The dissolution of the former USSR left shaky institutions in its wake, allowing for the spread and intensification of opium production and trafficking in the region. Tamara Makarenko suggests that an effective response to the problem requires an understanding of the "crime-terror nexus" involving organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking in Central Asia.

Tamara Makarenko is a lecturer in Criminology at the University of Glamorgan (UK). She is also a senior associate of Cornell Caspian Consulting and the transnational crime consulting editor for Jane’s Intelligence Review. Her research focuses on organized crime and terrorism, specializing on their emergence, development and impact in the former Soviet Union.

Over the last decade, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has been rising incrementally, culminating in a bumper crop in 1999 that produced approximately 80 percent of the global supply of illicit opium. Despite this predicament, the dynamics of the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan has received little attention. Most media reports and government statements oversimplify the situation, making it appear as though the Taliban controlled the planting, cultivation, production and trafficking of all opiates. For example, The Times (London), in an article published in January 2000, reported: “The Taliban rulers of Afghanistan have become the world’s biggest producers and smugglers of hard drugs, overtaking rings in Colombia and Burma. They are now responsible for 95 percent of all the heroin entering Britain.”1  Following the September 11 attacks, this responsibility was shared with Osama bin Laden, and the Al-Qaeda network was likewise implicated in the trafficking of opiates. British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that the “arms the Taliban are buying today are paid for with the lives of young British people buying their drugs on British streets” and subsequently added that the Taliban and Osama bin Laden “jointly exploited the drugs trade.”2  This view has also been propagated in the United States by leading news agencies. CNN, for example, explicitly reported that the Taliban both taxed and trafficked in narcotics, which were directly used to finance their military operations.3 

Although evidence implicates members of both groups in the drug trade, it is analytically inadequate to suggest that these two players entirely controlled the production and distribution of opiates from Afghanistan. Furthermore, it would be incorrect to assert that narcotics constituted a significant portion of either Taliban or Al-Qaeda finances used to purchase arms and ammunition. Many of the publicly accessible accounts of the regional drug trade post-September 11 were examples of “disturbing declarations” – commonly made nowadays – “inspired by media spin doctors to rally public opinion” for the US-led military operations in Afghanistan.4  As a result, any attempt to understand the trade in its totality must place it in the context of the prevailing post-Cold War security environment that has been colored by the crime-terror nexus where organized crime, the drug trade and terrorism converge. The crime-terror nexus illustrates the complex nature of the regional drug trade while distinguishing between the players who control it and those who merely take advantage of its presence and the instability it creates. Understanding the dynamics of the trade provides the information and analytical clarity required to devise appropriate policy responses. These policies need to address the incessant regional instability caused by the relationships between organized crime, the drug trade and terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. 

In a theoretical context, the term ‘crime-terror nexus’ refers to a security continuum with traditional organized crime on one end of the spectrum and terrorism at the other. In the middle of the spectrum is a ‘gray area’ – where organized crime and terrorism are indistinguishable from one another. The spectrum includes three separate situations. First, it refers to traditional criminal organizations – such as the Russian mafia and Albanian criminal groups – that initially used terror tactics as an operational tool, normally to eliminate competitors, but subsequently to seek political objectives. Second, the fulcrum of the crime-terror nexus refers to terrorist groups – such as Abu Sayyaf and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – who initially used criminal activities as a source of financing, but subsequently changed the focus of their ideological beliefs from political to financial. Finally, it may be applied to contemporary civil wars – wars in which factions have evolved from basing their motivations on religion and ideology to crime (for example, the ‘diamond’ wars of Sierra Leone and Angola).5  In Afghanistan and Central Asia the entire crime-terror continuum is represented. Thus, in addition to providing a base for organized criminal (drug mafias) and terrorist groups (Al-Qaeda), this region is also home to groups that simultaneously appear to be criminal and terrorist in nature (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).  

Afghanistan grew and consolidated itself as a major actor within the international narcotics trade, in an environment created by the crime-terror nexus. This is in part because of the symbiotic relationship that the Afghan opiate trade developed with the Central Asian republics, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As discussed in the following section, it is evident that narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan grew in tandem with regional criminal organizations, transnational crime, and insurgent and terrorist movements. As a result, the regional drug trade has been a considerable source of national insecurity and regional instability.6  It is a reality that persists in the face of the ongoing US-led ‘war on terrorism’ conducted in Afghanistan, and the semi-permanent presence of American troops in Central Asia.7 

Contrary to strong beliefs that an American military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia would discourage the illicit trade in narcotics, recent studies have confirmed that Afghanistan’s drug trade is actually on the rise. It has successfully recovered from the opium ban announced and enforced by the Taliban in 2000, which diminished Afghanistan’s share of the global opium yield in 2001 to 10 percent from approximately 70 percent the year before.8  Some estimates suggest that the cultivation of opium poppy in 2002 will reach production levels consistent with the mid-1990s, or up to 2,700 tons of opium.9  However, more recent reports strongly indicate that Afghanistan is likely to produce a bumper crop comparable to the record yield of 4,600 tons produced in 1999.10  As noted by Mohammad Amirkhizi, Senior Adviser to the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), “the area now most likely to replace the missing production [in Afghanistan] is Afghanistan itself.”11 

The Rise of the Afghan/Central Asian Drug Trade

Opium poppy cultivation in the contemporary region of Central Asia has historical roots dating back to 500 BC. Opium was commonly used for medicinal purposes until the 18th century, when opium became increasingly used for recreation due to the widespread availability of the drug. As opium use expanded, social and political attitudes towards the drug changed from “panacea” to “evil,” thus driving the opium trade underground and subsequently raising the profits for individuals prepared to face the rising risks of supplying the drug.12  Although there is a vast history of opiate use and smuggling in Central Asia – due in part to a geographic environment conducive to the growth of opium poppies – the roots of the contemporary drug environment lie in the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989). Not only did the war spread drug addiction in the 1980s, but it also facilitated cross-border trafficking. Dire social conditions led many soldiers and people living in Afghanistan to find refuge in opiate use. Economic and political turmoil also attracted criminals, warlords, and political and religious extremists to take advantage of the lucrative gains promised by the illicit trade in narcotics.

