy on ethnic cultures in Xinjiang, especially Uygur culture. Among Western scholars and human rights activists, and among the Uygur diaspora, there is also some anxiety about the effects on traditional cultures of the modernization process currently under way in Xinjiang.

Modernization weakens traditional cultures in many ways. Many young people lose interest in their tradition, preferring the more globalized cultures from the West. The fact that a Harry Potter book was readily available in the modern shops of Aksu is a case in point. When I commented on its presence in the shop, a Uygur friend told me, “Oh, yes, Harry Potter is very popular now among Uygur children.” She was not familiar with The Lord of the Rings films that were also available there, but it may be they also have a following among young Uygurs.

At the same time, I was struck by the prevalence of Uygur traditional culture. One hears traditional Uygur music widely broadcast. In Kashgar I was able to buy very good DVDs of a full video performance of the most famous of Uygur classical musical items, The Twelve Mukams , and CDs of the same music were also available. In Hotan, I went to the home of a musician who specialized in playing these musical classics. He told me proudly that more and more people were learning to play the musical instruments that are part of Uygur culture and enable the Mukams to survive in Uygur communities. The fact that these classics were more in demand in 2003 than five years earlier made him optimistic about their future.

Though modernization may weaken traditions, in some respects it can also strengthen them. Uygur traditional music is part of Uygur identity. Both have strengthened since the 1980s and they have done so at precisely the same time as modernization has gathered momentum.

The government is quite happy to see these traditions strengthen, as long as they pose no threat to the Chinese state. While traditional Uygur music can strengthen identity, it has not been a factor in separatism. Moreover, the Chinese state can use the survival of this music as evidence that it is genuinely honoring minority cultures, just as the Constitution promises. This would change if the Chinese state were to discover a link between Uygur traditional music and separatism.

Education

A modernizing state needs its people to be educated and, in particular, to be literate in the national language. Modern states also use education systems to spread knowledge and understanding of such matters as science, history, geography and the arts as well as to impart their own ideology to the people and integrate the country.

Table 3 shows comparative figures for the total number of students and for minority students enrolled in schools and universities in Xinjiang.

These figures show that the minorities of Xinjiang are receiving education in increasing numbers. Preferential policies favoring minorities through quotas 35  succeeded in increasing the proportion of minorities in the primary system quite significantly in the 1980s, to a figure greater than their percentage in the total population. The rise was much slighter in the 1990s, with a slide backwards in the first years of the twenty-first century. This slide backwards may be due to the declining birth rate and the imposition of fees. In November 2003 I was informed at the University of Xinjiang in Ürümqi that fees would be abolished in Xinjiang at the primary level from the 2003-2004 academic year on, which may make a difference to future figures.

The proportions of minorities at the secondary level saw large increases both in the 1980s and 1990s, and by the year 2000 the percentages of minorities in the high school system were about the same as in Xinjiang's total population. At the tertiary level, however, the Han are still predominant, and the rise in the proportion of minority students in the 1980s was not sustained in the 1990s. The growing cost of tertiary education, together with the significant Han migration in the 1990s, have had a major effect on who goes to college. Though most Han Chinese have no opportunity for tertiary education, there are increasing numbers who do. At the same time, the rise in absolute numbers of minority students has been quite small and their proportion of the total has fallen, despite the affirmative action policies.

Because of its modernization project and its wish to integrate the country, the Chinese government wants the Uygurs and other minorities of Xinjiang to learn Chinese. There is a two-track education sytem: Uygur-language schools for Uygur children, in which the instruction and textbooks are in Uygur, and Chinese-language schools with instruction in Chinese, with most of the students being the children of Han Chinese. Both systems have the same curriculum, though the Uygur-language schools include more Uygur music, dance, and culture than the Chinese-language ones.

At Uygur schools the study of Chinese is compulsory but there is no quid-pro-quo . In other words, the Chinese schools do not teach Uygur. Instead, they teach a foreign language considered more useful, usually English. The Uygur schools are also beginning to teach English, but learning a foreign language is rather haphazard in the Uygur schools. This means that those children who attend Uygur schools will know their own language and some Chinese, but probably not English, whereas those who go to the Chinese schools will learn no Uygur, but will have mastery of Chinese and will begin learning English. Another advantage of going to a Chinese-language school is easier access to college, since Chinese is necessary for the entrance examination.

