There has been considerable progress towards peace and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula over the last year or so but now it hangs in the balance with a new U.S. administration. President Bush can wholeheartedly endorse President Kim Dae-jung's 'sunshine policy' of constructive engagement with the North or he can take a tough line and derail the policy. In this article, Tim Beal predicts that 2001 will see a de facto alliance between the two Kims to persuade Bush to support the peace process.

One of the major foreign policy issues the new U.S. administration will need to tackle is the peace process on the Korean peninsula. The promise of the breakthrough visit to Pyongyang in October of then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was dampened by Bush's victory in the presidential election, and Clinton's last-minute decision not to accept the invitation to visit North Korea. Whilst Pyongyang has so far kept quiet on these developments, there is no doubt that President Kim Dae-jung Jung is both disappointed and worried. He has put on a brave face by claiming that there will be no substantial change in U.S. policy, but has pushed for an early visit to Washington to press the case for continued support of his 'sunshine' policy of engagement with the North. He highlighted his concern by not merely sending Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn to arrange the March 7 summit, but also by dispatching at short notice Lim Dong-won, director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and his key handler of North Korean affairs, for meetings with Secretary of State Colin Powell, CIA director George Tenet, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. President Bush is unlikely to express any overt opposition to the process of establishing a cooperative modus vivendi in Korea, which has gathered momentum over the past year, but there is a danger that the administration will take a line in negotiations with the North that will effectively delay or even derail the process.

Détente in Korea and normalization of relations with North Korea-the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-threaten to unravel current U.S. military strategy in Northeast Asia and to remove a primary ostensible reason for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. Meanwhile, normalization could lead to peace in Northeast Asia, alleviation of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea, rehabilitation and reinvigoration of North Korea's economy, assistance to the faltering recovery in South Korea, and further consolidation of South Korea's democracy. Moreover, the Korean peninsula is perhaps unique among trouble spots around the world in that, at the moment, the local antagonists are driving the peace process. This is in stark contrast, for example, to peace efforts in the Israeli-Palestine conflict or the Indo-Pakistan confrontation, where overlapping claims continue to delay hope for eventual resolutions.

While other powers-notably China, Japan, and Russia-have a continuing interest in Korean issues, at the core of these issues is the triangular relationship between the two Koreas and the United States. The United States has been deeply involved in Korean affairs since 1945, when, with Russia, it divided the former Japanese colony. The U.S. created the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South, sustained it through insurrection and civil war, and nurtured it into an an industrial economy. Washington has supported military dictatorships in Seoul and the growth of democracy. American policy continues to have a deep impact on Korean affairs, including Pyongyang-Seoul relations, and the new administration has a heavy responsibility at this crucial stage in the peace process. Will the Bush administration continue and complete what the Clinton administration has started, or will it turn its back on the progress that has been achieved?

The Clinton administration was coming to terms with the centerpiece of the 'sunshine policy.' Kim Dae-j Jung believes that the DPRK will not collapse and should not be destroyed. He sees a 'German solution' whereby the South takes over and assimilates the North as untenable. The only alternative, he argues, is to help the DPRK overcome its economic problems and to normalize its relations with certain foreign countries, principally the U.S. and Japan. Relations between the two Korean states, he believes, should move from hostility to cooperation, and in time this will lead to reunification. This process will remove the threat of war from the Korean peninsula and lead to the improvement of the human rights situation in the North.

The 'sunshine policy' has its opponents, both in Korea and abroad, and Kim Dae-j Jung's fears seem justified that Bush and his advisors are among them. President Kim is under considerable domestic political and economic pressure at the moment. However, , but it seems that he will continue to give priority to his engagement policy, not only for personal reasons-reconciliation and reunification will be his main claim to a place in Korean history-but also because he sees no alternative. However, the policy cannot succeed without American support or at least acquiescence, thus he will have to make every effort to win Bush over. In order to do that, he needs to show that the policy is working. Therefore, it is significant that the South Korean press has been carrying stories urging Kim Jong Il to make good his promise at the Pyongyang Summit of June 2000 and undertake a reciprocal visit to Seoul in early 2001. There have even been rumors that a visit might be arranged at short notice prior to Kim Dae-Jung's Washington summit.

