The Shenyang Incident and Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang reflect the potential uncertainty of Japan's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Through an analysis of these two events, Shinju Fujihira examines recent developments in Japanese bilateral relations with China and North Korea, and the changing role of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping foreign policy.

Shinju Fujihara is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. He is currently on leave from Tufts as an Advanced Research Fellow in the Program on US-Japan Relations at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. His research interests include comparative political economy, political economy of national security, and Japanese politics and foreign policy. He is currently completing his book manuscript, entitled Conscripting Money: Democracies, Dictatorships, and Fiscal State-Building in the Age of Total War.      

In 2002, Japanese newspaper headlines have largely overlooked Al Qaeda and Iraq and instead featured two events that transpired in Shenyang, a northern Chinese city, and Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital. While Japan has readily provided logistical support for the US-led war against terrorism, its diplomatic priorities are still located closer to home. In particular, managing relations with China and promoting stability on the Korean peninsula remain the paramount goals of Japanese foreign policy. In May, Japan-China relations were rocked by the so-called “Shenyang Incident,” in which China’s armed security police entered the compound of Japan’s Shenyang Consulate General and detained five North Korean asylum seekers. Such action demonstrated Beijing’s determination to block North Koreans’ illegal migration to northern China and its hard-line stance against those who sought asylum in foreign missions. For two weeks, Japan and China haggled over this incident’s diplomatic resolution. Tokyo protested against the security police’s high-handed intrusion into Japan’s sovereign territory, while Beijing asserted that it had acted with the explicit consent of the Japanese consulate staff. In the end, most of Japan’s claims were brushed off by China. The Shenyang Incident set off a storm of criticisms against Japan’s diplomatic establishment, and dampened its enthusiasm for celebrating the thirty-year anniversary of official relations with China.1 

By September, the entire nation was fixated on another diplomatic watershed: Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s landmark trip to Pyongyang, which was aimed at stabilizing the Korean peninsula and jumpstarting the negotiation of diplomatic normalization with North Korea. During his visit, North Korea admitted that it had abducted over a dozen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s and used them to train spies in the Japanese language. A few weeks later, North Korea came out with yet another mind-blowing confession: it was developing nuclear and other “more powerful” weapons in breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework.2   Koizumi’s voyage produced mixed results for Japan’s diplomatic initiatives on the Korean peninsula.

What do the Shenyang Incident and Koizumi’s Pyongyang trip teach us about Japan’s contemporary foreign policy challenges and strategies?  To investigate this question, this essay focuses on two variables: Northeast Asia’s changing security environment, and the central and controversial role of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). First, the broad parameters of Japanese diplomacy are set by the impact of the end of the Cold War and the cataclysmic events of September 11 on Northeast Asia. North Korea’s economic predicament and strategic vulnerability were the underlying causes behind the Shenyang Incident and Koizumi’s trip. China’s burgeoning confidence on the world stage and its long-term challenge for Japanese diplomacy was amply displayed during the Shenyang Incident. The United States has preserved its preponderant military power in the region and continues to act as the guardian of Japan’s national security through Japan-US security arrangements. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, America’s global war on terrorism was also a significant factor that laid the groundwork for Koizumi’s journey to Pyongyang. Understanding the post-Cold War, post-September 11 strategic setting in Northeast Asia goes a long way towards explaining Japan’s foreign policy choices.

Second, the two episodes testified to MOFA’s pivotal and contested place in Japanese diplomacy. In the summer of 2002, MOFA’s reputation was in tatters after its handling of the Shenyang Incident was mauled in the press. However, MOFA orchestrated Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang and proved that it still remained the paramount organization in charge of Japan’s foreign and security policies. In this regard, the Shenyang Incident and Koizumi’s trip brought to light the international and domestic dimensions of Japan’s foreign policy challenges. Japan has not only had to deal with the uncertainty of its external environment in Northeast Asia, but also has struggled to define MOFA’s proper place in its diplomacy.

