The fear of Islamic militancy has taken on a new and urgent dimension in view of the September 11 attacks. But the threat is hardly limited to the United States, or even to Western countries. If Asia does not strive to manage it, Islamic militancy could go on to become a source of regional instability. In particular, Southeast Asian countries must make an effort to define the legitimate boundaries of Islamic holy war, or jihad, in order to prevent its subversion by militant extremists.

Kim Beng Phar is an Asian Public Intellectual (API) research fellow of The Nippon Foundation, currently based at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University. He is also a correspondent for the Straits Times, a Singapore-based daily newspaper.

MILITANCY AND JIHAD

In the weeks preceding the attacks, three prominent Asian leaders spoke publicly of the the potential threat of Islamic militancy to domestic regimes as well as to the region at large. Speaking at a conference in Hong Kong in early September, former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan warned of the rise of Islamic militancy in response to “globalization,” referring to the social dislocation and uncertainty that the intensification of market forces has caused.

During a working visit to Malaysia two weeks prior to the attacks, Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew likewise spoke of the possible rise of Islamic militancy in Indonesia and the rural heartland of Malaysia: “You have to watch Islamic militancy carefully, because if it takes root in Indonesia and they go up to the islands south of Singapore, or if they take root in Malaysia and come down to Johor, then we are vulnerable,” Lee said. He also expressed the opinion that the recent rise of Islam in Indonesia started when then-president B.J. Habibie nullified a decree imposed by former president Suharto outlawing the use of Islam or Islamic emblems by political parties. As a result of Habibie’s action, more than 20 political parties made use of Islamic rhetoric and symbolism, some with impressive electoral results.

In Malaysia, President Mahathir Mohammad has spoken of the threat posed by Malaysians who fought in Pakistan and then trained in Afghanistan. In August, the government arrested 10 members of the “Kumpulan Mujaheddin Malaysia” (KMM), a militant group accused of a series of robberies and at least one murder. Malaysian authorities have affirmed that the group is part of a regional network of militants determined to form a union of Islamic states comprising Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
If Islamic militancy is in fact on the rise in Southeast Asia, how can the region aim to contain it? Or at the very least, how should the region modulate or blunt its impact? The answer to this question lies in giving jihad, a powerful but dangerously vague term meaning “holy war” frequently used by Islamic militants, a fixed meaning once and for all.

How the term “jihad” is prone to contradictory definitions was clearly brought home by events prior to the start of Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait. In the midst of the Operation’s early phase, both Saudi Arabia and Iraq sought international Islamic sanction for their policies. The International Congress of Ulama (religious scholars) convened by Iraq in December 1990 issued a declaration supporting the Iraqi position, urging Muslims to undertake jihad and revolution against the Arab Muslim leaders who had joined coalition forces under American leadership. At about the same time, a countercongress of religious scholars met in Saudi Arabia calling for war against Saddam Hussein as the highest form of jihad. In the end, the groups each issued two different fatwas (Islamic judicial verdicts) declaring their side’s cause to be a “just war” – that is, jihad. Indeed, fatwas, declarations and proclamations originated not only in Islamic countries but also in communities of the Muslim diaspora, including in Europe and the United States.

The Islamic Council of Europe, for example, called for an independent Islamic vision, absolutely rejecting the presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil. It supported the conclusion that “those who provide a fatwa that legitimizes the seeking of aid from the non-Muslims under current circumstances have not an iota of support in either the Quran or the Sunnah [recorded deeds of the prophet Muhammad].”

These controversies amply demonstrate the internal confusion within Islam. Indeed, besides a general consensus that jihad should be defensive, Muslims widely disagree on the terms under which jihad can be initiated or conducted. What results is a rhetorical free-for-all in which any aggrieved Muslim group can latch on to their own version of jihad in the name of God. Depending on one’s political perspective, jihad can be flexibly used and abused. Moreover, the ease and speed with which different judgments are delivered in the most heated of moments invariably casts doubt upon the integrity of the Islamic exegetical process.

If regional organizations such as ASEAN wish to curtail the rise of Islamic militancy, there needs to be a common charter signed by every member state’s religious authorities on the precise meaning of the term jihad. Barring such a collective endeavor, Islam threatens to develop into a hydra-headed monster, with every religiously inspired individual or group launching their personally defined jihad against enemies of their choosing.