The Seoul-Pyongyang-Washington triangle is inevitably a complex and somewhat dynamic inter-relationship, where developments on any one side of the triangle impinge on the others. Although the major configuration is a Washington-Seoul alliance against Pyongyang, there is fluidity. Recently, for instance,, relations have been strained by U.S. pressure to buy F-15 fighters. In particular, Pyongyang treats Seoul and Washington differently, even when it sees them as a common adversary. When it discerns a division between the two, it naturally seeks to exploit the division. In addition, it has traditionally attempted to reach over the head of the government in Seoul to the South Korean people with calls for patriotism and independence. Usually, but not always, this translates into anti-Americanism. For instance, people in the North and the South share a common unfavorable attitude towards Japan. Issues such as 'comfort women'-women, mainly Korean, who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese military during the war-have been the subject of joint action. Seoul has less room to maneuver than Pyongyang, but it is not impervious to calls of Korean nationalism and the dangers of ignoring such calls. Moreover, there have been South Korean press reports that 2001 may witness a de facto alliance between Kim Dae-j Jung and Kim Jong Il to pressure President Bush to follow the Clinton path. The course of recent events and assessment of the policies of the Bush administration should be seen within this framework of complex inter-relationships.

Recent years have been a tumultuous time in Korean affairs. The diplomatic scene was perhaps set with the US-DPRK Berlin Agreement of September 1999, where a suspension of rocket tests by the DPRK was matched by an American promise to lift economic sanctions and to move towards normalization of relations. In October 1999, William J. Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to President Clinton, submitted his report, which outlined U.S. policy toward Korea. In early 2000, however, U.S.-DPRK negotiations were overshadowed by developments on other fronts.

On January 4, 2000, Italy became the first major European Union country to establish relations with the DPRK. Since normalization of relations with Italy, the DPRK 'diplomatic offensive' has scored a number of victories. Relations were restored with Australia in May 2000. And since then the Philippines, Britain, Canada, Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Belgium, BrazilBrazil, and New Zealand have either established relations or are on the verge of doing so. The DPRK joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2000, and Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun attended the Bangkok meeting that month. He had unprecedented talks with a string of foreign ministers including South Korea's Lee Joung-Binn, Japan's Yohei Kono, Canada's Lloyd Axworthy, China's Tang Jiaxuan, Thailand's Surin Pitsuwan, Australia's Alexander Downer, New Zealand's Phil Goff, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

The background to all this is Kim Dae-j Jung's 'sunshine policy'. This policy had been derided by the North as no more than a trick. There were allusions to the Aesop fable in which a man, lulled by the warmth of the sun, takes off his coat only to be frozen by the cold wind. However, two things appear to have altered the DPRK's stance. First, Pyongyang realized that the ROK was in fact supporting its diplomatic offensive and encouraging its allies to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. Second, there were secret negotiations that led to the dramatic announcement in Beijing on April 10, 2000 that Kim Dae-j Jung would visit Pyongyang in June for a summit with Kim Jong Il. This announcement, coming just days before a crucial South Korean election, was attacked by the opposition as an election ploy. The Korean public, however, welcomed the news. While there has been growing criticism from the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) of the specifics of the process, it has not attacked the concept itself, which continues to receive wide public support.

The success of the summit took most observers by surprise. Although the agreement was, if anything, less substantive than previous high-level agreements of the past (1972 and 1991/2), there was a crucial difference this time-the very public personal commitment of the two leaders. The summit has been followed by two sets of very emotive family reunions and a stream of official and ministerial meetings. Work has begun on clearing mines from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the two Koreas so that rail and road links can be restored. Although there has been opposition and setbacks, the momentum towards peace and reconciliation has generally been maintained.