The Road to Shenyang

Dealing with China’s growing power, wealth, and assertiveness has emerged as the central challenge for Japan’s long-term national strategy. In the decade leading up to the Shenyang Incident, Japan and China weathered a host of security and diplomatic disputes. In the security realm, four issues proved to be controversial: China’s nuclear tests, China’s military actions during the Taiwan Straits Crisis, dispute over the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyudao, and Chinese marine and naval incursions into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). First, given the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, China’s underground nuclear experiments ignited a major domestic debate in Japan. Between 1995 and 1997, Japan took unprecedented action and protested by suspending the grant component of its Official Development Aid (ODA) to China.3 Second, during the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996, China’s missile tests and military exercises in anticipation of Taiwan’s presidential election rattled Japan’s diplomatic community. Such a forceful stance by China portended the undesirable possibility of a future US-China standoff in the Taiwan Strait, in which Japan would be urged to support US military operations against China. For its part, China denounced the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance’s security interests in the late 1990s, which were expressed in situational rather than geographical terms and did not explicitly rule out the Taiwan Straits.4  

Japan’s diplomatic finesse toward China was also tested in the East China Sea. In 1996, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyudao surfaced as a vexing issue when a right-wing group called the Japan Youth Federation erected a lighthouse on one of the islands. This incident incited widespread anti-Japanese protests in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Finally, in the late 1990s, China’s marine research and naval reconnaissance ships increased their exploratory activities within Japan’s EEZ in the East China Sea, presumably in search of natural resources.5  Alarmed by such actions, Japanese government officials were compelled to initiate a flurry of consultations with their Chinese counterparts. In sum, while each of these security-related disputes was handled pragmatically, the four combined to foment a sense of anxiety, frustration, and mistrust towards China among Japanese officials and the general public.

These security controversies were also compounded by the resurgence of the “history problem” in Japan-China diplomatic relations. Japan remains deeply divided over the origins and nature of its imperial legacy in Asia that culminated in the Pacific War. From China’s vantage point, this signifies Japan’s continued failure to atone for its brutal actions that inflicted unspeakable suffering on the Chinese people. In more concrete terms, the “history problem” has manifested itself in three ways. First, China amplified its criticism of Japan when Prime Ministers Hashimoto Ryutaro and Koizumi Junichiro visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 1996, 2001, and 2002. The Yasukuni Shrine is dedicated to Japan’s war dead including Class-A criminals, and is regarded by China as a symbol of Japan’s unwillingness to repent its imperialist aggression. Second, from the Japanese standpoint, President Jiang Zemin’s official visit to Tokyo in November 1998 politicized Japan’s “history problem” to an excessive degree.6 Jiang relentlessly denounced Japan’s “historical consciousness” during his visit, including at the summit with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, the official dinner at the Imperial Court, and his lecture at Waseda University. Many Japanese still remember this visit as an instance in which Japan’s “apology fatigue” towards China reached a pinnacle. Finally, in the spring and summer of 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Education’s approval of a controversial history textbook, which glossed over the brutal aspects of Japanese colonialism, also led to a diplomatic wrangle. In short, the two countries continued to collide over Japan’s handling of its imperial past in Asia.

It is important to note that in the midst of these security and diplomatic rows, Japan and China deepened their economic ties through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and ODA.7  During the 1990s, China emerged as Japan’s most important trade partner after the United States. Enhanced economic ties, which can increase cooperation, can also foster disputes. In 2001, the two countries clashed over Japan’s provisionary safeguards against three farm products (mostly imported from China) and China’s retaliation against Japanese manufactured goods.8  While this might be seen as a harbinger of future conflicts, the two countries are fundamentally committed to promoting bilateral trade. Second, although Japan’s FDI in China plummeted in the late-1990s, it has taken off again since 2000.9  Finally, the security and diplomatic tensions, coupled with Japan’s economic stagnation, have prompted the Japanese government to reform its ODA policy toward China. However, the reform agenda has primarily targeted the procedures and priorities of Japan’s aid to China and does not question its continuing importance in the foreseeable future.10  Mutual economic interests continue to underpin the cooperative aspects of Japan-China relations.