Lacking licit economic resources required to purchase war supplies, drugs increasingly became the most reliable source of currency that could be used to purchase weapons, ammunition and foodstuffs. Afghanistan thus supplied a stable, but relatively low, yield of opiates until the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union.  The opiate yield in Afghanistan was low compared to other global suppliers throughout the Afghan-Soviet war for several reasons. First, given the widespread nature of the Soviet occupation, Afghan traders were not in a position to increase their operations; in a sense it may be argued that the Soviet presence controlled supply. Second, actors engaged in the drug trade, such as warlords, initially did so for a relatively focused purpose: to purchase war supplies. Finally, given the Soviet presence and the isolation of Afghanistan from the international community, domestic traders were unable to develop the international network required to bring Afghan opiates to the international market.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and the absence of external support to help Afghanistan reintegrate with the international community as a nation thus created a  hospitable environment for the expansion of opium poppy cultivation and production. Sustained insecurity and destruction, caused by factional fighting between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban in the early 1990s, turned Afghanistan into the world’s new heroin haven. During this sustained armed conflict, factions engaged in a fight for the control of Afghan territory needed to secure sources to purchase war supplies. In the absence of adequate foreign aid, the only way to secure short-term financing was via participation in the drug trade. Rising demands for opiates – both in Europe and throughout the former Soviet Union – ensured that Afghan opiates would find an international market.

Faced with few prospects for legal economic gain, illegal cross-border trade and smuggling in both licit and illicit commodities – including durable goods, fuel and narcotics – rose dramatically in Afghanistan. This situation was arguably compounded by the economic embargoes placed on Afghanistan by the United States and the United Nations. Several academics and professionals have argued that these embargoes further isolated Afghan society from the international community. Giles Dorronsoro, for example, noted that “despite all the high-sounding words about human rights and a negotiated solution, Western policy towards Afghanistan, led by Washington, has two contradictory themes: let the Taliban win, and punish Afghanistan by isolating it.”13  By eliminating any hope for future economic security, these embargoes drove an estimated 50 percent of the country to participate in the drug trade. Suggestions have also been made that had the international community established diplomatic and economic ties with the Taliban, Afghan people themselves would have eventually sought change from within.14  However, the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan was unstoppable in the absence of international support, and it thus came as no surprise that the self-appointed government of Afghanistan – the Taliban – found it beneficial to tax this trade. Of the greatest significance for the region, however, were the transnational networks developed in Afghanistan between criminal organizations, drug traffickers and terrorist groups that facilitated the operation of trafficking routes taking Afghan opiates to the international market. The dynamics of this network will be illustrated in the following section.

As the cultivation and production of opiates increased in Afghanistan, the dominant “Balkan Route” was disrupted by the Iranian counter-narcotics initiative. Since the 1980s, this route has been taking heroin to the Western market from Afghanistan through Iran, Turkey, and the Balkan Peninsula. As a result of counter-narcotics efforts supported by the United Nations Drug Control Program and Western governments over the last decade, Iran interrupted a significant flow of illicit narcotics crossing its borders. The UNODCCP estimated that by 1999, Iran alone accounted for 85 percent of total global opium seizures. Thus it was essential for the survival of trafficking operations that drug dealers diversify their routes out of Afghanistan.

The favored routes for Afghan and Pakistani traders in the early 1990s were those transiting the Central Asian republics. Although some routes going through Central Asia eventually transited the Balkans, the majority of the new routes were established through the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe as well as via the Caucasus.15  Decisions to penetrate Central Asian territory were informed by several key factors: the existence of smuggling routes between Afghanistan and Central Asia created during the Afghan civil war; the unstable environment that prevailed in the region following declarations of independence (weak governments and security organs, the absence of border controls, and declining socio-economic conditions); and a host of additional Soviet legacies, such as widespread corruption. As a result, the Central Asian states were easily penetrable and thus became an important component of the Afghan drug predicament. UNODCCP officials and independent analysts now believe that up to 65 percent of Afghan opiates enter the Western market via the Central Asian republics. As such, a comprehensive understanding of the illicit opiate trade originating in Afghanistan necessitates a discussion of each facet of the crime-terror spectrum throughout Central Asia to determine how it developed and how each facet interacts with the others.

The environment that prevailed in Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union attracted a wide range of groups interested in profiting from the lucrative trade in illicit opiates. Three types of groups are involved in the regional narcotics trade: drug mafias; transnational criminal organizations; and insurgent/terrorist groups. These groups have developed extensive smuggling networks that supply the growing opiate market in the former Soviet Union and the vast European market. There are also indications that small shipments are now regularly sent to China and Japan.

Drug Mafias

The first group of actors associated with the Afghan drug trade are drug mafias. Located in Afghanistan and all five Central Asian republics, drug mafias are identified by their domestic base (they generally do not have an international network in place), and a membership normally restricted to specific clans or ethnic groups.  Often engaged in illegal trade at local markets within their specific country of operation, their role in the drug chain appears to be restricted to buying raw opiates from farmers and selling shipments to international buyers. Drug mafias are thus considered nothing more than middlemen in the regional drug trade. Clearly motivated by criminal intentions, drug mafias hold one of the two extreme poles of the crime-terror nexus, and are thus relatively simple to identify.

Drug mafias in Afghanistan have operated with impunity for several decades. In fact, their control over the illicit Afghan drug trade was established prior to the Taliban attaining power in 1996. Drug mafias are directly responsible for either distributing opium poppy seeds to local farmers or for providing farmers with loans to plant opium poppy crops. These loans are subsequently repaid in opium resin (the raw form of opium). Furthermore, drug mafias constitute the first line of buyers in the international opiate trade and, as such, they exercise a considerable degree of influence in Afghanistan. Their position has been further strengthened by their long-established relations with local elites and warlords, which has the potential to disrupt the fragile attempts to bring peace to Afghanistan today. This is especially true in the primary opium cultivating areas of Helmand and Kandahar.

As the interim government of Hamid Karzai attempts to assert political control over Afghanistan, it must find a way to incorporate former drug lords into society while ensuring that they break their ties to the lucrative narcotics trade. This is a complicated task given that many individuals involved in the trade have been appointed to official government positions. Unconvinced of future security, many see drugs as the sole guarantor of economic survival. Unfortunately, the interim government is too weak and compromised to reverse the criminal environment that has existed in the country for over two decades.

