Criminal syndicates coordinate the trafficking of women from Thailand to Japan as workers in the sex industry. Kinsey Dinan reports on the working conditions of these women and calls for greater efforts by the Japanese and Thai governments to protect their welfare.

Kinsey Dinan is a former researcher with the Women’s Rights and Asia divisions of Human Rights Watch, where she wrote Owed Justice: Thai Women Trafficked Into Debt Bondage in Japan (2000). Her work included lobbying government delegates at negotiations for the UN protocol on trafficking in persons and proposing text for the United States’ anti-trafficking legislation. She is currently working as a Policy Analyst at the National Center for Children in Poverty at Columbia University, and serving as a consultant to the Asia Foundation on programming related to trafficking in women.

In December 2000, delegates from countries around the world met in Palermo, Italy for the signing of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The impetus for this document was intense international concern about the rise in transnational criminal activity by organized crime groups and about the difficulty of combating cross-border crimes. One of the most alarming trends in this area was the increase in human trafficking – the transport and trade of people for the purpose of exploiting their labor. In specific response to this issue, an optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (hereinafter, the Trafficking Protocol) was opened for signature with the main convention.1 

While exact numbers are difficult to come by, trafficking in persons is a global phenomenon of large-scale magnitude. It claims hundreds of thousands or even millions of victims each year and generates billions of dollars in profits for organized crime syndicates, trailing only drugs and weapons smuggling as a source of revenue for such groups. At the same time, trafficking in persons remains relatively low-risk, as prosecutions are rare and punishment typically light. In recent years, governments from every region of the world have engaged in a wide range of efforts to combat trafficking in persons. At the domestic and bilateral levels, these include new anti-trafficking legislation, specialized training of police and immigration officials, and foreign aid money dedicated to trafficking prevention and prosecution. There also have been a variety of multilateral initiatives designed to promote cross-border information sharing and law enforcement cooperation. In Asia, for example, countries participating in the Asian Regional Initiative Against Trafficking in Women and Children (ARIAT) have held a series of multilateral meetings and drafted a regional action plan – complemented by individual state plans – that calls for collaborative efforts to prevent and prosecute trafficking offenses and to protect and repatriate trafficking victims.

The most significant international initiative has been the drafting of the UN Trafficking Protocol described above. The scope of the protocol is limited to transnational trafficking by “organized crime groups,” but these groups are defined broadly enough to cover small trafficking networks as well as large, well-established crime syndicates.2  The focus of this initiative now is on increasing the number of states who are parties to the protocol, and encouraging states to take the necessary steps to bring their laws, policies, and practices in line with the agreement and thus facilitate coordinated anti-trafficking efforts. Currently, 104 countries have signed the protocol, but only six have taken the more meaningful step of acceding to or ratifying it. The disputes that marked the protocol negotiations indicate that there will be steep obstacles to achieving such cooperation, since countries’ common desire to combat trafficking masks important differences in their understanding of the practice and of the appropriate government response.

As a lobbyist at one of the protocol’s week-long negotiating sessions in June 2000, I found that the most hotly contested issue was the definition of trafficking itself, an issue debated perhaps even more vigorously among the women’s rights groups lobbying at the negotiations than among the government delegates. The disagreement focused on the meaning of “exploitation” within the context of trafficking for sexual purposes and on whether lack of consent is a necessary component of such trafficking. On one side, many argued that anyone who participates in the cross-border recruitment, transport, or procurement of a woman for the purpose of employment in the sex industry is guilty of transnational trafficking, regardless of their tactics, as commercial sex work is inherently abusive and a woman cannot legitimately “consent” to engage in it. Others countered that the concept of consent is critical to the definition of trafficking and that trafficking exists only where coercive tactics are used to extract a person’s labor, sexual or not (this applies only to adults; there is general agreement that a child cannot consent to sex work or other types of work that are injurious to children’s health or development). I support the latter position, and it is this understanding of the term that is used in this article, except where otherwise indicated. The outcome in the protocol was a compromise that allows signatories to define sexual exploitation for themselves.3 

Another significant area of debate related to the protections and services that governments should provide to victims of trafficking. Some countries – supported by myself and other lobbyists – argued that ensuring trafficked persons’ access to services such as temporary housing, medical care, and legal assistance was one of the fundamental purposes of having a separate protocol to deal with trafficking in persons, a crime in which the “product” is a person with needs and rights. In the final document, however, provisions related to services for victims were left highly discretionary. According to the protocol, governments “shall consider” providing such assistance “in appropriate cases” – language that contrasts strikingly with the mandatory terms used in provisions related to law enforcement issues.4  It was clear that for many countries, the priority was ensuring other nations’ cooperation in closing their borders against the illegal flow of trafficked persons and in cracking down on the threat posed by powerful crime syndicates. Protecting the victims of trafficking was a secondary issue.

My foremost concern was the human rights of trafficked persons. I had spent the last year and a half at Human Rights Watch conducting the final round of a several-year long research project documenting the trafficking of women from Thailand to Japan. We found that thousands of women from Thailand were being trafficked into slavery-like working conditions in Japan each year, and while both governments had expressed concern about the problem, little progress had been made in combating it.5  This article, which draws on the work I did for that project, describes the process of trafficking women from Thailand to Japan, the role of organized crime in perpetuating the trade, and the responses of the Japanese and Thai governments to the problem. Around the world, despite the numerous efforts and initiatives referred to above, traffickers continue to act with virtual impunity and trafficked persons remain unable to access the justice and compensation they deserve. I hope this case study will provide some insight into this dilemma and point the way toward a more effective approach to the problem.