In 2002, the Shenyang Incident was added to the laundry list of security and diplomatic skirmishes that have troubled contemporary Japan-China relations. This episode reflected China’s tough stand against North Koreans’ emigration and Japan’s unspoken but well-known reluctance towards accepting refugees and asylum seekers. In the spring of 2002, there were as many as 300,000 North Koreans who had fled oppression and famine at home and settled in northern China without the Chinese government’s explicit approval.11 Furthermore, they began seeking asylum in foreign missions with the support of China’s ethnic Koreans and anti-Pyongyang activists and South Korea-based non-governmental organizations. Faced with this situation, Beijing feared that letting North Koreans gain asylum in foreign premises would unleash more migration and complicate its ties with Pyongyang. China’s solution was to bolster security around foreign missions and barricade them from refugees. Around Beijing’s embassy district, for example, China erected barbed wire and ratcheted up its police patrols. In essence, Beijing took this matter into its own hands and strove to foil the asylum seekers’ attempts to enter foreign embassies and consulates.

On May 8, the Shenyang Incident broke out inside Japan’s Consulate General in Shenyang. Dramatic footage was broadcast worldwide, showing China’s armed security police hauling five asylum seekers away from inside the consulate compound. They included two men who had entered into the visa waiting room within the consulate, two women who screamed and clasped onto the consulate gate, and a two year-old girl. The video also revealed that Japan’s consulate officials did not resist China’s police officers, and even appeared to assist them by picking up their hats. This visual testimony generated a diplomatic wrangle over whether China had infringed on Japan’s sovereign territory. Tokyo immediately protested on the basis of the Vienna Convention, which stipulates that foreign missions’ premises are inviolable. On the other hand, the Vienna Convention also states that host nations can guard the foreign premises against intruders with the approval of the mission’s head. The video image certainly did not show Japan’s consul staff barring the way against China’s security police, but it remained unclear whether the staff had actually given consent.

For two weeks in May, Japan and China were at loggerheads with each other and traded conflicting accounts of the Shenyang Incident. Tokyo claimed that the security police had acted in breach of the Vienna Convention, and made three demands to Beijing: an apology, a promise that such incidents would not recur, and the transfer of the asylum seekers to Japanese custody. However, China released its official investigation of the incident before Japan, which asserted that all of its security police’s actions – entering into the consulate compound, snatching the two men from the visa waiting room, and detaining the asylum seekers – took place with the consent of Japan’s consular officials. Beijing further maintained that the Japanese staff had expressed gratitude toward the security police’s efforts.12  Two days later, Japan’s MOFA followed with its official report that categorically denied any expression of consent or gratitude by the consulate staff. Nonetheless, it admitted that Japan’s consulate officials never protested against China’s police officers at any point.13  MOFA’s findings did not exactly amount to a diplomatic counterpunch to China’s version of the incident.

To make matters worse, press reports disclosed that Japan’s ambassador to China, Anami Koreshige, had instructed embassy and consulate officials to drive out any suspicious trespassers on the morning of May 8.14  Such a remark was made in response to rumored speculation within China’s foreign premises that North Korean refugees and their supporters were planning to storm into foreign missions on a large scale. More importantly, Anami’s statement exposed not only Japan’s unwillingness to accommodate refugees, but also a lack of concern for human rights among MOFA’s top diplomats. Finally, Anami’s instruction fueled the suspicion that Japan’s consular staff did not want to deal with the asylum seekers, and stood quietly on the sidelines so that China’s security police could take them away. In light of these revelations, Japan’s initial demands increasingly lost credibility.15  In the end, Tokyo had no choice but to shelve its diplomatic differences with Beijing and resolve the incident on purely humanitarian grounds. On May 22, the five asylum seekers flew safely to South Korea with a stop in Manila.