The republics of Central Asia are also home to domestic drug mafias, but Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek groups are not as well established in the drug trade as their Afghan counterparts. Unlike the Afghan traders who developed in tandem with the rise of the illicit trade in opiates several decades ago, contemporary Central Asian groups have very limited experience with the trade. In fact, until the emergence of the “Northern Route,” there was little reason for Central Asian groups to seek relations with their Afghan counterparts. Most of the domestic drug mafias in Central Asia are relatively small, and their activities are largely limited to the local production and distribution of hashish.17  Some groups, however, directly purchase opiates from Afghan traders for distribution within their respective countries of operation. Not very influential in the broader picture, drug mafias in countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan maintain a degree of community influence and have established connections with local officials, but normally do not possess greater power because they lack the necessary national and international connections.

Transnational Crime

Transnational criminal organizations constitute the second group of actors engaged in the regional drug trade. These groups pose the single greatest threat to the region, in part because they are composed of a chain of regional and international players including officials in several governments and their security services. As a result of their diverse membership, some transnational criminal groups entertain political motivations. With their propensity for using violence, these groups form the fulcrum of the crime-terror nexus. Major players in the Afghan/Central Asian drug trade include the following: a network of Afghan, Kyrgyz and Russian syndicates who move shipments of opiates through Central Asia, Russia, the Baltic states and into Western Europe; a network of Afghan, Turkmen and Turkish syndicates who regularly traffic opiates through Turkmenistan (sometimes via Armenia and Azerbaijan) into Turkey for European redistribution; a coalition of Caucasian syndicates allegedly responsible for controlling a significant proportion of the narcotics industry in the Russian Federation; a coalition of Afghan-Iranian and Afghan-Pakistani groups; and independent Tajik and Uzbek groups with ethnic diaspora links in Afghanistan.18 

In addition to these networks, there is evidence of Kyrgyz and Turkmen groups attempting to increase their ties to Afghan drug mafias. There are also rumors of Chinese, Korean, American, Latin American and Nigerian criminal groups attempting to assert their influence over segments of the regional trade. Exemplifying this transnational aspect was the 1999 case of an American citizen, Andrew Klein. Uzbek security services discovered that Klein, working from Central Asia, was coordinating Afghan and Latin American drug mafias operating in the Russian, European and American drug markets. Klein was arrested in Amsterdam while attempting to organize an operation that would simultaneously transport 13 tons of illicit drugs from Asia to Europe, using Central Asia and Russia as transshipment points.19 

The operations of transnational criminal organizations are not always based in Afghanistan. Established relationships with drug mafias in Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries enable transnational criminal networks to use Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian republics as operational bases. Thus, in addition to stockpiling opiates in Afghanistan, transnational groups also stockpile in other regional centers such as Osh, Shymkent and Samarkand in Central Asia.

As with most criminal organizations throughout history, transnational organized crime uses corruption and intimidation to establish and exert its influence. Given their membership base – including political, law enforcement, customs and military officials20  – the intimidation and corruption perpetrated by this group of actors is significantly more destructive for state and regional security than domestic drug mafias. In Tajikistan, for example, transnational groups are believed to be responsible for several bombings in Dushanbe in 1999 and 2000. Having displayed their violent inclinations, transnational groups have established a more secure base from which they can effectively bribe officials. Faced with a choice between death or injury to family members and bribery, many government and security officials have chosen the latter, especially given their extremely low wages. Furthermore, in addition to relatively small-scale corruption of public officials – such as the acceptance of bribes by border guards21  – high-ranking Turkmen, Kazakh and Tajik officials have been implicated in the operations of transnational criminal groups over the past few years. Most recently there have been allegations that Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov and other leading officials were involved in drug trafficking operations based at the Ashgabat airport.22  It may thus be concluded that groups of this nature are simultaneously interested in acquiring the financial gains associated with involvement in the drug trade and in asserting political control to secure their operations.

Insurgent/Terrorist Groups

The last group of actors commonly associated with the Afghan/Central Asian drug trade are insurgent and terrorist groups including the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Although these groups are not necessarily the most powerful or important players in the larger picture, they have been the focus of international observers largely because of their capacity for perpetuating violence and instability in the region. Given ongoing misunderstandings – such as the suggestion that they control the trade and directly traffic in narcotics themselves – surrounding their role in the drug trade, a focus on the role of warlords, insurgent groups and terrorists should provide a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of the regional drug trade and of the role of the crime-terror nexus.23 

Warlords exist in abundance throughout Afghanistan and Tajikistan as a result of their experience with civil war.24  Since the early 1990s in Afghanistan, warlords such as General Abdul Rashid Dostum commonly shifted political allegiances in order to attain or maintain influence within a geographical area that would free them to engage in a combination of licit and illicit activities. Prior to the Taliban’s assertion of authority throughout much of Afghan territory in the late 1990s, warlords were predominantly involved in the drug trade in two ways. First, some warlords profited from the trade by collecting “taxes” from local farmers and traffickers transiting territory under their control. Second, several warlords allegedly controlled production facilities and were more deeply involved in the trade as processors and traffickers,  often using narcotics as their primary currency for buying weapons and other supplies.

Although warlords continue to be involved in the regional drug trade, many of their operational movements have been restricted since 1998 as a result of cooperating with either the Taliban or the Northern Alliance. For example, warlords helped to collect taxes on behalf of the Taliban.  Given the history and nature of their activities in Afghanistan, however, some warlords continued to profit from the drug trade by engaging in independent activities on the side. As suggested in the previous section, the presence of warlords in the current interim government necessarily complicates future attempts to construct peace and eliminate the drug trade. The future of Afghanistan is endangered by international pressure to control the drug trade “at a time when it relies on drug-dealing warlords for support and legitimacy. The new leaders in Kabul are reluctant to alienate these warlords because they command powerful armed factions which could disrupt Afghanistan’s delicate political settlement.”25 

Insurgencies, on the other hand, refer to the operations of the Taliban and Northern Alliance – the two groups directly engaged in the battle for control of Afghanistan prior to September 11. The groups’ involvement in the drug trade was not identical; in fact, evidence strongly indicates that Northern Alliance troops were directly involved in the production and trafficking of opiates, whereas the Taliban primarily benefited by collecting taxes from farmers and traders.

Confronted by the power of domestic drug mafias and warlords operating in Afghanistan, the Taliban entered into tacit agreements with drug traders. In return for paying a 10-20 percent tax on their profits, drugs mafias secured their immunity. The Taliban raised between US$15-40 million of its estimated US$100 million annual budget from taxing the drug trade.26  However, despite this source of profit, drugs never constituted the main economic source of the Taliban war effort. Most of the Taliban’s finances were secured from the cross-border smuggling of licit commodities, such as consumer and durable goods and fuel, to and from Pakistan and Central Asia.