Organized Crime in Japan and Thailand

Japanese organized crime groups—popularly referred to as “yakuza”—enjoy a highly established position in Japanese society. There are about 84,000 yakuza members, and while they are organized into more than 3,000 gangs, nearly 70 percent are affiliated with one of three major syndicates, the largest based in Kobe and the others based in Tokyo.6  Yakuza activities include a wide range of domestic and transnational crimes, such as loan sharking, prostitution, gambling, drug trafficking, gun smuggling, extralegal mediation in car accidents and other disputes, and a form of corporate extortion called “sokaiya,” in which yakuza demand payoffs by threatening to disrupt corporate shareholders’ meetings. In addition, as described in more detail below, the yakuza are principal actors in the traffic of migrant women into Japan’s commercial sex industry.

The yakuza operate in an unusually open style, as registered organizations with membership lists and headquarter buildings marked with their logos. Traditionally, they have been careful to spare the general public from violence and have used their considerable resources to help communities in times of emergency. Along with substantial bribes to government officials, this has helped them gain a wide degree of tolerance among civil society and the government. In recent years, however, attitudes have been changing in response to a growing number of political scandals involving large bribes by yakuza members, as well as concerns about the dangers posed by rising levels of drugs and gun violence. Perhaps the clearest sign of this shift is the Law Concerning Prevention of Unjust Acts by Boryokudan Members, which went into effect in 1992. (“Boryokudan,” or violent groups, is the government’s preferred term for organized crime groups.) This law allows police to designate certain organizations as boyrokudan – based on factors such as the proportion of convicted criminals in their membership – and then prohibit their members from perpetrating any of fifteen “acts of violent demand,” that include collecting debts with undue interest, engaging in sokaiya, or demanding “protection” money from local businesses.7  Japan’s National Policy Agency recently reported that this law was used to keep more than 2 billion yen (US$19.2 million8 ) out of gangsters’ hands in the year 2000 alone.9  Other recent legislative changes targeting organized crime include a 1991 law allowing police to confiscate assets purchased with drug proceeds, and a 1999 law permitting the use of wiretaps in investigations of crimes committed by organized crime groups involving drugs, guns, murders, and the smuggling of large numbers of people into Japan.10 

Thailand also has a large number of organized crime groups, although there is less information available about their size and structure. These groups derive enormous profits from activities such as gambling, drug dealing, and prostitution, and this money is used to perpetuate high levels of corruption throughout the Thai government. Since Thailand’s new constitution took effect in 1997, high profile efforts have been made to tackle the illegal economy and the pervasive official corruption. These efforts include establishing a National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC), as mandated in the constitution, as well as an Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), which was established under the 1999 Anti-Money Laundering Act. AMLO is authorized to investigate assets suspected of being acquired through one of seven illegal activities, including trafficking in persons and misuse of a public office.11  Both NCCC and AMLO have succeeded in carrying out a number of investigations over the past few years, but both also have come under criticism for ineffectiveness and misuse of power.

There is little indication that Thai crime groups are engaged directly in transnational criminal activities; instead, they participate in transnational crime through collaboration with foreign crime syndicates. A number of such groups – from China, Russia, Japan, Burma, and a host of other countries – have established a strong presence in Thailand. Among other illegal activities, these groups are engaged in the traffic of persons into Thailand (from countries such as Burma and Laos), through Thailand (for example, from China to other destinations in Asia and the United States), and out of Thailand (to countries that include Japan, Australia, and the US).12  Some point to the lax Thai visa policy – which until this year allowed nationals of more than 150 countries to enter without an advance visa – as fostering this situation, and in response to such concerns, about 100 countries recently were removed from this list.13  But more important factors are inadequate law enforcement by underpaid and corrupt police, and a culture in which buying influence and favors is routine.

The Roots of the Trade

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the beginning of the large-scale trafficking of women into Japan from Thailand, the Philippines, and other countries in Southeast and East Asia. This phenomenon coincided with a more general pattern of dramatic increases in both legal and illegal migration into Japan that continued through the early 1990s. The Japanese economy was booming, and the country was suffering from a severe shortage in unskilled labor. Migrant workers from throughout the region were attracted by the country’s relatively high wages. At the same time, opportunities for legal unskilled labor migration remained sharply limited, resulting in a growing workforce of undocumented migrants that peaked at nearly 300,000 in 1993. Since then, this number has declined somewhat with the weakening Japanese economy, but remains close to 250,000, nearly two and a half times the 1990 levels.14 

The rising demand for migrant women’s labor in Japan’s sex industry during this period was partly a consequence of the public outcry over “sex tours,” which had become very popular in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. These package tours organized by the yakuza brought Japanese men to countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand to engage in commercial sex with local women. The blatantly sexual purpose of the tours, compounded by revelations that local women saw only a small fraction of the fees that men paid for their services, led to strong public criticism. By the 1980s, in response to loud protests by feminist organizations in tour destination countries and in Japan, demand for sex tours had declined (although the practice still continues today), and the yakuza shifted their attention toward bringing foreign women into Japan instead.

