Liu presents different factors impacting Taipei-Africa-Beijing triangular relationship. By analyzing Taipei-Beijing competition in Africa, Liu argues that Beijing's recent China-Africa Cooperation Forum will not deteriorate Taipei's diplomatic relations with Africa. Liu concludes that African states could maximize their interests by effectively manipulating their relations with both Chinas.

Phillip Liu received his BA in political science and history from National Taiwan University and his MA in international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Prior to studying in the US, Liu was attached to the Taiwan Foreign Ministry. He currently works as a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and focuses on analyzing Taipei-Beijing economic, political, and security issues

Introduction: Cross-strait Global Competition for Legitimacy

One of the critical factors in obtaining international legitimacy is gaining recognition from the world community. Since 1949, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and Beijing's People's Republic of China (PRC) have competed with each other for international legitimacy and recognition from world community. Before 1971, when the PRC replaced the ROC in the United Nations as the legitimate China, the ROC enjoyed diplomatic recognition by a majority of independent states. Since 1971, the number of countries that recognize the ROC had dropped from approximately 70 to about 22 in early 1980s. Gaining recognition, therefore, has become the most important task for the ROC.

Because the PRC also replaced the ROC as one of the five permanent members in the UN Security Council in 1971, the PRC's influence on international affairs has expanded beyond Asia to encompass the globe. Most countries in the world-even the United States-seek cooperation with the PRC in order to win support in global affairs. This international reality has forced Taipei to seek political recognition from states, such as those in Africa, that are somewhat outside the reach of the PRC's sphere of influence.

Why Africa?

Africa comprises over fifty countries, many of which characterized by low gross national income, racial conflicts, and unstable governments. Historically, these features of the African nations facilitated the invasion of European powers, as they established numerous spheres of influence over the continent in the late nineteenth century. This meddling by foreign powers persisted in the Cold War, as Moscow, Beijing, and Washington competed to form alliances with African nations in order to influence voting in the UN. Today, the enduring ethnic, economic, and political complexities in Africa offer the ROC an opportunity to gain some political leverage despite the PRC's global presence. For similar reasons, the PRC sought alliances with African countries in order to gain official recognition prior to 1971, and to target ROC's remaining friends afterward.

Given that fighting poverty is the most important issue for many African states, particularly for sub-Saharan states, the search for aid is often at the forefront of African nation's foreign policy. According to the World Bank, 38 of the world's 64 low-income states are located in sub-Saharan Africa. About 290 million people, around 46 percent of Africa's population, earn less than US$ 1 a day. For example, in Burkina Faso, 50 percent of the rural population lives in extreme poverty. In Zambia, 74 percent of rural area lives in extreme poverty. In Nigeria, even within the urban population, 57 percent lives in similar conditions. The poor living standards in sub-Saharan Africa make the female life expectancy as short as 53 years, and the male about 50. 107 out of every 1,000 infants die. This is the world's most serious infant mortality rate.

Most African nations have limited interest in the two Chinas situation, nor do they dislike either Beijing or Taipei for specific historical or political reasons. The comparable Chinese experience with imperialism during nineteenth and twentieth centuries even lends a feeling of common experience and comradeship. The ROC's emergence from a developing country to a developed country, especially with its successful experience in developing small and medium enterprises (SME), and the PRC's sympathy and power in the international arena to support the Third World, appeal to the African states. Most important of all, if the political preconditions, i.e. recognizing or expelling the ROC embassy respectively, are matched, both Taipei and Beijing are willing to provide extraordinary aids.

China-Africa Cooperation Forum

Recently, many external factors drive Beijing further to woo the African continent. In addition to the concern about the ROC's continuing breakthroughs and political recognition from Beijing's friends, the PRC has long promoted itself as the leader of the Third World and as a major power in the post-Cold War multi-polar world. To repair its dented self-esteem from the U.S. bombing of its Belgrade embassy, and to join the ranks of Western economic powers, Beijing wants to increase its influence by gathering the support of African states. In China's eyes, what the African nations lack in wealth is made up by their large numbers. Not only does getting their support give Beijing greater legitimacy to call for the reconstruction of the world order in favor of the Third World in the U.N. and the WTO, it also gains the PRC allies in its constant efforts to erode the ROC's international status. These factors motivated the unprecedented China-Africa Cooperation Forum, held in Beijing from October 10 to October 12, 2000. Representatives from over forty African states gathered in Beijing discussing South-South cooperation, North-South dialogue, debt forgiveness and Chinese economic cooperation with African states.