Inter-Korean developments were in turn somewhat overshadowed by remarkable turns in US-DPRK relations. The Paek-Albright talks in Bangkok seemed to have been dealt a blow by the 'Frankfurt Incident', when Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, was searched by American Airlines staff at Frankfurt airport while on his way to attend the UN Millennium Summit in New York. He went home and Pyongyang complained of the 'misbehavior of world's largest rogue state', causing serious embarrassment to both Seoul and Washington.

However, Albright's letter of apology seems to have been accepted by Pyongyang and things moved ahead. It appears that what in the past would have led to the possibility of conflict is now manageable within the improving US-DPRK relationship. Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, first vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission, was dispatched to Washington as Kim Jong Il's special envoy in early October. The results were dramatic. Secretary Albright made her historic visit to Pyongyang later in the month, leading to an invitation for Clinton himself to visit before he left office. Although the warm welcome Clinton received in Vietnam might have encouraged another essay into history with a path-breaking journey to a former enemy, Bush's election victory effectively put off the idea, though a decision was not made public until the end of December. US-Vietnam relations were relatively uncontroversial, but with the DPRK there were major issues outstanding, particularly concerning missiles. The November US-DPRK talks in Kuala Lumpur achieved little because Clinton, as a lame duck President, was unable to give the sort of guarantees that would enable both sides to hammer out an agreement that would barter the DPRK's missile and satellite programs for a U.S. commitment to non-hostility. A Gore victory, with assumptions of continuity in DPRK policy, might have provided a framework within which a statement acceptable to both sides could have been agreed on. However, Bush's victory made that impossible, and without a statement on missiles, Clinton could not go to Pyongyang. Development in Washington-Pyongyang relations are likely to be held were in abeyance until the new administration is sworn in. reviewed policies and consulted with allies, particularly South Korea. The March 7 Kim-Bush summit will be crucial and we may expect At that time, some important decisions will have to be made following that. The communiqué will, no doubt, proclaim unanimity between the two presidents but analysts will scrutinize the fine print to discern the real thrust of Bush's policy on North Korea.

The United States military presence in South Korea is a leading issue. The 37,000 U.S. troops currently stationed in South Korea, its control of the United Nations Command (UNC), and its management of ammunition and military materiel in general, give it a large measure of power over the ROK military. The American presence, the joint U.S.-ROK exercises, and the contingency plans for rapid beefing-up of military capacity in times of tension are clearly seen by Pyongyang as a threat and an affront to Korean national dignity. However, there is a further dimension to all these. To the chagrin of Seoul, and causing some annoyance in Washington, Pyongyang has tended to ignore the ROK and focus on Washington in negotiations negotiations onon of security issues. Seoul was paid more attention in September 2000, with the first-ever meeting of Defense Ministers from North and South. However, it has recently complained that it is being ignored again with Pyongyang's renewed call for a DPRK-U.S. peace agreement to replace the armistice and bring closure to the Korean War.

The public justification for U.S. forces to remain in Korea is the neutralization of any North Korean threat, although some would argue that the real focus of U.S. concerns is China. The North Korean armed forces are large; the Pentagon estimates it to be over a million strong. More important than numbers are the state and age of equipment and offensive or defensive capabilities. Available evidence suggests that while North Korea's defensive capability might be formidable, its ability to project and sustain force any distance beyond the DMZ, especially against the vast technological superiority of the U.S. and its allies, is severely limited. Nevertheless, Pyongyang does have the ability to shell Seoul, which has huge symbolic, if not necessarily military, value. However, all arguments about the DPRK's military capabilities become somewhat redundant in a state of détente.

In addition, South Koreans' resentment to the U.S. military presence, formerly contested primarily by radical student groups, is now simmering in the larger public and could come to a boil as the perceived threat from the North diminishes. Rapes and murders, bombing accidents, environmental pollution, and mounting evidence of U.S atrocities during the Korean War, such as the incident at No Gun Ri where, according to Associated Press stories, hundreds of Korean civilians were gunned down by U.S. troops, all fuel public discontent, despite Clinton's belated 'statement of regret' in January . Revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which currently gives U.S. forces in Korea a high degree of extra-territoriality and limits the power of the ROK judiciary, has support across the political spectrum. Kim Dae-j Jung's government has concluded another round of talks, but it seems unlikely that the issue will be resolved sufficiently to assuage public opposition for any length of time.