In addition to taxation, Russian authorities released a report to the United Nations Security Council implicating senior Taliban officials in drug operations.27  Although several high-ranking Taliban officials were likely involved in the regional trade, it is not necessarily correct to see this as evidence of Taliban control over Afghan opiates. Many of the official Taliban links to the trade existed because of strong personal ties to drug mafias and warlords and thus were often limited to personal gain. If the Taliban did control the majority of the trade, the Afghan drug scene would have been far more organized and centralized than it ever was. Dominating up to 95 percent of Afghan territory prior to their downfall and having installed a relatively effective system of collecting taxes with armed men placed throughout the country, the Taliban could have replaced the power of the drug mafias and organized the trade themselves. The Taliban’s successes in diminishing the area of territory under opium poppy cultivation with the opium ban in 2000 is thus best understood as the Taliban taking advantage of a decision made by drug mafias and transnational criminal organizations to force the price of opiates up, while eliminating stockpiles.28 

The Northern Alliance, on the other hand, has been directly linked as a group to the production of opiates. Its ties to drugs existed before it retreated to its last northern strongholds as a result of successful Taliban military operations.29  By 2001, the Northern Alliance was well positioned as a result of the Taliban opium ban to capitalize on its role in the regional drug trade. Previously limited by market demands and the power of the drug mafias, the Northern Alliance was able to raise the area under opium cultivation in Badakhshan province from 2,458 hectares in 2000 to 6,342 hectares in 2001.30  It was able to significantly increase opium cultivation  within its territory because the ban did not apply there and because the Northern Alliance was able to circumvent the Afghan drug mafias by dealing with transnational networks. Furthermore, despite having leveraged its way back to Kabul by cooperating with the international coalition, the Northern Alliance has further increased the area under poppy cultivation in Badakhshan today to approximately 13,000 hectares, according to UN estimates.

Therefore, it is of great concern that members of the Northern Alliance constitute a considerable portion of the interim government, due to an increase in opium poppy cultivation by over 200 percent on its territories in 2001. Ironically, Northern Alliance members in the Interior Ministry are now responsible for counter-narcotics initiatives. Furthermore, high-level officials in Kandahar, Helmand and the Defense Ministry are also allegedly tied to the drug trade.31  This situation is further exacerbated by numerous recent allegations that soldiers from the interim government’s security forces have been guarding drug markets.32 

Prior to September 11, several terrorist groups were also involved to varying degrees in the regional drug trade. Most terrorist groups implicated in the trade, such as Al-Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers, played a very limited role: some of their members used their group networks to profit from small-scale trafficking operations. The only group significantly involved in trafficking Afghan opiates was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). However, given the organization and operations of the IMU prior to September 11, it appears that they were driven more by criminal interests than by political or religious purposes. Unlike other insurgent or terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan – identified by their political motivations – the IMU is the only group that encompasses the entire range of the crime-terror nexus. It is both criminal and terrorist in nature: criminal because of its direct involvement in the drug trade, and terrorist because of its explicit (even if only rhetorical) political declarations.

Although the leadership of the IMU can be traced back to the Islamic opposition parties that appeared in the Ferghana Valley in the 1990s, it was not until the late 1990s that the IMU emerged as an organized force. The IMU’s declared intentions were to focus international attention on the persecution of Muslims in Uzbekistan and to replace the current Uzbek government with an Islamic state. Following this declaration the government of Uzbekistan held the IMU responsible for planning and conducting a terrorist campaign, which included an attack on policemen in Namangan in late 1997 and a series of bomb attacks in Tashkent in 1999. By 2000 the group had been placed on the US State Department list of terrorist groups.33 

Although the IMU has not conducted terrorist acts in Central Asia (i.e., they have not targeted innocent civilians), they have led an insurgency against the government and trafficked in illicit narcotics. The activities of the IMU suggest that the driving motivation of their insurgent incursions in 1999 and 2000 was not to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, but to destabilize border areas in order to maintain and secure narcotics transportation routes. In other words, the IMU successfully manipulated a political situation through the use of what has been labeled terrorist activity to pursue criminal interests.34 

Throughout 1998 and 1999, IMU insurgents appeared to concentrate most of their efforts on locating trafficking routes and, as a result, had little reason to conduct terrorist activities in Central Asia. Insurgents searching for routes and trafficking in narcotics went undetected or unreported for most of this time, despite increasingly frequent border clashes with border guards.35  It was not until mid-1999 that reports of incursions into southern Kyrgyzstan and clashes on the Tajik-Uzbek border began to cause heightened concern about regional security. This was especially true following the bomb attacks in Uzbekistan and growing concerns within the Uzbek government over strengthening opposition forces. In two separate incidents in August, the IMU entered the Batken district of Kyrgzystan and took hostages. The official demand presented to the Kyrgyz government was that the IMU would free the hostages in exchange for the release of approximately 50,000 unjustly imprisoned Muslims in Uzbekistan, in addition to safe passage into Uzbekistan. Despite these demands the IMU released the first set of hostages for US$50,000 ransom, and the remaining hostages were released after a two month stand-off in exchange for an alleged US$2 million and safe passage to Tajikistan.36  The ease with which the leadership of the IMU abandoned their initial demands immediately called into question their stated motivations.37  While regional leaders and the international media focused on the relatively small groups of militants that held hostages in Batken, other members were transporting illicit shipments over the borders while simultaneously conducting reconnaissance missions to confirm potential new trafficking routes.38 

Incursions into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by IMU militants during August 2000 further confirm that the group was focused on their role in the regional drug trade. Having gained from militant activity the previous year, it was expected that the IMU would attempt to duplicate their successes. At the beginning of August, militants engaged an Uzbek border guard post on the Tajik-Uzbek border and a day later engaged Kyrgyz forces. Although this direct confrontation with Central Asian security forces could be interpreted as an act of guerrilla warfare, it is unlikely that these two incursions represented IMU attempts to overthrow the government. It was, however, their intent to create a sense of instability and confusion within the two districts that were used as a transit route for drugs.

The incursions of 1999 and 2000 occurred in areas through which several important trafficking routes transit. Instability in these areas created perfect conditions for moving large illicit shipments. Furthermore, all of these incidents happened at roughly the same time of year, just after the annual opium harvest in Afghanistan. The question that should be asked is therefore whether the pattern of incursions in August 1999 and 2000 were coincidental or whether they were planned at the height of the summer to maximize trafficking potential due to weather constraints.39  It may be concluded that the IMU used regional instability created by insurgent activity to transport drugs across borders. Given that the IMU reportedly controls up to 70 percent of the narcotics entering Kyrgyzstan, and likely a portion of shipments entering Tajikistan, the onus for securing trafficking routes was placed on the IMU if they wanted to maintain control over this portion of the “Northern Route.”