The Shenyang Incident triggered a vigorous debate on the overall health of Japan-China relations, though the jury is still out on its long-term repercussions. In the short run, Beijing is likely to maintain its hard-nosed policy against North Korean refugees, and Tokyo will remain averse towards accepting them. Given this equation, both sides have an interest in working together to prevent another diplomatic row involving China’s security police and Japanese officials. In the long run, Japan and China are likely to refocus their attention toward the pending issues that have dominated their bilateral agenda since the early 1990s: the Taiwan question, the history problem, and economic cooperation. Tokyo will carefully watch Taiwan’s future presidential and parliamentary elections, which may reinvigorate Taipei’s independence rhetoric and cause confrontations between Beijing and Washington. As in the past, Japanese political leaders’ homage to the Yasukuni Shrine and its denunciation by China will continue to stoke tensions between the two countries. Though economic ties will likely deepen, Japan’s economic stagnation may also intensify bilateral trade conflicts, since more sectors are likely to demand and obtain protection against China’s cheap imports.

Finally, regardless of the long-term repercussions of the Shenyang Incident, it tarnished MOFA’s reputation. In the summer of 2002, it appeared utterly defenseless against unremitting opprobrium from politicians, media, and the public.16 For this reason, few in Japan imagined that MOFA’s behind-the-scenes dealings would pave the way for another diplomatic upheaval in the fall.

Japan has a fundamental interest in fostering stability and preventing warfare on the Korean peninsula. Since the early 1990s, one of Japan’s strategies to achieve this goal has been to engage in dialogue and prepare for diplomatic normalization with North Korea. Such efforts, however, had been hampered by four security threats that North Korea posed to Japan. First, the nuclear deadlock in 1993-1994 that brought the US and DPRK to the brink of war “left a searing impression in the psyche of many in the Japanese political world.”17  That crisis directed Japan’s efforts toward halting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and “regionalizing” Japan-US security arrangements. Then, in August 1998, North Korea lobbed a Taepo-dong missile directly over northern Japan, stunning the Japanese public with a live performance of its advancing missile capabilities. As if airspace was not enough, North Korea was believed to have sent “suspicious ships” (fushinsen) into Japanese territorial waters, which were driven out in March 1999 and sunk in December 2001 by Japan’s coast guard and navy ships. Finally, North Korea had long been suspected of having abducted over a dozen Japanese citizens who had disappeared in the 1970s and 1980s. Pyongyang’s refusal to address this issue intensified the Japanese public’s anger and hostility. Nukes, missiles, “suspicious ships,” and unanswered abductions—these were not exactly the kind of gestures that would cultivate Japanese public support for engaging North Korea.

Another critical factor that stymied Japan-North Korea normalization attempts was the two countries’ collision over the resolution of Japan’s colonial legacy. Pyongyang was unyielding in its demand for an official apology and reparations, which were unacceptable to Tokyo. The Japanese side insisted on the “economic cooperation formula,” which was based on long-term foreign aid and had been used for the Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) normalization in 1965.18   Moreover, Japan’s negotiating strategy was made difficult by North Korea’s nationalist propaganda, much of which was based on virulent attacks against Japan. Indeed, North Korea often played the “history card” to pull Japan away from the US and South Korea. As Victor Cha observes, “North Korea’s thaw in relations with the US and ROK have counterintuitively increased history-based invectives against Japan.”19 In short, North Korea’s aggressive military gestures and anti-Japanese nationalist propaganda bespoke of its unwillingness to reciprocate Japan’s overtures.20 In order for Japan’s strategy to work, North Korea’s negotiating incentives had to change.