Jiang Zemin stated in March, 2000 that the purpose of the Sino-Africa Forum is to construct international political and economic order and explore new Sino-African cooperation. If one includes also recent information of leadership exchanges between Africa and Beijing, Jiang's opening remarks, and the "Beijing Declaration of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum", four strategic objectives were found.

First, the PRC challenged the U.S. leadership. Attacking immorality always displays one's morality. The Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, when visiting the Zimbabwean president Mugabe in January 2000, elaborated on the reasons that China wants to reconstruct the global order. He argued that hegemony and economic globalization are damaging the independence of developing countries. In their discussion, democracy and human rights, which are praised by some countries, are a "false goodness." During the forum, Jiang encouraged a new international order (similar to George Bush's New World Order in the early 1990s). After the forum, the Beijing Declaration criticized politicization and conditionalities of human rights (this was a response to U.S. human right accusations) and warned of a threat from "still existing hegemonism." Given that the United States is the most visible symbol of hegemony and falsity, these African states regard Beijing's challenge to U.S. leadership as advancing international morality.

Second, the forum attempted to consolidate Beijing's role in the developing world. Beijing challenges the Western leadership in economic globalization, which strongly affects China's development, by gathering voices from the Third World. Beijing has obviously displayed its will to lead the developing countries. The huge gap between the rich North and poor South, the shocks from globalization, global injustice, inequality, and encouragement of debt forgiveness are incessantly mentioned in conference documents. Jiang reminded Africa of China's leadership status by stating that "China is the largest developing country in the world and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries." He further emphasized the similarity of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence espoused by China, the charter of the OAU (Organization of African Unity), and the UN charter. By linking the diplomatic principles of the largest developing country with the OAU and the U.N., Beijing strongly implied its hope to lead developing countries, including African states, in the UN.

Third, by providing its own management skills and reform experience to African allies, Beijing now prefers to give fishing rods instead of giving fishes. The forum displayed Chinese achievements in economic reform in order to justify its desire to give skill-based aid rather than monetary aid. The PRC hopes to change its current aid policy toward Africa. For example, in 2000, many African bilateral talks with China, such as the presidents of Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Botswana, as well as the foreign minister of Cameroon, began with the Africans showing their appreciation of Chinese aid, but Chinese leaders often asked them to see the "world-shaking" achievement of Chinese economic reforms, or encouraged them to explore new ways for economic cooperation. Moreover, the fact that over twenty Chinese government agencies joined the forum suggests that Beijing is trying to construct a new foreign aid framework based on its experience of development and by providing cross-ministry cooperation. This inference is confirmed by the fact that right after the forum ended, most African representatives were taken on a four-day visit to Guangzhou, the leading city of China's reform and opening. China was trying to demonstrate to the African nations that because of its successful reforms, it can better deliver aids in the form of knowledge rather than cash and commodities. Also, rising domestic financial problems may cause Beijing to try to relieve its own aid burden by encouraging its African allies to reform.

Fourth, the forum tried to contain Taiwan's space. Although not included in the forum's public statement and despite Foreign Minister Tang's denial, the Taiwan issue was still prominent. In every recent Chinese talk with African leaders, Beijing praised their support of the one-China principle, and promoted the achievement of the idea of "one country two systems." Although they are usually described as a small group of illusionary countries in collaboration with Taiwan's separatist conspiracy, Beijing strongly encouraged Taipei's eight African allies to join the forum and successfully invited two of them. The opening day of the forum was coincidentally selected to be the same day as ROC's founding day. During the forum, though the PRC leadership tried not to mention Taiwan, Defense Minister Chi Haotien acknowledged Guinea's cooperation on Taiwan issues, and Foreign Minister Tang announced that those countries having an official relationship with Taiwan were excluded from Beijing's aid list. Although not formally discussed, the Taiwan issue did play a major role in China-Africa forum.

Will the Forum successfully damage Taipei's international recognition? How important is the Taiwan issue in Sino-Africa relations? Is Taiwan issue always going to be there? One may obtain clues by reviewing PRC-Africa communiqués for establishing diplomatic relations.