What we appear to be witnessing in Central Asia is similar to the situation that emerged in Pakistan as a result of the international drug trade. Despite the radical Islamic programs espoused by fundamentalist groups in Pakistan, their primary interest over the past few years has been in trafficking narcotics. As Ahmed Rashid argues, “in Pakistan by having a veneer of Islam, it’s very difficult to discredit these parties or explain their criminalization.”40 

All the events perpetrated by the IMU prior to September 11 indicate that the primary motivation of the IMU, under the leadership of military commander Juma Namanganiy, was criminal. After 1999 the IMU was predominantly under the control of Namanganiy. Although he has been described as a ‘born again’ Muslim, there are no indications that he was a strict Muslim with any associated allegiances. On the contrary, prior to dedicating his life to the IMU it is believed that Namanganiy was involved in the drug trade. It is not surprising that under his leadership the IMU was focused on securing its role as a leading trafficker of opiates into Central Asia. Given the death of Namanganiy during the US-led counter-terrorist offensive in Afghanistan, it is likely that the IMU will re-emerge as an ideological group under the leadership of the group’s political leader Tahir Yuldashev.   

Current anecdotal evidence suggests that Yuldashev is reforming the IMU, and is likely to reserve membership to individuals dedicated to radical Islamic ideals.41  If this were to happen, the IMU would exhibit a reverse trend in that, unlike most criminal-terrorist groups which began with strict political motivations that turned into criminal considerations, the IMU may turn from a predominantly criminal organization to one that gives priority to its political aims. Given the current situation in Central Asia, with insurgent extremists scattered throughout the region and with continuing human rights abuses against Muslim groups (such as Hizb-ut Tahrir), it is unlikely that Yuldashev will find it difficult to recruit a solid membership base for the IMU. In the absence of the financial and operational support base that once existed in Afghanistan, it remains likely that a resurgent IMU will continue to depend on narcotics trafficking to secure financing despite the group’s new political focus. Unless the regional drug trade receives greater international attention, the IMU’s continued involvement in drug trafficking may eventually secure the funding required for it to overtly seek political objectives through terrorist activities.

The extent that drug mafias have asserted their control over the illicit narcotics trade through Afghanistan and Central Asia is a cause of great concern because of the negative repercussions that it has on the region.42  Few signs indicate that the ongoing “war on terrorism” will target opium poppy crops before they are cultivated this spring and summer. On the contrary, given current evidence of the production of a bumper crop this year, criminal networks are preparing to secure their production and trafficking operations. The political frailty of the Afghan interim government, combined with the apparent shortsightedness of US military operations in Afghanistan, suggests that drugs will continue to plague Central Asia. This situation will undermine any attempt to build a stable long-term peace in the region.

Despite an international military presence, it does not appear that drug mafias have been deterred from their business, due to a number of reasons. First, despite intelligence indicating the locations of drug production laboratories and alleged stockpiles, the international coalition did not destroy these targets. The failure to directly confront drugs as an essential component of the “war against terrorism” signaled to those engaged in the drug trade that the international community has no serious intentions of destroying their business. Second, the involvement of high-ranking Afghan and Central Asian officials in the trade ensures that drug traders are able to operate with relative impunity, although some risk will remain as governments are obliged to make sporadic confiscations to appease Western observers. Third, given existing political sensitivities, the international coalition does not appear willing to directly disrupt the drug trade with military force.43 Once again, this inactivity gives traders additional freedom to continue with their illicit operations. Fourth, although the international coalition has officially voiced its concern over the drug trade, it has made a concerted effort to avoid direct involvement in counter-narcotics initiatives.

In an attempt to appear as though they are dedicated  to the eventual destruction of the trade, however, the coalition forces have taken alternative actions. Supported by the United Kingdom and the US, the interim government has attempted to entice farmers into destroying their opium poppy crops in exchange for US$350 per 2,500 square meters. However, this initiative has merely frustrated farmers trying to recovering their losses last year as a result of the Taliban’s opium ban. The monetary alternative does not even cover the expenses incurred by farmers in growing their crops. In most drug-producing regions of Afghanistan, farmers normally receive up to US$3500 per 2,500 square meters of opium poppy cultivated.44  Finally, because Afghan heroin does not supply the US market, it is difficult for the US government to commit their military forces to counter-narcotics operations. Considering that the US has had a difficult historical record with counter-narcotics initiatives in Latin America, it is unlikely that similar efforts would work in Afghanistan.

Even if international forces do act in the short term to deter drug mafias, or directly seek to eliminate opium poppy crops and drug stockpiles, the potential for the regional drug trade to take advantage of conditions in Central Asia remains. Estimates suggest that the former Soviet Union now produces at least 25 percent more hashish than the rest of the world combined.45  Within Central Asia, over 4.5 million hectares of hemp is planted in the Chuy Valley – an amount capable of producing approximately 6,000 tons of hashish annually.46  In addition, it was estimated in 1997 that 2,000 hectares of opium poppy were planted in Kazakhstan, capable of producing 30 tons of opium annually.47  Although this is not a great amount, areas in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are ideal for the widespread cultivation of opium poppy. As part of the Soviet Union, the Issyk-Kyl valley in Kyrgyzstan used to supply 95 percent of the raw opium for the Soviet pharmaceutical industry.48  Since then, sporadic anecdotal evidence has emerged suggesting that some heroin production laboratories exist in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – allegations that both governments have officially dismissed.

The spread of opium poppy crops to Central Asia could be facilitated by the vast network of domestic drug mafias and transnational criminal groups that currently operate from within every state in the region. Not only have these networks established important relationships with official law enforcement, security and government agencies, they have also secured numerous means and routes used for trafficking illicit shipments. The importance of the “Northern Route,” rampant corruption, and deteriorating political, economic and social environments have made the Central Asian republics inseparable from the regional drug problem. The only thing standing in the way of already calling Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan “narco-states” is their rhetorical commitment to Western-led counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism pressures and their ability to suppress information.