In Ürümqi I interviewed two young Han Chinese students from the University of Xinjiang, the region's premier educational institution, who were learning Uygur. On being asked why they were learning Uygur, the two young women replied that they wanted to understand other people's cultures better and improve their relations with the Uygurs. A Han woman who was listening to this conversation told me afterwards that she thought it was silly for a Han to learn Uygur. It was a useless language that was simply not worth the time necessary to learn it. The reality is that Uygur will never be a widely used language outside Xinjiang. However, ethnic relations will not improve if the Han maintain condescending attitudes towards Uygur language and culture.

Some Uygurs send their children to Chinese schools, not Uygur ones. Their rationale is simple: the Chinese are here to stay, Chinese is the national language, and if you know Chinese well in addition to some English, you are far better placed to get a good job and career than if you know only Uygur. Some Uygurs regard such an attitude as a betrayal of Uygur culture; many Uygur children who go to the Uygur schools feel hostility towards those who go to the Chinese schools, thinking they are moving too close to the Han. I interviewed a Uygur family in Ürümqi in which two daughters of Uygurs both went to the Chinese school, even though it was more costly than the Uygur one. The elder daughter, who was eleven, spoke excellent Chinese and basic English. She could read and write Chinese quite well but only basic Uygur.

It is reasonable in a social context like the one in Xinjiang to allow minorities to teach in their own language. It is also reasonable for the Chinese state to expand knowledge of its own language. States everywhere have a duty to provide secular and universally useful education to their people, and China's record in this area is a good one. But it is also clear that the education system helps China's political goal of maintaining control of the people of Xinjiang.

Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang

In 2000, Professor Herbert Yee from the Hong Kong Baptist University carried out a detailed survey of attitudes among Xinjiang's Uygurs and Han towards each other. The results from the capital Ürümqi suggest “a low degree of integration between the two ethnic groups.” They also point to continuing feelings of prejudice among members of both ethnic groups against the other, and very strong feelings of ethnic identity among the Uygurs. 36  These results confirm my impressions from casual conversations and interviews both in 1999 and in 2003.

As the survey suggests, the relations between the Uygurs and the Han are not particularly good even at the best of times. Although the two ethnic groups work and live together, they visit each other at festival times and seek friendships among the other group less than they used to in times like the 1980s, when the political situation was less fraught with tension than it is now.

Intermarriage is extremely rare and several Uygur and Kazak families I interviewed expressed hostile views towards the possibility that any of their children would marry a Han. This is partly a religious matter, because Muslims regard the Han as infidels, which means that any Han marrying a Uygur must convert to Islam. But it is also an ethnic matter, suggesting not very good relations. Yee found that 77.9 percent of Han believed intermarriage between Uygurs and Han was all right, but only 32.4 percent of Uygurs did. 37 

Uygurs are not keen to marry Hui either, even though they are also Muslims. Uygurs and Hui pray in different mosques. Several imams I interviewed expressed irritation at the suggestion that they would not let Muslims of different ethnic groups into their mosques, but did concede that virtually all those who prayed at their mosque were of the same nationality.

Intermarriage between Uygurs or Hui and Kazaks is also quite rare. Several Uygur interviewees told me that the Kazaks are backward in culture and they would strongly oppose any of their children marrying into a Kazak family. It appears that Uygurs tend to look down on the Kazaks as much as the Han do, and possibly even more. Authorities are aware of these ethnic tensions, and there are education programs designed to make people more sensitive to other people's cultures, but they have not been particularly successful.

As noted above, one of the primary sources of Uygur resentment against Han is immigration. This resentment is especially fierce if Han people take jobs the Uygurs think should rightly belong to them. It is said that newly arrived Han who do not intend to stay long are the most resented, because they are thought to come only to make money and show no loyalty to Xinjiang. Han who came to Xinjiang in the 1950s or 1960s and live there on a long-term basis are far less resented because they are considered more loyal to Xinjiang and, because they take more interest in Uygur culture and lifestyle, are more sympathetic to the Uygurs generally. 38 

International Relations and the Terrorism Factor

China's fear of separatism and its determination to keep Xinjiang within China has had an impact on its foreign relations. Two of the major ways China's policy has expressed itself has been the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and an improvement in China's relations with the United States.