Finding Beijing-Africa Relations through Communiqués

Although the Chinese leadership talks about Taiwan issues all the time, before 1971, the communiqués Beijing signed when it established diplomatic relations with African states normally mentioned mutual respect of territorial integrity. Even with its close friends Tanzania and Sierra Leone (which recognized the PRC two months before the ROC was expelled from the U.N.) Beijing only reiterated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Not a word was mentioned about Taiwan. Even over a decade after the PRC replaced the ROC in the UN, the word "Taiwan" did not appear as an important precondition in clauses of each agreement. For example, Taiwan was not mentioned in the PRC's communiqué with Gabon in 1974, but the clause "Taiwan province is an integral part of the PRC" appeared in its communiqué with Botswana in 1975. Taiwan did not appear in Beijing's communiqué with Central African Republic in 1976. And in PRC's communiqué with Zimbabwe in 1980, "Taiwan," "one-China principle," and "respect of territorial integrity" all disappeared from the articles. "Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC" reappeared in Beijing's communiqué with Lesotho in 1983. Judging by the inconsistent wording of the communiqués, generally speaking, blocking Taiwan's international status was not the top priority in Chinese foreign policy before mid-1980s.

Since Taipei changed its firm One-China principle in the late 1980s, addressing Taiwan has become Beijing's precondition for establishing diplomatic relations. Wording in the communiqués also became more sophisticated. For example, Beijing's communiqué with recently-independent Eritrea in 1993 not only mentioned that "Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory," but Eritrea also promised "not to establish official relations with Taiwan." In 1996, the wording was more direct. Beijing praised Niger's promise to not establish official relations with Taiwan. In the 1998 communiqué for resuming diplomatic relations with the Central African Republic, the PRC emphasized that "Taiwan is a province of the PRC," and "the effectiveness of UN resolution 2758." By studying the change of Beijing's wording, one can see that Beijing is increasing its pressure on Taipei in Africa.

Historical documents indicate that Africa has become an important forum for the PRC to declare its sovereignty over Taiwan since mid-1980s. Furthermore, some communiqués for "resuming" diplomatic relations with the PRC, as mentioned in PRC-Central African Republic ones, themselves imply instabilities among Beijing's African allies. Obviously, Taipei was the one that made Beijing resume official relations every now and then.

Taipei's Response to Beijing's Pressure

Notwithstanding Beijing's tactics, Taipei has persisted in its competition for diplomatic recognition in Africa. The harder Beijing pressed, the stronger Taipei bounced back. In the 1990s, Africa became the most intensive battleground for Taipei to lose and gain diplomatic relations. After 1988, when the ROC launched its dual-recognition foreign policy, Taipei gained additional diplomatic recognitions from three states in Caribbean, one state in Central America, and eight states in Africa before the end of 1996. And before the end of 1998, four of these African states (Lesotho in 1994, Niger in 1996, Central African Republic, and Guinea-Bissau in 1998) and one in the Caribbean (Bahamas in 1997) switched their diplomatic recognition back to the PRC. Compared with states in other regions, African states are relatively easier for the ROC and the PRC to establish and disestablish diplomatic relations.

Securing diplomatic ties with Liberia showcases ROC's determination to win over African nations. Although the Liberian provisional government resumed diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1993, Taipei refused to retreat. Both Beijing and Taipei had embassies in Monrovia from 1993 to 1997 and ironically created the first two-China's example. Bolstered by its strong economic power, Taipei gained diplomatic recognition in Africa by loaning $30 million, $50 million, and $125 million to Sao Tome and Principe (1997), Niger (1992), and Chad (1997) respectively. In August 2000, soon after Taiwan's new president, Chen Shuibian, assumed office, he visited three West African states. As these cases suggest, Taiwan shows no intention of yielding in the African diplomatic competition.

Policy Tools

Economic Means

African nations have learned to play the PRC against the ROC in their efforts to maximize their foreign aid. Taipei's foreign minister once criticized Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic for switching their diplomatic recognitions to Beijing because Taipei rejected their loan request for $90 and $120 million respectively, which Beijing agreed to pay. Although the PRC promised $2 million in aid and extended a $14 million loan to Sao Tome and Principe in January 1997, that country recognized the ROC four months later because of a $30 million loan from Taipei. If Taipei or Beijing cannot satisfy their African allies' demands for aid, the allies could reverse their diplomatic recognition at any time.

