With the approaching retirement of Jiang Zemin as President and Communist Party general secretary, Chinese foreign policy towards the US may change under the new leadership of Hu Jintao. Willy Lam considers the future of Sino-US relations, in light of the expected changes in the Chinese leadership and the policies of the Bush administration.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam is Senior China Analyst for the Asia-Pacific Bureau of CNN. From 1989 to 2000 he was China Editor for the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. He is the author of several books, including China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle in Beijing since Tiananmen (J. Wiley & Sons, 1995) and The Era of Jiang Zemin (Prentice Hall, 1999). Lam is currently writing a book on Hu Jintao and the Fourth Generation Leadership in China.

Superficially, nothing too exciting was accomplished at the February summit between Presidents George W. Bush and Jiang Zemin in Beijing. On a number of issues, including Taiwan as well as religious and civil freedoms, both sides merely agreed to disagree. Jiang, who had earlier characterized relations with the US as a “constructive, cooperative relationship,” said at his joint press conference with Bush that he was happy they were able to “seek common ground while shelving differences.” Bush said on the same occasion, “we believe that we can discuss our differences with mutual understanding and respect.”

The American leader also called bilateral ties “mature and respectful,” an assessment with which the Jiang leadership fully concurred. At least from the Chinese perspective, however, Jiang and Bush did more than to the merely agree to disagree. At the summit, the two presidents committed both governments to regular high-level exchanges on issues ranging from human rights to arms non-proliferation. Moreover, joint commissions on economics, commerce and trade as well as science and technology were established, with their first meetings to be held in the coming year.

Nevertheless, Jiang, who is Beijing’s highest foreign policy-maker, realizes that the new “constructive, cooperative relationship” with the US is a few rungs down the diplomatic ladder from the “constructive, strategic partnership” that he had agreed to forge with former president Bill Clinton in 1998. The idea of “strategic partnership” had meant not only that Washington would abandon what Beijing perceived to be an “anti-China containment policy,” but also would be willing to work on thorny issues such as Taiwan. The Clinton administration’s flexibility on Taiwan was evident when the former president enunciated the “Three Nos policy” (no to Taiwan independence; no to one China, one Taiwan; and no to Taiwan joining international bodies whose admission criteria include statehood) during a visit to Shanghai in 1998.

Beijing was alarmed when Bush labeled the US and China “strategic competitors” during his election campaign in 2000. Jiang and his advisers feared that Bush, along with “China-bashing hawks” in the Pentagon and the US Congress, were about to revive the Cold War agenda of encircling China and thwarting its development into a great power. Thus, Bush’s new-found willingness to engage in a dialogue with Beijing – albeit on the somewhat minimalist premise of focusing on common interests and temporarily setting aside differences – represented significant progress, despite the fact that it took September 11 for the Bush administration to realize the importance of maintaining a hotline to the Beijing leadership.1 

At stake are the growing economic ties between the two nations – bilateral trade was more than $80 billion in 2001, a jump of 32 times since 1978 – as well as shared interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.2  Bush hopes that Beijing will continue its policy of acquiescence in, if not full-fledged support for, America’s anti-terrorism campaign in Central Asia and other hot spots. On the other hand, Jiang expects Washington to help rein in the pro-independence gambit of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian.

While it is likely that Beijing will maintain its largely conciliatory policy toward the US in the foreseeable future, it is prudent to presume that such a policy will undergo significant mutations later this decade. Beijing will witness a changing of the guard at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 16th Congress this autumn. Moreover, the country is undergoing unprecedented socio-economic changes after its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and such changes will necessarily impact foreign policy.

The Underpinnings of Beijing’s Conciliatory US Policy

In an internal session to prepare for Bush’s February visit, Jiang reiterated Beijing’s generally placatory policy toward Washington:  “If necessary, we can make concessions [to America] for 20 more years.” The President and Communist Party chief was referring to the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping’s instructions that good ties with America were essential to China’s economic development in the first decades of the new century.3  In the early 1990s, Deng, who was fully in charge of foreign policy, laid down a series of well-known dictums on diplomacy, the best known of which was: “Keep a cool head, maintain a low profile and never take the lead.” With particular reference to the US, the late paramount leader also instructed: “Boost cooperation and avoid trouble and confrontation.”