Drawing on the contacts they had established, yakuza partnered with local agents throughout the region and developed transnational networks that were able to recruit large numbers of women each year, arrange their travel to Japan, and connect them with different employers in the Japanese sex industry. More recently, the yakuza have expanded these activities to other regions, building trafficking networks in the former Soviet republics, Colombia, and elsewhere.15  In addition to these large networks, smaller-scale agents have entered the trade, and in some cases, owners of adult entertainment businesses send agents overseas to work with local contacts in recruiting foreign women directly for their businesses. The following analysis focuses on the trafficking of women from Thailand to Japan by large crime syndicates, but smaller trafficking networks employ similar tactics.16 

Recruited from Thailand – Sold in Japan

Migration to Japan and other wealthy countries has become a common economic strategy for both men and women in Thailand, and trafficking networks operate within this context, recruiting women who are interested in working abroad. Some women are recruited directly from their hometowns, typically villages in northern Thai provinces such as Chiang Rai or Phayao; others have already migrated domestically to Bangkok or southern Thailand. In either case, the initial identification of women is handled by local “recruiters” who tell women about lucrative job opportunities in Japan and offer to introduce them to agents who can arrange their travel and employment. Recruiters generally approach women whom they have known for a long time – sometimes their relatives or neighbors – targeting those who are struggling with difficult financial and personal circumstances. If a woman expresses interest, the recruiter will introduce her to an agent, who may be a yakuza member residing in Thailand or a Thai national with links to Japanese gangs. The agent determines the woman’s “suitability” for work in Japan and makes the official employment offer. Once a woman agrees to go, the agent assists her in obtaining a passport and a tourist or transit visa (often by forging documents and or bribing officials), purchases her plane ticket to Japan, and arranges an escort for her trip. The agent also contacts a “job broker” in Japan to receive the woman once she arrives.

Recruiters and trafficking agents invariably mislead women about the jobs that await them in Japan. In the initial years of the trade, most Thai women were promised jobs as waitresses or factory workers and learned only after they arrived in Japan that they would be employed in the commercial sex industry. Today, the majority of the women know the nature of the work they will be doing, but continue to be deceived about the financial arrangements and labor conditions. By the time a woman arrives in Japan and fully understands the terms of her “contract,” she has already lost the ability to change her mind without risking violent retaliation from her traffickers. 

When trafficked women arrive in Japan, they are taken to a broker who negotiates their job placement arrangements. The women themselves have no input in this process: no opportunity to select or refuse an employer, nor any voice in setting the terms of the “contract.” It is often at this point that the coercive nature of the woman’s situation first becomes clear. Jo, who was trafficked to Japan in the early 1990s, told me about her first few days in Japan during an interview several years later. “At Narita airport [outside Tokyo],” she recalled, “someone was waiting for me and took the clothes and jewelry that [the agents in Thailand] had given me to wear. The person took me to the mama’s house in Tokyo. There were lots of women there and people came to choose women and buy them. I was bought on the third day and told that my price was 380 bai [3.8 million yen; US$30,000].”17  Another Thai woman, Khai, offered a similar description of her “job placement” in Japan in 1986: “I saw the money changing hands and didn’t know at first what it was about, but then realized I was being sold.”18 

A woman’s purchase price becomes the basis for an exorbitant “debt” that she will have to work off before she can earn any money for herself. Initial debt levels range from about 3 to 5 million yen, or about US$25,000 to US$45,000. Regardless of what promises were made in Thailand, these debts must invariably be paid through commercial sex work, typically in establishments operated by – or in close connection to – yakuza gangs. In some cases, women are sold to low-end brothels, where clients pay for short sessions of about eight or ten minutes and women may serve dozens of clients each day. Women who have been trafficked into such venues offer harrowing descriptions of their conditions, sometimes referring to them as “black jails.” I met a Thai woman named Bee shortly after her escape from a brothel in the spring of 1999. Bee described a grueling “contract” which forced her to serve 17 clients per day before she could even begin to repay her debt. “I had been promised a job as a waitress in a restaurant,” she explained, “but when I got to Japan I was sent to a brothel to work and told that I owed 4.5 million yen [US$38,000]. In addition, I had to pay 4,000 yen per day to the yakuza and 30,000 yen per day for the space where I worked. Each customer paid 12,000 yen for eight minutes, but I earned only 2,000 yen – the rest went to the brothel.”19 

More often, Thai women are sold to work as “hostesses” in somewhat more upscale establishments called “snack bars.” Here too, however, they are subjected to intense coercion and abuse. The following section describes the conditions in these bars in more detail, based on my own research as well as information from interviews with hundreds of trafficked Thai women conducted over the past decade by Thai and Japanese researchers and by staff in women’s shelters in Japan.20 

Working Conditions in the Snack Bars

In “baishun,” or prostitution, snack bars, the duties of the hostesses include serving drinks and snacks to customers at the bar and accompanying customers to nearby hotels to provide sexual services (there are many types of snack bars frequented by men and women in Japan; baishun snack bars – also called “dating” snack bars – are only one type). The bars are typically owned by Japanese men who are either members of the yakuza or have strong ties to gang members. They rely on gangs for “protection” against police raids and for “enforcement” services when needed to control the women they employ. Most of the direct responsibility for supervising the hostesses, however, falls on a female manager whom the women refer to as “mama” or “mama-san.” Like the hostesses, the mama is usually a migrant from Thailand or another Southeast or East Asian country and may be an undocumented worker herself.

While in debt, women are expected to obey all instructions from their employers both on and off the job. They work nearly every day – often even when sick – and may not refuse a customer or a customer’s request without their employer’s permission. The trafficking process leaves the women vulnerable to abuse in unfamiliar surroundings, where they are isolated by language barriers and separated from family and friends. The women view Japanese law enforcement officials as a source of fear, rather than protection, quickly understanding that as “illegal aliens” (even those with valid papers do not have permission to work in Japan) and “prostitutes” they are unlikely to receive sympathetic treatment at their hands. At best, they will be summarily deported and will return to Thailand empty-handed; they also could be held in detention for weeks or longer. Compounding these factors, the mamas confiscate the women’s passports, depriving them of proof of identity and heightening their fear of encountering Japanese authorities (foreigners in Japan are required to carry their passports at all times, and failure to produce one often results in detention for suspected immigration violations). Mamas also closely monitor the women at all times, and strictly limit their movements and communication. Moreover, the mamas control the women’s debt repayment calculations, and thus have the power to determine when the women will regain their freedom.