There are different types of aid, technological, medical, and financial. Among the types of aid, loans with low interest or no interest are the most popular among the aid receivers. Debt forgiveness is another way for the PRC and the ROC to show their kindness to African states. In the China-Africa Cooperation forum, the PRC's announcement of its 10 billion RMB (US$ 1.2 billion) debt-forgiveness toward the indebted poor African states in the coming two years signified Beijing's good will. After the Forum, Taipei may receive and permit the similar request for debt-forgiveness from its African allies.

With its inferior position in competing international recognitions, the ROC's aid amount must exceed the general standard in order to attract African friendship. For example, Chad's total foreign financial aid committed in 1995 was about $238.3 million, and Taipei won its diplomatic recognition by committing $125 million in August 1997, over half of Chad's total aids. The $30 million financial aid Taipei committed to San Tome and Principe in 1997 also exceeded half of its general total foreign financial aids of $57.3 million.

Taipei's money diplomacy is more effective if the targeted state is not in Beijing's sphere of influence. For example, Liberia, which recognized the ROC in 1989 and 1997, is located in West Africa. Beset by civil wars for a decade, Liberia is in extreme poverty and political chaos. With such domestic instability, influence from the United States-the state that gave Liberia independence-on Liberia, is no stronger than that from its neighbor Nigeria. Despite the PRC's prominent position in the international community, it is almost ludicrous for a West African state in extreme chaos to have any concern for the one-China policy. How to gain supply for the next day is the only matter it is concerned with, regardless of whether the supplies are from a faraway island that violates the one-China principle. Beijing, unable to provide supplies it needs, loses its influence on Liberia. Therefore, as long as the ROC's influence in the form of foreign aid executed in Liberia is stronger than PRC's aids plus international influence, the ROC might decide the result of competition. With a weak government, substantial financial aids carry more weight than international political influence.

Cross-strait competition for legitimacy does not happen within states with important strategic interests to Beijing, such as Muslim Africa. As Muslim Africa is much closer in global affairs to Beijing than to Taipei, it will almost surely rebuff Taipei's attempt to exchange aids for political recognition. The main diplomatic battlefield where Taipei may have some chances is in low-income states in sub-Saharan Africa, where Sino-Africa strategic cooperation is low, the governments are unstable, but aid needs are high. Beijing's $1.2 billion promise of debt-forgiveness in China-Africa forum is also targeting this area.

Trade balances are another variable in the cross-strait African game. In 1996, one year before Hong Kong's turnover, Beijing threatened to close consulates of Taipei's allies in Hong Kong after resuming sovereignty. Because South Africa intended to secure its still-growing $3 billion trade with the PRC, it terminated its diplomatic relations with Taipei in order to keep its consulate in Hong Kong. Liberia, in contrast, exported only $1,000 worth of goods to the PRC. PRC's threat to close Liberia's consulate in Hong Kong was meaningless.

Non-Economic Means

Beijing's and Taipei's relative capacities to act as an advocate of African interests in international forums directly affect their ability to form alliance with the African states. Given Taipei's much weaker voice than PRC's in these forums, its ability to attract African countries other than economic aids is limited. Furthermore, even if some African states currently do not desire PRC's support, they may in the future and will seek Chinese international influence. For example, the ROC used to be South Africa's strongest ally during the apartheid. In 1996, when South African President Nelson Mandela was considering terminating diplomatic ties with Taipei, which had invested $1.6 billion in and provided 41,000 employment opportunities to the deteriorating post-apartheid economy, one of the most important motivations was to enhance Pretoria's influence in the African continent by seeking Beijing's cooperation in the U.N.. South Africa has aspirations in the proposed enlargement of UN Security Council. Although Liberia is beyond the PRC's sphere of influence now, in the long run, PRC influence could become important again when Liberia needs to pursue further cooperation with the PRC to improve its standing in the international community.

Leadership visits are usually a symbol of closeness in nation-to-nation friendships, but do not always work in consolidating Beijing-Africa relations. Four months after Qian Qichen visited Sao Tome and Principe, Sao Tome and Principe recognized Taipei. Qian signed an economic cooperation agreement in Chad in January 1996, Chad's president visited Beijing in July 1997, but Chad recognized Taipei in August 1997. Two months after PRC's vice premier Lee Lanqing's visit in November 1995, Senegal recognized the ROC. Meanwhile, although counting leadership visits is not always indicative of bilateral relations, its function should not be overlooked. Seychelles, one of Beijing's stable allies in Africa, has greeted one premier, one vice premier, one foreign minister, and one deputy foreign minister from Beijing in the past five years. Another ally of PRC, Mozambique, has greeted one premier, one deputy premier, one minister of defense, and one foreign minister. Mali, another PRC ally, has greeted President Jiang, one vice premier, and one state councilor during the same period. These trips to Africa may have helped to establish personal relations among the leaders of the countries and explain these countries' stable relationships with Beijing.