Ties between the two countries were jolted soon after Bush entered the White House. The CCP leadership was alarmed by a series of “unilateralist,” even “anti-Chinese” actions by the new Republican administration. They included the decision to shift the focus of US military forces from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region; enhanced strategic cooperation with Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia; the deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system; Bush’s declaration that the US would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan if it is attacked by mainland China; and the White House’s decision to sell to Taiwan a package of sophisticated weapons that included diesel-fueled submarines.4  Beijing’s military and civilian strategists were convinced that Bush was reviving the Cold War agenda of pursuing an “anti-China containment policy.”

By and large, however, the Jiang administration has maintained a moderate, even conciliatory stance toward Washington, to the extent that the Chinese President is widely criticized by hard-line army officers and nationalistic professors and students for pursuing a pro-US policy.5  This was apparent with the so-called EP3 incident of April 1, in which a US spy plane was forced to land on Hainan Island after a collision with a Chinese jetfighter. A few days before the Easter holidays, Jiang agreed to release the EP3 crew detained on Hainan without any apparent concessions from the US. Washington’s view was that because the Chinese pilot who intercepted the spy plane was at fault, the crew should have been released immediately, and that Beijing had cynically used the incident to whip up an anti-American frenzy among the public. However, Jiang, who took early action to prevent college students from holding anti-US demonstrations, was faulted not only by nationalists but also the general public for being too soft on Washington.

Beijing also adopted a generally cooperative attitude toward the American war on terrorism. While the CCP leadership had consistently opposed efforts in the past by countries and blocs, including the US and NATO, to “interfere in the domestic affairs” of other countries, it opted for a policy of acquiescence toward the US-led coalition’s incursion into Afghanistan. Equally significantly, officials and the state media did not play up the potential threat to China posed by the much-enhanced US presence in Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, despite the perception among civilian and military strategists that the quasi-permanent stationing of US troops close to China’s western borders would further promote America’s containment policy. Given China’s plans to import petroleum from or build pipelines through Central Asian countries, Chinese observers also worried about a threat to the country’s “petroleum security.” Furthermore, the American presence in Central Asia will undermine one of Jiang’s major diplomatic initiatives: setting up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization mechanism (a grouping of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan) as a counterweight to the perceived eastward expansion of NATO.6 

Then came the alleged bugging of Jiang’s personal jet, the so-called Chinese Air Force One. Although the incident was not reported until January 2002, Chinese state security personnel had discovered listening devices on board the plane as early as September 2001. Since the Boeing aircraft had been outfitted by four contractors on US soil, some in China suspected US government involvement. Nonetheless, Beijing has kept mum on the incident, if only because more than 20 Chinese army officers responsible for buying the plane and guarding it during the outfitting period were arrested for alleged corruption.7  And on the eve of Bush’s February visit, Beijing showed it was willing to roll out the red carpet by releasing Hong Kong resident Li Guangqiang, who was arrested last year for smuggling bibles into Fujian Province.

Economic arguments have remained paramount in explanations of Beijing’s forbearance. In a dialogue with the faculty and students of Tsinghua University last summer, Premier Zhu Rongji defended the Jiang leadership’s decision to release the EP3 crew with the now-familiar argument that China needed access to the US market and investments to speed up economic development. Moreover, at that juncture, Beijing required Washington’s blessings in areas ranging from accession to the WTO to hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics.8 

In recent months, Beijing’s top US experts in the areas of defense, diplomacy and foreign trade have been working on what they call a ratio of relative interdependence. While a ratio of 50:50 denotes an equal degree of mutual dependence, the figure was 70:30 until the mid-1990s, meaning China needed the US much more than the US needed China. However, the experts believe a ratio of around 60:40 better reflects the current stage of mutual economic dependence. The change is mainly due to China’s fast-growing economic clout, and the reliance of American companies such as Boeing and Motorola on the China market.9  Beijing is convinced that when the relevant ratio has reached 50:50, it will be easier for the two countries to solve bilateral problems, including Taiwan. Put another way, it will be more difficult for Washington to continue bullying China. Before parity is reached, however, Beijing has to swallow its pride and “seek cooperation instead of confrontation.”