A variety of enforcement tactics – sometimes involving recourse to the yakuza – are used to ensure that women are obedient and do not try to escape before their debts are repaid. Infractions are met with punishments that include “fines” that increase women’s debt levels and thus extend their period of servitude, “resale” into renewed levels of debt at other bars or brothels, and beatings that can be severe depending on the offense. As Jo explained, “Girls were beaten if they didn’t agree, and the owner was close to the yakuza so he knew how to fight. Women were also fined for coming back late, fighting with each other, or not agreeing to sit with a client, so I did what I was told. Other women were beaten so badly they had to take days off.”21  The most serious infraction is attempting to escape. Trafficked women commonly recount stories they were told by their mamas or coworkers about women who were killed in failed escape attempts, with their bodies hidden in the forest or ocean, and in some cases threats are made against a woman’s family members back in Thailand. Chan, who was trafficked to Japan in early 1999, explained that at the snack bar where she worked, “The mama told us that if we tried to escape we would be followed and found by the yakuza or police” and that the penalty for asking a customer for help in escaping was being “sold to another place with double debt.”22  And Khai’s mama told her simply, “If anybody escaped from here, she would be killed.”23  It is not clear how often such death threats are carried out and the stories of escapees being murdered are difficult to verify, but snack bars’ yakuza connections make these accounts plausible, and true or not, they serve as an effective method of terrorizing women into obedience.

Despite these threats and other obstacles, some women do escape, in many cases with the assistance of a customer who helps them contact the Thai Embassy or the police. These women typically are referred to private women’s shelters while arrangements are made for their return to Thailand (public shelters in Japan do not accept undocumented migrants, regardless of the circumstances of their migration), and once the arrangements are complete, they are deported by the Immigration Bureau. More often, however, women continue working until they are released from their “contracts” after a period of servitude lasting anywhere from a few months to a year or more. There are two ways to gain release: by working until the mama says that the debt is “finished,” or by being “bought out” by a client who offers to pay a woman’s outstanding debt. After release, women typically remain in Japan, sometimes for several years, but now enjoy a greater degree of independence and – importantly – the ability to collect wages for the work that they do so that they can support their families in Thailand. Most continue working in the sex industry, sometimes at the same bars; others move on to other types of employment such as factory work. A women who is “bought out” is not entirely free of obligation. She often receives financial support from her “boyfriend” and typically spends only one or two days per week with him, allowing her to earn money on other days.

Eventually the vast majority of women return to Thailand, either voluntarily, after surrendering themselves to immigration officials (without a valid passport and visa, the women cannot simply return on their own), or forcibly, after being picked up in a police or immigration sweep. Those who surrender are not detained, but women picked up in raids are held in immigration detention centers while deportation arrangements are being made. This process can be swift if a woman has a valid passport and enough money for the trip home, but in other cases, collecting proof of identity and funds for the plane ticket can take several weeks or longer, leading to a prolonged period of detention. Then, like the escapees, the women are deported back to Thailand as “illegal aliens,” without any opportunity to claim their back wages or other damages.

The Response of the Japanese Government:

Trafficking Victim or Illegal Alien?

In January 2000, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored the “Asia-Pacific Symposium on Trafficking in Persons.” The Ministry’s Senior State Secretary gave a keynote presentation, acknowledging Japan’s role as a destination country for trafficked women and pointing to Japan’s participation in drafting the UN Trafficking Protocol as evidence of the country’s commitment to combating the trade. When members of law enforcement agencies took the podium, however, there was a notable change in attitude. The Director-General of the Immigration Bureau questioned whether Japan really had a problem with trafficking, insisting that incidents of coercion were rare and most supposed victims would be more accurately described as illegal migrants with crime syndicates “behind them.” When Japan’s Interpol President spoke, he cited statistics on the number of “stowaways” arrested for immigration violations and the number of foreign women arrested for prostitution and other similar charges as demonstration of Japan’s efforts to crack down on trafficking. No statistics were provided on arrests of traffickers or employers of undocumented migrants.24 

Japan’s response to trafficking has largely reflected this latter perspective. Women’s shelter staff, lawyers, researchers, and others who work with migrant women consistently describe the reluctance of police and immigration officers to investigate abuses by trafficked women’s job brokers and employers, complaining that authorities are more concerned with the immigration status of the women than with the abuses they have endured.25  As one police inspector explained, “If a foreign woman asks the koban [police box] for help, we first see if she is legal or illegal. If she is legal then we fight against the broker. If she is illegal then we have to send her to immigration.”26  And at immigration, their job is “deporting the women who are staying here illegally.”27  Immigration officials know that employers commonly withhold migrant women’s wages, so if a woman cannot afford the cost of her deportation, officials may track down her employer to demand that they cover her travel expenses. As long as that money is forthcoming, however, no action is taken against the employer.28  Some cases involving particularly extreme abuse and/or large numbers of undocumented workers are investigated, but even then the abuses suffered by the migrants are typically ignored. Traffickers are charged with immigration-related violations, procuring women for prostitution, or violating entertainment business regulations; crimes such as violence, illegal confinement, withheld wages (Japanese labor laws prohibit all forms of indebted labor), and coerced prostitution go unpunished.29 