Taipei seems less concerned than Beijing about visiting Africa. Taipei's leadership visits to Burkina Faso, its closest ally in Africa, were no more frequent than Beijing's. Five years before Burkina Faso recognized Taipei in 1994, Beijing sent two ministers, in charge of land resource and business respectively, and one political bureau member to visit Ouagadougou. In the next five years, Taipei's two foreign ministers have each visited only once. The same can said of Taipei's other friend, Malawi, which has retained its official relationship with Taiwan since 1964. In its four-year relationship with Niger (1992-1996), Taipei sent no ministerial level representatives to visit Niamey. Taipei's ranking policy makers tended to host African guests at home instead of visiting Africa. As a result, they may have been unable to develop close friendships with their African allies.

Taipei's foreign policy toward Africa focuses on enhancement of economic cooperation and the dispatch of medical and farming groups. However, even with these friendly gestures, some bilateral relations are still vulnerable. Beijing's long-term contribution to African education may help explain its attractiveness. In the past four decades, African students have counted for about 14% of foreign students in the PRC. In 1995 alone, China sent 42 teachers to sub-Saharan Africa and received 626 students from the same region. Right after the Central African Republic turned to recognize Beijing again in 1998, one reward was four scholarships offered to study in the PRC. Furthermore, in the 1990s, 48 percent of the African students in the PRC were pursuing graduate degrees. At the China-Africa Forum, plans further to increase scholarships for African students and to send teachers to Africa were announced. Unlike Taipei's economy-oriented policy, Beijing's encouragement of exchanges in education strengthens grassroot support for the PRC and may even nourish next generation of African leaders.

Aid Policy with Political Preconditions

Although Beijing continues to claim that its aid to Africa is not premised upon political conditions, in practice, it always terminates its aid when any African state violates its one-China policy by recognizing Taiwan. As PRC's foreign minister announced at the China-Africa Forum, "No PRC aids go to African states that recognize Taiwan." Taipei's aid to African states is also more closely correlated with political recognition than with humanitarian concerns. As a result, many African states receive aid from both China and Taiwan without appreciation. For instance, even after Taipei promised $30 million in aid, government officials in Sao Tome and Principe announced that Taiwanese diplomats would not be allowed to appear at public and official occasions in that country. Chad turned to Taipei right after Beijing completed the construction of its People Palace and its most advanced hospital (estimated $50 million). Obviously, some African states do not feel bound by the political preconditions in both Taipei's and Beijing's aids.

Taipei-Africa-Beijing diplomatic ties illustrate that a foreign-aid recipient is not always under the control of the provider. By effectively manipulating of the providers' contradictory policy goals, the recipient could maximize its interests. These ties of convenience also show that respect for sovereignty can be bought rather than earned.

Although playing off the two Chinas may not seem like a winning strategy, it is understandable that the unstable African governments pursue them. Most African states, independent only since the 1950s and 1960s, grew during the Cold War and have been plagued by poverty and civil wars. A consistent policy is extravagant hope for many of them. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia lost interest in Africa. The decline in aid could be compensated by Taipei and Beijing if these countries play a two-China game. In the post-Cold War era, rivalry between the two Chinas is perhaps the only political competition that Africa can hope to exploit in a manner similar to the competition between the two superpowers during the Cold War.

A critical reason that Taipei desires to gain diplomatic recognitions in Africa is to win support to survive in the global community. Foreign aid usually is the only option for the ROC to develop relations with the African countries because Taipei has lost its seats in international organizations. However, in addition to monetary aids, Taipei should enhance its image in Africa by encouraging leadership visits, academic exchanges, and relief groups without political preconditions to show genuine altruism. Taipei's humanitarian activities in African states should be extended to states that deny the ROC's diplomatic recognition. Like the PRC's strategy of railroad building in Tanzania in 1960s, simple measures advertised broadly would improve Taiwan's image in Africa and the world. This may help Taipei win friendships within or outside Africa without the need of giving financial assistance.

Conclusion: Will the Unprecedented Forum Hurt Taiwan Badly?