In April 1996, the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan held a meeting in Shanghai to discuss mutual problems and opportunities. Fundamentalist Islamic terrorism inevitably loomed large in their thinking. Meetings of the presidents of these five countries were held every year and, in June 2001, before the September 11 incidents in New York and Washington, the five were joined by the president of Uzbekistan to form the SCO. One of the aims of this body was to counter Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, which all six presidents believed to be a threat to their mutual security.

Tensions sharpened after the September 11 incidents because fundamentalist Islamic terrorism became more closely involved in world international politics and because China shares a border with Afghanistan. Both China and the United States agreed that there were some Uygurs fighting alongside the Taliban and that they were involved in terrorist acts that threatened not only China but also the United States.

At the end of December 2001, the Chinese government amended the Chinese criminal law with the specific aim of strengthening its anti-terrorism provisions. The next month Chinese authorities issued a report claiming a whole series of terrorist acts by Uygur fundamentalists over the previous decade. This report made many accusations against Muslim radicals and connected them with the al-Qaeda network. In particular, it named Hasan Mahsum as head of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and charged that Osama bin Laden had conspired with him and others to launch a holy war in Xinjiang, including giving money for training and all operations in 2001 and supplying arms and ammunition. 39 

Some scholars have doubted this and similar reports, arguing that they “fly in the face of bin Laden's silence on East Turkistan.” 40  Hasan Mahsum himself, while acknowledging his leadership of ETIM, strongly denied any connections, let alone financial help, from al-Qaeda. 41  However, silence is not a strong argument when one is talking of a secretive terrorist organization like al-Qaeda and Hasan Mahsum may have had political reasons for refuting claims made by the Chinese state. What is clear is that the Chinese government wanted support from the United States for the suppression of Uygur terrorism and separatism. The sections within the Department of State with interests in counterterrorism and in human rights spoke with different tongues. The former was keen to support China, regarding it as having done a creditable job in opposing terrorism, while the latter was more interested in pressing the notion that China's actions involved an abuse of human rights.

The matter was resolved in August 2002 when Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage announced in Beijing that the United States recognized ETIM as a terrorist organization. The United Nations soon followed the American lead with a similar declaration. The Chinese government was delighted, but the Uygur diasporic movement and human rights activists felt betrayed. It seems the September 11 incidents caused a shift in emphasis worldwide away from human rights and towards attacking fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. These developments were definitely a blow to Uygur separatists in Xinjiang. The authorities had been promoting anti-terrorism in Xinjiang for some time, and now found this cause was part of an international agenda pursued by the world's only superpower and a country with which China was particularly anxious to have good relations. The Chinese authorities, who were feeling even more under threat than they had before, now felt free to react with greater efforts against separatist movements, even if it meant committing human rights abuses. If anything, the war against terrorism made them more determined than ever to retain control of Xinjiang.

Organizations such as Amnesty International were highly critical of developments in Xinjiang in the wake of the September 11 incidents. Amnesty International stated that it recognized “the duty of states under international human rights law to protect their populations from violent criminal acts.” However, it went on, “such measures should be implemented within a framework of protection for all human rights.” It expressed great concern that the Chinese authorities were making use of the September 11 incidents to intensify its crackdown on Uygur opponents of Chinese rule by branding them as terrorists. In particular, Amnesty International was worried that the government had further restricted the religious rights of the Muslim population in Xinjiang, “banning some religious practices during the holy month of Ramadan, closing mosques, increasing official controls over the Islamic clergy in the region, and detaining or arresting religious leaders deemed to be ‘unpatriotic' or subversive.” 42 

My own experiences in Xinjiang in 2003 suggest that security was tighter in parts of southern Xinjiang than in 1999, but was about the same or at least no worse in most other regions. In Hotan the situation was quite tense in 1999, and I became aware through contacts that Muslim clerics were trying to incite feelings of rage and rebellion against the infidel Chinese, but there was nothing of the kind in 2003. I was certainly followed by the public security in most places, but they did not interfere with my research, except in Kashgar. I found imams in the Uygur mosques in the south very cautious in what they said, probably because they did not want to get out of line with the government and were fearful that anything they said might be reported back to the authorities.

Conclusion

China is indeed succeeding in its policy of holding on to Xinjiang through a combination of modernization and suppression of separatism. The extent of separatism has receded in the last few years, partly because the Chinese government has coopted significant numbers of Uygurs to support its rule, especially from the emerging Uygur middle classes, and successfully suppressed the radical opposition. Although the separatist movement still exists and will not go away in the near future, it is fractured and weak, with the state even more vigilant against that threat since the September 11 incident. Open and strong support among Uygurs for separation has declined.