Withdrawal of U.S forces from forward deployment in Asia might itself seem to make NMD more attractive. Without forces on the spot to apply military pressure, such as surgical air strikes on missile sites, it could be argued that U.S. interests would become more vulnerable to hostile action. However, the rationale for NMD would suffer from the same affliction as the U.S. military presence in Korea if détente developed. Defense needs a credible enemy. Credibility has two aspects: motivation and capability. Détente might remove motivation, or at least diminish it to below acceptable levels. What about capability? Does the DPRK have the capability to threaten the United States?

In fact, the DPRK has never really been a credible threat to the United States, and whether it could be in the future is disputed. North Korea has demonstrated rocket capacity, as evidenced by the attempted launching of a satellite in 1998. Whether that technology can be translated into meaningful military capacity is another matter. In November 1999, the Federation of American Scientists obtained commercial satellite photos which, it was claimed, showed that the DPRK launch facility at No Dong was neither intended to be, nor capable of, 'the extensive test program that would be needed to fully develop a reliable missile system'. Recently, the Iranian Embassy in Seoul claimed that 'Iranian missile technology is superior to that of North Korea'. A report to the Australian government issued in December 2000 declared that 'North Korea could deploy a primitive and unreliable intercontinental missile within five years given the will and continued access to the necessary resources', scarcely a meaningful threat to the United States, except as a retaliatory weapon of last resort.

Nevertheless, the DPRK does export missile technology and has been negotiating with the U.S. for $1 billion in annual compensation to halt further missile trade. Foreign experts claim that figure is far in excess of actual export revenues. $100 million is often quoted. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI) estimates that for the period 1994-98, the DPRK ranked thirtieth, behind Singapore and ahead of the ROK, in arms trade. SPIRI calculated that total DPRK sales for the period equated to only US$118 million. By comparison, U.S. sales amounted to $53.9 billion. In addition, missiles are only useful if they can deliver a powerful payload. The DPRK nuclear program has been in abeyance since the 'Agreed Framework' with the United States in 1994. Whilst there has been talk of chemical and biological warfare capacity, no evidence has been produced. The hysteria about DPRK nuclear capabilities and intentions has been brilliantly debunked by U.S. Korea expert Bruce Cumings in the Atlantic Quarterly in 1997.

CIA data also show the overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. and its allies over North Korea: the combined military expenditure of the U.S., Japan, and ROK is over 60 times that of the DPRK. All this evidence suggests that the capacity of North Korea to pose a threat, either with conventional forces or with missiles, has been grossly exaggerated, perhaps for political and economic reasons, in the United States and elsewhere. It could be argued that this is a classic case of the dangers of the 'military-industrial complex' about which Eisenhower warned in his valedictory speech. U.S. policy is perhaps being driven by vested interests rather than a search for mutually beneficial outcomes for the United States and the countries of Northeast Asia. This policy is based not on a dispassionate analysis of the roots of conflict but on that of demonizing of adversaries.

But perceptions are important. Condoleezza Rice, the newly-appointed NSA advisor to George W. Bush, no doubt expressed a common opinion when she said of North Korea: "The regime of Kim Jong Il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign." Is the regime really opaque? Is it difficult to know its motivations? The charge of opaqueness has some weight. DPRK international public relations have tended to range from the uninspiring to the fatuous. However, part of North Korea's failure to communicate can be attributed to cultural reasons and to a lack of familiarity with the the outside world. Its policy is much more successful with Koreans in Japan, a considerable number of whom are considered to be 'pro-DPRK'.