THE ROLE OF SCHOLARS

If ASEAN authorities are to adopt a common charter on the meaning of jihad, religious scholars will have to play a prominent role. There is much that can be done by Muslim jurists to explain the tenets of Islam in relation to jihad. Confining the fight against Islamic radicals to military operations alone is insufficient.

The Prophet Muhammad eschewed violence when he was propagating Islam in Mecca, and the doctrine of jihad did not take its incipient form until after the prophet’s emigration to Medina in 622 A.D. It was also in Medina that jihad was elevated to the status of a religious obligation. But Muhammad did not speak narrowly of jihad as a military obligation – it also referred to an internal struggle to conquer one’s spiritual weaknesses.

Yet modern Muslim authors have not dealt with jihad extensively, and as a result its meaning remains mired in ambiguity. This can be partialy attributed to a general stultification of Islamic legal discourse which dates back many centuries. Ever since the twelfth-century division of Islamic legal thought into four schools, discussion of Islamic law, or shariah, has tended to rely on what four canonical jurists have written. While they discussed a variety of issues in their writings, their treatment of jihad was in fact quite limited. 

To the four jurists, jihad was a prophetic injunction that did not require further debate. The classical jurists believed that questions surrounding the legitimacy of jihad in various situations were not as critical as how jihad ought to be conducted on the battle front. For example, the Hanafi legal school of thought, which was first promulgated by Al-Shaybani (d.804 A.D.), adhered persistently to the partition of the world into Darul Islam (Domain of Peace) and Darul Harb (Domain of War). Nations not under Islamic government were considered to represent the latter. Hence, jihad could legitimately be declared on them if they refused to accept the sovereignty of Islam.

Ibn Tammiyah (1263-1328 A.D.), an orthodox jurist of the Hanbali persuasion, whose interpretation is often adopted by Islamic radicals, affirmed jihad as pleasing and acceptable to God. Yet, like other jurists before him, he did not define or question the nature of jihad. Ibn Rushd (1126-1198 A.D.), a follower of the Maliki school of thought, who impartially compiled the opinions of the four schools in his legal handbook “Al Bidaya”, also expressed his full support for jihad while providing little detail as to how it should be carried out.

Why did traditional jurists and authors all agree that jihad is appealing in the eyes of God and its tenets should not be questioned? Much of the consensus can be explained by the ambition and power of the ancient Islamic empire. All the treatises were written during the ascendancy of Islam and they bear the imprint of a strong, confident and unified religion. When there was internal dissent, subversive elements were classified as rebels and crushed.

Moreover, the Islamic empire’s relations with non-Muslim nations were often conceived in the form of peaceful co-existence, but never permanent acceptance. This meant, for instance, that if non-Muslim nations should at some point refuse to pay a tributary tax to the Islamic authorities, jihad could still be launched. Indeed, if the traditional jurists disagreed on any aspect of jihad, it was the issue of whether enemies should be slain or captured. 

To this day, discussion of jihad is still constrained by the legal and political discourse that took place in the heyday of Islamic expansion. The inability of modern Muslim jurists to take jihad beyond these ambiguities has hampered a reformulation of jihad that is more appropriate to the present age, and prevented Islamic law from keeping up with the realities of contemporary international politics.

The general understanding of jihad, both within the Muslim world and without, remains sketchy. One way in which the confusion can be dealt with is for Muslim jurists to clarify the terms and conditions in which jihad can be launched. Such terms would, among other things, have to conform to the humane objectives of Islamic law. Only when this ethical imperative is taken into consideration can jihad be seized from religious extremists. 

In tackling the problem of Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia and the world at large, governments and religious scholars have to work hand-in-hand to prevent Islamic discourse from being subverted by extreme elements. For an interpretation of jihad to have any legitimacy, however, it must be made by a legitimate religious authority. In the case of the Catholic Church, which is highly centralized, theological interpretations can be made and enforced effectively. Since Islam is not centralized, the fifty-seven members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) should move towards a reformulation of jihad, and regional organizations should attempt to do the same.

If the reformulation is carried out under the auspices of the OIC, ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and has the blessing of the countries’ Islamic authorities, then the legitimate parameters of jihad could be narrowed considerably. This will be only one step toward solving the problem of Islamic militarism, but it will help prevent militant groups – such as Al-Qaeda, Abu Sayaff in the Philippines and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia – from subverting Islamic discourse for their violent purposes.