Anything other than a coherent anti-narcotics policy that simultaneously targets the entire region will merely result in the spread of poppy cultivation. Seccombe suggested that drug smuggling “is like a balloon: squeeze it in one place and it bulges out elsewhere.”49  Afghanistan and Central Asia thus require a carefully formulated response and commitment by the international community.

The importance of analyzing the Central Asian drug trade in the context of the crime-terror nexus is two-fold: first, it highlights the role of the myriad of players involved in drug operations; second, it reveals the relationships between actors. This type of analysis demonstrates that few groups control the trade from field to international market, and most are forced – at one point or another – to interact with other actors. It also dispels the myth (increasingly common post-September 11) that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda single-handedly controlled the Afghan drug trade.

Based on these perceptions of the Central Asian drug trade, several implications for the development of international policy in the region can be highlighted. To begin with, an understanding of the various components of the crime-terror nexus and how they interact with one another suggests that international policy aimed at Afghanistan and Central Asia cannot simply focus on insurgent/terrorist groups. In the context of Central Asia, such a limited approach has legitimized government oppression of opposition movements, thus ironically sowing the seeds for terrorism rather than destroying them.50  In addition to considering the role of terrorist groups in the trade, it is imperative that the role of transnational crime not be overlooked. Besides the central role they play in the illicit drug trade, transnational criminal groups are also responsible for teaching terrorist groups new operational and organizational techniques.51  Authorities can learn more about the changing dynamics of terrorist groups and the international drug trade if they understood the evolving nature of transnational crime. Any “war on terrorism” in Afghanistan and Central Asia is incomplete without integrating both a “war on drugs” and a “war on crime”.

Second, in light of the crime-terror nexus and the adverse affect it has on national security and regional stability, a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between crime, drugs and terrorism must be attained if effective security policies are to be developed and implemented in the region. The role of non-military threats in compounding regional security situations needs to be acknowledged, especially given that domestic drug mafias and transnational criminal groups already have experience with armed engagements against government forces to secure their criminal operations.

Third, the concept of the crime-terror nexus gives government, law enforcement and security agencies (in the region and in the West) more tools to address the threats of transnational crime, terrorism and the drug trade. It highlights the necessity that official crime, drug and terrorism policies must work together if they are to be successful. Moreover, these policies require national, regional and international interagency cooperation. Although this may appear to be a tall order, it is only the first step that needs to be taken to curtail the relative freedom enjoyed by transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.

Endnotes

 1 Michael Binyon, “Taliban are Top Heroin Suppliers,” The Times, January 7, 2000.

 2 “Afghanistan, Drugs and Terrorism: Merging Wars,” Transnational Institute Brief, No. 3 (December 2001). Similar statements were also made by American officials following September 11. During a hearing of the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee (03 October 2001), Drug Enforcement Administration Administrator Asa Hutchinson stated that the Taliban “exercise nearly total control” over the drug trade. Given the operational and organizational dynamics of the drug trade, these statements over-simplify the problem.

 3 CNN Correspondent Donna Kelley, during a broadcast entitled “America’s New War: Taliban Has History of Opium Production,” (01 October 2001) stated that “The Taliban taxed it [the drugs trade] and trafficked in the drug and then used it to finance military operations.”

 4 “Afghanistan, Drugs and Terrorism: Merging Wars,” Transnational Institute Brief, No. 3 (December 2001).

 5 An in-depth account of the crime-terror nexus can be found in Tamara Makarenko, “Transnational Crime and Terrorism: the emerging nexus,” Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia-Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism, Hawaii: Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Forthcoming 2003.

 6 For one, the drug trade has compounded dire social conditions throughout the region by contributing to rising addiction rates and crime rates in almost every Central Asian republic. For example, the Tajik Ministry of Health reported that drug addicts in state institutions increased fourfold between 1996 and 2000: 74% allegedly used heroin. The ‘real’ figure, according to health experts, however is likely 10-15% higher. Konstantin Parshin, “Anti-Drug Trafficking Effort Could Help Fight Terrorism,” Eurasia Insight, 21 September 2001. Between 1991 and 1997, drug addiction increased approximately eight times, while the average age of addicts dropped and associated criminality rose. Nina Kerimi, “Opium Use in Turkmenistan: a Historical Perspective,” Addiction, vol. 95, issue 9 (September 2000). Between 1991 and 2001, Kyrgyzstan experienced a 340% increase in drug addicts. In 1991 82% were hashish users, however by 2001 68% of addicts used heroin and opium. Robert Ponce, “Rising heroin abuse in Central Asia raises threat of public health crisis,” Eurasia Insight, 29 March 2002. In 2000, drug-related crimes increased 40% in Tajikistan, and between January and September 2001 they rose 73.5%. Konstantin Parshin, “Anti-Drug Trafficking Effort Could Help Fight Terrorism,” Eurasia Insight, 21 September 2001. Second, the drug trade affects economic stability through corruption, and by providing a more lucrative source of revenue for individuals who otherwise face no economic prospects; and, politically the drug trade has proven to discredit the upper echelons of governments as evidence has uncovered direct links between government officials and the illicit trade in opiates. Furthermore, the drug trade has directly contributed to instability as traffickers commonly enter into armed engagements with border guards. Given the profits associated with this trade, it is in the interest of all actors engaged in the trade to seek to maintain relative regional instability in order to maintain a conducive environment for their operations. Thus, a similar situation to that in Latin American and Southeast Asia appears to be developing in Central Asia.

 7 Despite recognizing the link between terrorism and the drugs trade in Afghanistan, the coalition forces engaged in the “war on terrorism” have avoided directly engaging with the continuing threat posed by the drugs trade to regional security. It is evident that the Pentagon has rejected suggestions to use US military forces to eradicate poppy crops. Illustrating this view, the Commander of US forces in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, was quoted as saying “That’s not our mission.” Bill Gertz, “Military opposes spraying poppies,” The Washington Times, 25 March 2002.