Such change came in the form of the terrorist attacks in September 2001, which spurred the US to launch its global war on terrorism and exacerbated North Korea’s strategic vulnerability. In January 2002, President Bush’s State of the Union Speech promoted North Korea from a regional security threat to one of the three most-wanted global pariahs that forged an “axis of evil.” In spring 2002, the Bush administration’s saber rattling against Iraq and hard line position on weapons of mass destruction deepened North Korea’s sense of insecurity.21 North Korea’s Cold War compatriots, Russia and China, also warned that America’s tough talk was no bluff and prodded it to reach out to Japan.22    Furthermore, North Korea’s emaciated economy was in desperate need for aid, much of which was presumed to come from Japan. These factors appeared to have convinced Pyongyang that its diplomatic road to Washington, DC might first have to pass through Tokyo. North Korea’s foreign ministry officials began reaching out to their Japanese counterparts in October 2001, and the two sides met over thirty times to make a deal for reinvigorating their normalization talks. Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was an unintended and unanticipated consequence of the tragic events of September 11.

In addition to demonstrating North Korea’s new approach to relations with Japan, Koizumi’s momentous trip also exhibited MOFA’s pivotal role in Japanese diplomacy, despite the barrage of public condemnation waged against it in the wake of the Shenyang Incident. What was remarkable was that Japan’s contacts with North Korea had been steered and kept secret by one MOFA official: Tanaka Hitoshi, Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Bureau.23  North Korea approached Tanaka, presumably because bureau chief-level contacts were ideal for feeling out Japan’s position in a low-key fashion. In his talks with North Korea, Tanaka sensed that it was willing to reveal information about its suspected kidnapping of Japanese citizens. He decided that his negotiation’s success hinged on its maximum confidentiality, since public debate on such a politically explosive subject might doom the entire bargaining process. Indeed, press reports suggest that Tanaka shared his discussions with North Korea only with several other MOFA officials, Prime Minister Koizumi, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo. By so doing, he bypassed several chains of command in Japanese foreign policy, including Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko, and perhaps more significantly, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo, who was known to be hawkish toward North Korea. Critics argued that Tanaka’s handling of this issue reflected his personal ambition, and lambasted him for seeking personal glory and mesmerizing Koizumi with his recurrent talk of “moving history.”24  The Shenyang Incident might have tainted MOFA’s public image, but it did not prevent this single official from engineering Prime Minister Koizumi’s journey to Pyongyang.

In the specific context of Japan-North Korea interactions, Tanaka’s central clout also evinced the shifting balance of power between MOFA and Japanese politicians.25    Throughout the 1990s, Japan’s efforts to engage North Korea were spearheaded by prominent politicians (such as Kanemaru Shin and former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi) and their parliamentary missions to Pyongyang. These political delegations were scrutinized by the media, and faced harsh criticism whenever North Korea responded with aggressive gestures. Nonaka Hiromu, the key politician with strong links to both North Korea and Japan’s North Korean community, had expressed privately that his tireless efforts had come to naught. After a decade of unsuccessful attempts, Japanese politicians had exhausted their options and were devoid of motivation for renewing their engagement with North Korea. In many ways, Tanaka was filling the diplomatic vacuum left by politicians and was bent on executing Japan-North Korea negotiations in a covert fashion.

On his way to Pyongyang on September 17, Koizumi had doubtlessly hoped for a breakthrough on the status of Japan’s abducted citizens in North Korea. Instead, he was handed a bombshell: eight of the kidnapped were dead, one was unaccounted for, and only five survived. North Korea appeared to adopt this “shock therapy” strategy so that it could treat the kidnapping issue swiftly and jump onto normalization talks. Koizumi was indeed shocked by this breathtakingly forthcoming confession, and protested vigorously against North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-Il. The Prime Minister also had to decide whether to endorse the Japan-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang Declaration. This document had been prepared by both sides prior to his trip, and addressed a broad range of issues beyond the abduction question, including Japan’s colonial legacy and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Some traveling with Koizumi, notably Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, counseled him to hold off his signature.26   Meanwhile, the North Korean side proposed a toast during the signing ceremony, a remarkably undiplomatic gesture that unveiled its insensitivity toward the tragic fate of Japan’s abducted victims. In the end, Koizumi prioritized the importance of making progress on Japan-North Korea normalization, and signed the Declaration.27 Needless to say, the Japanese public was astonished and incensed by the plight of the abducted citizens.