Serious problems in ethnic relations and inequalities remain. These problems are becoming both more and less serious. Although the government's top priority is to keep Xinjiang as part of China, which has led to some oppressive policies, it has also made an attempt to lessen inequalities by increasing education and allowing Uygurs and other minorities decent opportunities. However, many Uygurs continue to feel discrimination, believing that what really concerns the government is political control and ascribing bad motives to the preferential policies.

Islam is growing stronger. Because the state regards fundamentalist Islam as a threat, it keeps an eagle eye on Islamic organizations, but allows the practice of Islam generally, and even contributes money to the salaries of state-supported Islamic clergy and to the building, restoration and upkeep of mosques. The growth of Islam could spawn more separatism, but will probably not do so, because there is nothing inherently separatist about Islam and because security is so tight.

Han immigration remains a major factor involved in economic development and private investment in Xinjiang. Despite the primarily economic function of this immigration, it still causes major resentment among Uygurs. It is also a factor increasing Chinese control over Xinjiang. In this author's opinion, ethnic relations in Xinjiang would improve if this immigration slowed or ceased, but the Great Western Development Strategy – with its reliance on investment from eastern parts of China – is more likely to increase than decrease the number of Han moving to Xinjiang.

Endnotes

 1 According to the 2000 census, the Han numbered 1.1594 billion people, or 91.59 percent of China's total, while the minorities were 106.43 million, or 8.41 percent. See National Bureau of Statistics, People's Republic of China (comp.) (2003), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2003 ( China Statistical Yearbook 2003 ), China Statistical Press, Beijing, p. 99.

 2 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2000), “Fifty Years of Progress in China's Human Rights, Zhongguo renquan fazhan 50 nian,” Beijing Review , vol. 43, no. 9 (February 28), pp. 48–49.

 3 In 2002, the Kazak population of the Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture was 1,021,497, and of all Xinjiang 1,333,455. See Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2003 Editorial Board (comp.) (2003), Xinjiang tongji nianjian Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2003, China Statistics Press, Beijing, p. 110.

 4 Michael Winchester (1997), “Beijing vs. Islam,” Asiaweek , vol. 23, no. 42 (October 24), p. 31.

 5 The Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities of the PRC was adopted on 31 May 1984, and was amended on 28 February 2001. See the amended law, in Chinese and English, in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy , The Ethnic Publishing House, Beijing, 2001. For brief comments on the nature of the amendments, see Colin Mackerras (2003), China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation , RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, p. 39.

 6 For an account on how these policies have affected Xinjiang see Barry Sautman (1998), “Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang,” in William Safran (ed.), Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China , Frank Cass, London, Portland, OR, pp. 86–113.

 7 Wang Shuanqian (ed.) (1999), Zou xiang 21 shiji de Xinjiang, Zhengzhi juan ( Xinjiang Towards the 21 st Century, Politics Volume ), Xinjiang People's Press, Ürümqi, p. 301.

 8 See Sun Jingxin et al. (eds) (1994), Kua shiji de Zhongguo renkou, The Population of China Towards the 21 st Century, Xinjiang juan , China Statistical Press, Beijing, pp. 233–240. This book was written by 36 people, among whom Sun Jingxin is listed as editor-in-chief and five others as deputy editors.

 9 Wang Zhenben, Abula Aimaiti, Liang Wei and Zhang Yong (2001), Xinjiang shaoshu minzu shuangyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu ( Xinjiang's Minority Nationalities Two-track Teaching and Research ), Nationalities Press, Beijing, p. 8.

 10 There are about 8 Chinese yuan to the US dollar.

 11 Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2003 , p. 72.

 12 These figures are based on statistics to be found in Xinjiang tongji nianjian , p. 298.

 13 For instance, Rémi Castets (2003), “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows,” no. 49 (September–October), p. 36. A team headed by Herbert Yee of the Baptist University of Hong Kong carried out a survey in Ürümqi in August 2000. One question concerned perceptions on increases in the standard of living under the reform policies. Only 15.1 percent of Uygurs thought their standard of living had grown faster than that of the Han, while 46.9 percent thought the increase was about the same, and 38 percent believed it had risen more slowly. Comparable percentages among the Han were 38 percent believed Uygurs' living standards had risen faster, 49.5 percent about the same and 12.5 percent slower. Herbert S. Yee (2003), “Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uygur-Han Relations in Urumqi,” Journal of Contemporary China , vol. 12, no. 36 (August), p. 443.