 8 In 2000 the Taliban announced that it had banned the cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan. However, despite significantly reducing opium cultivation that year, it is unlikely that the ban was an honest effort by the Taliban to engage the international community. Looking at the dynamics of the trade more closely, the success of the opium ban can be explained twofold. First, the Taliban was able to exert a significant degree of force on the local population. Their aspiration to ensure that the ban was enforced resulted in violence, thus frightening many local farmers into obeying the ban. Despite exerting influence over farmers, the Taliban did not control the activities of the drug mafias. Second, before the ban was announced dealers operating in the region had amassed considerable stockpiles of opiates, largely due to the 1999 bumper crop and a large crop in 2000. Various sources suggest that the stockpiles could supply the European and American market for three to six years. As a result of this predicament, the price of opiates had fallen drastically. This appeared to have led the dealers to stop cultivation in order to drive the price up again. Sources thus suggest that the dealers and the Taliban worked in tandem at this point, forcing the price of opium and heroin up, while allowing the Taliban to improve their international image. Ironically, taking advantage of this situation by increasing production on territory under their control, was the ally of the US-led counter-terrorism coalition, the Northern Alliance. For a good analysis of the opium ban in Afghanistan, see “Afghanistan, Drugs and Terrorism: merging wars,” Transnational Institute Brief, no. 3 (December 2001).

 9 “Opium Ban in Afghanistan: Important Step in Global Drug Control Efforts Say UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,” United Nations Information Service, 17 January 2002.

 10 Confidential discussions held with the author, March 2002.

 11 Mohammad Amirkhizi, “Illicit Drugs and Organized Crime: the Impact of Recent Developments in Afghanistan,” presented at the Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: Strengthening Comprehensive Efforts to Counter Terrorism,” Organised by UNODCCP and OSCE, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, December 2001.

 12 For a general overview of opiate use in Central Asia see Nina Kerimi, “Opium Use in Turkmenistan: a Historical Perspective,” Addiction, vol. 95, issue 9 (September 2000).

 13 Giles Dorronsoro, “The World Isolates the Taliban: Afghanistan all Alone,” Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2001. International aid workers in Afghanistan had also commonly commented on the negative impact of the embargoes placed on Afghanistan. For example, in a news report published by the Associated Press, aid workers noted that the embargoes “sent a signal to ordinary Afghans that the international community has abandoned them.”. Kathy Gannon, “Aid Workers Question Afghan Sanctions,” Associated Press, 24 March 2001.

 14 This conclusion is drawn from several conversations held between the author and Afghani professionals residing in Western Europe and Central Asia.

 15 A more in-depth account of the Northern Trafficking routes is provided in Tamara Makarenko, “Traffickers turn from Balkan conduit to ‘Northern Route’,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 13, no. 8 (August 2001). The vast majority of Afghan opiates shipped via the Northern Routes initially cross at points along the shared 1300km Tajik-Afghan border. UNODCCP officials estimate that 100-120 tons of heroin pass through Tajikistan every year. Furthermore, there are indications that heroin processing laboratories now operate on Tajik territory.  Although Tajik government sources report that 10-15 percent of drugs transiting Tajikistan are seized, UNDCP sources suggest that the percentage seized is no more than 5 per cent. 

 16 Large portions of this section originally appeared in Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 14, no. 5 (May 2002).

 17 Hashish is a derivative of the hemp (cannabis) plant, whereas opiates (such as heroin) derive from the opium poppy.

 18 Although most transnational criminal groups engaged in the illicit Afghan opiate trade are multinational in their composition, Tajik and Uzbek groups based in Central Asia are some of the few groups that depend on their ethnic diaspora links in Afghanistan to obtain heroin or opium shipments.

 19 “Russia Fights Bolivian Drug Mafia on Tajik-Afghan Border,” The Times of Central Asia, vol. 1, no. 43 (1999).  It was discovered that Bolivia served as Klein’s headquarters.

 20 Among the most disturbing discoveries has been the involvement of members of the Russian 201st Division, stationed along the Tajik-Afghan border, in trafficking opiates to Russia via military transportation.

 21 In most instances border crossings can be bought for as little as US$50, a sum that is two to three times the amount of monthly salaries for most members of the military and law enforcement. This, however, is not to suggest that all border guards in Central Asia are corrupt. In many cases border guards and law enforcement ignore illicit border crossings out of fear that their families will be targeted by criminal organizations.

 22 The original report was published by Deutsche Welles, 21 March 2002. For an analysis of these allegations see Rustem Safronov, “Turkmenistan’s Niyazov Implicated in Drug Smuggling,” Eurasia Insight, 29 March 2002.

 23 There is an ongoing debate about how to define insurgency, warlordism and terrorism. Despite the fact that there exists no universal definition for these terms, there appears to be general consensus on the basic meaning of each term. Insurgency basically refers to any armed uprising against authorities (government, civil service) in power. Insurgents, subsequently, use one of three major tools to promote their political aims: conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare or terrorism. Conventional war refers to a struggle between two armed forces – thus suggesting that the insurgent group has attained the status of a fully armed military (Bolsheviks and Mao’s Communists). Guerrilla warfare, on the other hand, suggests that one side engaged in a conflict is significantly weaker than the other, and is thus forced to rely on guerrilla tactics – attacking enemy military forces by surprise (Afghanistan’s mujahideen, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Finally, terrorism refers to the “systemic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends”, and “is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence, and to publicize a cause, as well as to coerce a target to acceding to terrorists’ aims.” For a more detailed discussion of these terms, see Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, London: Frank Cass, 2001.

 24 Historically, countries engaged in protracted civil wars commonly develop a problem with warlords. Warlords are individuals who are initially engaged in the ongoing political struggle, but who eventually end up asserting control over specific geographical areas. Supported by a following of armed militants, warlords become the ‘de facto’ rulers of a territory – and maintain their control via intimidating the local populations. Furthermore, they often engage in highly profitable ventures to secure their economic (and thus military) strength. In addition to Afghanistan, warlords are a common feature of many African countries with a vast history of civil war (Angola, Sierra Leone), and in Burma.

 25 Thomas Withington, “If the new Afghan government bows to international pressure to ban poppy cultivation the economic consequences could be catastrophic,” IWPR’s Reporting Central Asia, No. 99 (18 January 2001).

 26 Ahmed Rashid, “Economic Sources of Conflict in Central Asia,” presented at the International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: an Integrated Approach to Counter Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism, 19-20 October 2000, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

 27 This report, which has not been publicly released, allegedly names several Taliban officials as playing a leading role in the regional drug trade. Given the Russian position on Afghanistan, these allegations should be taken with some caution. Discussions on the contents of the report were conducted between the author and independent analysts.

 28 UN sources have estimated that between 1996 and 2000, as much as 60 percent of opiate production in Afghanistan was stockpiled. Stockpiling narcotics is a relatively common practice exercised by drug mafias throughout the world to ensure that prices remain stable, and to ensure that they secure a steady future supply.

 29 Some of these early ties are discussed in John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, London: Pluto Press, 1999.