The second reason behind Jiang’s conciliatory US policy is that in view of the wild gyrations in bilateral relations since the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen massacre, Beijing is eager to stabilize ties with Washington. Particularly given the Bush administration’s “unilateralist” foreign policy and its perceived coziness with Taipei, the Jiang administration realizes that the old goal of a “constructive strategic partnership” is unrealistic. However, Jiang hopes that the post-September 11 reality – namely, Washington’s need for Chinese cooperation in the long-term fight against terrorism – might provide a platform for focusing on common interests and setting aside differences.10 

Beijing also hopes that a mechanism of regular consultation can be established to increase cooperation and iron out differences in areas including economic cooperation, human rights, terrorism, and arms proliferation. Both sides first agreed to resume regular meetings on subjects such as arms proliferation and human rights soon after September 11. Additional momentum on this score was symbolized by the setting up an FBI branch in Beijing, which was agreed upon during the presidential summit.11 

In return for Beijing’s placatory stance on the anti-terrorism issue and other fronts, Jiang hopes the US will accommodate Beijing’s concerns about curbing independence movements within China. Early in the anti-terrorism campaign, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry raised a quid pro quo: in return for Beijing’s support for the American campaign in Afghanistan, Washington should stop interfering in Chinese actions vis-à-vis Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In Chinese documents, anti-Beijing elements in Xinjiang, and to some extent Tibet, are labeled “splittists,” religious extremists and terrorists. Chinese cadres have insisted in official statements that there be no “double standards” on anti-terrorism. This means that the West should not frown on Beijing’s own crusade against “East Turkestan terrorists” in Xinjiang, who according to  the Chinese, have received training from the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

 The Bush administration has indicated there would be no “selling out of Taiwan” despite Washington’s desire to secure Beijing’s cooperation in the long-term struggle against terrorism. In fact, in his Asian tour, Bush repeatedly cited the Taiwan Relations Act and Washington’s obligation to defend the island if it is invaded. However, it is apparent that in return for Chinese acquiescence in the US offensives in Central Asia, the Bush administration has obliged Beijing to some extent. While the White House has raised a hue and cry over “bible smuggler” Li and other religious prisoners, it has largely remained silent over the more serious case of the detention of more than 2,000 Uighurs in western and southern Xinjiang since late September.12 

The Wild Card in Bilateral Ties: The Taiwan Factor

While from the US perspective, good relations with China hinge on a number of factors including trade, human rights, weapons non-proliferation, Taiwan and Tibet, for the Chinese one question matters much more than the others: Taiwan. Thus, the Taiwan issue will continue to be the wild card in bilateral ties.

As discussed above, Beijing’s reaction to the Bush administration’s closeness with Taipei has been largely moderate. In addition to arms sales to Taipei, Washington allowed a number of top Taiwan officials – including President Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu – to stop in the US during “transits” to Central and South American countries. In March 2001, Washington permitted Taiwan Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming to attend a defense-related seminar in Florida – the first time that a Taiwan defense minister was allowed into the US since the US de-recognized Taiwan in 1979. There is little doubt in Beijing’s mind that Bush has gone back on pledges on Taiwan that were made by the Clinton administration.13 

However, Beijing has refrained from high-decibel reactions such as stepping up war games along the coast. Rather, it has focused on three strategies. One is to stress that it does not serve American interests to be dragged into a mainland-Taiwan dispute. Beijing has reminded Washington that it has extended a series of olive branches to Taiwan the past year, including Vice-Premier Qian’s statement in early 2002 that certain categories of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) members were welcome to visit the mainland.