The Japanese government’s failure to address these abuses stems in part from pervasive negative attitudes towards foreigners, and especially illegal aliens, who are commonly targeted as scapegoats for crime and other social problems. Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro, for example, often speaks of the dangers posed by Japan’s migrants and has drawn criticism from local advocates as well as the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination for his use of derogatory terms in describing them.30  The yakuza’s involvement in trafficking operations only compounds police reluctance to intervene. In part, this is because the yakuza bribe officers to protect their bars and other businesses from police crackdowns. But more important is the police practice of using yakuza as informers in investigations and, in exchange, looking the other way on other offenses. More specifically, police tolerate “lower priority” crimes against foreigners in order to gain yakuza cooperation in solving crimes such as drug dealing and extortion that are seen as threatening general public security.31 

In 1998, facing domestic and international pressure to address the trafficking situation, Japan adopted legislation specifically targeting tactics used by snack bar operators to control trafficked women. This legislation prohibits operators of entertainment businesses from imposing an unreasonably high debt (relative to the debtor’s ability to pay) that must be repaid at the time the debtor wants to leave his or her job. It also prohibits the operators from confiscating passports or other forms of identification from an employee upon whom an unreasonably high debt has been imposed. Significantly, however, no criminal penalties were provided for these offenses—those found in violation only would have their business licenses revoked32 —and nearly a year after the provision went into effect, the National Police Agency reported that it had not yet been used.33  To date, aside from this provision, Japan has not adopted any laws or policies designed to address the abuses endured by trafficked persons (there have been efforts to strengthen provisions against promoting or employing illegal migrant labor). In addition, it is has not ratified the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which it signed in December 2000, or signed the Trafficking Protocol.

Japan’s failure to adequately address crimes perpetrated against foreigners, including serious abuses such as trafficking and coerced sex work, leaves the victims of these crimes with virtually no access to justice or compensation. In addition, the government has no provisions for ensuring that the other needs of trafficked persons are met, a particularly problematic lapse given that government policies obstruct undocumented migrants’ access to basic services such as temporary shelter and emergency medical care. In an egregious example of these policies, the Ministry of Health and Human Services made the decision in 1990 to stop reimbursing hospitals for the cost of emergency care in cases where the patient is a temporary or undocumented migrant. Such reimbursement had been provided without regard for patients’ immigration status for more than 40 years.34  Finally, the Japanese government fails to provide trafficked women with any special consideration in the repatriation process. There are no policies or procedures in place to exempt persons from punitive treatment for immigration violations when the conditions of their migration or employment were deceptive or coercive. In keeping with Japan’s treatment of other foreigners arrested only on immigration charges, fines and jail terms typically are waived, but the policy of detention pending deportation (except in cases of voluntary surrender) and the five-year ban on applying for a visa after deportation are enforced.

A number of private nongovernmental organizations and concerned advocates in Japan have responded to the lack of services for trafficked women and other foreigners by providing shelter, medical care, legal assistance, and other critical support. In some cases, Japanese organizations also have developed ties with groups in Thailand to facilitate trafficked women’s continued access to services and support after their return. These efforts, however, are under-funded and under-staffed, and needs remain unmet.

The Response of the Thai Government: Protection or Protectionist?

The Thai government provides important assistance to its nationals in Japan, primarily through the Royal Thai Embassy in Tokyo. Their services are not directed specifically at trafficking victims, but according to embassy reports, most of the women they assist are trafficked into the country, though many have long paid off their initial “debts” before seeking assistance. The embassy facilitates women’s return to Thailand by issuing Certificates of Identity (papers that serve as temporary travel documents) to those who lack valid passports,35  and, when necessary, by helping women contact friends and family to collect the funds to cover their travel expenses. As a last resort, the embassy will provide women with a loan from the Thai government, on the condition that they cannot travel outside of Thailand again until it is repaid.36  Embassy officials also have developed connections with local women’s shelters where they can refer women who need a place to stay until deportation arrangements are complete, and there have been cases in which embassy officials have gotten actively involved in helping women escape from their employers, despite the personal risk involved.37  After women return to Thailand, the Thai government offers them additional assistance on a voluntary basis, including temporary shelter, counseling, and vocational training.

Over the past several years, combating trafficking in women and children, particularly for sexual purposes, has been high on Thai policymakers’ agenda, and substantial efforts have been made to strengthen the country’s anti-trafficking legislation. In 1996 and 1997, revisions to the Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act and to the Penal Code increased penalties for transnational trafficking in persons, especially where the victims are children. In addition, the Measures in Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children Act (hereinafter, the Trafficking Act) was substantially revised to enhance the ability of law enforcement and judicial officials to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases. One of the new provisions in this law is specifically designed to address the problem of witness intimidation, a major obstacle to prosecuting trafficking cases and other offenses involving organized crime in Thailand. To minimize the risk of such intimidation, courts may take the testimony of trafficking victims as soon as complaints are filed and later use their statements as evidence if a suspect is indicted. In a further effort to protect victims and other witnesses in organized crime cases, a witness protection bill was proposed in 1999 – three years later, the legislation is still under consideration, but appears to be moving forward.38 

Complementing these legislative changes, the Thai government released a “Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] on Common Guidelines of Practices for Agencies Concerned with Cases Where Women and Children are Victims of Human Trafficking” in 1999. This MOU provides detailed information for police and other officials involved in responding to trafficking cases and was drafted under the leadership of Senator Saisuree Chutikhul in a major collaborative effort between the government, nongovernmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations in Thailand. Among other things, the MOU explains the advance testimony provision described above and directs police to inform the Department of Public Welfare or a nongovernmental organization about all trafficking cases, so that a social worker or similarly trained person can participate in the investigation and ensure that the victims are treated appropriately.39  In December 2001, Thailand committed itself to further measures to combat trafficking in persons by signing the UN Trafficking Protocol, though it has yet to ratify the protocol or the main convention, which it signed in December 2000.