 30 Based on estimates released by the United Nations Drug Control Programme.

 31 Conversations conducted, in confidence, with intelligence officers in Europe and Central Asia.

 32 The details of such arrangements have yet to be confirmed, however it appears as though the involvement of lower level soldiers is confined to accepting bribes, whereas allegations suggest that some officers may be directly involved in the operations of drug mafias themselves.

 33 Despite being listed as a foreign terrorist group by American officials, there exists no conclusive evidence implicating the IMU in terrorism. It is, for example, very unlikely that the IMU was responsible for the 1997 and 1999 bombings. For one, not officially created until 1999, the group was not developed enough politically or organizationally to be able to plan and execute a successful series of terrorist acts. It is more likely that the bombings were the result of a disagreement between criminal groups. Initially Uzbek President Islam Karimov and his government blamed the attacks on ‘Islamic extremists’, seeking to discredit any form of political opposition that threatened to emerge in the country. However it appears as though they re-shifted their focus on the IMU in response to the groups’ official declaration – thus justifying widespread government crackdowns and subsequent human rights abuses against suspected Islamic radicals, who are often members of the opposition.

 34 This argument was first presented in Tamara Makarenko, “Crime and terrorism in Central Asia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 12, no. 7 (July 2000). It is explained in further detail in Tamara Makarenko “Central Asia: a new centre for terrorism?,” an article to be published with the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

 35 The majority of border clashes along the Afghan/Central Asian borders are the result of traffickers securing shipments which were detected by border officials who were either unwilling to accept bribes, or who were allied with competing groups. 

 36 The ransom demand was higher for the second hostage crisis because the IMU managed to take four Japanese citizens hostage. Although the Japanese government officially denied that it paid a ransom, sources in the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry suggested otherwise. Having met terrorist demands in the past, it is very likely that Japan did pay the ransom. It is also worth noting that these hostage incidents appear not to have been planned in advance, but actually occurred by chance as bands of militants successfully took advantage of a profitable opportunity.

 37 For a good overview of the defining characteristics of Islamic terrorist groups see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz, 1998, and Walter Laqueuer, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

 38 See Tamara Makarenko, “Drugs in Central Asia: security implications and political manipulations,” Cahiers d’etudes sur la Mediterranee oreintale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI), No. 32 (July-December 2001), pp. 87-115 for an in-depth analysis of additional events that simultaneously took place during the 1999 Batken crisis which support the thesis that the IMU has used ‘terrorism’ as a cover for their involvement in the drugs trade.

 39 Given that most trafficking routes in Central Asia run through the mountains, traffickers have been forced to increase shipments during the summer months because many of these routes are inaccessible during the winter months due to snow coverage.

 40 Ahmed Rashid, “From Deobandism to Batken: Adventures of an Islamic Heritage,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Forum Transcripts, 13 April 2000.

 41 Prior to the events of September 11th there were indications the IMU was splitting between the criminal and ideological – between Namanganiy and Yuldashev. Reports that the IMU had changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan was evidence of the shifting internal dynamics of the IMU.

 42 See Tamara Makarenko, “Drugs in Central Asia: security implications and political manipulations,” Cahiers d’etudes sur la Mediterranee oreintale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI), No. 32 (July-December 2001), pp. 87-115 for an in-depth analysis of these implications.

 43 If the coalition forces were to directly target drug crops with military force, the international coalition must ensure that the farmers are adequately compensated financially, and that they are given the required skills and technology to grow alternative crops. Such an exercise, as the UNDCP has learned from past experiences, necessitates significant organization on the ground. In addition, it would necessitate simultaneously targeting drug mafias and warlords still engaged in the trade – failure to do so would merely force the trade into surrounding areas. Combined with the international coalition force trying to ensure that their presence does not cause frustration amongst local groups, this predicament has created an environment of great political sensitivity in Afghanistan.

 44 “Angry Afghan farmers get dollars for drug harvest as destruction begins,” Agence France-Presse, 13 August 2002.

 45 Kadyr Alimov, “Social and economic transformations in Central Asia and the international drug problem: an Uzbekistan case study,” in Globalization and the International Drug Problem in Central Asia and Pakistan: Proceedings of the Sub-Regional Workshop organized by UNESCO/MOST in collaboration with UNDCP, Tashkent, National Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan for UNESCO, 14 December 1998.

 46 Alexander Zelichenko, “The Drug Situation in Central Asia,” The Times of Central Asia, vol. 1, no. 11, 20 May 1999.

 47 “UN, Central Asian states plan to bolster anti-narcotics activity,” New Europe, 31 January 1998.

 48 Yury Razgulyayev, “Growing of Opium Poppies May be Renewed in the Issyk-Kyl Valley in Kyrgyzia,” Pravda.ru, 01 September 2002.

 49 R. Seccombe, “Troublesome Boomerang: Illicit Drug Policy and Security,” Security Diaologue, vol. 28, no. 3 (September 1997), p. 294.

 50 This situation is especially problematic in Uzbekistan where the government of President Islam Karimov has commonly persecuted and unjustly imprisoned thousands of Muslims whom the government have labeled ‘extremist.’ Although most of these individuals cannot be tied to violent extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, they are still targeted out of fear that non-state sanctioned Islamic organizations (Hizb-ut Tahrir) have the potential to pose an opposition to the government. Human rights abuses in Uzbekistan, and increasingly in Kyrgyzstan, are a cause of growing concern – especially following September 11. Unfortunately, instead of preventing terrorism in the region, these policies are merely creating frustration and resentment – which in turn are threatening to produce the emergence of more violent opposition. This issue has been covered in greater detail by a variety of sources, including: the Central Asia section at http://www.crisisweb.org, and by Tamara Makarenko, “Central Asian Insecurity Expands Post 9-11,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 14, no. 6 (June 2002).

 51 For example, terrorist groups have used and learned from the financial experiences of transnational crime. As a result, they appear increasingly competent in laundering illegal funds, and creating legitimate businesses. Like transnational crime, terrorist groups are able to locate new opportunities to secure future funding – as such, it is evident why terrorist groups are involved in relative new areas of criminality such as CD/video piracy and human smuggling. Terrorist groups are also learning from transnational crime’s experience with ensuring organizational effectiveness and security. Thus it is increasingly common to find terrorist groups out source  (usually to criminal groups) activities believed to be essential to their operations, including identity forgery and money laundering – thus revealing another important area of convergence between terrorism and organized crime which requires a coordinated response by law enforcement and counter-terrorist agencies.