Second, Beijing has relied on the “business card” to lure more Taiwan investors and professionals to invest, work and live in the mainland. Beijing’s hope is that if Taiwan becomes even more dependent economically on the mainland, there will be a limit to the extent that the DPP administration can  pursue independence. Beijing’s success in luring even high tech Taiwan firms to industrial parks in Shanghai and Guangdong has been a factor in the reduction of tension across the Taiwan Strait. Some Chinese experts on Taiwan have cited the “Canada analogy” – a reference to the fact that given Canada’s economic dependence on the US, Ottawa has no choice but to subsume the country’s foreign and defense policy under that of Washington. As Jiang Zemin remarked in one internal session, if Taiwan is dependent on China economically, “the Monkey King can’t get out of the grip of [Buddha] Rulai.”14 

Third, the PLA has persevered with preparations for the eventuality of a “military option” against Taiwan. The stockpiling of short to medium-range missiles in at least three bases in Fujian and Jiangxi Provinces has progressed unabated. The US and Taiwan media have quoted experts as saying that more than 400 such missiles, some on mobile launchers, have been installed in these two coastal provinces.

In the final analysis, however, the Jiang leadership thinks that China’s sheer economic might  will eventually persuade Washington that it is in America’s best interest to gravitate toward China and gradually “dump” Taiwan. Chinese cadres have remarked in internal meetings upon the change of attitude on the part of various European countries concerning China’s human rights record. Because of enhanced trade with and investments in China, fewer European countries are willing to confront China in the annual meeting of the UN Subcommittee on Human Rights held in Geneva every spring.15 

The Military Dimension: Finding Tupokou

It would, of course, be naïve to think that the CCP leadership will depend merely on the “economic card” to pursue diplomatic objectives. Beijing has always insisted that it has a right to develop a military force commensurate with its economic and geopolitical clout. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has in absolute terms enjoyed sizeable budget increases since the late 1990s. In 2001, it got a 17.7% budget hike over the previous year, and this year, the margin of increase is 17.6%.16  The projected military spending for 2002 – 166 billion yuan (about US $20.5 billion) – constitutes more than 1.5% of China’s GDP. While it is substantially lower than the American 5%, Western PLA experts estimate that actual defense outlays in China are about three times the published figures. Most of the funds for research and development of new weapons, for example, come from hidden civilian budgets.

Beijing is basically following tactics that Mao called “walking on two legs” and Deng characterized as “fighting with two fists.” Should diplomacy and trade fail, naked might would be a means to pursue objectives in the international  and Taiwan arenas. Chinese military sources say Jiang has for a long time instructed his military aides to find ways to counter American “hegemonism” and unilateralism. “We must find tupokou [breakthrough points] to check American preponderance,” the president said earlier this year. Jiang, who also serves as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has also asked PLA strategists to find the weak links in the American defense system.

Last December, the Jiang leadership reacted in a surprisingly muted fashion to Washington’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Moscow, even though this was a sign that the US is determined to develop the NMD soon. Beijing is very aware that an Asia-based missile defense system that incorporates Japan, South Korea and Taiwan may be used as an effective weapon in “containing” China. After all, Taipei has been lobbying for the past two years to be included in such an anti-missile framework. How to thwart the NMD is the latest addition to the many priority tasks slapped on the PLA for the period covered by the 10th Five Year Plan (2001 to 2005). It is believed that the PLA is currently building upon Russian military technology to develop new models of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or missiles with multiple warheads.17 

Beijing also decided earlier this year to set up an inter-departmental organ to speed up defense-related research and development. The new body is composed of leading cadres from the Commission for Science and Technology for National Defense (a unit of the State Council, or central government), the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Since these three units are not within the military establishment, funds that the new organ has earmarked for military R&D need not come from the PLA budget. At the plenary session of the National People’s Congress in March, Jiang in his capacity as CMC chairman repeatedly pledged that the state will be unstinting in providing more resources for the PLA’s “high-tech transformation.” Given that issues such as the PLA’s arms build-up have been a source of friction between China and the US, the PLA’s relentless high-tech drive could further complicate bilateral ties.