Unfortunately, the impact of Thailand’s law enforcement efforts has been undermined by the insufficient training of police and other relevant officials with respect to new laws and policies. Two years after the revised Trafficking Act was enacted, for example, a high level police officer I spoke with insisted that no such law existed, despite the fact that the province where he was stationed had a large-scale problem of girls and women being trafficked from Burma.40  Advocates confirmed that they often found themselves instructing police on the content of Thailand’s anti-trafficking legislation as they sought to facilitate investigations.41  In addition, despite the government’s efforts to combat corruption, it remains difficult to investigate and prosecute offenses such as trafficking in which organized crime groups and large profits are involved, as people at all levels of the law enforcement and judicial system – including the judges – often can be bought off.

Further undermining Thailand’s efforts, is a protectionist approach toward trafficking that sometimes pits the government against the very women it is trying to “protect.” Thailand’s laws define sexual trafficking as the procurement of a person for an indecent sexual act “with or without her consent.”42  In keeping with this definition, its trafficking prevention measures target both consensual and nonconsensual activity by potential “victims,” and they include elements that infringe on women’s rights to privacy, equal treatment, and freedom from arbitrary detention. The 1997 amendments to the Trafficking Act, for example, allow officials to conduct body searches of women and children and to detain them for up to 10 days (with the permission of the Director General of the Police Department or the provincial governor) if they are suspected not of committing a trafficking offense, but of being the victims of one.43  And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs subjects the passport applications of women aged 14 to 36 years to a special review process designed to identify women “being procured to sexual business in foreign countries.” After an initial review, suspicious applications are referred to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) for an investigation that that can include invasive interrogations of applicants’ family members about financial and other personal details. Each year, hundreds of women are refused passports through this process for reasons that include, “she doesn’t have work in Thailand; her family doesn’t have enough money to give her to travel; her documents, such as her marriage license, aren’t valid; the address she gave for her boyfriend – if she says she is going abroad to marry – isn’t correct.”44  A DPW official who participates in these reviews provided some insight into the effectiveness of this policy, explaining, “If a woman’s application is rejected, then she will change her surname and try again.”45 

The government’s anti-trafficking education campaigns also are based on the premise that women need to be protected from migrating to countries where they are likely to be employed in the sex industry, rather than protected within the course of migration for sex work or other employment. This message rings hollow to women who have chosen to engage in sex work – or who are willing to risk ending up in it – in order to support their families, including women who already are working in Thailand’s large sex industry. Thus, while the government’s efforts to warn women about the dangers of migration to Japan and other countries have contributed positively to raising women’s awareness of the risks involved, they have not stemmed the flow of trafficking nor provided women with information they could use to protect themselves while migrating. Some nongovernmental organizations have responded with education efforts that include information about trafficking abuses as well as telephone numbers women can call for assistance when abroad.

A similar bias is evident in the range of services that the Thai government offers to women who have been trafficked to Japan. While the government facilitates trafficked women’s repatriation, it does not offer them any legal assistance to facilitate their access to justice or compensation for withheld wages and other abuses. This gap in services is particularly striking given that the Thai Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare has posted a Labor Attaché in Tokyo for the express purpose of providing assistance to (documented and undocumented) migrants in labor disputes. When I called the attaché to set up a meeting to discuss her work with female migrants, she quickly cut me off, explaining, “If you are interested in women you should speak to the First Secretary at the Thai Embassy. We don’t work with women.”46  A ministry official in Bangkok confirmed that the Thai government “classifies this work [done by female migrants] differently ... It’s unusual work so it’s not covered by the Labor Attaché.”47 

A New Approach

Japan is a major destination country for trafficked persons, but it has failed to adequately acknowledge or address this problem. Combating trafficking and responding to the needs of trafficked persons will require a significant reevaluation of the government’s attitude toward migrants and a commitment to prioritize the protection of human rights – including the rights of foreigners – above immigration objectives and other government interests. In addition, Japanese authorities will have to adopt a more aggressive approach to combating organized crime, at the very least ensuring that coercive labor practices are among the offenses that will not be tolerated, regardless of the victims’ immigration status.  The Japanese government should take several specific measures: First, it should signal its commitment to combating trafficking in persons and protecting the rights of trafficking victims and other migrants by adopting the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Trafficking Protocol, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Second, the Japanese government should actively investigate, prosecute, and punish coercive or otherwise abusive employment conditions regardless of the victim’s immigration status, imposing penalties consistent with the gravity of the abuse. Third, it should ensure migrants’ access to legal redress for labor violations and other abuses suffered in Japan, especially where there is evidence of violence and/or coercion. Fourth, it should protect trafficked persons from further victimization by exempting them from all penalties associated with their immigration status and by facilitating their access to basic services, such as appropriate (non-punitive) temporary shelter, medical care, and legal assistance. In all of its efforts, the government should coordinate closely with nongovernmental organizations and other advocates in Japan who have extensive experience working with trafficked persons and foreigners more generally.