Critics argue that the participation of Taipei's allies in the China-Africa Forum would seriously undermine Taiwan-Africa relations. Beijing intended to use the Forum to marginalize Taiwan in Africa. However, six out of eight of Taipei's African allies switched their recognition from Beijing to Taipei, and every one of them has argued for Taiwan's readmission to the U.N.. These allies are not ignorant of Beijing's policies, propaganda, and strategy toward Taiwan. Unless the two allies of Taipei that joined China-Africa Forum, Liberia and Malawi, received substantial aid promise from Beijing, the forum itself would not seem to hurt Taiwan badly. Moreover, both Chinas have limited resources for foreign aid. The PRC must spread its aid thinly among forty African states with which it has relations. The Africa forum while a visible symbol of the PRC's commitment to its 40 African friends didn't promise more tangible resources. For example, the PRC's remarkable $1.2 billion debt-forgiveness announcement in the forum became less remarkable if divided by forty. In contrast, the ROC's aid to Africa is shared among 8 African states. The ROC aid to Africa is spread more thickly, binding Taiwan to its African allies more closely and in a tighter financial way.

Judged by the current domestic situation, Beijing prefers to keep most of its resources at home to deal with problems with recent economic reforms. The number of illegal demonstrations reached 110,000 in 1999, about 70 percent higher than in 1998. Unemployment resulting from reforms will increase by another 10 million workers this year. China's accession to the World Trade Organization will dramatically change its legal, administrative, and economic systems. Government budget deficit, which reached 92.2 billion RMB in 1998, continues to worsen. Therefore, foreign policy toward Africa, particularly foreign aid, is not expected to be on Beijing's priority list.

A numerical balance has developed in the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic competition in the past decades. The more countries the PRC wins, the fewer resources it can spend on each of them. As the ROC is recognized by less, the more resources it can use to break through the PRC's containment. Assuming that the relative availability of resources between two sides is the same and all the political dilemmas remain, the number of states recognizing the ROC and the PRC can be said to have reached a dynamic equilibrium. For example, since 1991, the ROC has successfully established diplomatic relations with seven African states, but has also lost another five states to the PRC. During the same time, the PRC and ROC were gaining and losing a number of states in other regions, which more or less helped maintain the numerical balance. Therefore, even if one of Taipei's African allies switches to Beijing, instead of hurting ROC's international space, it might help save resources to fuel Taipei's next breakthrough.

In the past decade, despite efforts by both sides, the total number of countries in the world that recognized the ROC has been around 30. The lowest number over the past fives decades has been 22. Very few scholars can explain how the ROC's international standing is enhanced if it is recognized by 31 states, how it is hurt when it is only recognized by 29 states, etc. However, the character of politics and economics in many African states demonstrates that the PRC-ROC competition in Africa may continue for a long time. As long as both Chinas need to affirm their sovereignty over Taiwan, Africa will always provide a perfect stage for this incessant "how many Chinas?" dispute. Under the one-China principle, quality is not as important as quantity.

Africa's Shifting Relations

*Taipei's current allies

**Shifts from Taipei to Beijing in the 1990s

***Taipei did not recognize the 1993 Liberian diplomatic relationship with Beijing legal, so it was not a new gain of allies for the ROC.