Jiang’s Legacy: “Great Power Diplomacy”

A key reason why Jiang has pushed what his critics call a “pro-US policy” is that the core of the Third Generation leadership – the group of septuagenarian leaders including Zhu Rongji and Li Peng – hopes that improvement of ties with the US and the European Union will go down in history as one of his major legacies. Jiang is due to give up his position as party general secretary at the 16th CCP Congress this autumn and the post of President in March 2003. With retirement just one year away, the 75-year-old stalwart is very conscious of his place in the history books – particularly how he will fare when compared with First and Second Generation titans, namely Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.

Jiang and his publicists have come to the conclusion that the President has broken new ground on diplomacy, especially China’s relations with First World countries and groupings such as the US and the EU. This “great power diplomacy” – a reference to China’s ability to perform on the world stage on par with great powers like the US and the EU – will be featured prominently in the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin to be published this year.18 

A centerpiece of Jiang-style great power diplomacy will be Beijing’s ability to conduct business with the US and other powers on an equal footing, which is something that neither the Mao nor the Deng administration was able to do. Moreover, Jiang hopes to consolidate his reputation as an international statesman with a last visit to the US as Chinese head of state in October, just prior to his participation in the APEC heads of state meeting in Mexico City. Bush is in a position to make Jiang very happy if he accedes to the Chinese President’s wish of paying a full-fledged state visit to Washington. Jiang has also made known to his diplomatic advisers that he wants to go to Bush’s ranch in Texas much the same way that Russian president Vladimir Putin did last year.

A source close to Jiang’s personal office says the President also hopes to set up a protocol for diplomatic activities by China’s retired senior officials. “Jiang wants to establish some kind of rapport with the Bush family, so that even after stepping down he can still visit the US as a senior statesman,” the source said. Needless to say, Washington is in a position to extract concessions from Beijing given Jiang’s anxiety to go down in history as the CCP leader who mended fences with the US.

The Future of Bilateral Ties: The Hu Jintao Factor

After Bush’s China trip in February, whether and how  Hu Jintao will modify Beijing’s long-standing US policy has become one of the most crucial questions with respect to bilateral ties. The 59-year-old leader will in one year’s time take over from Jiang Zemin as CCP general secretary and state President. Not much, however, is known about Hu’s ideas and statecraft, let alone his thinking on foreign policy.

While Hu was inducted into the elite Politburo Standing Committee in 1992, the former head of the Communist Youth League has concentrated on party affairs. It is true that as Vice-President and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Hu should in theory have had some input in foreign and security matters. However, Jiang, who is CMC Chairman and Head of the CCP Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA), has studiously kept Hu out of the diplomatic loop. Like Deng Xiaoping before him, Jiang has jealously guarded the portfolio of foreign policy and Taiwan. It was not until last October that Hu made his first trip to Western Europe. While the Bush administration had since then pressed for a US tour for Hu, it was only shortly before Bush’s visit that the LGFA approved the trip. It is expected that, like he did in Europe, Hu will keep a low profile while visiting the US in late April as the guest of Vice-President Dick Cheney.

For the first two or three years of Hu’s tenure, it is probable that he and his Politburo colleagues – who are in their 50s and 60s – will toe the Jiang line on foreign policy. After all, it is likely that Jiang will continue to be a major influence from behind the scenes for some time.19  However, it is also true that despite his ambiguous persona, Hu has ideas of his own and that he is conscious of the need to quickly modify policy to suit China’s fast-changing political landscape. It is reasonable to expect that Hu could, if required, make significant shifts in foreign policy before his first term as party chief ends in 2007.

While it is difficult to make predictions about most things having to do with the CCP and its secretive leaders, several points can be made about Hu’s foreign policy, particularly with regard to the US. First, despite his reputation as a lightweight, colorless apparatchik who owes his meteoric rise to an ability to cultivate patrons such as Deng, Hu has a keen intellect and a desire for reform. According to a senior Western diplomat who was with Hu for part of his European tour, the vice-president had a good grasp of matters beyond his portfolio of party affairs. “Hu surprised us with his thorough understanding of international economics,” the diplomat said. “At one meeting, Hu was asked about his views of the Japanese and Asian economies. He gave a well-rounded assessment of the situation in just ten minutes.”