The Thai government has prioritized the issue of trafficking in persons and provides a number of important services for trafficked Thai women. Despite its efforts, however, the government has had little success in curbing the incidence of trafficking, and significant reform will be needed to improve the effectiveness of its anti-trafficking measures. To this end, the Thai government should pursue the following strategies: First, it should revise anti-trafficking legislation and policies to ensure that they target the deceptive and coercive tactics used by traffickers, rather than the consensual migration of (adult) women for work in the sex industry or other areas, and ensure that all anti-trafficking efforts are consistent with respecting women’s rights. Second, it should expand anti-trafficking education campaigns to include information on safe migration for women, and expand services for trafficked women to include legal assistance. As a first step in this direction, the Labor Attaché in Japan should be instructed and trained to promote the rights of migrant Thai women in disputes with their employers. Third, it should use the Memorandum of Understanding on trafficking to train police and other law enforcement personnel regarding the proper response to trafficking cases. Fourth, it should adopt witness protection legislation and continue to strengthen efforts to combat official corruption (these goals are interrelated, as corruption in the law enforcement system will undermine any effort to protect witnesses).

Combating transnational trafficking in persons and responding adequately to the needs of trafficking victims also requires cooperation between the countries of origin and destination. The Japanese and Thai governments should work together in law enforcement efforts, in the provision of services to trafficked persons, and in ensuring trafficked persons’ safe and non-punitive repatriation. In addition, bilateral discussions should be initiated with the objective of increasing Thai women’s economic options through expanding both educational and employment opportunities in Thailand and also opportunities for legal labor migration to Japan.

An effective response to the trafficking of women from Thailand to Japan must address trafficked women’s rights and needs, and must reflect an understanding of the fact that trafficked women are, at the same time, victims of severe slavery-like human rights abuses and migrant workers struggling to support themselves and their families. The forces driving the traffic in women include organized crime, government corruption, poverty, and economic disparity. These are complicated and intractable problems, so it is not surprising that combating the trade is a difficult task. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is much more that Japan and Thailand could do to prevent and prosecute trafficking offenses and to protect the victims of this crime.

Endnotes

 1 There are two other optional protocols with the convention: the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air was adopted with the convention and the Trafficking Protocol, and a protocol on firearms was adopted the following May.

 2 Article 2 of the convention provides the following definitions:

(a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;

(b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty;

(c) “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.

 3 According to the protocol: ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”

 4 See Article 6(3). Somewhat less discretionary language is used in protection provisions related to the victims’ physical safety (Article 6(5)) and certain legal rights (Article 6(1, 2, 6)), but a marked difference remains between the strength of these provisions and the rest of the protocol.

 5 The results of this research were published in September 2000 in the Human Rights Watch report Owed Justice: Thai Women Trafficked into Debt Bondage in Japan.

 6 For more information, including a list of yakuza syndicates (also called “boyrokudan”), see the Web site of the National Center for the Elimination of Boryokudan: http://www1m.mesh.ne.jp/BOUTSUI/english/e-index.htm

 7 This law functions somewhat like a restraining order. If members of a designated group engage in one of the prohibited practices, the local public safety commission will issue a “stop order” and anyone violating such an order may be punished with up to a year imprisonment or a fine of up to one million yen. For more information about this law and a list of designated boryokudan syndicates, see: http://www1m.mesh.ne.jp/BOUTSUI/english/e-index.htm

 8 Here and below, the value of Japanese yen in U.S. dollars is calculated based on the average yen-dollar exchange rate for the relevant year.

 9 “Extortion clamped down under 10 years of antigangster law,” Japan Economic Newswire, February 27, 2002.

 10 “Ministry to report no wiretapping since law entered into force,” Japan Economic Newswire, February 8, 2001; Barbara Wanner, “More eyes on yakuza’s role in Japanese economy,” Japan Economic Institute, May 8, 1992.

 11 For more information, see AMLO’s website: http://www.amlo.go.th/about/AMLO_E.html

 12 For more information on organized crime in Thailand and the role of foreign mafia, see: Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, and Nualoi Treerat, Guns, girls, gambling, ganja: Thailand’s illegal economy and public policy. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1998); Achara Ashayagachat And Dpa, “Human Trafficking: Gangs Make Thailand a Regional Hub: Yakuza Operating with Local Mafia,” Bangkok Post, September 6, 2000; Joshua Kurlantzick, “Criminals flock to friendly Thailand,” The Washington Times, January 2, 2001; Antony Davis, “Bangkok as Crime Central: Where international gangs are settling scores,” Asiaweek.com magazine, 26(40), October 13, 2000.

 13 Imtiaz Muqbil, “Visas, politics blip on positive horizon,” Bangkok Post, January 2, 2002.

 14 These estimates are based on official figures regarding the number of persons overstaying their visas in Japan, the vast majority of whom are believed to be working illegally. They do not capture those who bypass immigration controls and enter Japan through illegal channels, without any visa at all. For government estimates, see: Japan’s Ministry of Justice, “Deportation of Foreign Nationals: Illegal entry, Illegal work, Illegal activities,” The Immigration Bureau’s Duties (2001). Retrieved January 14, 2002 from the World Wide Web: http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-11.html 

 15 See, for example, “Colombia-Japan Prostitution Ring Broken Up,” EFE New Service, December 25, 2000.

 16 Chitraporn Vanaspong, “Key Players: They may be abused an looked down upon, but Thai prostitutes are key players in an illegal game that generates billions of baht each year in Japan,” Bangkok Post, August 18, 1996.

 17 Interview, Chiang Rai province, Thailand, April 25, 1999. Here and below, all names of trafficked women have been changed.