The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration commits the two governments to undertake normalization talks, and illuminates where they currently stand with regards to the crucial historical and security questions analyzed above. First, North Korea made an unprecedented concession by jettisoning its longstanding demands for Japan’s official apology and reparations. In effect, North Korea decided to accept Japan’s position in its entirety and agreed to the aforementioned “economic cooperation formula.”28  Such cooperation – in the form of loans, grants, and humanitarian aid – will begin only after the completion of diplomatic normalization. While Pyongyang’s accommodation was an important achievement for Tokyo, it also attested to the desperation caused by North Korea’s economic devastation.

Second, with regards to North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens, the Pyongyang Declaration alluded to it as  “the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals.”29 The two governments made a deal for the five abducted survivors to visit Japan, though their stay has generated another diplomatic tussle. Heeding their families’ pleas, Tokyo now insists that the survivors should stay indefinitely and their relatives in North Korea should also be allowed to travel to Japan. For its part, Pyongyang has accused Tokyo of reneging on their original bargain that had promised the survivors’ return to North Korea after two weeks. Since neither side has budged on this matter, it will continue to affect the tenor of normalization negotiations until they strike a compromise.

Third, in terms of the “suspicious ships,” the Pyongyang Declaration alludes to them in general terms and pronounces that the two governments “would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side.”30  Obviously, this statement alone may not prevent North Korea from unleashing more “suspicious ships” onto Japanese waters in the future. If the “suspicious ships” resurface, Japan’s coast guard will respond by pursuing and battling against them, as it has done in the past.31 Such incidents, however, will likely cool off Japanese official and public support for continuing normalization talks. If Pyongyang wants to foster Tokyo’s good will, it will have to abide by the statement and halt its operations of the “suspicious ships.”

Finally, nuclear and missile issues have emerged as the decisive factor affecting Japan-North Korea normalization negotiations. Prior to Koizumi’s trip in early September, Washington had already urged Tokyo to focus on the threat of Pyongyang’s weapons programs rather than the abduction question.32 Regarding this issue, the Pyongyang Declaration avers: “Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries involved.”33   However, North Korea’s revelation in early October denuded this statement of much meaning. Since then, the United States has pressured Japan and South Korea to form a united front against North Korea’s weapons programs. In the recent Japan-North Korea talks in Kuala Lumpur, the Japanese side insisted that it would not start its normalization negotiation until the nuclear question was resolved. For its part, North Korea has been determined to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan, and has indicated to Japan that it would tackle the weapons issues only with the United States.34  

Koizumi’s voyage left a complex legacy for Japan in its efforts to engage North Korea. On the one hand, Japan scored a significant victory with North Korea’s acceptance of the “economic cooperation formula,” which cleared away one significant hurdle for bilateral normalization. Moreover, in the absence of Koizumi’s overture, it is unlikely that North Korea would have confessed to its abduction of Japanese citizens. Even though the Pyongyang Declaration’s wording may sound ambiguous in many places, it was important for Japan to ensure that North Korea would sign agree to general principles before embarking on their normalization negotiations. All of these are major diplomatic accomplishments that should not be underrated. On the other hand, Japan’s normalization negotiation with North Korea is unlikely to move forward unless the latter’s nuclear and missile questions are resolved. While the Bush administration’s aggressive posture created favorable conditions for Koizumi’s trip, it also demanded Japan’s full cooperation with the United States on North Korea’s disarmament. In this regard, Japan’s normalization efforts are likely to hang on the outcome of the US-North Korea showdown over nuclear and missile issues.35    

Conclusion

The Shenyang Incident and Koizumi’s Pyongyang trip demonstrate that Japan must continue to cope with the Cold War’s regional legacy in Northeast Asia, which is fundamentally different from the Cold War’s legacy in Europe.36  While the Soviet collapse unleashed a cascade of democratization in Eastern Europe, it was survived by the two communist regimes in China and North Korea. Moreover, the two states’ radically diverging paths in the past decade have posed formidable challenges for Japanese foreign policy. China’s ascent and assertiveness will test Japan’s statecraft  over the long term. North Korea’s economic desperation and its threat to regional security will continue to stir a heated debate in Japan over the benefits and costs of diplomatic normalization. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Tokyo has also faced new opportunities as well as constraints as it collaborates with Washington to pursue its security interests in Northeast Asia.