Endnotes

1. African volatility of leadership, for both Taipei and Beijing, is always an opportunity in switching of diplomatic recognition. For example, Niger recognized the ROC in 1963. Three months after the 1974 coup d’etat, it switched its recognition to the PRC. Eight months after Amadou Cheiffou was elected to be the provincial premier in November 1991, he recognized the ROC. Seven months after Ibrahim Mainssara Bare launched his coup d’etat in November 1995, he switched recognition back to the PRC.
2. World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 (Oxford University Press, September 2000).
3. See Fact Sheet of African Red Cross & Red Crescent Health Initiative 2010, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent <http://www.ifrc.org/what/health/archi/FACTIMRE.HTM >, accessed 12/14/2000
4. "North" is generally developed nations of the so-called First World or, in common parlance, the West, and "South" is every other nation that does not belong to the "developed" nation club.
5. Before the October China-Africa Forum, talks between African leaders and President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zu Rongji, and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan could be viewed on the web site of the PRC Foreign Ministry (Bilateral Relations with each African State): <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/sbgx/sbgx_03.htm.>
6. Text of Jiang’s keynote speech, Xinghua News Agency, Beijing, Oct12, 2000 (in English).
7. Text of Beijing Declaration, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, Oct13, 2000 (in English)
8. PRC Foreign Ministry, "Tang’s Talks with Zimbabwe Leadership," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfb_wjbhd_25.htm>, accessed 10/24/2000.
9. Jiang’s keynote speech, op., cit.
10. OAU, established in 1963 and includes 52 African members, is the most influential African regional organization. "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" have remained most repetitive announcement of Chinese diplomacy since 1950s. They are: respect for each other's sovereignty and integrity of territory, mutual non-invasion, mutual non-interference of internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
11. See Jiang’s talk with African leaders, op., cit.
12. Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, Oct. 13, 2000 (in English).
13. The ROC currently has diplomatic relations with eight African states: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Liberia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Kingdom of Swaziland. The PRC has diplomatic relations with all the other states in Africa. Liberia and Malawi dispatched representatives to join the China-Africa Forum.
14. Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, Oct 12, 2000 (in English).
15. The text of PRC’s communiqués for establishing diplomatic relations with African states can be viewed on <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/sbgx/sbgx_03.htm>.
16. The ROC used to terminate official relations with any states that established diplomatic relations with the PRC in order to safeguard its one-China principle—the ROC was the only legitimate China. With that policy, the PRC believed that Taiwan sooner or later would lose all diplomatic recognitions. However, in 1988, the ROC foreign minister, Lian Chan, declared that the ROC would accept dual recognition, meaning Taiwan could accept its friends having diplomatic relations with Beijing. Taipei was trying to secure its diplomatic recognitions, but in Beijing’s interpretation, this new policy meant Taiwan was playing "two Chinas".
17. About African shifting relations with Taipei and Beijing, please see attached graphic.
18. Taiwan’s unofficial relationship with African states can be viewed on <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/frame14.htm>.
19. In 1989, the ROC resumed its diplomatic relations with Liberia, and the PRC immediately terminated its diplomatic relations with Liberia—also because of the PRC’s one-China policy. In 1993, Amos Sawyer’s provisional government resumed Liberia’s diplomatic relations with the PRC. The ROC, knowing Sawyer controlled only 10 percent of the territory, questioned the legitimacy of Sawyer’s government. Since then, there had been two Chinese embassies in Monrovia until 1997, when the newly elected Liberian President Taylor formally confirmed Taiwan’s political status. The PRC embassy left right after Taylor’s announcement.
20. Agence France Press (AFP), Sao Tome, May11, 1997. Although the foreign minister of Sao Tome and Principe admitted the payment, Taipei did not acknowledge this $30 million aid.
21. CIA, "The World Fact Book 2000-Chad", <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cd.html>, accessed Oct. 30, 2000.
22. China Times, April 26, 1998
23. Announcement of Shi Guangsheng, China foreign trade and economic co-operation minister, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, Oct. 12, 2000 (in English).
24. CIA-Chad, op., cit.
25. CIA- San Tome and Principe, Ibid.
26. It was reported that Taipei spent respectively $140 million and $210 million in 1989 and 1997 recognition, and Beijing spent $3 million in the 1993 recognition. Source: China Times Aug 21, 2000 and The ROC Foreign Ministry, Liberia Briefing, April 1997.
27. ROC-South Africa trade amount was about $1.4 billion (1998 data).
28. PRC Foreign Ministry, "Relationship with Liberia," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/sbgx/sbgx_03_l02.html>, accessed 10/04/2000.
29. After President Taylor confirmed Liberian official relations with Taipei in September 1997, the PRC shut off the consulate next month.
30. Dates of leadership exchanges between China and African states can be viewed on the web site of the PRC Foreign Ministry <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/sbgx/sbgx_03.htm>; and exchanges between Taiwan and African states can be viewed on the web site of the ROC Foreign Ministry http://www.mofa.gov.tw/frame14.htm
31. ROC Foreign Minister Tien’s report to Legislative Yuan, June 5, 2000
32. Chinese Diplomacy 1995 (Beijing, PRC Foreign Ministry, 1996)
33. Announcement of Wei Yu, PRC Deputy Minister of Education, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, Oct. 10
34. Agence France Press, Sao Tome, July 1, 1997
35. Ian Taylor,"Africa’s Place in the Diplomatic Competition Between Beijing and Taipei," Issues & Studies, 34, no. 3 (March 1998): 131.
36. China Statistical Yearbook 1999 (Beijing, China Statistic Bureau, 1999)