The DPRK government is secretive and releases very few data on its economy or society, with the information flow decreasing over time. The movement of foreigners in North Korea is severely curtailed. One of the bones of contention between the DPRK and international aid agencies has been reluctance to allow access to sensitive parts of the country to monitor the aid effort. In 1998, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), and the European Union carried out a joint nutritional survey in the DPRK, which confirmed both the horrifying level of malnutrition and the achievement of the U.N. aid effort. Their attempts to conduct a further survey were subsequently rebuffed. David Morton, U.N. Resident Representative and WFP representative in the DPRK, said in a December 1999 press conference in Beijing, "The last survey that we carried out in 1998 was a rigorous, scientific survey that satisfied the experts-for example from CDC Atlanta. It was quite an invasive process. It involved many teams of expatriates with Korean staff as well as selecting houses on a scientific basis and going into those houses and measuring the children. We were told that in some of the areas where this had been done there had been a reaction, that the people hadn't liked these foreigners coming into their houses and measuring their children."

One reason for the obsessive secrecy is the concern over military security. The DPRK sees itself as a small, vulnerable country threatened by far more powerful adversaries. In the words of Perry, it is 'wrapped in an overriding sense of vulnerability'. Perry and others suggest this is paranoia, but given the historical experience of the DPRK, it is not unreasonable. Leaving aside the disputed question of the origins of the Korean War, and whether the DPRK could have handled its foreign relations better, it is important to recognize the effects of the war and its aftermath. The U.S. Air Force had virtually unchallenged air superiority and destroyed everything above ground. Even today, enterprises of strategic importance are built underground. It is claimed that 400,000 bombs were dropped on Pyongyang alone, a number equal to the pre-war population of the city. Untold North Koreans died in the war. The war itself was followed by an armistice, not a peace agreement, and the DPRK was subject to embargo and economic sanctions. Although many of these have been lifted, the U.S. still imposes substantial economic constraints. In addition, North Korea has been under constant surveillance from the sea (e.g. the U.S.S. Pueblo) and air. Although satellites have supplanted older surveillance methods, the DPRK still complains about infringement of its airspace: it claimed it claimed 150 cases 150 cases of 'U.S. aerial espionage' in October 2000 alone. Moreover, according to recent reports coming out of South Korea, up to 10,000 South Korean 'spies' were dispatched to the North between 1953 and 1972.

Whilst the sense of military vulnerability is easy to understand, the ideological and cultural aspects are more difficult. There are various ways of conceptualizing the DPRK. The cliché 'Stalinist' is much bandied about, but the most meaningful way is to see the DPRK as an expression of Korean nationalism, deeply imbued with Confucianism, and molded by its own particular historical experience and the particular role of the Kim family. North Korea has borrowed elements of Marxism-Leninism and parts of that tradition such as Stalinist central planning as tools with which to achieve its aims. The same is true elsewhere, such as in China or Vietnam, where Marxism-Leninism was seen as an explanation and critique of foreign imperialism; the Leninist party and centrally-planned economy were seen as the most effective tools to achieve national liberation and economic growth. While these tools were abandoned when they were no longer applicable or effective, the fundamental objectives of national sovereignty and economic development remained. The drive to build a strong and rich country and wipe out the colonial past is a constant theme. Although the DPRK is very different from both China and Vietnam, it shares the same objectives and will have the same lack of sentimentality when it comes to shedding things that to outsiders seem a core part of its system. Reading accounts of the Cultural Revolution in China should prepare us for what could happen in the DPRK. However, there will be substantial differences due to cultural reasons. Confucianism is much stronger in Korea, which is more ethnically homogeneous and where cohesion and nationalism takes a special place because of the area's particular geographical and historical circumstances.

Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao seem to get little coverage in the DPRK where the focus, whether it be museums or the press, seems to be entirely Korean, with Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il as the embodiments, though not exclusively so, of the national experience and character. An exegesis of the writings of the Kims may provide references to the Marxist canon, but there seems little trace of a real connection. The driving force behind the DPRK is nationalism. Its founding myth is the struggle, led by Kim Il Sung, to expel the Japanese after many years of hated colonial rule, to establish an independent and powerful state even if on only part of the national territory, and to repulse American attempts to destroy that independence. Although Confucius gets even less of a mention than Marx, DPRK practice is deeply imbued with Confucianism, and no where was this more manifest than in the mode of succession of power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il. David Steinberg, commenting on the summit, noted that Kim Jong Il "can claim, with a great deal of accuracy, that he is the Confucian filial son following his revered father's wishes by completing (after the proper three-year mourning period) the summit that had been planned by Kim Il-sung in 1994 and only interrupted by his father's death." Kim Jong Il's deference to the older Kim Dae-j Jung during the Pyongyang summit was straight Confucian protocol and was instantly recognized and appreciated as such in the South.

There is little doubt that Confucius would feel much more at home in the DPRK than would Marx (although neither of them would have liked the role of the military). Foreign complaints about the strangeness of the DPRK and the difficulty of understanding it mirror Western criticisms of the Confucian states of East Asia over the centuries. While the 'opaqueness' of the DPRK is a source of frustration to scholars, it is explicable. What of the motivations that Rice finds difficult to know but easy to characterize as malign? The two overriding motivations of the DPRK are national survival and economic growth. DPRK slogans invoke memories of the Meiji Restoration's 'rich country and strong military'. Significantly, there are no calls for world revolution or the class-based internationalism that at times characterized the French, Soviet, and Chinese revolutions. The New Year Joint Editorial of the main Pyongyang papers for 2001 was typical in that it did indeed say that the DPRK was an inspiration 'to the revolutionary people of the world.' But its reason was that the 'DPRK firmly defend the banner of independence'.

Sentiments such as these may be seen to challenge American hegemony and globalization, but to see them as inordinately 'malign' seems extravagant. These sentiments have wide currency outside North Korea. However, this still leaves the question of North-South relations unresolved. Would Pyongyang invade the South if it could, as is is if often charged? Does it aim to 'communize the South by force' as conservatives in Seoul claim? Both North and South claim national re-unification as their goal. Both have used force in the past in an attempt to achieve such a goal. No doubt there are those, both in the North and South, who would argue that, feasibility and cost aside, this is morally justifiable. Given that the U.S., among others, was itself re-unified by force, this should cause no surprise. But such questions are rather academic. Feasibility and cost cannot be left aside, and it is seems that the ascendant opinion in both Pyongyang and Seoul at the moment is that the continued existence of two Korean states, moving to an as yet undefined unification framework in the future, is the desired reality. This is certainly the basic point of Kim Dae-j Jung's 'sunshine policy.' Given the extreme weakness of the DPRK, it is difficult not to accept Kim Jong Il's assurances on this point.

It is unlikely that Kim Jong Il has any illusions about the North's capacity to take over the South. During the Pyongyang summit, and especially in his long interview with South Korea media in August, he displayed a familiarity with the situation in the South and elsewhere that surprised many observers. Apparently, he is a fan of CNN and he approves of KBS (South Korea), NHK (Japan), and the BBC (UK), characterizing each as a 'voice of the state'. He also made it quite clear that he recognized the strength of the South, especially in economic terms. Meanwhile, the regime shows no signs of collapse or willingness to abdicate national sovereignty. Given the hostility displayed in the past and the sense that they represent authentic Korean nationalism, and, for those who know of it, the experience of German unification, it is unlikely that the 15-20% of the population with some role in the regime would easily tolerate being taken over by the South.

In the meantime, the economic situation in the North remains perilous, and there is continuing need for foreign aid and economic assistance. The latest report on the food supply situation in the DPRK by the World Food Program and Food and Agriculture Organization paints a continuing dire, but hopeful, picture. At the October celebrations of the 55th anniversary of the Workers Party of Korea, it was claimed that the 'arduous march', the euphemism for the economic crisis, was over. The recovery seems to have been a result of much improved relations with Washington (and concomitant expected flows of aid and loans) and a consequent revival of the economy. The FAO/WFP report noted that after two relatively stable years in agriculture in 1998 and 1999, which saw moderate recovery in domestic food production following earlier disasters in 1995, 1996 and 1997, food production in 2000 has again slumped. This is due to a combination of drought and the cumulative effect of underlying problems in agriculture that continue to constrain production heavily. Most important of these constraints has been the lack of electricity and fuel, which has greatly hindered irrigation and water delivery systems, resulting in low reservoirs during the season. As a result of these factors there has been a sizeable reduction in rice and maize production.