 18 Interview, Chiang Rai province, Thailand, April 24, 1999.

 19 Interview, Tokyo, Japan, April 16, 1999.

 20 See Human Rights Watch, Owed Justice: Thai Women Trafficked from Thailand into Debt Bondage in Japan (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2000); Nobuya Tomita, “From Thailand to Japan: The Reality of Trafficking in Women, Voices from a Shelter,” in Women’s Research and Action Committee, Forum on Asian Immigrant Workers [ed.], NGOs’ Report on the Situation of Foreign Migrant Women in Japan and Strategies for Improvement: for the Fourth World Conference on Women, September 4-15, 1995, Beijing (Tokyo: 1995); Interview with Dr. Suriya Samutkupt, Professor of Anthropology at the Suranaree University of Technology, Nakhon Ratchiasima, Thailand, April 27, 1999; Interview with the director of a women’s shelter [name withheld], Tokyo, Japan, April 8, 1999.

 21 Interview, Chiang Rai province, Thailand, April 25, 1999.

 22 Interview, Tokyo, Japan, April 16, 1999.

 23 Interview, Chiang Rai province, Thailand, April 24, 1999.

 24 Presentations at the Asia-Pacific Symposium on Trafficking in Persons, Tokyo, Japan, January 20, 2000.

 25 Interview with Attorney Tadanori Onitsuka, Tokyo, Japan, April 17, 1999; interview with the director of a women’s shelter [name withheld], Tokyo, Japan, April 8, 1999; interview with Attorney Yoko Yoshida, Kyoto, Japan; interview with Kinhide Mushakoji, Secretary-General of IMADR, Tokyo, Japan, April 9, 1999.

 26 Interview with Police Inspector Koshikawa, Tokyo, Japan, April 15, 1999.

 27 Interview with immigration officer Makiyoshi Uehara, Tokyo, Japan, April 15, 1999.

 28 Interview with a local government labor official in Tokyo [name withheld], Tokyo, Japan, April 14, 1999; interview with Attorney Yoko Yoshida, Kyoto, Japan, April 13, 1999.

 29 See interviews cited in notes 25 and 28. See also reports in the Japanese press, for example: “Bangkok resident arrested in recruitment of Thai women,” Kyodo News International, January 24, 2000; “3 Thais arrested for arranging prostitution in Japan,” Japan Economic Newswire, August 12, 1999.

 30 “Group wants Tokyo ward mayor to apologize for racist remark,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 19, 2001.

 31 Interview with Kinhide Mushakoji, Secretary-General of IMADR, Tokyo, Japan, April 9, 1999.

 32 See Article 18-2 of the Law on Control and Improvement of Amusement Businesses (also called the Entertainment Businesses Law).

 33 Personal communication with Fumie Saito, Legislative Aide to Senator Mizuho Fukushima, Member of the House of Councilors, Japan, March 16, 2000.

 34 Japan Civil Liberties Union, “1998 Report Concerning the Present Status of Human Rights in Japan (Third Counter Report).” Though hospitals remain obligated to accept all persons with emergency medical needs, advocates report that this change in policy has led to a significant problem of migrants being turned away. Dr. Sawada, who works with the Kanagawa Workers’ Medical Cooperative at the Minatomachi Medical Center, explained that a few prefectures have decided to use local government money to reimburse hospitals for the emergency care of foreigners, but most local governments have not taken such steps and the impact of the differing policies is noticeable: “In Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures where they have this [reimbursement] system, it is much better than in Chiba and Ibaraki, where they don’t and acceptance of uninsured migrants is low.” (Interview, Tokyo, Japan, April 7, 1999.)

 35 The embassy in Japan issues hundreds of these certificates each month, just over half to women. Women typically must present some proof of identity, but embassy officials will assist them in collecting such documents from family members in Thailand and also can issue certificates based exclusively on a personal interview. (Interview with Nopporn Ratchewej, First Secretary of the Royal Thai Embassy, April 15, 1999.)

 36 Interview with Maliwan, Japan Desk Officer, Division of Protection of Thai Nationals Abroad, Consular Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand, April 30, 1999.

 37 Interview with Nopporn Ratchewej, First Secretary of the Royal Thai Embassy, April 15, 1999.

 38 Thongbai Thongpao, “Vital new law will protect witnesses,” The Bangkok Post, December 9, 2001; “Duangchalerm Case: No special witness security; protection bill still before parliament,” Bangkok Post, May 9, 2002.

 39 Office of the National Commission on Women’s Affairs, Office of the Permanent Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, Thailand, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Guidelines of Practices for Agencies Concerned with Cases Where Women and Children are Victims of Human Trafficking, B.E. 2541 (1999).”

 40 Interview with a police colonel [name withheld], northern Thailand, April 26, 1999.

 41 Interview with advocates [names withheld], Bangkok, Thailand, April 22, 1999.

 42 Section 282 of the Penal Code. Similar provisions exist in the Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act.

 43 Sections 9 and 10 discuss searching and detaining victims, respectively.

 44 Department of Public Welfare, Thailand’s Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, 1998, p. 9; interview with Suwaree Jaiharn, Occupational Assistance Division, Department of Public Welfare, Thailand’s Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, April 28, 1999.

 45 Interview with Suwaree Jaiharn, Occupational Assistance Division, Department of Public Welfare, Thailand’s Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, April 28, 1999.

 46 Telephone communication with Pranee Sukkar, Minister-Counselor, Office of Labor Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, April 7, 1999.

 47 Interview with Jintana, Division of Foreign Affairs Coordination, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, Bangkok, Thailand, April 29, 1999.