Since early 2001, Hu has put together several think tanks to help him formulate policies on areas including the economy, political reform, and foreign affairs. Since late last year, the vice-president has ventured into new areas such as economics and world trade. Hu has also displayed greater initiative in foreign policy. For example, while the bulk of the preparations for his trip to Europe last year, including the speeches,  were handled by the Foreign Ministry and LGFA, sources close to Hu’s personal office said the vice-president’s new think tank on foreign affairs was responsible for planning his US tour.20 

The sources close to Hu’s personal office said he could for practical and tactical reasons make considerable revisions of Jiang’s so-called pro-US policy. Much of Jiang’s conciliatory stance toward the US has to do with the pre-eminence of the Shanghai Faction – a reference to politicians who have close associations with the eastern metropolis. Moreover, since Deng’s time, the majority of Politburo members are spokesmen for the interests of coastal provinces and cities including Shanghai and Guangdong, which are the major beneficiaries of the open-door, pro-market and “pro-West policy.” In addition, a good number of the children of senior Politburo members are either joint venture partners with American companies or senior executives in multinational companies.

This has given rise to accusations by so-called “leftists,” or remnant Maoists, that three unsavory groups – “pro-US” Politburo members and their children, the rising class of private businessmen, and multinational, mostly American, firms – have formed an unholy alliance to adulterate the party’s socialist creed and “exploit” the riches of the land.21 While not being leftists, Hu and members of the younger generation of leadership such as Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao are aware of the anti-Shanghai Faction sentiments among cadres and residents in the hinterland regions. They are also conscious of the negative fallout of fast-paced integration with Western economies, such as income level disparities. Much of the opposition to China’s accession to the WTO – particularly the concessions that Beijing has made to the American and other Western governments – comes from the central and western provinces, which stand to lose the most from an influx of foreign goods and produce. Having served long years in the heartland and western provinces of Gansu, Guizhou, and Tibet, Hu has a good understanding of the needs and biases of officials there.

Hu and the new Politburo must also contend with the rising tide of nationalism. Given the near-obsolescence of Communism, nationalism is virtually the only card that the CCP leadership can play to promote cohesiveness, and to divert attention from disasters such as massive riots that may be caused by worsening unemployment. Sinologist Jean-Pierre Cabestan, who heads the Hong Kong-based French Center for Research on Contemporary China, said Hu could face more pressure from nationalistic, conservative and anti-American groups in the party, army and society to be tougher with Washington on certain issues. Cabestan indicated that due to his lack of a strong power base, “Hu may be in a weaker position than Jiang to thwart pressures” from such groups.22 

Nationalistic and anti-US sentiments have manifested themselves the past year in thinly veiled attacks on Jiang  and his “weak and soft US policy.” Jiang has been taken to task by nationalistic intellectuals and army generals over a range of developments including his failure to check Bush’s “pro-Taiwan” policies and acquiescing to US actions in Central Asia. Despite the Jiang administration’s relatively tight grip on the mainstream media, nationalistic feelings can often be seen in the chat rooms of a number of websites. Given his hold on power, however, Jiang has been able to rein in critics of his US policy, including PLA officers.

It is true that Hu is not given to nationalistic excesses and that he is aware of China’s considerable economic dependence on the US. Yet the vice-president is untested and lacks national stature. On sensitive matters such as Taiwan, Hu must show the world that he can stand up to the Americans if he is to avoid an ugly confrontation with hardliners both within and outside the PLA. At this stage, most of Hu’s advisers on the US, including the head of the America Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Wang Jisi, are considered moderate figures who have also played a role in shaping Jiang’s “great power diplomacy.” However, Hu’s aides are also aware of his need to be seen as tough. In a recent article, Wang cited the imperative of being more assertive with the US. “The nature of America’s [China] policy is aggressive, while ours is a diplomacy of peace geared toward self-preservation,” he argued, adding that Beijing needed effective means to counter the incessant demands that Washington was making on China. Wang also made an implicit criticism of cadres who wanted to make concessions to the US in order to maintain a good Sino-US relationship. “It is true that relationships count on the world stage,” he wrote. “Yet relationships are only a means, while [national] interests are an end. It won’t do to give up interests in return for relationships.”23 