 14 Xinjiang tongji nianjian , p. 112.

 15 Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2003 , p. 72.

 16 Xinjiang tongji nianjian , p. 371.

 17 Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2003 , p. 431.

 18 Nicolas Becquelin (2000), “Xinjiang in the Nineties,” The China Journal , no. 44 (July), pp. 80–83.

 19 “The International Conference of Strategic Study for the Great West Development,” held on September 26 and 27, 2001. See Asian Development Bank and State Development Planning Commission, People's Republic of China (2001), Policy Support for the CHINA 2020 Project (Phase III): Strategic Study for the Great West Development, Draft Final Report , Monash International, Melbourne, p. 5-12 (chapter 5, p. 12).

 20 Renmin ribao  ( People's Daily ), October 23, 2001, p. 1.

 21 Policy Support for the CHINA 2020 Project (Phase III): Strategic Study for the Great West Development , p. 5-12.

 22 See, “China Country Assessment, Two Decades of Poverty Reduction,” UNDP Poverty Report 2000 , http://www.undp.org/povertyreport/countryprofiles/china1.html , accessed January 26, 2004.

 23 “Main Messages of UNDP Poverty Report 2000,” UNDP Poverty Report 2000 , http://www.undp.org/povertyreport/main/main.html , accessed January 26, 2004.

 24 For the figures down to 1994, see Sautman, “Preferential Policies,” p. 117 and for 1997 see Wang, Zou xiang 21 shiji de Xinjiang , p. 232. For the 1999 figure, see Liu Yusheng, Zhang Bin and Liu Xiaoqing (2001), Xinjiang gailan ( Survey of Xinjiang ), Xinjiang People's Press, Ürümqi, p. 81.

 25 See Colin Mackerras (2001), “Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism,” Central Asian Survey , vol. 20, no. 3 (September), p. 290.

 26 Liu, et al. (eds), Xinjiang gailan, p. 81.

 27 Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” p. 37.

 28 See Mackerras, “Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century,” p. 292.

 29 Department of Population, Social Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics China (2002), Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian China Population Statistics Yearbook 2002 , China Statistics Press, Beijing, p. 70.

 30 According to the 2000 census, 57.32 percent of families in Xinjiang (counting all ethnic groups) had one child only, 27.01 percent had two children, and 15.67 percent had three or more. See Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Regional Gazetteers Compilation Committee (comp.) (2001), Xinjiang nianjian ( Xinjiang Yearbook ) 2001 , Xinjiang Yearbook Press, Ürümqi, p. 316.

 31 Xinjiang nianjian 2001 , pp. 316, 496. The figure of 19.25 million was also the one given when the provincial figures for the 2000 census were first announced in Renmin ribao ( People's Daily ), 3 April 2001, p. 1.

 32 Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties,” pp. 75–6.

 33 For example, Erling Hoh (2000), “Hear Our Prayer,” Far Eastern Economic Review , vol. 163, no. 15 (April 13), p. 25.

 34 Dru C. Gladney (2003), “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?,” The China Quarterly , no. 174 (June), p. 457.

 35 Discussed in Sautman “Preferential Policies,” pp. 90–94.

 36 Yee, “Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang,” p. 431.

 37 Yee, “Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang,” p. 437.

 38 Joanne N. Smith (2002), “‘Making Culture Matter': Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese,” Asian Ethnicity , vol. 3, no. 2 (September), p. 173.

 39 Information Office of the State Council (2002), “‘East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” Beijing Review , vol. 45, no. 5 (January 31), p. 19.

 40 Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” p. 44.

 41 English transcript of inteview by Omar Khanat broadcast over Radio Free Asia Uygur Service on January 22, 2002. This was pointed out to me by Marika Vicziany of Monash University, Melbourne.

 42 Amnesty International (2002), “People's Republic of China, China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” (March 22), found on the Internet at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170102002, 1. Introduction. For a very good general account of Uygur terrorism, especially since the September 11 incidents, see Marika Vicziany (2003), “State Responses to Islamic Terrorism in Western China and Their Impact on South Asia,” Contemporary South Asia , vol. 12, no. 2 (June), pp. 243-262.