The two events also illuminate MOFA’s present-day struggle to reclaim its place in Japanese diplomacy and politics. After the Shenyang Incident, MOFA was attacked as an unprofessional organization that was unfit for making Japan’s foreign and security policies. Then, MOFA’s engineering of Koizumi’s visit was denounced as excessively clandestine. As its critics charge, MOFA may be corrupt, elitist, haughty, inept, and secretive, but “MOFA bashing” is ultimately counterproductive in addressing Japan’s key diplomatic challenges. While MOFA officials will make their own future, MOFA’s fate as an organization rests on whether Japanese politicians, citizens, and media can reform and support it in a dispassionate fashion.

Endnotes

1. In September 1972, then Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Beijing and established Japan’s official relations with the People’s Republic of China.
2. The Agreed Framework of 1994 was signed between the United States and North Korea. It committed North Korea to dismantle its efforts to build nuclear weapons in exchange for light-water reactor power plants and heavy oil. For the full text, see “The Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994,” Appendix II in Leon V. Segal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 262-264.
3. This aid sanction, however, only had a symbolic significance since it did not affect the yen loans that comprised over 90 percent of Japan’s ODA to China. For a more detailed account of Japan’s decision-making, see Saori Katada, “Why did Japan Suspend Foreign Aid to China?  Japan’s Foreign Aid Decision-making and Sources of Aid Sanction,” Social Science Japan Journal Vol. 4, No. 1 (2001), pp. 46-47; Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 80-82.
4. On the “regionalization” of the Japan-US security arrangements in the late-1990s, see Nobuo Okawara and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japan and Asia-Pacific security: regionalization, entrenched bilateralism and incipient multilateralism,” Pacific Review Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001), pp. 167-170. On China’s insecurity toward the strengthened Japan-US security arrangements, see Thomas Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999).
5. For more details on Chinese marine and naval incursions into Japan’s EEZ, see Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chugoku no Senryakuteki Kaiyo Shinshutsu (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2002), pp. 74-136, 217-244.
6. For more detailed accounts of this visit, see Okazaki Hisahiko, “Kotakumin shuseki honichi no shippai.” Voice (February 1999); Green, ibid., pp. 96-98.
7. For an analysis that stresses Japan’s economic interests in China, see Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, “Japan’s Double Hedge,” Foreign Affairs (September 2002).
8. In April 2001, Japan enacted provisionary safeguards against scallions, shiitake mushrooms, and tatami bulrushes. In June, China retaliated by putting up 100 percent tariffs against Japanese automobiles, cellular phones, and air-conditioners. In December, the two governments struck a deal to end the trade row.
9. Between 1999 and 2000, Japan’s FDI contracts in China rose by 42 percent. In 2001, Japan’s contracted FDI rose by 47 percent from the previous year and amounted to $5.4 billion. See Kokubun Ryosei, “’1972-nen taisei’ o koeta nitchu kankei o motomete.” Gaiko Forum (October 2002), p. 19.