The DPRK is particularly vulnerable to drought as the country can produce food during only one season in the year (June-Oct.). Chronic input problems in the agricultural sector strain the already serious and persistent food shortages. Consequently, with no real possibility of enhancing food supplies significantly through domestic production until the next harvest in September or October of 2001, and with limited resources to import food commercially, the country appears to have little alternative other than to rely heavily on food assistance during the next twelve months, as it has done so for the last five years.

The North is in desperate need not merely of food, but also of a whole range of products from medical supplies to soap. It needs fertilizers, spare parts, industrial equipment, and, most critically, electricity; North-South economic talks in late December 2000 were bogged down by the North's request for immediate provision of 500,000 kilowatts of electricity. Ultimately, North Korea needs to obtain sufficient foreign currency from exports, tourism, investment, and international loans to rehabilitate and develop its economy on a sustainable basis. The government is making strenuous efforts to diversify agriculture, especially by expanding potato production, and to increase double cropping. But there are limits to what can be wrested from the soil. North Korea needs to be integrated into the global economy in such a way that its foreign earnings allow it to move away from excessive dependence on domestic agricultural production. It has a long way to go, but there are many encouraging signs, such as the projected Hyundai export-production complex in Kaesong. Without underestimating the difficulties, it seems fair to say that if the sunshine policy is continued and facilitated, then a way can be found out of the current crisis.

Where does this leave the United States, and what are the implications for the policy decisions of the new administration? Acceptance of the continued existence of a state that the U.S. has sought to destroy for fifty years might be considered a blow to pride (and one that Bush might sustain better than Gore), but it is inevitable and will only be temporary. If the U.S. agrees to normalization and facilitates the rehabilitation of the DPRK economy and the development of a capacity to earn foreign exchange, which is the key to its development, the society and politics of the North will change. As long as its sovereignty is respected, the DPRK may well transform itself at a speed and in ways that will surprise us. Kim Jong Il's visit to China in January 2001, on the eve of the Bush inauguration, has led to speculation in the South Korean press that he will embark on a program of 'reform and opening'. If he does, it will be done in Korean style. Kim Jong Il's visit to China in January 2001, on the eve of the Bush inauguration, has led to speculation in the South Korea press that he will announce 'reform and opening' on his return. If he does, it will be couched in Korean terms. It will not be a matter of following the Chinese model but of creating a new Korean one, which may be extremely nationalistic and, for some time, authoritarian. It is interesting to note that Kim Jong Il has spoken approvingly of the model of Park Chung Hee-the general whose repressive rule, five-year plans, export-led growth, and fostering of the chaebol (conglomerates) are often credited with South Korea's rapid economic growth from the 1960s. A more open economic policy will also be contingent on American response- - the Shanghai visit was widely seen as an overture to the Bush Administration. If the response is positive and the international environment is benign, the authoritarianism should mellow over time. The South, for its part, may rediscover in the North some of its Korean essence, which many feel has been swamped by foreign influence. Together the two countries can create a unified, peaceful, and prosperous Korea.

In a sense, Korea is at a crossroads and the United States has a heavy responsibility. There could be a return to the hostility of the past with dreadful consequences. Meanwhile, continuing aid and move towards détente will relieve misery, tension, and uncertainty, and could lead to a peaceful, prosperous, and unified Korea at peace with itself and the world. When Kim Dae-j Jung comes to Washington, President Bush should listen to him with care and endorse the 'sunshine policy'. If the new U.S. administration acts with restraint, wisdom, and generosity, it can strengthen and facilitate the peace process.