Sino-US Ties: Still a Difficult Balancing Act

That Sino-US relations still remain relatively fragile despite tentative gains made at the Jiang-Bush summit is obvious in the aftermath of two incidents in early March: Taiwan Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming’s visit to Florida; and the leaked Pentagon report about the possible use of nuclear weapons against seven countries, including China. While Beijing’s reactions did not go beyond protests made by the Foreign Ministry – and it is unlikely that planned visits to the US by either Hu or Jiang will be affected – these incidents have from China’s perspective undermined the element of trust that is essential to a “constructive, cooperative relationship.”24 

Moreover, the significantly more strident rhetoric used by Jiang and his colleagues at the National People’s Congress (NPC) of March 5 to 15 has further confirmed the fact that the LGFA and other party and government diplomatic organs are under tremendous pressure from hardliners to “act tough” toward the US. During the NPC, generals who have remained largely quiet during the past year became outspoken concerning the need to develop state-of-the-art weapons to guard against what they consider the still-treacherous global climate. Partly because of Tang’s visit to the US, Jiang called upon the PLA to “make solid preparations for military struggle” in the course of national reunification. Diplomatic analysts say the top cadre had not used such tough language for some time. Moreover, the analysts said, a number of military deputies to the NPC had privately criticized Premier Zhu for not mentioning in his annual government report to the legislature that Beijing would never renounce the use of force against Taiwan.25 

It is likely that as long as the “pro-business” and “pro-West” leaders are in charge in Beijing – and that the Taipei administration does not seek aggressive steps to change the status quo of the Taiwan Strait – differences between China and the US can be contained within manageable parameters. Tangible benefits that both sides can derive from trade and investment might serve to obscure their differences. Bilateral ties also hinge on Washington’s perception of how much the US needs China to defuse possible crises in the Korean Peninsula and South Asia. However, China itself is also undergoing rapid changes on economic and political fronts, and it is probable that nationalism will exert a more marked influence on diplomacy. While there is no need to be pessimistic about how the Hu Jintao administration might handle ties with the US, it is reasonable to assume that relations will continue to be informed by the yin and yang of cooperation coupled with confrontation.

Endnotes

 1 For an analysis of the impact of the fight against terrorism on Sino-US relations, see, for example, Catharin Dalpino and Minxin Pei, “Beijing’s chance to forge true alliance,” South China Morning Post, September 19, 2001; and Cheng Li, “Assessing Sino-US relations after the APEC Shanghai meeting,” Center for Strategic and International Studies occasional paper, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/li_cheng.pdf.

 2 The figure provided for Sino-US bilateral trade is based on Chinese customs statistics. The US calculates trade statistics according to a different formula.

 3 Cited in Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China plays waiting game with the US”, at www.cnn.com/Asia, February 13, 2002.

 4 For a discussion of Bush’s readiness to defend Taiwan, see  “The End of Strategic Ambiguity,” Editorial, Washington Times, April 27, 2001; and Robert Kagan, “Bush’s Straight Talk on China,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Newsletter, April 30, 2001.

 5 For a discussion of Jiang’s US policy, see Matt Forney, “China’s Great Wall,” Time (Asia), April 23, 2001; Francesco Sisci, “China, US and the New World Order,” Asia Times online edition, September 19, 2001.

 6 For a discussion of the impact of US actions in Central Asia on Beijing’s strategy considerations, see Niklas Swanstrom and Svante E. Cornell, “China’s Trepidation in Afghanistan,” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, October 10, 2001.

 7 For an account of the alleged bugging of the Chinese Air Force One, see Reuters “China Says President’s Jet Bugged,” January 19, 2002. See also stories about the bugging in the Financial Times (London) and Washington Post, January 19, 2002

 8 For an account of Zhu’s speech at Tsinghua University, see, for example Reuters, “Zhu Rongji Says Reforms Will Slow Down,” June 8, 2001.