10. Prior to the reform, China was unique among Japan’s ODA recipients as the only country that received aid in multiyear lump-sum packages that were disbursed in line with its five-year economic plans. The reform changed this practice so that Japan would negotiate and provide aid to China on an annual basis, as it does with other countries. The reform also proposed a shift in ODA’s geographical focus from coastal to underdeveloped inland areas, and stressed the need to address China’s environmental, energy, and health problems. For the full text, see “21-seiki ni muketa taichu keizai kyoryoku no arikata ni kansuru kondankai: Teigen”; “Taichugoku keizai kyoryoku keikaku”. Both accessed on June 4, 2002.
11. The following account is based on: “Bomei kankoku NGO ga shien,” Asahi Shimbun (AS, May 10, 2002), p. 1; “Japan Protests China’s Arrest of Koreans at Consulate,” New York Times (May 10, 2002), p. 9; “Japan insists China return refugees,” Financial Times (May 11, 2002),  p. 5.
12. “Chugoku ‘fukuryoji ga doi,” AS (May 12, 2002), p.1.
13. “Renko soshi, tochu de danen,” AS (May 14, 2002), p. 1; “Nihon hanron, chugoku to mizo fukamaru,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun (NKS, May 14, 2002), p. 2.
14. “‘Jinken shokoku nihon’ o rotei,” AS (May 16, 2002), p. 3; “Tegiwa no warusa tsugi tsugi ni,” NKS (May 16, 2002), p. 2.
15. “Nitchu kyogi saihatsu boshi jiku ni,” AS (May 23, 2002), p. 2.
16. For the criticisms against MOFA, see “Kaibo chaina sukuuru (1)-(6),” Sankei Shimbun (May 19-24, 2002); Sasa Atsuyuki, “Chugoku ni No! to ienai nihon,” Bungei Shunju (July 2002); Sakurai Yoshiko, “Gaimusho Chaina Sukuru no zaigyo,” Bungei Shunju (July 2002); Nakajima Mineo, “Na mo haji mo nai nihon gaiko,” Voice (July 2002).
17. Green, ibid., p. 121.
18. For a comparison of the “economic cooperation formula” in Japan-ROK and Japan-DPRK negotiations, see Takasaki Soji, “Shazai, hosho mondai wa dokomade kitaka,” Sekai (November 2002), pp. 70-72.
19. Victor Cha, “Japan’s Engagement Dilemmas with North Korea,” Asian Survey (Vol. 41, No. 4),  p. 556.
20. Japan’s recent normalization efforts with DPRK have come in two spurts: between January 1991 and November 1992, and since April 2000. See Kitaoka Shinichi, “Sengo nihon gaikoshi ni nokoru seiko de aru,” Chuo Koron (November 2002), pp. 47-48.
21. On the impact of the events of 9/11 and the “axis of evil” speech on DPRK’s foreign policy, see “Kensho Koizumi hocho (2): Bei no iko, jiwari kiita,” AS  (September 20, 2002), p. 1. On “hawk engagement” more generally, see Victor Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula.” International Security (Summer 2002).
22. “Kensho Koizumi hocho (3): Nichichukanro, gaikosen retsuretsu,” AS (September 21, 2002), p. 1.
23. “‘Kensho Koizumji hocho (1): Hachinin shibo’ ni shusho zekku,” AS (September 19, 2002), p. 3.
24. Shiroyama Tatsuya, “’Dokudan gaikokan’ Tanaka Hitoshi to wa nanimono ka,” Bungei Shunju (November 2002); Kunimasa Takeshige, “Kita ga nyushu shita Koizumi no ‘shinjo chosho,” Bungei Shunju (November 2002).
25. This account is based on: “Kensho Koizumi hocho (5): Kaya no soto sukumu seijika,” AS (September 23, 2002), p.1.
26. “’Kensho Koizumji hocho (1): Hachinin shibo’ ni shusho zekku,” AS (September 19, 2002), p. 3.
27. “Kensho Koizumi hocho (2): Bei  no iko, jiwari kiita,” AS (September 20, 2002), p. 1.
28. Section 2, “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration”, accessed November 3, 2002.
29. Section 3, “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.”
30. Section 3, “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.”
31. Kitaoka, ibid., p. 50.
32. “Kensho Koizumi hocho (2): Bei  no iko, jiwari kiita,” AS (September 20, 2002), p. 1.
33. Section 4, “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.”
34. “N. Korea refuses to talk arms with Japan,” Financial Times (October 30, 2002), p. 8.
35. Okonogi Masao, “’Shinjo seiji o hajimeta Kim Jong-Il.”  Chuo Koron (November 2002), p. 57.
36. Kitaoka, ibid., p. 47.