 9 Beijing, for example, is keenly aware of the growing dependence of Boeing on the Chinese market. Thus, when Vice-Minister of Planning Zhang Guobao signed a multi-billion dollar deal to buy 300 Boeing aircrafts soon after September 11, Zhang pointed out that “China won’t forget our friends in need.” For a view of the signing ceremony, see “Chinese Airlines Sign Procurement Contracts with Boeing Company,” website of the Chinese embassy in the US, October 2, 2001.

 10 In his analysis of 30 years of relations with the US, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen expressed optimism that both countries would focus on their common interests rather than let their differences get out of hand. See “Qian Qichen: China and the US can Lessen Troubles and Confrontation in the Coming 30 Years,” China News Service, February 25, 2002.

 11 For a discussion of the mechanisms for Sino-American dialogue, see, for example, “High Level Strategic Dialogue will be Boosted,” in Wen Wei Po, February 22, 2002; Reuters, “FBI to Set Up Office in Beijing,” March 13, 2002.

 12 For a discussion of the arrests of Uighurs in Xinjiang, see Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Asian Governments Seen Exploiting September 11,” in Asia Times online edition, December 14, 2001. The US State Department report on human rights conditions in China, released on March 4, 2002, criticized Beijing’s suppression of legitimate religious practices by Uighurs in Xinjiang.

 13 For a discussion of Taiwan Defense Minister Tang’s visit to the US, see Tom Wolf, “US Grants Taiwan Defense Minister Visa,” Reuters, March 6, 2002. After Bush got into the White House, he and senior officials have refused to repeat the so-called Three Nos policy on Taiwan (no to Taiwan independence; no to one China, one Taiwan; and no to Taiwan joining global bodies that require statehood as admission criterion) that was enunciated by former president Bill Clinton in 1998.

 14 Cited in Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Trade Ties Taiwan to China’s Leash,” in the www.cnn.com/Asia website, January 29, 2002. In the famous Chinese classical novel Journey to the West, the legendary monkey fails to escape the control of Buddha Rulai.

 15 Western diplomats in Beijing have expressed doubt as to whether a motion censuring China’s human rights records will be tabled at the UN Subcommittee on Human Rights due to be convened in Geneva in May 2002. They say that since the US is no longer a member of the committee, it is doubtful whether any European country will raise the motion.

 16 For a discussion of the 2002 military budget, see “China’s Military Budget to Increase by 17.6% to 166 Billion Yuan,” in Ming Pao, March 4, 2002.

 17 For a discussion of China’s latest weapons development, see Anthony Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction and China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, February 2001; and “What is the current shape of the Chinese military,” at http://www.uwmc.uwc.edu/political_science/MIIIE/Chinacurrentshape.htm

 18 Jiang’s writings, collected in The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, are due to be released before the 16th Communist Party Congress. For a discussion of Jiang’s writings, see, for example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Jiang Battles to Save His Legacy,” www.cnn.com/Asia, November 28, 2001.

 19 For a discussion of Jiang’s succession crisis and his role in the army, see, for example, David Shambaugh, “Comment on Civil-Military Relations in China: the Search for New Paradigms,” Rand Corp. papers; http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF160/CF160.ch2.pdf

 20 For a discussion of Hu Jintao’s trip to the US and his thinking on foreign policy see, for example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Hu Jintao in the Wings,” China Brief (http://china.Jamestown.org), Jamestown Foundation, February 28, 2002.

 21 For a discussion of the “collusion” between party bureaucrats, capitalists and multinationals, see Wu Li, “The Situation In and Out of China After May 8,” at www.redflag.com website, http://redflagsh.myetang,com/redsee/wu58.html.

 22 Author’s interview with Cabestan, February, 2002.

 23 See Wang Jisi, “It Won’t Do to be Passive and Conciliatory,” in www.pen123.net., June 25, 2001.

 24 For a discussion of the impact of the leaked Pentagon report on Beijing’s Taiwan strategy, see “America’s New Nuclear Strategy and the Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, March 14, 2002.

 25 For an analysis of Jiang’s response to the views of hardline PLA elements on the Taiwan issue, see “Jiang Orders ‘Military Struggle’ Against Taiwan,” Ming Pao, March 13, 2002.